


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
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HISTORY

THE TREATIES

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE

FROM THE TREATY OF

THE CONFERENCE AT BILLYT.

TO 1814

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN

1814

1814

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RECOVER PEACE

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

By HERBERT MARSH,

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, CAMBRIDGE.

LONDON

LONDON

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,

BY JOHN W. BAKER AND SONS, 10, MARK LANE.

1815

HISTORY

THE POLITICAL

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT

BRITAIN

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THE
HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
FROM THE TIME OF
THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,
TO THE
DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT
BRITAIN.
WITH AN
APPENDIX,
CONTAINING
*A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.*
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.

By HERBERT MARSH,
FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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P R E F A C E.

THE present war between Great Britain and France has been condemned by one class of writers as unnecessary and unjust, while another class has defended it on grounds of expediency and justice. Writers, however, of the latter, as well as those of the former description, set out in general with the supposition, that the choice of war or peace rested with the British government; and they endeavour to justify the supposed determination of the cabinet in favour of hostilities, by arguing that the circumstances under which the war was begun, rendered it an evil of still less magnitude to Great Britain than peace itself would have been; a position which their adversaries deny. Now though it is certainly adviseable of two evils

to choose the less, yet, as it must be previously ascertained, which of the two really *is* the less; and as the calamities which may happen to associate themselves with a continuance of peace, must be very complicated before they can even balance the calamities which are inseparable from war, it is not extraordinary that a defence grounded on a position, which, though true in the abstract, may be doubtful in its application, should not have produced universal conviction.

Let us set aside therefore the question of expediency, on which perhaps an unanimity of opinion will never prevail: let us try the merits of the cause on another ground, and examine whether the British government really had it in its *power* to prevent a rupture with France. If *this* question be decided in the negative, no further vindication can be necessary. Not only in a political, but likewise in a moral light, the war, on our part, will then be justified; for whatever doubts may be entertained of the lawfulness of commencing hostilities through mere motives of policy or

expediency, no rational man will deny, that it is lawful to repel an unjust aggression. It is not indeed the bare circumstance, that the public declaration of war proceeded from the part of France, which will warrant us to say that France was the aggressor. In the year 1756 the great king of Prussia declared war on Austria; yet he was properly not the aggressor, because he had received certain information that within a few months he himself would be attacked by Austria, in conjunction with Russia and France. Since then, the very same excuse may, before the subject has been fully investigated, be thought applicable likewise to the French national convention in respect to its declaration of war against Great Britain on the 1st of February 1793, the question of *real* aggression must be determined by the relative conduct of the two governments antecedent to that declaration. With this view the following history has been written. It commences with the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in August 1791, because at that time the first coalition against France was in agitation: and, as it is

continued to the declaration of war, it comprises an important period of eighteen months, the events of which must finally decide the question, 'Who were the aggressors?'

The plan on which the following work has been conducted, may perhaps expose the author to the charge of prolixity: but at a time, when falsehood is so blended with truth, when random reports are adopted as indubitable facts, and history itself has been almost converted into fable, the plan appeared absolutely necessary, in order to enforce conviction. I have made it a rule therefore, throughout the whole work, to advance not a single fact, without supporting it by unanswerable authority: and I have not only grounded this history on authentic documents, but have every where presented those documents to the view of the reader. Further, to preserve diplomatic accuracy as much as possible, I have in general quoted French documents in their original language. The whole therefore is an official report in the strictest sense.

As the *Moniteur* was the official French paper during the period which this history comprises, and the French themselves therefore cannot appeal from it, the first step which I took, was to examine every number of it from August 1791 to February 1793, and to transcribe all those articles in which French politicks had any reference, direct or indirect, to Great Britain. I then had recourse to the most celebrated publications of the French republicans. Brissot, Louvet, Chauffard, Dumouriez, &c. and especially the two collections which contain the private correspondence of Dumouriez with the war minister Pache and general Miranda, a correspondence which, though not generally known, throws great light on our present subject. I have likewise consulted the memoirs of the Marquis de Bouillé, Lally Tolendal's Defence of the Emigrants, the Memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville, and the collection of pieces published in defence of Louis XVI, not with the view of copying *opinions*, but of extracting *facts*, which the authors were competent to attest. The authentic correspondence of Mr. Miles with the

French minister Le Brun and others, has afforded very material assistance in investigating the motives by which the French rulers were actuated in their conduct towards Great Britain: and it has furnished likewise much valuable information in regard to the real sentiments entertained by the British government on the subject of a war with France. These sentiments have been further developed not only from his Majesty's speeches and the parliamentary debates, but from the *measures* which were adopted by ministers, and which stand recorded either in official notes, or authentic journals. The diplomatic papers which are quoted in this history, are taken partly from the *Moniteur*, and partly from the two annual registers; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection of professor Martens at Göttingen. Various other works have been occasionally consulted, as the reader will find in the course of the history.

To the pains which I have taken in the search of materials I have endeavoured to add a fair and

candid use of them. I have suppressed no document, and no fact, which had come within my knowledge, (and I believe I have overlooked nothing of importance,) whether favourable or unfavourable to either party; and that what I have asserted, is indisputably true, the reader himself will every where perceive, from the authority quoted in favour of each assertion. Whether I have been guilty of errors of judgment, and have drawn false conclusions from true facts, is a matter which the reader will likewise easily determine, as he is put in possession of all those premises which will enable him to judge for himself, and is therefore, in less danger of receiving a false bias, even if the author has one. Indeed it is impossible to write a history of two living parties, without attaching oneself to either; or, if it is possible, he who possesses such indifference, must be destitute of that energy, and of that spirit of perseverance, which are requisite in the collecting and the arranging of the materials for an history. With regard to myself, I honestly confess, that I am sincerely attached to the present administration, and

that I take a decided part with it on the subject of the following history, not on account of any personal connexions, for I have not the honour of being acquainted with any one of the members of it, but because a full investigation of the subject, to which the following history relates, has convinced me, that not the British ministry, but the French rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall *the taking a decided part*, then, after an examination of the whole evidence on both sides, be termed *partiality*? If this be admitted, the decision of every court of justice must be partial. But an historian must have already collected his materials, before he *begins* to compose his history; he must already therefore have formed a decided opinion on the result of those materials. Consequently, even if throughout the whole of his work he appears more attached to one party than to another, yet, if he suspended his judgment till his collection of data was as complete as he could make it, that subsequent attachment can never deserve the appellation of prejudice or partiality. His judgment, indeed, may be erroneous, but so may the

judgment of a man who is possessed of a stoical apathy, or an absolute indifference.

That historian alone can properly be called partial who *sets out* with the determination to justify, *at all events*, a particular party ; who knowingly suppresses facts and documents which are unfavourable to it, and thus, by presenting his readers with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the power of forming a true judgment of the whole. This method has been very successfully practised during the present war, both at home and abroad : for, as most men want either the leisure, or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect for themselves all those facts and documents which are necessary for the forming of a right judgment on a controverted point of history, they are seldom aware of the defectiveness of that information which an author thinks proper to lay before them ; they fancy themselves in possession of every thing requisite for the illustration of the subject, and deduce therefore an inference diametrically opposite

to that which they would have deduced, had they been enabled, by a complete representation of the whole picture, to make a due estimate of the respective parts. Whether the following history be likewise chargeable in this respect, the public will easily determine, because every thing which appears in the least unfavourable to the British government, has been already collected with great diligence; has been industriously propagated, and is generally known. Indeed, had I been resolved, at all events, to justify the present administration in regard to the origin of the war, I should no where have been even tempted to suppress a single circumstance, which, when viewed alone, appears to be unfavourable to it. For in every instance a bare comparison with the actions of the French rulers is sufficient to vindicate the measures of the British government; and the only reason why these measures have been thought exceptionable by so many well-meaning men, has been the want of an historical parallel between the conduct of the French government on the one hand, and that of

the British government on the other, representing in what manner the former necessarily occasioned, and fully justified, the latter.

The history, now presented to the British public, I wrote originally in German*, a language, which a long residence in the university of Leipzig has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A desire of rescuing my native country from the calumnies of some German journalists, had induced me at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invasion of Great Britain, to draw up a short Essay, in the form of an Epistle, to a literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to shew, that whatever might be the issue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame of its origin attached only to the rulers of France.

* It was published at Leipzig, in February 1799, under the title *Historische Uebersicht der Politik Englands und Frankreichs*.

This Essay was printed in the German Mercury * for March, 1798: and, as the period of the publication was very unfavourable to the author, the expectations of those, who were attached to the French cause, being at that time very high, it was not to be expected, that those journalists, who had asserted, that the coalition against France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the British cabinet, that the French rulers were solicitous for peace, but that the ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had resolved, at all events, to commence hostilities, and had so confidently repeated these assertions during several years, till at length they were received in almost every part of Germany, and in the adjacent countries, as indisputable truths †, it

* Der neue Teutsche Merkur. It is published monthly at Weimar; and the editor is the celebrated Wieland.

† An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other respects extremely well informed, and moreover well-affected toward

was not to be expected, that such men, under such circumstances, would silently permit the oracular authority, which they had so long enjoyed, to be questioned by a writer, who had given no proofs of experience in political history. The opposition, which was made, especially by one of them*, determined me, therefore, to bring the question at once to an issue, by laying before the public all the facts and documents, arranged in historical order, which concerned the relative politics of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war against Great Britain in February 1793. The decision was soon made: for my work had not long ap-

Great Britain, said to me a few months before the present history (in German) left the press: "I heartily wish you success, but I fear you have undertaken a desperate cause." But he is *now* of opinion that the cause is perfectly good.

* Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthusiastic panegyrist of Great Britain, and who even, in 1794, expressly said, in his *Annals of the British History*, "that the British ministers did *not* wish for war." What has since induced him so vehemently to assert the contrary, is best known to himself.

peared, when the first literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had, till that time, very generally prevailed, pronounced that the British government was completely rescued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin, as well as the continuance of the war, must be wholly and solely ascribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers*. Even the journalist, who had so virulently attacked the Essay inserted in the German Mercury, has since thought proper to assume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives against the British government, but has turned them against the French Directory: and, though a candid acknowledgment of his errors was not to be

* See the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, for May 1799, No. 162; the Göttingen Review (Göttingische Anzeige), 6th July, 1799, No. 106; and the analysis which Mr. Genz, the most eminent political writer now in Germany, has given of it in his Historical Journal (Historisches Journal), for May 1799. The merits of this valuable Journal are already known in England, from the extracts, which have been given of it in the Mercure Britannique.

expected from a man of his description, yet he has virtually acknowledged his inability to write a confutation*.

The work now presented to the British public, may, in one sense, be called a translation, as it was originally written in German: but as it proceeds from the author himself, it has an equal claim to the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a literal translation, but only the same narrative drawn up in another language, and supported by the same documents. In various places new matter has been added, and several alterations have been made in the arrangement of the materials. On the other hand, all allusions to German writers, with some other passages, which would have been

* In one of his journals, which appeared soon after my German work, he said, that to write a confutation would require more time and labour than he was able to bestow. This shuffling excuse, though it has not the merit of a candid confession, yet after the violent attack with which he had commenced hostilities, could proceed only from the consciousness of his inability to continue them.

uninteresting, if not unintelligible, to a British reader, have been omitted.

The Appendix, containing a short statement of the attempts made by the British government to restore peace, is for the very reason, that it is a mere appendix, necessarily less diffuse: but, though the facts are compressed into a small compass, enough is given to enable the reader to form a just opinion on the subject. Authentic documents are here likewise invariably adduced in support of each fact.

With great deference I submit the whole to the judgment of my fellow-countrymen; and if they who have hitherto believed, either that the war might have been avoided, or that peace might have been restored, should be convinced by it of the contrary, that unanimity of opinion, which is so necessary to carry us triumphantly through the present conflict, will be the result of it. Few persons indeed, since the negotiation at Lisle in 1797, have ascribed the *continuance* of the war to the British ministry;

but there are thousands, who still ascribe to them its *commencement*, and consequently consider them as the original authors of every evil, which it has occasioned. If then the following history should convince those who still entertain this notion, that it is founded in error, the distrust, which throws a shackle on national energy, will be removed, the public burdens will be borne with patience, from the consideration, that it was not in the power of government to prevent the cause of them; domestic animosity will cease, and the efforts of every individual, who has not lost all affection for his country, will be directed against the French rulers, as the sole authors, as well as protractors, of the present war.

HERBERT MARSH.

August 4, 1799.

ERRATA.

Vol. I. p. 143, Note 47, Line 16, for *destines* read *desins*.

154		5	—	month	—	mouth.
158		2 & 5	—	year	—	the year.
167	— 14	13	—	will	—	with.
168		21	—	ambassy	—	embassy.
171		19	—	presenting	—	preventing.
178	—	27 and 28 are misplaced.				
181		15	—	was	—	were.
184		13	—	to contribute	—	contribute.
198		22	}	— 19	—	15
206		8				
227		4	—	send	—	sent.
Vol. II. p. 9		5	—	been	—	has been.
	14	9	—	wrote he	—	he wrote.
	41	11	—	has	—	had.
	119	19	—	even	—	ever.
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By the way, I have just received
from the printer a copy of the
new edition of the "History of
the County of York" which
has just been published. It is
a very interesting and valuable
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THE
HISTORY
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THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE
FROM THE TIME OF
THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ
TO THE
DECLARATION OF WAR
AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAPTER I.

Conference at Pillnitz: and Conduct of Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against France in 1791.

On the 27. of August 1791 the Emperor and the King of Prussia signed a Declaration ¹ at Pillnitz, by

1) The following is the authentic Declaration, contained in the *Memoires sur la Revolution Française* par le Marquis de Bouillé, Tom. II. p. 133. and *Martens Recueil des principaux Traités*. Tom. V. p. 35.

which they agreed to take certain measures in respect to France, provided other powers, whose assistance had been already solicited, consented to support them. The powers, which had been invited to take part with the Emperor and the King of Prussia, were Spain,

“Leurs Majestés l’Empereur et le Roi de Prusse, ayant
 “entendu les desirs et les representations de Monsieur Frere
 “du Roi de France et de S. A. le Comte d’Artois, declareront
 “conjointement qu’elles regardent la situation ou se trouve
 “actuellement le Roi de France comme un objet d’un inté-
 “rêt commun à tous les souverains de l’Europe. Ils esperent
 “que cet intérêt ne peut manquer d’être reconnu par les
 “puissances, dont les secours sont réclamés, et qu’en conse-
 “quence elles ne refuseront pas d’employer conjointement
 “avec leurs dites Majestés les moyens les plus efficaces rela-
 “tivement à leurs forces, pour mettre le Roi de France en
 “état d’affermir, dans la plus parfaite liberté, les bases d’un
 “gouvernement monarchique également convenable aux
 “droits des souverains, et au bien-être de la nation Française.
 “Alors et dans ce cas, leurs dites Majestés l’Empereur et le
 “Roi de Prusse sont résolus d’agir promptement, d’un mutuel
 “accord, avec les forces nécessaires pour obtenir le but pro-
 “posé en commun. En attendant elles donneront à leur
 “troupes les ordres convenables pour qu’elles soient à portée
 “de se mettre en activité.

“Donné à Pillnitz le 27. Août 1791.

“Signé, Leopold.

Frederic Guillaume.,

Russia, England, and the principal states of Italy: but their answers did not arrive till after the Conference at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned to Vienna. On the 12. of September therefore the Emperor sent for the Marquis de Bouillé, and addressed him in the following terms. "It was not in my power to converse with you sooner on the subject, for which I had requested your attendance, because I had not received the answers of the Courts of Russia, Spain, England, and the principal sovereigns of Italy. At present they are arrived, and correspond to my wishes and expectations: for I am assured of the cooperation of all these powers, *with exception to England, which is resolved to preserve the most strict neutrality.*" 2,,

Here we have a testimony, which places the conduct of the British Cabinet in the clearest point of view. The mere circumstance, that its answer was not

It appears from this authentic document, that the report of a *partition* treaty at Pillnitz has no historical foundation. Even the six secret articles, of which however the authenticity is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either of France, or of any other country. See Martens, T. V. p. 36.

2. The Emperor's own words were: „Je suis assuré de la coopération de toutes ces puissances, à l'exception de l'Angleterre, qui est déterminée à observer la plus stricte neutralité.“ *Memoires de Bouillé, Tom. II, p. 139.*

received by Leopold before the beginning of September, sufficiently proves, that the British Cabinet took no part in the Conference at Pillnitz³: and as the reply to the Emperor's proposal was decidedly in the negative, we have absolute proof that Great Britain had no concern in the coalition then forming against France.⁴ No one can object in this instance, that the real views of a cabinet are often at variance with its

3. Another proof, and one too of the highest authority, is Lord Grenville's Dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 20 June 1797, and printed among the Papers relative to the Negotiation at Lisle. In this dispatch Lord Grenville said: "Your Lordship should take this opportunity to explain, in the most distinct and unequivocal terms, that if any secret treaty was in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, between the late Emperor and the King of Prussia, which is, to say the least, very doubtful in point of fact, this at least is certain that his Majesty was no party to such treaty; and not only was not then included in it, but has never since adhered to it, nor even been apprised of its contents. The public *Declaration*, which was made at that interview, shews on the face of it, that his Majesty was no party to it; and it is indeed notorious, that it applied to circumstances, which were done away long before the war broke out between Austria and France, and that the subsequent negotiations for the maintenance of peace between those two powers, turned on points wholly distinct from those supposed to have been referred to in the pretended *Treaty* of Pillnitz."

protestations, since the answer was given to a question proposed, not by the Court of France, but by the Court of Austria. It is true, that if the British government had been resolved on a war with France, it would have been consistent with its own interest, to conceal its intentions from its future adversary: in like manner, as the French government, at the beginning of the American war, continued to give the British ambassador the most friendly assurances, even after war was resolved on at Versailles. But the British government could have no interest in deceiving the Emperor: on the contrary, it would have been prejudicial to its own interest, to assure the leader of the coalesced powers, that its positive determination was to preserve a strict neutrality, had it really intended to join the coalition. However should any one still doubt, whether the dispositions of the British Cabinet were friendly toward France or not, the answer given to the Emperor proves at least thus much, that Great Britain *at that period* took no part in a coalition against France.

Another very strong proof of this position is contained in a Letter written by the King of Sweden, dated 2. of September 1791, to the Marquis de Bouillé ⁴.

4. This Letter is printed in the *Memoires de Bouillé*.
Tom. II. p. 142 — 145.

It appears from this Letter that the King of Sweden at that time intended to embark troops, which were to be landed on the coast of Flanders: but he was so far from expecting assistance, that he apprehended even opposition on the part of England, and said, *it would be a grand point gained, if England remained neutral.* ⁵ Hence it is evident that England no more made a common cause with the King of Sweden, than with the Emperor. In fact, the British government not only refused to join the coalition against France, ⁶ but

5. His own words were: *Ce serait un grand point que la neutralité d'Angleterre, dont vous me parlez.* Ib. p. 144.

6. If further proof were necessary, we might quote the authority of the French themselves. The Minister of the war department in a report delivered to the National Assembly on the 11. of October 1791, which in the *Moniteur* of the 13. of October occupies four whole columns, described very circumstantially the danger, which at that time threatened France from various powers of Europe, and mentioned them by name, but did not say a syllable of England. And Brissot in his Speech of the 20. October 1791 was so far from representing the English ministers as *encouraging* the princes of Europe to a confederacy against France, as some late writers have done without the least foundation, that on the contrary he spoke of them as mediators, and said, *l'Angleterre était occupée à calmer les esprits de Ratisbonne.* *Moniteur* 22. Oct, 1791. But Brissot, it is said, was a friend of the English ministry! Now it must be observed

acted toward that country with the greatest friendship, as will appear from the following chapter.

that this absurd report was first propagated in the Spring of the year 1793, at the time that the power of the Girondists was on the decline, when Cambon, a principal member of the opposite party, in order to accelerate the fall of Brissot, suggested that he was in secret alliance with the English ministry. The thought was so valuable to the Anarchists, who were then coming into power, that it was seized with great avidity; and as this party, at the head of which was Robespierre, maintained their authority a considerable time, it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without any one's knowing, or even asking, whence it came. Brissot (*A ses Commettans*, p. 98. Paris 1793) says: "Cambon, 'craint il la lumiere? Le mien (c'est à dire, bilan) est prêt; 'il est dans un mot — Rien; et c'est la seule réponse que je 'fais à l'épithète qu'il m'a donnée, Allié de Pitt., In fact it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, since Pitt's adversaries have claimed Brissot as *their* friend, and a noble Peer at the head of the Opposition called him in his speech of 1. Feb. 1793 (to use the words of the *Moniteur* 10. Feb. 1793) "un homme aussi vertueux, qu'éclairé, *de l'amitié duquel il s'honore.*," Brissot's virulent abuse of the English ministry a short time before the declaration of war, as well as on the day, on which it was declared, is likewise not very reconcileable with his supposed friendship for them. But that was mere dissimulation, it is said. Now if that was mere dissimulation, the Director Barras is likewise attached to the English ministry, and all his invectives are no-

thing more than a mask, to cover his real friendship. In fact if another 18. of Fructidor should take place, and the same fate should befall Barras, which he prepared for his colleagues, Barthelemy and Carnot, it would be nothing extraordinary, to hear Barras decried as an agent of the British minister: for it has been the fate of the French rulers from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored, while in power, and to be calumniated, when fallen. — Lastly in the catalogue of grievances, with which the national convention on the 1. of February 1793 accompanied the declaration of war against Great Britain, no charge whatsoever was laid to the British government, prior to the 10. of August 1792. See *Moniteur* 3. Feb. 1793. We may be assured therefore that the national convention itself was conscious of the British government's having no concern in a coalition against France in 1791.

CHAPTER II.

Insurrection of the negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly conduct of Great Britain toward France on this occasion: and ingratitude of the French national assembly to the British government.

Toward the close of the summer of 1791, an insurrection broke out among the negroes of St. Domingo, which was so dreadful in its effects that the French inhabitants of the Island were reduced to a state of despair. The town of Cape François was surrounded by a formidable army of the insurgents: and the inhabitants had neither a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to enable them to defend themselves, nor provisions sufficient to support a long blockade. Without speedy relief therefore, the French colony of St. Domingo must have been for ever lost to France: but from France itself, on account of its distance, speedy relief was not to be obtained. In this distressed situation, the governor of St. Domingo sent deputies to Lord Effingham, the governor of Jamaica, to request both provisions and ammunition: and Lord Effingham, with the consent of Admiral Affleck, sent immediately

two frigates, the *Daphne* and the *Blonde*, provided with all necessaries to Cape Français, and a third, the *Centurion*, to Port au Prince. The *Daphne* and the *Blonde* arrived at the Cape on the 26. of September. On board the former was M. Bryan Edwards, who in the preface to his *Historical Survey of St. Domingo* has circumstantially described the manner, in which the assistance afforded to the distressed colonists was received. "The inhabitants of the town," says Mr. Edwards, ¹ "being assembled on the beach directed all their attention towards us, and we landed amidst a crowd of Spectators, who with uplifted hands and streaming eyes gave welcome to their deliverers, for such they considered us, and acclamations of „vivent les Anglais“ resounded from every quarter. The Governor of St. Domingo was at that time the unfortunate General Blanchelande, who has since perished on the scaffold. He did us the honour to receive us on the quay. A committee of the colonial assembly accompanied by the Governor's only son, an amiable and accomplished youth, had before attended us on board the *Blonde*, and we were immediately conducted to the place of their meeting. The scene was striking and solemn. The hall was splendidly illuminated, and all the members appeared in mourning. Chairs were placed for us within the bar, and the

"Governor having taken his seat at the right hand of
 "the President, the latter addressed us in an eloquent
 "and affecting oration, of which the following is as
 "literal a translation, as the idiom of the two langua-
 "ges will admit.,,

"We were not mistaken, Gentlemen, when we
 "placed our confidence in your generosity; but we
 "could hardly entertain the hope, that, beside sending
 "us succours, you would come in person to give us
 "consolation. — Generous islanders! humanity has
 "operated powerfully on your hearts; you have yielded
 "to the first emotion of your generosity, in the hopes
 "of snatching us from death, for it is already too late
 "to save us from misery. What a contrast between *your*
 "conduct and that of other nations!² We will avail

2. What a contrast likewise between the conduct of the
 English, and that of their own countrymen! While the
 northern district of St. Domingo was in the utmost want of
 provisions, a French ship arrived laden with meal from Bor-
 deaux, but the captain refused to dispose of his cargo, be-
 cause the colonists were unable to pay him ready money. On
 this subject a complaint was afterwards made in the national
 assembly, in which the following letter from St. Domingo
 was read on the 11. of January 1792. "Les paroisses du Nord
 "manquaient de subsistances. Mr. Fournier, commandant le
 "Triton de Bordeaux, refusait de fournir de la farine aux
 "habitans de Bougres, parceque ceux-ci epuises en ce mo-
 "ment ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain lui avaient-

“ourselves of your benevolence; but the days, you
 “preserve to us, will not be sufficient to manifest our
 “gratitude: our children shall keep it in remembrance.
 “Regenerated France, unapprized that such calamities
 “might befall us has taken no measures to protect us
 “against their effects. With what admiration will she
 “learn, *that without your assistance we should no longer*
 “*exist as a dependency to any nation!*,”

This address of the President of the Colonial Assembly is an unanswerable proof, that the French were at that time indebted to the friendship of the English for the preservation of their valuable colony of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewise to the British *government*: for the Governor of Jamaica would not have ventured to supply the French colonists with arms and ammunition, unless he had been assured, that the dispositions of his cabinet had been friendly toward France. And to remove all doubts on this subject, the British ambassador at Paris was ordered to notify to the Court of France, that his Majesty approved of Lord Effinghams conduct. ³

“ils rémontré, que son refus de fournir des farines allait les
 “exposer aux plus affreux besoins.,, Moniteur, 12. Jan. 1792.

3. The following is the official note of the British Minister at Paris to the French Minister for foreign affairs. “Je
 “crois devoir vous envoyer une lettre de Milord Effingham,
 “Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, en date du 7. Septembre. Je

On the 5. of November the Note of the British Ambassador was taken into consideration by the National Assembly ⁴. The person however, who spoke first, proposed neither a vote of thanks to the British government, nor even to Lord Effingham: but directed his whole attention to the state of the French colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obligations, which they owed to the generous governor of Jamaica. ⁵ Another member of the Assembly, but a person of so little importance, that his name was unknown even to the editor of the *Moniteur* ⁶, then proposed a vote of thanks to the British government: but the motion was seconded by no one in the whole assembly. Upon this, Mr. Goujon moved, that the thanks of the Assembly should be voted, neither to the British Government, nor to the Governor of Jamaica,

“dois vous annoncer, que le roi mon maître a bien voulu
 “approuver la conduite, qu’a tenu le gouverneur en envoyant
 “tous les secours, dont il pouvait se passer, pour soutenir le
 “gouvernement de St. Domingue., *Moniteur* 6. Nov. 1791.

4. The whole debate is contained in the *Moniteur* 6. Nov. 1791.

5. “Vous devez jeter vos regards sur la conduite de M. Effingham, gouverneur de la Jamaïque, digne d’une grande nation, qui rivalise avec nous pour la liberté. Je demande qu’il lui soit voté des remerciemens.,

6. This appears from the circumstance, that after Mr. a mere line is placed, instead of a name.

but to the British nation: ⁷ and this motion passed with only the following amendment, that Lord Effingham, as a member of the British nation, was named in particular. ⁸

This strange behaviour of the National Assembly was by no means calculated to promote that friendship with the British government, of which they had just received so striking a proof. It was not only absurd to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely the government, the governor of Jamaica, and a few individuals of that island had taken part, but it was ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks, which were proposed, and were really due to the government of Great Britain. The object however, which the National Assembly had in view admits of no doubt: and we may safely conclude, that the system, which the French rulers have since followed with so much success, was at that time already adopted. ⁹

7. Je demande qu'il soit voté des remerciemens, non pas au gouverneur, non pas au gouvernement Anglais, mais à la nation Anglaise.

8. Mr. le Président. La motion est faite, à voter des remerciemens à la nation Anglaise, et en particulier à Mr. Effingham, gouverneur de la Jamaïque.

La proposition énoncée par M. le Président est adoptée.

9. This system consists in separating the governed from their governors, in exciting the one against the other; that both of them may at last fall a prey to French avarice and

The conduct of the National Assembly was likewise in another respect highly ungrateful: for if the British ministry had thought proper to act on the same political principles, on which the French government acted at the commencement of the American war, or to retaliate its unjust aggression, they might, without the least difficulty, have gained possession of the capital of

ambition. Brissot said: "Que pensaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l'Europe? Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait l'établir par-tout, en soulevant les administrés contre les administrans, en faisant voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces soulèvements., Brissot à ses commettans (Paris, May 1793) p. 81.

And that this system was already adopted at the end of the year 1791, appears from Isnard's speech in the National Assembly on the 5. Jan. 1792. In this speech said Isnard:

"Voici l'instant qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des destins des peuples et des nations: c'est vous que le ciel réservait à ces grands événemens: élevez vous au niveau de vos destinées.,

And a few lines after: "Est-il bien vrai qu'un langage national ne serait entendu dans aucune contrée? Ah sans doute les Anglais seraient un peuple digne de l'entendre.,

Moniteur 6. Janv. 1792. This last passage shews likewise that the leaders of the National Assembly even at that time directed their attention to the people of England, who, in consequence of their political liberty, were considered as fitter subjects for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any other country.

St. Domingo. The French marine was then in such a situation, that it could not have made the least resistance. Ever since the year 1789 the French sailors had been in a continual state of insurrection ¹⁰: almost all the naval officers were dissatisfied ¹¹, the greatest part of them had actually quitted the service, and many had already emigrated. Even those who were appointed in their stead, returned, almost to a man, their commissions, as soon as they received them ¹²; and

10. All the documents relative to this subject are contained in the *Memoires secrets*, pour servir à l'histoire de la dernière année du regne de Louis XVI. Par A. F. Bertrand de Molleville, Ministre d'Etat à cette époque (Londres 1797, Tom. III. 8.) Tom. II. p. 315 — 335.

11. Bertrand de Molleville (Tom. I. p. 291) says: "Un esprit d'insubordination et de révolte s'était manifesté de lui même dans les principaux ports de mer, et à bord de plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre depuis l'année 1789. Plusieurs officiers avaient été outragés et insultés par les matelots: aussi tous les officiers en général étoient dégoûtés du service, et je crus fermement que le Duc d'Orléans et le Comte d'Estaing seroient les seuls d'un rang distingué qui contenoient à servir, tant que la marine seroit soumise aux nouveaux réglemens.,,

12. "La désobéissance et la révolte étoient non seulement tolérées, mais encouragées et regardées comme les marques distinctives du patriotisme: aussi, presque tous les officiers

and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Minister of the marine, has himself acknowledged, that he should have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found an officer, who would have accepted the command of a ship of war ¹³.

But even if the French marine had been in the best possible condition, there would have been no necessity for using force, in order to accomplish the end: for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were so exasperated against the National Assembly, to whose proceedings they imputed their disasters ¹⁴, that all the

"m'envoyèrent leurs démissions dès qu'ils eurent reçu la lettre, par laquelle je leur annonçais leur promotion., Ib. T. I. p. 278.

13. Tom I. p. 263 he relates the following conversation, which took place at that period between himself and Mr. de Narbonne, the war Minister. "Le jour où je parlai au conseil de ce refus des officiers, M. de Narbonne m'entreprit en ces termes.,

"Quoi! tous les officiers refusent? c'est donc à dire, que si nous avions quelqu' inquietude relativement aux dispositions de l'Angleterre, et que je vous demandasse une frégate pour croiser sur nos côtes, vous ne pourriez la fournir."

"Ce ne sont pas les frégates, qui nous manquent, répondis-je: mais dans ce moment je serais fort embarrassé pour trouver un officier, qui voulut se charger d'en commander une.,

14. Edwards's Historical Survey of St. Domingo; Pref. p. 10. They accused particularly those members of the Assembly, who called themselves Amis des Noirs, and

classes of the whites were disposed to renounce their allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade," says M. Edwards ¹⁵, was universally substituted in place of the tri-coloured one, and very earnest wishes were avowed in all companies, without scruple or restraint, that the British administration would send an armament to conquer the island, or rather to receive its voluntary surrender from the inhabitants. Very earnest application was likewise made to the British ministry, that an armament might be sent to take possession of the country: but no attention was paid to the solicitations of the colonists, till the French government had thought proper to declare war against Great Britain. ¹⁶ And this generous conduct has been repaid, on the part of France, with the blackest ingratitude.

whose conduct, as well as the effects, which it produced, M. Edwards has described in Ch. VII. See also Bertrand de Molleville *Memoires secrets*, Tom. II. p. 241 — 245. where an account is given of some papers, found in the hands of the mulatto Raimond, which contained the instructions communicated to the Negroes of St. Domingo by the *Amis des noirs* during the years 1790 and 1791, in order to excite them to rebellion.

15. *Ib.* *ib.*

16. *Ib.* p. 140.

CHAPTER III.

Other less important events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the year 1791.

On the 28. of September 1791 the King of France issued a proclamation, in which he formally notified his acceptance of the new constitution: and he wrote likewise circular letters to the different courts of Europe, to the same purpose. The court of Great Britain was one of the first, which sent an answer, and this answer was delivered in terms of great respect. ¹ It may be said indeed that answers of this kind are mere matters of form: yet, when we consider, that several of the European courts answered much later, others not at all, that the King of Spain gave for answer, he regarded not the acceptance as an act of free will, and that the King of Sweden returned the letter delivered to him by the French minister at Stockholm, without even opening it, ² the new legislative power of France had certainly reason to be satisfied with the early and friendly answer of the court of Great Britain.

1. It is contained in the *Moniteur* 5. Nov. 1791, and is dated Oct. 6. 1791.

2. *Ib.*

But another event took place before the close of the year, which could by no means afford the court of Great Britain reciprocal satisfaction. By the twenty fourth article of the treaty of commerce ³ it had been stipulated, that if one of the two contracting powers should be engaged in war with a third, all vessels belonging to subjects of the other power should be provided with sea-letters and certificates, that the masters of them, in case they should be suspected of carrying ammunition or any warlike stores to the enemies of the former power, which was strictly prohibited by the twenty second article, might be able to clear themselves. It had been further stipulated by the twenty sixth article, that if a ship of war belonging to the former power met a merchant-ship Belonging to any subject of the latter, the captain of the ship of war should have the liberty of sending a person on board the merchant-ship to examine the sea-letter and certificate. Agreeably to these stipulations, Sir Richard Strachan, at that time Captain of the Phoenix, meeting with some French merchantmen on the coast of Malabar in November 1791, determined to examine their sea-letters and certificates: but

3. The treaty of commerce between Great Britain and France is printed among the State Papers, in the Annual Register for 1786: and also in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 680 — 707.

as they were under convoy of a French frigate, he first sent off an officer to signify his intentions to the captain, and to request him to make the proper signal to the merchantmen under his convoy. Now as England was then engaged in a war with Tippoo Saib, who, as well as his predecessor, had always stood in close alliance with France, and a suspicion therefore must necessarily arise that these merchantmen were carrying warlike stores to the enemies of Great Britain, especially since they were under convoy of a frigate, which, as France was then engaged in no war, appeared unnecessary for vessels, which had nothing contraband on board, the captain of the French frigate was in duty bound, to attend to the representations of Sir Richard Strachan, and to make a signal to the vessels under his convoy, to bring to, and clear themselves. But instead of this he made a signal to the merchantmen to crowd sail, and get off: and, to prevent Sir Richard Strachan from following them, he attacked the Phoenix, as if Great Britain and France were then at war, nor did he even wait till the English lieutenant was returned on board, to make report to his captain. It is true, that the French frigate, after a short engagement was obliged to strike, ⁴ and that

4. Commodore, now Admiral, Cornwallis, who then commanded the English fleet at Tellichery gave orders however for her immediate release.

her captain was so severely wounded, that he paid for his temerity with the loss of his life: his conduct however was not only a violation of the treaty of commerce, but an act of open hostility.

As soon as intelligence of this event arrived in England, government of course complained of it to the court of France: but the complaint was delivered in terms of great moderation, and it was requested only, that orders might be given to prevent similar accidents in future, which might tend to destroy that harmony, which the British government sincerely wished to preserve. But when the note of the British ambassador^s was read in the National Assembly, the

5. It is contained in the *Moniteur* 12. April 1792, and is as follows,

“Milord Gower a l’honneur de communiquer à M. Du-
 “mourier la traduction des pieces dans lesquelles se trou-
 “vent les details du combat, qui a eu lieu entre le Phoenix,
 “et la fregate Française la Resolue. La premiere est une
 “lettre écrite par M. Strachan au Commodore Cornwallis:
 “l’autre est un recit de M. Parker lieutenant envoyé par le
 “Capitaine anglais à bord de la Fregate Française. Il est
 “aisé de se convaincre, que la conduite du capitaine anglais
 “est conforme aux traités, et que cette affaire ne doit pas
 “porter atteinte à la bonne harmonie qui subsiste entre les
 “deux nations. Il paraît que son objet étoit de s’assurer, si
 “les batimens Français ne contenaient aucunes des provisions

members of it were so far from offering any satisfaction for the violation of the treaty of commerce and the act of open hostility, committed on the part of France, that they did not condescend to make even an apology for the past, or to promise security for the future. ⁶ On the contrary, they sought only evasions, to justify the conduct of the French Captain. At last, the matter was referred to a committee, and there it ended.

The preceding transaction, though in itself of no great importance, shews at least the spirit, which animated the British government on the one hand, and the French National Assembly on the other. It shews

“militaires, qu'on est convenu par le traité de regarder
“comme contrebande, et qu'il est réciproquement défendu
“de fournir aux ennemis de l'une ou l'autre des parties con-
“tractantes. C'est après cette communication amicale, que
“le capitaine Français fit un signal sur son bord pour que les
“batimens Français fissent voile, au lieu d'amener. Il fit feu,
“sans attendre aucune explication ultérieure. La conduite
“de ce dernier est reprochable, sur-tout en ce qu'il a fait
“feu, avant que le lieutenant du vaisseau Anglais fût de re-
“tour à son bord. Sa Majesté Britannique ne doute pas que
“le Roi ne donne des ordres, pour prévenir désormais des
“evenemens semblables, qui pourraient troubler la paix, qu'il
“aura toujours à cœur de maintenir.,

6. See the Debates in the Moniteur 12. April 1792.

that the former was desirous to maintain peace, and that the latter was totally indifferent about it. ⁷

CHAPTER IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31 of January 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British forces both by sea, and by land. Cessation of the treaty of subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of taxes to the annual amount of two hundred thousand pounds. Falshood of the assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March 1792 to what is called the treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this time in France, for an augmentation of its forces by sea as well as by land.

On the 31. of January 1792 the session of the British Parliament was opened by a speech from the throne ¹,

⁷. It shews the dispositions of the two governments even so late as April 1792: for though the engagement between the frigates took place in Nov. 1791, on which account I have related the whole transaction in this chapter, yet the news of the engagement arrived not in London before the beginning of April 1792.

¹. See Rivington's Annual Register 1792, P. II. State Papers, p. 187: or New Annual Register, Public papers, p. 50.

in which his Majesty, having mentioned the treaty of peace between the Emperor and the Porte, and the preliminaries already signed between the latter power and Russia, concluded in the following terms, "The
 "friendly assurances, which I receive from foreign
 "powers, and the general state of affairs in Europe,
 "appear to promise to my subjects the continuance of
 "their present tranquillity. Under these circumstances
 "I am induced to think, *that some immediate reduction*
 "*may be safely made in our naval and military establish-*
 "*ments:* and my regard for the interests of my subjects
 "renders me at all times desirous of availing myself of
 "any favourable opportunity of *diminishing the public*
 "*expences.,,*

On the 9. of February, when this subject was taken into consideration by the House of Commons, the number of sailors and marines to be employed for the year 1792 was reduced to sixteen thousand: ² and on the 16. of February, even the army of Great Britain, though at that time so inconsiderable in point of number, that no foreign power could have taken

2. Ib. p. 183. Ib. p. 145.

3. On the 16. of Febr. guards and garrisons were estimated, from Dec. 25. 1791 to June 24. 1792, at 17,013 men: but from June 25. to Dec. 24. 1792, at only 15,701. Ib. Ib.

umbrage at it, likewise underwent a reduction.³ Further on the 17. of February Mr. Pitt informed the House that the Hessian subsidy being now expired, "his Majesty's ministers were not of opinion, that the circumstances of the country required its renewal.⁴," By these and similar reductions the annual expenditure of Great Britain received a diminution of four hundred thousand pounds: and it was resolved, that taxes should be abolished to the amount of one half of this sum, and that the other half should be applied to the diminution of the national debt⁵.

The preceding measures sufficiently evince the peaceful disposition of the British cabinet, and its determination to take no part in a war against France. And as there seemed no reason to believe, at the beginning of the year 1792, that France itself would so soon attempt to disturb the repose of Great Britain, ministers flattered themselves with the pleasing expectation, that the plans, by which they endeavoured to promote the happiness of their country, would be continued without interruption. "Though I am not so vain," said Mr. Pitt on the 21. of February, "as to

4. New Annual Register 1792, British and foreign history, p. 38.

5. *Ib.* p. 40.

“suppose, that *all* my present speculations should
 “succeed agreeably to my wishes, or that no unforeseen
 “event should prevent the execution of any one of
 “them: yet it is not unreasonable to expect, that the
 “peace, which we at present enjoy, should continue
 “at least *fifteen years*, since at no period of the British
 “history, whether we consider the internal situation of
 “the kingdom, or its relation to foreign powers, has
 “the prospect of war been further removed, than at
 “present., But unfortunately for Great Britain, and
 unfortunately for all Europe, these expectations were
 annihilated, in less than a year, by events, which no
 human sagacity could at that time predict.

The report, that England acceded in March 1792 to what was called the treaty of Pavia, ⁶ is contradicted by the facts, which have been already related in this chapter. It is even doubtful, whether the treaty itself, which is said to have been concluded in July 1791, be genuine or not ⁷: but even if we suppose it to be genuine, England was no party to it, for

6. This treaty may be seen in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. V. p. 5.

7. Martens in the place just quoted says, that he is “fort éloigné d’annoncer comme digne de foi une piece, que le contenu, les circonstances qui ont précédé, la signature même, semblent déclarer apocryphe.,

there is not only no signature on the part of England, ⁸ but England is not once mentioned in it, either directly or indirectly. Consequently, the only question to be examined is, whether the report be true, that England acceded to it in the month of March following: and that this report, in support of which not a single fact has ever been adduced, is devoid of foundation, appears from the general conduct of the British government at this very period, which is wholly irreconcilable with the prospect of a war with France. But to remove all doubts on this subject, it will be necessary to inquire into the origin of the report, which took its rise not at the time of the pretended accession, but in the following month of November. In the *Moniteur* of the 18. Nov. 1792, the treaty of Pavia was printed: and after the signatures, which close every treaty, was added the following note by the editor, "England *passively* acceded to it in March 1792 ⁹." This anonymous note is the source, from which the report in question took its rise. In the first place therefore, we must ask: what did the unknown author intend to express by this *passive* acces-

8. The only names signed to this treaty are, Leopold, Prince of Nassau, Count Florida Blanca, Bischofswerder.

9. "Nota. L'Angleterre y a *passivement* accédé en Mars 1792."

sion? Does the epithet apply to the act of accession, as the construction seems to indicate, or to the measures, which England was to adopt in consequence of the accession? Either to the one, or to the other, it must necessarily apply, if the note be not absolutely devoid of meaning. But no government can accede to a treaty, without signifying its accession by some *positive* act, such as the signature of an ambassador. A *passive* accession, therefore, if regard be had to the accession itself is a contradiction. Nor will the explanation be more satisfactory, if reference be made to the measures, which England was to adopt in consequence of the accession: for the accession to a treaty on the one hand, and a perfectly passive conduct on the other, are two things, which, though not in direct contradiction, are yet of such a nature, that the one destroys the other. The note therefore in the *Moniteur*, in whatever way we interpret it, contains its own confutation. This was clearly perceived by those commentators and quoters of the note, who were inimical to the British government: and for that reason they have omitted the inconvenient word "*passively*," which the author of the note had cautiously inserted, because six months had then already elapsed after the pretended accession, and yet no visible effect had been produced in the conduct of the British administration.

It appears then, on a near examination, that the report in question is founded, first on an anonymous and contradictory note in the *Moniteur* of the 18. Nov. 1792, and secondly on arbitrary alterations, which have been made in subsequent copies of it. How then is it possible, that any man, who has a regard for truth, can subscribe to a report, which rests on *such* a foundation? Indeed I believe that every man, who has seriously inquired into it, must perceive its falsity. The author of the British and foreign history in the *New Annual Register* for 1793, whom no one will accuse of partiality in favour of ministers, is himself of opinion, "that the insinuation is merely the effect of party malevolence."¹⁰ Nor did Brissot believe in this idle story: for in his speech of the 12. of January 1793, which was delivered nearly two months after the treaty of Pavia and the above-mentioned note appeared in the *Moniteur*, he acknowledged¹¹, that England had observed the most strict neutrality in respect to France, till after the 10. of August¹² 1792.

10. See p. 7.

11. His own words are, „Le cabinet de Saint James a plusieurs fois protesté d'observer scrupuleusement la neutralité envers la France, et en effet elle a été jusqu'à l'immortelle journée du 10. Août.“ *Moniteur* 15. Jan. 1793.

12. Whether the neutrality was violated after this period, is a question, which will be examined in the sequel.

And on the 13. of January 1793 the national convention itself admitted ¹³, that the observation of this strict neutrality toward France, on the part of England, had been continued even to the beginning of the year 1793. But the national convention would certainly not have made this confession, unless at least a majority of its members had been persuaded, that the report of England's accession to the treaty of Pavia was ungrounded. The very same confession contains likewise a direct acknowledgement on the part of the French government, that England had no concern in any coalition against France either in 1791 or 1792.

We have seen that the British cabinet in the spring of the year 1792, by a reduction of the army and navy, by the abolition of the treaty of subsidy with Hesse Cassel, by the repeal of taxes to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds, and by a decided resolution to engage in no coalition against France, evinced a manifest disposition to peace with

13. The introduction to the decree of the 13. Jan. 1793 is as follows. "La convention nationale informée par le ministre des affaires étrangères des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce pays relativement au caractère de neutralité, qu'il avait conservée jusqu'ici, touchant les affaires de la France, etc., Moniteur 16. Jan. 1793.

that country. Yet at this very period France itself not only took very active measures for an augmentation of its army, but likewise, what is not generally known, and what could have reference only to England, made preparations for an augmentation of its marine. On the 18. of March 1792, which was full six weeks after the British Parliament had reduced the sailors and marines to be employed that year to *sixteen thousand*, Theodore Lameth, in the name of the committee for naval affairs, delivered a report to the national assembly, in which he said, "that about *eighty thousand* sailors would be necessary, in order to man the vessels now at the disposition of the state, and which the honour of the nation, as well as the interest of its commerce, *does not permit us to reduce* ¹⁴," The committee further requested the national assembly to take the speediest measures for the organisation of the navy ¹⁵: and the proposal was made with an enthusiasm,

14. „L'armement entier des batimens, dont l'état peut disposer aujourd'hui, et que l'honneur de la nation, ainsi que l'intérêt de son commerce *ne permet pas de réduire*, exigeroit environ 80,000 matelots. Moniteur 31. Mars 1792.

15. "C'est au nom de ces troupes, dont le courage soutint toujours l'état du pavillon Français etc, que notre comité vous supplie, *de ne pas différer* l'organisation de l'artillerie, et des troupes de la marine.,, Ib.

fiafm, which indicated a disposition to engage in a war by sea ¹⁶, as well as by land.

It is true, that these were only preparatory steps to an augmentation of the French marine: but as they were taken at a time, when England had just made so considerable a diminution in its own naval force, the conduct of the national assembly unavoidably excited the suspicion of an hostile disposition toward England. The English government however still adhered to its principles of neutrality: and as the whole attention of France was soon after directed to a war on the continent, the intended augmentation of the French marine was of course deferred to a more convenient opportunity.

16. *Notre artillerie prête à gronder sur tous les mers, etc.* Ib.

CHAPTER V.

Declaration of war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the court of Great Britain by the French minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British cabinet to persevere in the system of neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this subject. Letter of thanks from the King of France to the King of England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville, in which it was requested, that all British subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign power at war with France. Punctual compliance with this request in a proclamation of the 25. of May. Remarks on the conduct of the British cabinet.

On the 20. of April 1792 the National Assembly decreed almost unanimously ¹, and amidst the plaudits of a numerous crowd of spectators, war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The French minister in London made a formal notification of it to the court of Great Britain: and the conduct which our government

1. Only seven members voted against the war. See the *Moniteur* 22. April 1792.

observed on this occasion, affords a new proof of its resolution to preserve the most strict neutrality. Chauvelin's letter to his own court, dated 28. of April, is decisive on this subject.²

Immediately on the receipt of Chauvelin's letter, the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to the King of England³, dated 1. of May, in which he said, "I embrace this opportunity to express to your Majesty, how sensible I am of all the public marks of affection you have given me. *I thank you for not having become a party to the concert formed by certain powers against France.*"

2.

"Londres le 28. Avril 1792.

"J'ai communiqué au Lord Grenville toutes les pièces, que vous m'aviez adressées relativement à la déclaration de guerre. L'effet de cette nouvelle a été de produire une baisse assez considérable dans les fonds publics. M. Pitt a fait dementir dans tous les papiers les bruits qui couraient, que des ordres avaient été donnés pour la presse. Il a répondu formellement à une députation de commerce, que le gouvernement ne se mêlerait pas des affaires de la France. L'intérêt qu'il met à soutenir les fonds publics est une nouvelle garantie de sa neutralité. La guerre n'est pas du goût de la nation; on ne fait aucuns préparatifs, ni dans les ports, ni dans les arsenaux. *Il est certain, que le système de neutralité, débattu au conseil, y a été adopté.*" Moniteur 8. May 1792.

3. See New Annual Register 1792. Public papers, p. 96: or Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State papers p. 256.

On the 15. of May the French ambassador communicated a note to Lord Grenville ⁴, in which, after a long and detailed representation of the motives, which had induced the national assembly, to declare war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, and after the most solemn protestation, first, that France renounced every idea of aggrandizement, and secondly, that France would never interfere in the internal concerns of other nations ⁵, the following demand was made of the court of Great Britain. "That conformably

4. In the New Annual Register, 1792. Public papers p. 99, this note is dated 15. of May; but, probably owing to an error of the press, it is called in the superscription p. 97, a note presented 12. of May. That 15. May is the true date, is certain: for not only Lord Grenville in his answer to this note, but likewise Mr. Chauvelin himself in his two following notes of the 24. of May and the 18. of June, quotes it as a note dated 15. of May. This determination is not superfluous, because several writers, in consequence of the above mentioned typographical error, have ascribed to the note in question a false date.

5. Whether the French rulers have kept their word, in regard to this solemn protestation, which they had already made in their Manifesto to all states and nations on the 29. of December 1791, is a question, which no one *at present* will venture to answer in the affirmative. An appeal to it therefore can prove nothing more, than the *hypocrisy* of those, who made it.

“to the treaty of navigation and commerce of the 26.
“of September 1786, his Britannic Majesty shall pro-
“hibit all the subjects of Great Britain and Ireland,
“(and publish the order in the usual way throughout
“the two kingdoms and the islands and countries de-
“pendent thereon) from committing any hostilities
“against French ships at sea: and that they shall not
“take out any patent, commission, or letters of reprisal,
“from the different princes, or states, who are or shall
“be at war with France, or make use in any way of
“such patents or commissions.”

With this demand the court of Great Britain punctually complied: for in ten days after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's Note, a proclamation ⁶, dated 25. of May ⁷; was published, agreeably to his own pre-

6. See Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State papers, p. 195: or New Annual Register 1792. Public papers, p. 99.

7. On the preceding day Lord Grenville sent a Note to Mr. Chauvelin, in which, after expressing his concern for the hostilities, which had broken out between France and Austria, he assured the French ambassador, that the court of Great Britain was ready “to fulfil in the most exact manner the stipulations of the treaty of navigation and commerce, of which his most Christian Majesty required the execution.” See Rivington's Annual Register 1792, State papers, p. 259.

scription, containing the following order relative to the subject in question. "Whereas the most Christian "King hath caused application to be made to his Majesty, that his Majesty would conformably to the "article of the treaty of navigation and commerce concluded at Versailles 26. of September 1786, renew "and publish in all his dominions and countries the "strict and exprefs prohibitions contained in the said "article; his Majesty doth hereby strictly forbid all "his subjects to receive any commission, for arming "and acting at sea as privateers, or letters of reprisals, "from any enemy of the most christian king, or, by "virtue or under colour of such commissions or reprisals, "to disturb, infest, or any ways damage his subjects; "or to arm ships as privateers, or to go out to sea "therewith, under the severest punishments that can "be inflicted on the transgressors, besides being liable "to make full restitution and satisfaction to those, to "whom they have done any damage.,,

The French government had certainly reason to be satisfied with this friendly conduct of the British court: and in fact it was so, as appears from the following paragraph in Mr. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville of the 18. of June ⁸. "The undersigned

8. The original is printed in the *Moniteur* 20. July 1792: and an English translation in *Rivington's Annual Re-*

“minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of
 “the French has transmitted to his majesty the official
 “note, which Lord Grenville addressed to him on the
 “24. of May last, on the part of his Britannic Majesty,
 “in answer to that, which he had the honour to deli-
 “ver to him on the 15. of the same month, together
 “with the royal proclamation published in consequence
 “of it. He is directed to assure his Britannic Majesty
 “of the due sense, which the king entertains of *the*
 “*friendly dispositions, and of the sentiments of humanity,*
 “*of justice, and of peace, which are so clearly manifested*
 “*in that answer* 9., Since then the French government
 itself expressed so much satisfaction at the conduct of
 the British court relative to Mr. Chauvelin’s note of
 the 15. of May, one should suppose, that no one
 would venture to make this very conduct a subject
 of animadversion and complaint. But as the three
 following charges have been preferred by British
 writers, first that Mr. Chauvelin was suffered to wait
 too long for his answer, secondly that in Lord Gren-
 gister, 1792, State papers, p. 263. In the New Annual
 Register it is omitted.

9. The words of the French original are, “Il a reçu
 “l’ordre de présenter à sa majesté britannique le temoignage
 “de la sensibilité du roi aux *dispositions amicales, et aux sen-*
 “*timens d’humanité, de justice, et de paix, si bien manifestés*
 “dans cette réponse.,

ville's answer no notice was taken of the motives, which had induced the national assembly to declare war against the King of Hungary, and thirdly that in the interval was issued a proclamation against seditious writings in Great Britain, it is necessary to make a particular reply to each. With respect to the first charge, every impartial man must admit, that an interval of nine days, for it was really no more ¹⁰, was by no means an exorbitant length of time for the deliberations on the demand of the French government, and the preparation of a proclamation, which was to serve as a rule for all British subjects during the war, especially as the British government was at that time engaged with domestic concerns of the highest importance. The second charge is still more extraordinary: for if Lord Grenville in his answer to Mr. Chauvelin's note had taken notice of the motives, which had induced the national assembly to declare war against the king of Hungary, he would have acted in direct opposition to the principle, which the French themselves continually repeated, that no nation has a right to intermeddle in the affairs of another. And in regard to the proclamation against seditious writings, which

10. Lord Grenville's answer was dated 24. of May, and Mr. Chauvelin's Note, as I have already proved, was dated 15. of May.

was issued on the 21. of May, it stood in no connexion with the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France: it related solely to matters of national police, and these were of too much consequence to be deferred, in order that Mr. Chauvelin might receive his answer a few days sooner. In fact the proclamation of the 21. of May has so little reference to the present history, that it might be safely passed over in silence: but as several writers have contended, that it evinced a hostile disposition toward France, we will examine it at full length in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

Proclamation of the 21. of May 1792 against seditious writings: and Confutation of the objections, which have been made to it.

During a considerable time before the appearance of this proclamation various political publications, which by no means contributed to promote the welfare of the British constitution, had been circulated with great assiduity throughout Great Britain. And these publications were not works of cool and philosophical inquiry, they were not calculated to exercise the judgement of the learned, but to inflame the passions of the illite-

rate. They were designed chiefly for the lower classes, to whose understandings they were particularly adapted: and that the poorest individual might be enabled to procure them, not only the cheapest possible editions were published, but even those cheap editions were sold at a price, which could hardly repay the expences of printing. In these publications the lower classes were taught, that the British constitution, the pride of Britons and the envy of foreigners, a constitution, which Montesquieu and De Lolme had made the theme of their admiration, was a system of slavery¹.

I. This was particularly Mr. Paine's doctrine, who asserted in the most general terms that "*all kings were tyrants, and their subjects slaves.*," See New Annual Register 1792, British and foreign history p. 72. whence it likewise appears, that Paine's writings had been circulated even in public schools. That Paine's second part of the Rights of Man was a libel on the constitution, was admitted in the House of Commons on the 30. of April 1792 by an eminent leader of opposition: and a celebrated writer of the same party has likewise granted, that several publications, at that time in general circulation, „were according to the just theory of the law unquestionably libels., The same writer adds, "*these irregularities and excesses were for a considerable length of time wholly overlooked by government.*„ and it may be further added, that, if these avowed excesses had been any longer treated with indulgence, the revolution, which soon after deprived the king of France of his throne, would in all probability have extended itself to Great Britain.

They were taught to believe, that evils, which not even the wisest administration can remove, were merely the result of political institutions, which distributed wealth and power in unequal portions, as if the same advantages were to be derived from indolence and ignorance, as from industry and talents. Even imaginary evils were represented as real ones, and causes, which had formerly produced content, were converted into motives of complaint. Before this period the lower, as well as the higher orders of society, had been instructed in the useful lesson, that, as they were privileged on the one hand to exercise the rights of free-born Britons, they were bound on the other hand to fulfil the duties of good citizens. But by the new doctrine the lower classes especially were informed, that the *Rights* of man must now occupy their whole attention, and that these rights, if properly exercised, would lead to wealth, to power, and to honour. This doctrine unavoidably produced a very sensible effect: for where shall we find a man, who possesses not vanity and ambition, who would not rather be rich than be poor, who would not rather govern, than be governed? The ignorant and the unwary regard only *immediate* consequences, and have not sufficient penetration to discover *ultimate* effects. They perceive not, that a system in which all men chuse to govern, can nowhere be of long duration, that, though well calcu-

lated to destroy an existing constitution, it must cease the moment a new one is erected, what ever shape the new constitution assumes, or however splendid the title, with which it is adorned. They perceive not that a system, which leads immediately to anarchy, must ultimately lead to despotism, and that the severity of the latter is always proportioned to the excesses of the former ²: nor are they aware, that they are mere instruments in the hands of a few ambitious demagogues, who amuse mankind with the magic words of liberty and equality, not with a view of promoting the happiness of their fellow citizens; or of introducing a real system of equality, which can no where exist, but solely to exchange the old system of inequality for one, which is better adapted to gratify their private vanity and ambition. Further, the effects of the new doctrine were so much the more extensive, as the writings, in which it was contained, were not merely circulated in the common course of trade, but were industriously distributed by numerous societies, who had correspondents in every part of the kingdom. Lastly, one at least of these societies, the society for constitutional information, a short time before the proclamation of the 21 of May, opened by its own avowal a correspondence with the jacobin club in Paris

2. The tyranny of Robespierre affords a striking proof.

whose grand object was the destruction of monarchical government of every description, in which it likewise succeeded in its own country within ten weeks after the period in question ³. Under these circumstances

3. So early as the 4. of May 1792, the society for constitutional information resolved that a committee should be appointed to consider of a correspondence with the jacobin club in Paris, as appears from an advertisement inserted by order of the society in the Morning Chronicle 8. May. And about the middle of this month, an address was actually voted and sent to the jacobin club, containing the following passages. "Brothers, and fellow-citizens of the world, the "cordial and affectionate reception, with which you have "honoured our worthy countrymen Mr. Thomas Cooper and "Mr. James Watt, members of the society at Manchester, "and united with our society, has been communicated to us "by the correspondence of those gentlemen,, (From this passage we learn, that even before the month of May 1792 deputies had been sent to the jacobin club). — "It is not "among the least of the revolutions, which time is unfolding "to an astonished world, that two nations nursed by some "wretched craft in reciprocal hatred, should so suddenly "break their common odious chain, and rush into amity. "The principle, that can produce such an effect is the off- "spring of no earthly court: and whilst it exhibits to us the "expensive iniquity of former politics, it enables us with "bold felicity to say, *We have done with them.* In contem- "plating the political condition of nations, we cannot con- "ceive a more diabolical system of government, than that

the British cabinet deemed it necessary to issue the following proclamation.

"which has hitherto *generally* been practised over the world.,, Though this language is cautiously obscure, its meaning is very easy to be discovered. — That the address was sent to the jacobin club at Paris at least a week before the proclamation of the 21. of May was issued, appears from the resolution entered into by the society on the 18. of May, (which in the Morning Chronicle of the 25. of May immediately precedes the address itself), namely, "The following "address to the friends of the constitution at Paris, commonly called Jacobins, and which was by the direction "of this society sent to them *last week*, was ordered for "publication.,, The information therefore, which government received of this address was probably one of the principal motives to the proclamation of the 21 of May: and every man, who thinks the British constitution worth preserving, must admit, that it was high time, to put a stop to proceedings, which tended to the destruction of it. The society of the Friends of the People, at a meeting held on the 12. of May, in consequence of a letter from the chairman of the society for constitutional information, and four days after the advertisement relative to the then intended address to the jacobin club had appeared in the Morning Chronicle, resolved that an answer should be returned, which concluded in the following words. "We decline all "intercourse with a society, whose views and objects, as "far as we can collect them from the various resolutions and "proceedings, which have been published, we cannot help

“Whereas divers wicked and seditious writings
 “have been printed, published, and industriously
 “disperfed, tending to excite tumult and diforder, by
 “endeavouring to raife groundlefs jealousies and difcon-
 “tents in the minds of our faithful and loving fubjects,
 “refpecting the laws and happy conftitution of govern-
 “ment, civil and religious, eftablifhed in this king-
 “dom, and endeavouring to vilify and bring into con-
 “tempt the wife and wholefome provifions made at the
 “time of the glorious revolution, and fince ftrengthened
 “and confirmed by fubfequent laws, for the preferva-
 “tion and fecurity of the rights and liberties of our
 “faithful and loving fubjects; and whereas divers wri-
 “tings have alfo been printed, published, and indu-
 “ftrioufly difperfed, recommending the faid wicked
 “and feditious publications to the attention of our
 “faithful and loving fubjects: and whereas we have
 “alfo reafon to believe that correpondencies have been

“regarding as *irreconcilable with thofe real interefts*, on
 “which you profefs to inform and enlighten the people.”

See the Morning Chronicle 14. May 1792. Since then the
 fociety of the friends of the people have declared that the
 proceedings of the fociety for conftitutional information
 were irreconcilable with the real interefts of the people of
 Great Britain, no one of its members can represent the pro-
 clamations of the 21. of May as unneceffary, without arraign-
 ing the proceedings of his own fociety.

“entered into with sundry persons in foreign parts,
“with a view to forward the criminal and wicked pur-
“poses above-mentioned: and whereas the wealth,
“happiness and prosperity of this kingdom do, under
“divine providence, chiefly depend upon a due sub-
“mission to the laws, a just confidence in the integrity
“and wisdom of parliament, and a continuance of that
“zealous attachment to the government and constitu-
“tion of the kingdom, which has ever prevailed in the
“minds of the people thereof: and whereas there is
“nothing, which we so earnestly desire, as to secure
“the public peace and prosperity, and to preserve to
“all our loving subjects the full enjoyment of their
“rights and liberties, both religious and civil: We
“therefore being resolved, as far as in us lies, to re-
“press the wicked and seditious practises aforesaid, and
“to deter all persons from following so pernicious an
“example, have thought fit by the advice of our privy
“council, to issue this our royal proclamation, solemnly
“warning all our loving subjects, as they tender their
“own happiness, and that of their posterity to guard
“against all such attempts, which aim at the subversion
“of all regular government within this kingdom, and
“which are inconsistent with the peace and order of
“society; and earnestly exhorting them at all times,
“and to the utmost of their power to avoid and discour-
“rage

"rage all proceedings tending to produce riots and tumults. And we do strictly charge and command all our magistrates in and throughout our kingdom of Great Britain, that they do make diligent inquiry, in order to discover the authors and printers of such wicked and seditious writings, as aforesaid, and all others, who shall disperse the same: and we do further charge and command all our sheriffs, justices of the peace, chief magistrates in our cities, boroughs and corporations, and all other our officers and magistrates throughout our kingdom of Great Britain, that they do, in their several and respective stations, take the most immediate and effectual care to suppress and prevent all riots, tumults, and other disorders, which may be attempted to be raised or made by any person or persons, which, on whatever pretext they may be grounded, are not only contrary to the law, but dangerous to the most important interests of this kingdom. And we do further require and command all and every our magistrates aforesaid, that they do from time to time, transmit to one of our principal secretaries of state, due and full information of such persons, as shall be found offending as aforesaid, or in any degree aiding or abetting therein: it being our determination, for the preservation of the peace and happiness of our faithful and loving subjects, to carry

“the laws vigourously into execution against such offenders as aforesaid ⁴.”

It is evident, that this proclamation had no relation to the government of France: it was a mere act of national police, which no more concerned the French government, than the measures taken in France relative to the emigrants concerned the English government. France therefore had no right to complain of it, as an eminent opposition writer has himself acknowledged. But if France had no right to complain of it, what right can any man possess, to represent it as inimical to France? The period however, it is said, at which the proclamation was issued, was very critical. This is perfectly true: but the period was critical for *England*. Why therefore might not government take measures to prevent an impending evil, as well at this, as at any other time? It is further objected, that there is an expression in the proclamation, which *may* be applied to certain Frenchmen, namely, “that correspondencies have been entered into with sundry persons in foreign parts.” Now the term “sundry persons in foreign parts,” is so general, that no one would apply it to himself, who was not conscious of having

4. Rivington's Annual Register 1792, State Papers, p. 192: or New Annual Register, 1792, Public Papers, p. 52.

corresponded with a political society in England ⁵. Nor does the question relate to a *government*, but simply to *individuals*: no government therefore, and consequently not even that of France, could be affected by it, however clear the reference might have been to certain inhabitants of that country. Even if a particular expression had been used instead of a general one, if instead of "sundry persons in foreign parts," had been said "sundry Frenchmen," no objection could have been made to it, since the society for constitutional information, by its own avowal commenced a correspondence with the jacobin club in Paris before the appearance of the present proclamation, not to mention the numerous, but less dangerous, addresses, which had been transmitted to various societies in France during more than two years past ⁶. In fact it was the *British* government, and the British government alone,

5. Condorcet, in his report to the national assembly on the 16. of February 1792, relative to a conspiracy against the new constitution of France, spoke in much stronger terms of a connexion between the leaders of it and persons in other countries. Why did not the British government apply to itself the general expressions used by Condorcet? The answer is obvious. Because it was conscious of having no concern in a conspiracy against the French constitution.

6. See Rivington's Annual Register 1792. P. II. p. 128 — 144.

which had a right to complain on this subject: it had a right to demand of the French government, if not satisfaction, at least an explanation, and an assurance of its disapprobation of the conduct of certain individuals in that country in regard to Great Britain, especially as the principle, that no one had a right, to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another nation, was no where so strongly enforced as in France itself. It is true, that the British government made no formal demand of any such explanation: but Mr. Chauvelin, himself was so convinced of the necessity of making one, that on the 24. of May he sent a note to Lord Grenville ⁷, in which he declared, "If certain individuals of this country have established a correspondence abroad, tending to excite troubles therein, and if, as the proclamation seems to insinuate, certain Frenchmen have come into their views, this is a proceeding wholly foreign to the French nation, to the legislative body, to the king, and his ministers; it is a proceeding, of which they are entirely ignorant, which militates against every principle of justice, and which whenever it became known would be universally condemned in France., Further, Mr. Chauvelin was so desirous of rescuing his court from all suspicion of favouring sedition in Great Britain, a suspicion which

7. Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State Papers, p. 260.

the British Cabinet did not entertain, for no allusion was made in the proclamation to any government, but merely to certain individuals, that he even requested, his note might be laid before the two houses of Parliament, previous to the debates on the proclamation, which however could not be granted, because it was contrary to the forms of the British constitution, as Lord Grenville informed him in a note written on the following day ⁸, to which Mr. Chauvelin immediately replied ⁹, "In making this request, my Lord, I intended to obviate the false interpretations, which might be occasioned in the two houses by the article of the proclamation, which is the subject of it: I flattered myself by these means to contribute toward the maintenance of that harmony and of that cordiality between the two states, of which I with joy remarked the expression in the assurance, which you gave me, that it is no less desired by his Britannic majesty, than by the king of the French.,

Since then the proclamation of the 21. of May by no means disturbed the harmony, which subsisted between the courts of Great Britain and France, it seems unnecessary, in a history of their political conduct, to

8. Ib. p. 261.

9. Ib. p. 262.

say any thing further on the subject. But an eminent writer has endeavoured to excite a suspicion, that, beside the avowed object of suppressing sedition, the proclamation had a *secres* tendency, and that "at this time the seeds of war were sown, which we have ever since been unfortunately reaping." I request therefore every impartial man, to re-consider the conduct of the British government toward France, as described in the preceding chapters of this work: I request him to recollect the absolute refusal to join the coalition, to remember the strict regard paid to the principles of neutrality, in the rejection of the advantageous offer made by the colonists of St. Domingo, to take a review of the general conduct of administration from the opening of parliament on the 31. of January 1792 to its prorogation on the 15. of June, and then seriously ask himself, whether it could be the design of the British government in May 1792 to engage in a war with France. At that time Mr. Pitt's favourite object was a diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, the promotion of commerce, and of general welfare throughout the kingdom, the attainment of which would necessarily be impeded by the expences of a foreign war. Is it possible that a minister could at one instant speak with enthusiasm of the advantages, which he proposed to obtain for his country, and yet resolve at the next instant to sacrifice all these advan-

rages without any reason? Whoever can admit this supposition, must possess a faith, which bids defiance to all the rules of probability. Why then is it conjectured, that it was Pitt's design in May 1792 to involve England in a war with France? Because a royal proclamation was issued on the 21. of this month against seditious writings! It is inferred therefore that, because a government takes measures to preserve *peace at home*, it has formed a resolution to engage in a *war abroad*! But if the inference be really valid, it operates much more forcibly against the other party, and proves that the national assembly had long before the period in question resolved on a war with England: for every decree, which had been made against the French royalists, affords just as good a proof of an hostile disposition toward England, as a proclamation against English democrats of an hostile disposition toward France. That the British cabinet however was far from entertaining any sentiments of hostility toward France, when this proclamation was issued, is a fact, which has been admitted not only by the old but even by the *new* government of that country. Mr. Chauvelin in his Note of the 18. of June, which was written nearly a month after the appearance of the proclamation, declared, that he had received orders from his court, to thank his Britannic Majesty for his *friendly dispositions, his sentiments of humanity, of justice and*

of peace ¹⁰: and when Lord Gower quitted Paris, after the king was dethroned, he received a Note from Le Brun, in the name of the executive council, containing the following declaration, "The French nation has reason to hope, that the British cabinet will not depart, at this critical moment, from *that justice, that moderation and that impartiality, which it has hitherto displayed* ¹¹," Mr. Chauvelin himself likewise in a letter sent to his own government on the 17. of July ¹² bore ample testimony to the friendly dispositions of the British court. When the advocates of the French therefore contend that government endeavoured in May 1792 to promote a war with France, they assert what their clients themselves deny. In fact, there is no connexion whatsoever between the premises and the conclusion, unless certain intermediate ideas be introduced, which will hardly occur to any man, who is a real lover of his country. That they, who wish to overturn the British constitution, have considered the cause of the French as their own, and have regar-

10. See the preceding chapter, Note 9.

11. "La nation Française a lieu d'espérer que le cabinet Britannique ne se départira point, en ce moment décisif, de la justice, de la moderation, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu'à présent., Moniteur 26. Aug. 1792.

12. This letter, which is printed in the Moniteur 29. July 1792, will be quoted at length in the eighth chapter.

ded therefore the proclamation of the 21. of May, which was certainly inimical to *them*, as inimical likewise to France, is very possible. But then they must not give too great a latitude to their conclusion: by the word "France,, they must not understand the French government, and still less the French nation at large: for the Jacobins, though their influence was very great, had not brought matters so far in May 1792, that they could be considered at that time, as constituting either the French government, or the representation of the whole body of the people. The utmost therefore that can be inferred, by help of this association of ideas, is, that the proclamation was inimical to a certain society in Paris. Now this society had either entered into the views of those persons, against whom the proclamation was levelled, or it had not. In the latter case, the general expression "fundry persons in foreign parts,, could no more affect the Jacobins, than any other society in Europe. In the former case, they had still less cause for complaint, since he, who makes the first attack, can have no reason to take it ill, if his adversary defends himself. And in this latter case, which admits of no doubt ¹³, those writers, who endeavour to throw the blame of the present war on the British government, will defeat

their own purpose, if they consider the term "Jacobin club," as synonymous with France at large: but if this synonymity be rejected, all appearance of foundation for the inference, that the proclamation was inimical to France, is removed.

CHAPTER VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15. of June. Speech from the throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June, requesting the mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British cabinet. Reflexions on this Subject.

On the 15. of June the British Parliament, after a session replete with measures, which indicated the expectation of continued peace, was prorogued with a speech from the throne ¹, in which his Majesty, after expressing his satisfaction at the steps, which had been taken for the diminution of the public burdens, and the reduction of the national debt, proceeded as follows. "I have seen with great concern the commencing of hostilities in different parts of Europe. In

1. Annual Register 1792. State Papers, p. 196: or New Annual Register. Public Papers, p. 58.

“the present situation of affairs it will be my principal
“care to maintain that harmony and good understand-
“ing, which subsists between me and the several belli-
“gerent powers, and to preserve to my people the un-
“interrupted blessings of peace. And the assurances,
“which I receive from all quarters, of a friendly dispo-
“sition toward this country, afford me the pleasing
“hope of succeeding in these endeavours.”

Within three days however after the prorogation of Parliament, a proposal was made on the part of France, which, had it been accepted, would have effectually disturbed the repose then enjoyed by Great Britain. On the 18. of June namely Mr. Chauvelin communicated a Note to Lord Grenville ², in which the mediation of the British Cabinet was requested, between France and the allied powers of Austria and Prussia. In this Note, after an introduction, expressive of the friendly conduct of Great Britain on the one hand ³, and the danger which threatened France from the two great continental powers on the other, the

2. The French original is printed in the *Moniteur* 20. July 1792, under the title, *Copie de la Note adressée à Milord Grenville par M. Chauvelin du 18. Juin 1792.* An English translation of it is in the *Annual Register* 1792. *State Papers*, p. 263.

3. See above, *Chapt. V. Note 9.*

interposition of the former was requested on the following grounds, and in the following words. "The consequences of such a conspiracy formed by the concurrence of powers, who have been so long rivals, will be easily felt by his Britannic Majesty: the balance of Europe, the independence of the different powers, the general peace, every consideration, which at all times has fixed the attention of the English government, is at once exposed and threatened. The king of the French presents these serious and important considerations to the solicitude and the friendship of his Britannic Majesty. Strongly penetrated with the marks of interest and of affection, which he has received from him, he invites him to seek in his wisdom, in his situation, and in his influence, means compatible with the independence of the French nation, to stop, while it is still time, the confederacy, etc.,

To this proposal, which involved the interests and the tranquillity of Great Britain, was returned on the 8. of July, after mature deliberation, the following answer ⁴. "His Majesty has thought, that in the existing circumstances of the war now begun, the in-

4. The French original is printed in the *Moniteur* 20. July 1792, and an English translation in the *Annual Register* immediately after M. Chauvelin's Note.

"tervention of his councils, or of his good offices,
"cannot be of use, *unless they should be desired by all*
"the parties interested."

The refusal of the British cabinet to interpose between France and the other belligerent powers, unless those powers likewise desired its mediation, was certainly the most prudent conduct, which could have been adopted. Yet this prudent conduct has been the subject of severe reprehension; and ministers have been censured, for not standing forward as the champions of France. Had France then so strong a claim on the gratitude of Great Britain, as to be entitled to expect, that we should involve ourselves in a war merely on her account? For every one knows, that a mediation, unsupported by an armament, must be wholly ineffectual, and Mr. Chauvelin himself had very clearly suggested, that the requested mediation was to consist, not in bare solicitations, but in effectual and decisive measures. Let us ask then: For whom was England to take these effectual and decisive measures? For whom was England to engage in a continental war? For whom was England to sacrifice those advantages, which were then the favourite objects of government, and which could not be preserved without a continuance of peace? For a nation, which has never ceased to be our mortal enemy: for a nation, which has

embraced every opportunity of humbling its neighbour, which never saw the British government in distress, without taking ungenerous advantage of it, and at the beginning of the very last war, which was concluded hardly ten years before the period in question, had proved itself as treacherous as hostile! Strange therefore was the request of France; and still more strange the censure of British subjects, because it was refused. This censure ill becomes those, who accuse ministers of being the authors of the war, which broke out in the following year, unless the case of commencing hostilities *in favour* of France is to be excepted from the general animadversion. The requested mediation has been termed indeed an act of peace, and the non-acceptance of it has been represented, as indicating a disposition to hostilities. But since this pretended act of peace would have previously involved us in a war, before any effect could have been produced, we may rather conclude, that the same principle of neutrality, and the same desire to avoid hostilities in general, which had induced the British cabinet, to refuse to join the adversaries of France, occasioned likewise the resolution to take no part against them. And as to the supposed hostile disposition toward France, at the time when the answer of the British cabinet was given, it is completely contradicted by the avowal of the French themselves, by Mr. Chauvelin's Letter to

his own government of the 17. of July, and by Le Brun's Note to Lord Gower on his departure from Paris in the month of August ⁵.

Suppose however that the British government had accepted the proffered mediation, and, what must necessarily have taken place, unless the mediation was to consist in mere words, had resolved to join France, if the other parties refused to accept it, the resolution though highly detrimental to ourselves, would have rendered very little service to those, who required it. The danger, which at that time threatened France, proceeded not from any maritime power, but from the two great continental powers, Austria and Prussia, in comparison of whose armies, that of Great Britain in the year 1792, at least in point of number, was a mere nothing. A mediation therefore could have produced no effect, unless these two powers *voluntarily* consented to it: and for this very reason the answer of the British cabinet was the most proper, which could be given. The case would have been totally different, if France had been engaged in a war at sea, since Great Britain, with its formidable fleet, would then have possessed the means of obliging the adversaries of France to accept its mediation. But even

5. See the latter part of the preceding chapter.

in this case, it would have been imprudent to have incurred the expenses of a naval armament: for the experiment had been already made, when we attempted a mediation between Russia and the Porte, and had met with sufficient opposition to dissuade ministers from making a second attempt of the same kind, within so short a period after the first.

I have hitherto argued on the supposition that the French government really wished for the re-establishment of peace. That the king of France himself sincerely wished it, may be readily granted: but on the 8. of July, when the answer of the British cabinet was given, the government of France had ceased to be vested in the hands of the king. It is true that he was not *formally* deposed till a month after the period in question: but nearly three weeks had elapsed after the celebrated 20. of June, and from this day the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, was lodged in the national assembly. Consequently, it was the business of the British cabinet, in all matters relative to the political situation of the two countries, to regulate its conduct by the views and motives of this assembly. The question therefore is: Did the national assembly, or at least a majority of its members, at the time of the proposed mediation, sincerely wish the re-establishment of peace? Or did they did not,

on the contrary, ardently wish for a continuance of the war? This question shall be minutely examined.

It was hardly two months, before Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June was presented to the British government, that the national assembly had decreed the war against the King of Hungary, with an unanimity and an enthusiasm, which clearly proved, that in the opinion of almost all its members war was more advantageous to them than peace ⁶. Even so early as the 29. of December 1791 Brissot had declared in the national assembly, that "war was a real benefit to the nation, and that the only evil, which they had to dread, was the not having war ⁷,"; and a few

6. See the debates in the Moniteur 22. April 1792. In vain said Mr. Becquet, one of the seven members, who alone out of the seven hundred and fifty voted against the war, "Renouçons à une entreprise qui n'a aucun objet réel; bornons nous à nous défendre, si quelque puissance nous attaque, et probablement nous n'aurons pas de guerre:," for his speech excited in the assembly a violent tumult.

7. "La guerre est actuellement un bienfait national, et la seule calamité qu'il y ait à redouter, c'est de n'avoir pas la guerre.," Moniteur 31. Dec. 1791. Even two months before, in a debate of the 20. of October 1791, Brissot had said: "Il ne faut pas seulement vous défendre, il faut attaquer vous même.," See Lally Tolendal Défense des Emigrés Français. Tom. I. p. 189.

days after, Isnard explained to the assembly, in what *respect* a war was to be considered as a national benefit, namely as being the means of completing the revolution ⁸. The completion of the revolution therefore, or, in other words, the deposition of the king and the establishment of a republic, was to be effected by a foreign war, which should divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders. That this was the real object of the war, which was declared against Austria, the chiefs of the revolution avowed openly, as soon as their object was attained. For on the very day after the national convention had decreed the abolition of royalty in France ⁹, Brissot boasted in his celebrated journal, that "without the war the "revolution of the 10. of August would not have taken "place, that without the war France would not have

8. "Une guerre est prête à s'allumer, *guerre indispensable pour consommer la révolution.*," *Moniteur* 6. Jan. 1792. On the 4. of January the same orator had already said: "Que tous les Français accourent au club des Jacobins; "voici le moment où nous allons publier la guerre.," See Lally Tolendal *Défense des Emigrés Français*. T. I. p. 198.

9. This decree, which was the first act of the national convention, passed on the 21. of September 1792. See the *Moniteur* 22. Sept. 1792.

"become a republic ¹⁰,": and a few weeks afterwards he declared in the most positive and unequivocal terms, that "it was the abolition of royalty, which he had in view, when he provoked the declaration of war ¹¹," Louvet also, in his Address to Robespierre said, "We wished for war, we genuine Jacobins, because peace was certainly destructive to the republic ¹²,": and a few lines afterwards he added, "republicans, who were worthy of the name, demanded the war, they dared aspire to the lasting renown, to the immortal honour, of abolishing royalty itself, of abolishing it for ever, at first in France, and then throughout the world ¹³,"

10. "Sans la guerre la révolution du 10. Août n'aurait pas eu lieu: sans la guerre la France ne serait pas republicque., Journal du Patriote Français, 22. Sept. 1792.

11. "C'était l'abolition de la royauté, que j'avais en vue, en faisant déclarer la guerre., Brissot à tous les républicains de France sur les Jacobins (Paris Oct. 1792) p. 8.

12. "Nous voulions la guerre, nous purs jacobins, parcequ' à coup sûr la paix tuait la république., I. B. Louvet à Maximilien Robespierre et à ses royalistes (Dec. 1792) p. 18.

13. "Ils appellaient la guerre les républicains dignes de l'être: ils osaient aspirer à la gloire solide, à l'immortel honneur de tuer la royauté même, de la tuer à jamais, d'abord en France, et puis dans l'univers., Ib. Likewise Collot d'Herbois said: "Nous avons voulu la guerre, parceque la guerre

The object therefore of the national assembly in involving France in a war, lies open to public view: and in order to attain this favourite object, the principal members of it had such a thirst after hostilities, and so frequently expressed it in their public speeches and writings, that if any man should take the pains to collect the scattered expressions on this subject, from the *Moniteur* and other political publications, he might fill with them a complete volume. Cambon even declared, that "it was necessary to break with *all* the courts ¹⁴," and Brissot himself acknowledges, that the resolution was formed "to set all Europe at defiance ¹⁵,". Lastly, as soon as the plan, which had been long in agitation, approached to its maturity, this same Brissot

devait tuer la royauté., See Lally Tollendal *Défence* etc. T. I. p. 208. And Cambon after, the war had begun to take a favourable turn, made the following declaration in the name of the three united committees of war, finance and diplomacy, "Ils se sont demandé d'abord quel est l'objet de "la guerre que vous avez entreprise? C'est sans doute l'ané-
"antissement de tous les privilèges., *Moniteur* 18. Dec. 1792.

14. "Il faut rompre avec tous les cabinets., These words of Cambon are quoted by Brissot in his work *A ses Commettians* (Paris 1793) p. 74.

15. "Voilà les grandes idées, qu'il fallait concevoir, "qu'il fallait executer, puisque l'on voulait braver toute
"l'Europe., *Ib.* p. 73.

went so far as to assert: „We must set fire to the four
“corners of Europe, for there lies our salvation”¹⁶„

This salvation was first fought in a war with Austria: and in order to effect it, the first step taken by the national assembly was the removal of De Lessart, Narbonne, Bertrand de Molleville, with the other French cabinet ministers, who as well as the king himself were desirous of preserving peace, and the appointment of a new ministry, which consisted entirely of jacobins, and agreeably to the wishes of the national assembly obliged the king, to propose a declaration of war¹⁷. It cannot be here objected that the members of the national assembly demanded a declaration of war *merely* because they themselves were apprehensive of a similar declaration on the part of Austria, and that they had *no other object* in view than to secure to themselves the advantages arising from the first attack: for their own confessions prove the contrary. Nor is it

16. “Il faut incendier les quatre coins de l’Europe: notre salut est là. These words are quoted from one of Brissot’s letters by Mallet du Pan in his *Considérations sur la nature de la révolution Française*., (Londres 1793) p. 37.

17. “Le ministère fut alors complètement composé de “jacobins, qui sous la protection du côté gauche de l’assemblée demandaient à grands cris une déclaration de guerre.” Bertrand de Molleville *Memoires secrets*. T. II. p. 145.

by any means so probable, as is commonly supposed, that the Austrian cabinet would have declared war against France, even if the national assembly had not declared war against Austria. It is true that in the year 1791 a coalition had been formed against France: but in April 1792, when France declared war against Austria, the coalition, which even in 1791 had produced no effect, appeared to have been abandoned. The king of Sweden, one of the chief instigators to a war with France was already murdered ¹⁸: and after his death the state of politicks in Sweden took a totally new turn. The Emperor Leopold was likewise dead ¹⁹: and his successor Francis II. gave no indications of a warlike disposition ²⁰. The character of Leopold was likewise pacific: and there is reason to believe that it was not his design to commence hostilities against France, but merely to alarm the jacobins by a junction

18. It was on the 18. of March 1792, that the king of Sweden was mortally wounded by the murderer Ankerström.

19. The Emperor Leopold died on the 1. of March 1792, and almost as suddenly as the king of Sweden.

20. Even a month before the declaration of war, Dumouriez, then minister for foreign affairs, wrote a letter to the French ambassador at Vienna, dated 18. March 1792, in which he said: "*Les affaires doivent prendre par la mort de Léopold une nouvelle marche.*" His letter is printed in the *Moniteur* 18. April, 1792.

of several powers, and to deter them from offering violence to the persons of his brother in law and his own sister, whose fate he could not regard with indifference ²¹. That it was the wish, neither of Leopold, nor of his ministers, to engage in a war with France, is attested by the Marquis de Bouillé, who was well acquainted with the sentiments of the Austrian cabinet ²². And if the testimony of a friend of Louis XVI.

21. In a note to the French ambassador at Vienna, which is printed in the *Moniteur* 24. Dec. 1791, he expressed himself as follows. “On ne peut plus douter de ma façon de penser sur les affaires de la France. Ma dernière déclaration, et les ordres que j’ai fait donner par mon gouverneur à Bruxelles à l’agent des émigrés Français prouvent que je regarde mon beau frère comme libre, et que mon intention n’est pas de me mêler des affaires de son royaume, aussi long tems que les Français lui laisseront tout ce qu’ils lui ont assuré volontairement, et ce qu’il a volontairement accepté dans le nouveau contract constitutionnel.,

22. In his *Memoires sur la révolution Française*, T. II. p. 136, where he speaks of his arrival in Prague at the coronation of the Emperor, he says: “J’y arrivai au commencement de Septembre, et j’y restai huit ou dix jours sans recevoir le moindre ordre de l’empereur. J’y appris, de manière à n’en pouvoir plus douter, que les dispositions du cabinet de Vienne n’étaient point du tout à la guerre; et je dois au marechal de Lasca la justice de déclarer, qu’il m’a plusieurs fois répété, que les ressources de la France étaient immenses, ses frontières impénétrables, et qu’il ne

be thought insufficient, we may produce the confession of the opposite party. On the 20. of October 1791, nearly two months after the conference at Pillnitz, Brissot declared to the national assembly, "I can assure you, that there is no reason to be alarmed at the conduct of the court of Austria. Its sovereign loves peace, and wishes for peace. — All circumstances unite, to induce Leopold to abstain from displaying the force of arms ²³., On the 29. of December 1791

"presserait jamais la declaration d'une guerre, qui dans son opinion pourrait avoir les suites les plus defastreuses pour l'empereur et pour l'empire. Telle étoit aussi, je l'avouerai, l'avis de tous les ministres imperiaux. Léopold espérait toujours terminer les affaires de France par une négociation., This moderate conduct of the Emperor was so much the more commendable, as the K. of Prussia was decidedly in favour of war: for M. de Bouillé in relating the conference at Pillnitz (*Memoires*, T. II. p. 134) says: "Les vues de l'Empereur étaient pacifiques. *Le Roi de Prusse au contraire voulait absolument la guerre.* Plusieurs circonstances de cette entrevue ne me permettent pas de douter des dispositions dont ces deux Souverains étaient animés. Elles m'ont d'ailleurs été confirmées par des personnes qui jouissaient de leur confiance.,

23. "Je dois vous rassurer sur la conduite de la cour autrichienne. Son chef aime la paix, veut la paix. — Tout fait à Léopold la loi, de ne point déployer la force des armes., *Moniteur* 22. Oct. 1791.

Brissot said again, "The wavering measures of the cabinet of Vienna afford us no reason to apprehend a war on the part of the Emperor. As prince, he wishes for peace: as head of the German empire, he gives himself the *air* of wishing for war ²⁴." And this confession was so much the more remarkable, as it was delivered in the very same speech, in which Brissot recommended war, as a national benefit to France ²⁵. From the 29. of December 1791, when the pacific designs of Leopold were acknowledged in the national assembly, till the time of his death, no circumstances occurred, which could excite a suspicion of his having changed his political system. On the contrary, all his measures evinced a determined resolution, to avoid hostilities with France. At the request of the French government, all military exercise and the assembling of troops was strictly forbidden to the emigrants on the borders of Germany ²⁶: and so con-

24. "Les oscillations du cabinet de Vienne ne doivent pas nous faire redouter la guerre de la part de l'Empereur. Comme prince il veut la paix: comme chef de l'empire germanique il a l'*air* de vouloir la guerre." Moniteur 30. Dec. 1791.

25. See Note 7.

26. By desire of the Emperor, the Elector of Treves issued an edict, (printed in the Moniteur 10. Jan. 1792) in which he engaged to fulfil the following articles.

ciliatory was Leopold in his conduct toward the national assembly, that when the Prince of Condé, with

1. De faire quitter l'Electorat dans huit jours d'ici, ou disperfer tous ceux qui portent la dénomination d'un corps militaire.

2. Toute espece d'exercise militaire sera défendu iterativement, et ceux qui agiront contre l'ordonnance seront tenus de quitter l'électorat dans trois jours; et à cette fin on dénoncera les logemens.

3. Tous les recruteurs étrangers, à l'exception de ceux de sa majesté l'empereur seront arrêtés et condamnés; suivant une ordonnance emanée depuis deux mois, à la foretresse, et aux travaux publics pour deux ans.

In the other articles, it was strictly forbidden to furnish the emigrants with ammunition, horses, waggon, or any thing which could assist them in military operations. And with regard to the Electorate of Mayence, the French minister himself resident at that court gave the following testimony in a Note to his own government, printed in the *Moniteur* 2. Feb. 1792, "que ni dans l'archevêché de Mayence, ni dans l'évêché de Worms, il ne s'était fait de rassemblemens militaires „ Further the Emperor himself in his letter to the Elector of Treves (printed in the *Moniteur* 24. Jan. 1792) said, "he had given orders, that in that case, and in that case only, (dans ce cas déterminé, et dans aucun autre, as "expressed in the *Moniteur*) that he should be attacked by "the French without having given provocation by permitting "the emigrants to arm and assemble on his territories (sans "que nous y eussions donné lieu en favorisant ou en tolérant

about eleven hundred emigrants, after having been ordered on the 2. of January 1792 to depart from Worms, retreated to Ettenheim, he gave further orders to the prince to depart likewise from that place ²⁷. In the Austrian Netherlands the number of troops did not exceed the usual peace establishment: and neither magazines were formed, nor any other measures taken, which indicated a preparation for war ²⁸. Yet at this very time, France itself made the most vigorous military exertions: for it appears by the official report of the war minister to the national assembly on the 12. of January 1792, that there were already assem-

“des attroupemens ou des préparatifs de guerre de la part “des Français émigrés) Austrian troops should be sent into “the electorate., This order, which clearly evinced the resolution of the Emperor to act only on the defensive, was with the usual French artifice on the 20. of April 1792, the day on which war was declared, converted into an act of hostility, by omitting all the words, which I have placed in parentheses, and thus metamorphosed was, for want of better reasons, alleged as one of the motives to a war with Austria. See the *Moniteur* 21. April 1791.

27. Lally Tollendal *Défense des Émigrés*, T. I. p. 196.

28. It is a well-known fact, that, when the French army invaded the Netherlands soon after the declaration of war against Austria, General Beaulieu was so little prepared for their reception, that he was obliged to order post horses to expedite the transport of artillery.

bled on the borders, from Dunkirk to Besançon, two hundred and forty battalions, an hundred and sixty squadrons, and artillery sufficient for an army of two hundred thousand men. The war minister further reported, that magazines, sufficient to supply two hundred and thirty thousand men, and twenty two thousand horses, for six months, were already prepared, and that the most active measures were then taking for a further augmentation of them ²⁹. This extraordinary armament, and these vigourous preparations, could not have merely the French emigrants for their object, or be designed merely to protect the frontiers from an invasion on their part: for even if the emigrants had been permitted to form themselves into a military corps, which they really were not, still the whole number of those, who had attached themselves, as well to the brothers of the king, as to the prince of Condé, did not *at that time* exceed four thousand seven hundred ³⁰. Nor could the armament have been

29. "Depuis Dunquerque jusqu' à Besançon l'armée présente une masse de 240 bataillons, et 160 escadrons avec l'artillerie nécessaire pour 200 mille hommes. Les magasins, tant en vivres qu'en fourage, assurent la subsistance de 230 mille hommes, et 22 mille chevaux, pendant six mois. On travaille à la plus grande activité à les augmenter encore." *Moniteur* 14. Jan. 1792.

30. Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés. T. I. p. 196.

a mere *defensive* measure against the Emperor, since Brissot himself had acknowledged only fourteen days, before the war minister made his report to the national assembly, that the designs of Leopold were pacific. It was evidently therefore the intention of the national assembly to act on the offensive, which actual experience soon afterwards confirmed ³¹.

197. It is true that at the latter end of July, when the Duke of Brunswick was at Coblenz, their number was thrice as great: but more than three months had then elapsed after the declaration of war.

31. I shall not investigate any further the origin of the war between France and Austria, because the present history is confined to the relations between France and Great Britain. Whoever wishes to examine the subject more fully, may consult the correspondence between the courts of France and Austria from Jan. 15. to April 7, 1792, printed in Rivingtons Annual Register 1792, State Papers, p. 212 — 242: the counter-declaration of the Austrian court of the 4. of July compared with the report delivered to the national assembly on the 20. of April: Lally Tollendal Défense des Emigrés Français, T. I. p. 189 — 209; and the Collection des meilleurs ouvrages qui ont été publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI. T. I. p. 307 — 313. 335 — 338. In this last place is printed a remarkable letter written to Necker on the 8. of July 1792 by Delessart, late minister for foreign affairs, from his prison at Orleans, in which he says: “Je commence à croire, que toutes les difficultés possibles sont épuisées; la communication des pièces qui m’étaient nécessaires va

But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Austria would have attacked France, if France had not attacked Austria, it will still remain an undeniable fact, that the national assembly, or at least a very great majority of its members, were as desirous of war, as any sovereign in Europe could be. The testimonies of its leading members, which have been already quoted, remove the question beyond all doubt. The same testimonies further prove, that the grand object of the national assembly in declaring war against Austria, was to effect the deposition of the king, and the abolition of royalty in France ³². But this grand object

*"bientôt me mettre en état de travailler à ma défense. Mais
 "je regretterai toute ma vie, qu'elle n'a pu paroître dans le
 "moment actuel; car elle sera curieuse, non pas pour ce
 "qui sera de moi, mais par la manifestation de ce qui s'est
 "passé dans les cours étrangères; par la démonstration qu'on
 "ne voulait point nous faire la guerre; par la preuve sans re-
 "pliche, que c'est nous, qui l'avons provoquée, qui l'avons
 "commencée, qui avons mis l'Europe contre nous.,* This testimony is so much the more credible, as Delessart could have no view of deriving any advantage from it, since it was delivered, in a private letter, to a man in a private station, and then resident out of France.

32. A secondary motive was the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, where they had already a considerable party. It is true that on the very day, on which war was declared against Austria, they made the most positive declaration,

was not yet attained, when the mediation of Great Britain was requested: for Mr. Chauvelin's Note was dated the 18. of June, and the king of France was not dethroned before the 10. of August. Consequently, had it been in the power of the British cabinet to have instantly produced a general peace, the national assembly would in all probability have declared war a second time: for if a general peace had taken place in June 1792, and that peace had continued, the king of France would have preserved both his life, and his crown. But it is evident that the leaders of the national assembly were resolved to run all hazards, rather than not attain their favourite object. The danger from without gave them very little concern, provided they could continue without interruption their intrigues,

“de n'entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquêtes.,, *Moniteur* 22. Avril 1792. But at present we all known by experience, what construction is to be put on French declarations. Mr. Becquet however said very candidly on the day on which war was declared: “Elle (l’Autriche) n’a pris, depuis que les négociations sont entamées, que des mesures defensives; trois armées formidables bordaient vos frontieres; elle n’y a opposé qu’un nombre de troupes très inferieur. Vous le savez, et sans doute vous ne voulez l’attaquer en ce moment, que parceque vous êtes certains d’être plus préparés qu’elle dans vos mesures.,, *Moniteur* 22. Avril 1792.

in the interior: and for this reason the march of the Prussian army made no alteration in the sentiments, which they entertained, when they declared war against Austria. They knew likewise beforehand, that a declaration of war against Austria included a declaration of war against Prussia; for these two powers had in February 1792 concluded a defensive treaty, by which it was stipulated, that in case either of the contracting parties should be attacked, the other party should immediately send a succour of fifteen thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and, if these should be deemed insufficient, augment their number according to the nature of the circumstances ³³. All this was known to the

33. The genuine treaty, concluded between Austria and Prussia in Feb. 1792, is printed in Martens Recueil des principaux Traités, T. V. p. 77 — 81. and is merely defensive, not offensive, as some writers have asserted. The preliminaries are dated 7. of February, the ratification 19. of February: and this date proves the spuriousness of the pretended offensive treaty, which bears date the 18. of February, and is printed in the Moniteur 13. April 1792. Even the editor of the Moniteur did not venture to assert its authenticity: for he called it only “une piece qui *paroît* authentique.” And the national assembly was fully persuaded of its spuriousness, as appears from the circumstance, that a whole week had elapsed after its appearance in the Moniteur, when

the members of the national assembly, before they decreed war against Austria: it cannot therefore be said, that they were threatened in the month of June with a danger, which they did not apprehend in the month of April. And that during this interval they had not changed their sentiments, is evident from all their speeches: for whoever consults the *Moniteur*, from the declaration of war against Austria to the proposal of a mediation, will find that not a single expression escaped the leaders of the assembly, which indicated a disposition to peace. The augmentation of the force, with which they had to contend, diminished not in the least their ardour for hostilities: on the contrary, as Brissot himself said: "vast ideas, grand designs, and an object sublime and difficult, were ne-

the war against Austria war decreed, and yet it was not mentioned among the motives, which were alleged in justification of the war, though the offensive treaty, had it really existed, would have been the best vindication, which the national assembly could have produced. It must be referred therefore to the class of fabrications, which the French rulers and their advocates have propagated with great industry and success: and we may safely conclude, that it was inserted in the *Moniteur* a week before the intended declaration of war, in order to prepare men's minds for the event.

"cessary to form men and a great nation ³⁴., It was in fact their *own* desire, "to break with *all* the courts:,, it was their own resolution "to set all Europe at defiance:,, it was their own determination "to set the four corners of Europe on fire ³⁵.,

These are the men, for whom Great Britain was requested to procure the blessings of *peace*: these are the men, for whose sakes the British government has been so severely reprehended for not attempting to confer a favour, which the former were as unwilling to accept ³⁶, as the latter was unable to bestow. The

34. "Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un but sublime et difficile., Brissot à ses Commettans p. 76.

35. See the 14, 15 and 16 notes to this chapter.

36. Beside the motives already alleged, another reason would have induced the national assembly in the summer of 1792 to reject all offers of peace, namely, fear for their own personal safety. For Roland, the French minister of the interior, said at that time to a friend of Mr. Miles in France: "Peace is out of the question, we have 300,000 men in arms, "we must make them march as far as their legs will carry "them; or they will return and cut our throats., See the Authentic correspondence with Mr. Le Brun the French minister and others to February 1793 inclusive. London 1796. 8. p. 144. 2. ed. The same reason, independent of schemes of ambition, prevents likewise the Directory from

advocates therefore of the French, who represent them as "solicitous for peace,,", defend them on grounds, which were openly and avowedly discarded by their clients themselves: and if Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the 18. of June be regarded as a request from the national assembly, it will become a proof of the blackest hypocrisy. — Consequently, in whatever light we view the answer of the British cabinet of the 8. of July, it is in every respect unexceptionable.

making a general peace: for the moment the French armies cease to be occupied with the plunder of foreign countries, they will demand, with arms in their hands, the promised thousand millions, and, as it will be impossible to pay them, will overturn the present government. Unhappy constitution, which requires for its support the wretchedness of all Europe!

CHAPTER VIII.

Sensation produced in France by the sailing of five ships of the line and a few frigates from Portsmouth, to perform naval evolutions in the channel. Proposal made in the national assembly of an immediate armament of thirty ships of the line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own government, containing positive assurances, that the British cabinet had no views of hostility. Resolution of the national assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval armament was unnecessary.

On the 11. of July 1792 a small fleet sailed from Portsmouth under the command of Admiral Lord Hood, to perform naval evolutions in the channel. The whole fleet consisted only five ships of the line, beside frigates and sloops: it had only a fortnight's provision on board, and had manifestly no other destination, than a sea-review ¹, which, being nothing new in England, ought no more to have excited alarm, than a land-

1. All these circumstances are confirmed by Chauvelin's Letter.

review at Potsdam or Berlin. The matter however was so magnified in France, and was represented in so false a light, that on the 26. of July an immediate armament of thirty ships of the line was proposed in the national assembly, and the marine committee was ordered to draw up a report on the subject, and present it within a few days ².

In the mean time the following Letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Mr. Chambonas dated London 17. July 1792 was published ³.

"You may have seen, Sir, from the public papers of this country, that a fleet, which has lately sailed from Portsmouth, has been for some time the topic of conversation. From all the information, which I have endeavoured to procure from the moment I had knowlege of it, I have partaken, and still partake

2. See the Moniteur 28. July 1792.

3. It was printed in the Moniteur 29. July 1792, and in the original is as follows.

"Londres le 17. Juillet 1792.

"Monsieur, vous avez pu voir dans les papiers publics de ce pays ci, que depuis assez long tems il a été question de l'escadre qui vient de sortir du port de Portsmouth. D'apres tous les renseignements, que je me suis empressé de prendre dès le premier moment que j'en ai eu connaissance, j'ai partagé à ce sujet, et je partage encore la secu-

"on this subject of the security of the English, even
 "of those who are the most jealous of the operations of
 "government. They have all been, and are still of
 "opinion, that the armament has no other object, than
 "to exercise the English sailors in certain evolutions,
 "and to prepare for the royal family, in the following
 "month, the spectacle of a sea-review, which may be
 "considered as the counterpart of the camp at Bagshot.
 "The silence therefore, which I have observed, Sir,
 "on this subject, must prove to you my conviction, that
 "the armament is of no importance: and I should not
 "have broken silence even now, without the alarms
 "signified to me by some Frenchmen lately arrived
 "from the continent, who seem still to entertain *certain*

"rité de tous les Anglais même les plus jaloux des opera-
 "tions du gouvernement. Tous ont pensé et pensent encore,
 "que cet armement n'a d'autre objet que de faire faire quel-
 "ques evolutions aux matelots Anglais, et de préparer pour
 "la famille royale, pour le mois prochain, le spectacle d'une
 "revue, qu'on peut regarder comme le pendant de celle du
 "camp de Bagshot. Aussi, Monsieur, le silence que j'ai gardé
 "à cet égard, aura-t-il sans doute été pour vous une preuve
 "du peu d'importance qu'on doit attacher à cet armement,
 "et je n'aurais pas rompu ce silence sans les alarmes que
 "m'ont temoignées quelques Français, qui récemment arri-
 "vés du Continent paraissent avoir conservé *certaines fausses*
 "*idées sur les dispositions du gouvernement Anglais.* Ce n'est
 "donc que pour rassurer ceux qui en France pourraient pen-

“false notions on the dispositions of the English govern-
 “ment. With a view therefore of removing the appré-
 “hensions of those who may be of the same opinion in
 “France, especially as in similar cases objects seen at a
 “distance are magnified rather than diminished, I have
 “determined, Sir, to give you an account of the arma-
 “ment, of which I send you a list, and to assure you,
 “that all the intelligence, which I have been able to
 “collect, unites in convincing me, that the armament
 “has no relation whatsoever either to France in parti-
 “cular, or to the continent in general.”

The minister plenipotentiary of France.

Signed, Chauvelin.

“ser comme eux, d'autant plus que dans de pareils cas les
 “objets vus de loin grossissent plutôt qu'ils ne diminuent,
 “que je me suis déterminé de vous rendre compte, Monsieur,
 “de cet armement dont je vous envoie la liste, et à vous
 “assurer, que toutes les données que j'ai pu recueillir se
 “réunissent à me convaincre, qu'il n'est en aucune manière
 “relatif aux affaires, soit de la France en particulier, soit du
 “continent en général.

“Le ministre plénipotentiaire de France.

“Signé, Chauvelin.

“Liste des Vaisseaux sortis le 11. Juillet au matin du port de
 “Portsmouth, pour croiser dans la Manche, sous le com-
 “mandement de Lord Hood.

On the 4. of August, the day on which the marine committee had been ordered to make its report, Mr. Forfaix, the chairman of the committee, read Mr. Chauvelin's Letter before the national assembly: and it was considered as so satisfactory, in regard to the sentiments of the British cabinet, that the proposed armament was declared unnecessary ⁴. We have the testimony therefore of the national assembly itself, that the British cabinet, as far as August 1792, had no hostile views toward France.

"Vaisseaux Canons

- | | |
|-------------------|-----|
| 1. Le Duc . . . | 90. |
| 2. L'Alfred . . . | 74. |
| 3. Le Brunswick | 74. |
| 4. L'Orion . . . | 74. |
| 5. L'Annibal . . | 74. |

"Fregattes

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------|
| 6. L'Iphigenie . | 32. |
| etc. etc. | etc. |

"En commission dans le port de Plymouth: 1 vaisseau de 74.

"1 de 24, 2 cutters de 16, 1 yacht de 10.

"L'escadre n'a des vivres à son bord que pour quinze jours.,

4. See *Moniteur* 6. Aug. 1792.

CHAPTER IX.

Recall of the British ambassador from Paris, after the king of France was dethroned. Examination of the question, whether this recall was a breach of neutrality toward France.

It is well-known, that on the 10. of August 1792 the palace of the king of France was attacked by an armed populace, that his guards were murdered, and he himself obliged to seek refuge in the national assembly, where he was at last doomed to hear the decree, by which he was deposed, and sent prisoner to the Temple. Now as according to the constitution of 1791, which placed the legislative power in the national assembly, but the executive in the hands of the king, the credentials of the British ambassador in Paris ceased after this event to be valid, his further residence in that city was deemed unnecessary. On the 17. of August therefore a letter of recall ¹ was dispatched by the

1. It is printed in Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State Papers p. 326. In this letter the following instructions were given to Lord Gower. "In all the conversations, which you may have occasion to hold before your departure, you

British government to Lord Gower, who communicated a translation of it to Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, and member of the council, to which the executive power was intrusted after the deposition of the king. To this letter the French minister returned an answer, in the name of the new republican government of France ², expressing the greatest satis-

“will take care to express yourself in a manner conformable
 “to the sentiments herein communicated to you : and you
 “will take especial care not to neglect any opportunity of
 “declaring, that at the same time *his Majesty means to observe*
“the principles of neutrality in every thing, which regards
“the arrangement of the internal government of France.,,

2. Le Brun's Note to Lord Gower is printed in the *Moniteur* 26. August 1792; and as it is a document of some importance, it is necessary to produce it at length in the original.

“Le soussigné, ministre des affaires étrangères, s'est
 “empressé à communiquer au conseil executif provisoire, la
 “lettre dont son excellence M. le comte de Gower, ambassa-
 “deur extraordinaire de S. M. Britannique lui a fait part.

“Le conseil a vu avec regret, que le cabinet britannique
 “se décidât à rappeler son ambassadeur, dont la présence
 “attestait les dispositions favorables d'une nation libre et gé-
 “néreuse, et qui n'avait jamais été l'organe que de paroles
 “amicales, et de sentimens de bienveillance. S'il est quel-
 “que chose qui puisse diminuer ce regret, c'est le renouvelle-
 “ment de l'assurance de neutralité donnée par l'Angleterre
 “à la nation Française.

faction at the friendly conduct of the British cabinet, and containing assurances, that the same justice and

“Cette assurance paraît être le résultat de l'intention
“sagement réfléchie et formellement exprimée par S. M. Bri-
“tannique, de ne point se mêler de l'arrangement intérieur
“des affaires de France. Une pareille déclaration ne peut
“surprendre de la part d'un peuple éclairé et fier, qui le
“premier a reconnu et établi le principe de la souveraineté
“nationale; qui substituant l'empire de la loi, expression de
“la volonté de tous, aux caprices arbitraires des volontés
“particulieres, le premier a donné l'exemple de soumettre
“les rois eux mêmes à ce joug salutaire, qui enfin n'a pas
“cru acheter trop cher, par de longues convulsions et de
“violens orages, la liberté à laquelle il a dû tant de gloire
“et de prospérité.

“Ce principe de souveraineté inalienable du peuple va
“se manifester d'une manière éclatante dans la Convention
“nationale, dont le Corps législatif a décrété la convocation,
“et qui fixera sans doute tous les partis et tous les intérêts.
“La nation Française a lieu d'espérer, que le cabinet britan-
“nique ne se départira point, en ce moment décisif, de la
“justice, de la modération, et de l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée
“jusqu'à présent.

“Dans cette confiance intime fondée sur les faits, le
“souffigné renouvelle à son excellence M. le comte de Gower,
“au nom du conseil exécutif provisoire, l'assurance qu'il a eu
“l'honneur de lui donner de vive voix, que les relations de
“commerce entre les deux nations, et toutes les affaires en
“général seront suivies de la part du gouvernement français

impartiality would be observed by the French executive council.

But as the recall of Lord Gower has been since represented as a violation of that neutrality, which by the acknowledgement of Le Brun himself in the above-mentioned answer, and afterwards by the acknowledgement even of the national convention ³, had been at least till that time observed by the British government, historical accuracy requires a full investigation of the subject. To determine this question, there is no necessity for previously inquiring, whether the mere *legislative* assembly of France had a right to annihilate the constitution of 1791, in which a decree of the constituent assembly had forbidden the legislative assembly to make the least alteration, which had been accepted by the king as well as by the people, and to which the legislative assembly itself had thrice sworn

“avec la même justice, et la même loyauté. Le conseil se flatte, que la réciprocité fera entière de la part du gouvernement britannique, et qu’ainsi rien n’altérera la bonne intelligence, qui regne entre les deux peuples.

“Le ministre des affaires étrangères, Le Brun.,

3. In the list of grievances alleged against the British government, at the time of the declaration of war, there is none prior to the recall of Lord Gower. See *Moniteur* 3. Feb. 1793.

allegiance, first at its meeting on the 3. of October 1791, secondly on the 7. of July 1792 in its public hall, and lastly before the altar of freedom on the 14. of July, only three weeks before the resolution was formed to overturn it. There is no necessity for inquiring, whether, after the disapprobation expressed by seventy one out of the eighty three departments at the events of the 20. of June ⁴, the legislative assembly had a right to deprive the king of his authority, though he committed none of the three misdemeanors ⁵, which alone, by the constitution of 1791, warranted his deposition. These are questions, which belong to other courts of inquiry, and we have at present only to con-

4. "Les réclamations contre la journée du 20. Juin furent générales dans tout l'empire; sur 83 départemens soixante et onze écrivirent à la législature pour demander la punition des séditieux, qui avaient offensé la loi si scandaleusement., Coll. de meilleurs ouvrages pour la défense de Louis XVI. Tom. I. p. 208. Likewise Brissot says: "Les révolutions répondait-on, ne se font qu'avec les minorités. C'est la minorité qui a fait la révolution française., A ses Commettans, p. 87.

5. Namely, the refusal to take the oath required by the constitution, the placing himself at the head of a foreign army destined to act against France, or his quitting the kingdom. See Ch. II. Sect. I. Art. 5. 6. 7. of the Constitution of 1791.

sider the result of the fact itself, whether the injustice, which occasioned it, be admitted or not ⁶.

An immediate and unavoidable consequence of the revolution of the 10. of August was a suspension of the diplomatic relations between the British ambassador in Paris and the French government; for, since his letters of credence had been made out to Louis XVI. as to the person invested with the executive power of France, they of course ceased to be of any value, after the king was deposed, and his authority transferred to a provisional executive council ⁷. There were only three possible modes therefore, which could be adopted by the British government: either to let Lord Gower continue in Paris in a private capacity: or to renew

6. However I cannot avoid quoting a remarkable confession made by the celebrated legislator Condorcet, who in his speech of the 20. of April 1792 said: "*La nation Française a une constitution, cette constitution a été reconnue, adoptée par la généralité des citoyens: elle ne peut être changée que par le vœu du peuple, et suivant les formes qu'elle même a prescrites.*" *Moniteur* 22. Avril 1792.

7. This was mentioned in the Letter to Lord Gower, of which a translation was communicated to the French minister, for it is there said: "As it appears, that in the present state of affairs the exercise of the executive power has been withdrawn from his most christian majesty, the Credentials, which have hitherto been made use of by your excellency can no longer be valid.,"

his diplomatic relations by fresh letters of credence: or to recall him. But it would have rendered no service either to France in general, or to the national assembly in particular, to have suffered a person, who by the revolution of the 10. of August was reduced to a private station, to continue his residence in that country. On the contrary, it would in all probability have produced rather discontent than satisfaction: for, though he was become a private person, and must remain as such till he had received new credentials, yet his former diplomatic relations would not have been forgotten, and his presence would have so frequently reminded the new executive power of the difference between his former and his present character, that it would have gradually become a subject of complaint. With regard to the second mode, there were likewise very weighty reasons, which dissuaded the British government from adopting it. For had new letters of credence been sent to Lord Gower, he must have been accredited either to the executive council or to the national assembly. But the very title of the executive council, *conseil exécutif provisoire*⁸, clearly indicated,

8. Le Brun himself in his Note to Lord Gower used this title. Likewise in the fourth article of the decree, which passed in the night of the 10. of August, was said: "Les ministres actuellement en activité continueront *provisoirement* l'exercice de leurs fonctions.,, *Moniteur* 12. Aug. 1792.

that its institution was merely temporary. Consequently letters of credence, addressed to the executive council, could likewise have been only temporary: and it might be expected that in a very short time fresh credentials would be required for some other council or committee. Still less could a British ambassador be accredited to the national assembly: for this very assembly had in the night of the 10. August pronounced its own dissolution, and ordered the election of a national convention ⁹. Further it was declared in the same decree, that the king was only *provisiionally* suspended from his functions ¹⁰. All authorities therefore in France were at that time merely transient: and consequently the most prudent part, which England could take, was to wait at least till the new constitution had been determined by the national convention, for which purpose it was ordered to assemble. This was certainly no breach of neutrality, especially as in

9. The first article of the decree of the 10. of August is: "Le peuple Français est invité à former une convention nationale., Ib.

10. The second article is: "Le chef du pouvoir exécutif est *provisoirement* suspendu de ses fonctions, jusqu'à ce que la convention nationale ait prononcé sur les mesures, qu'elle croira devoir adopter pour assurer la souveraineté du peuple, et le regne de la liberté et de l'égalité.

the letter by which the British ambassador was recalled, the most solemn declaration was made, that it was not the intention of the British government to interfere in the arrangement of the internal affairs of France. Besides, when it is the intention of a court to abandon its system of neutrality, its ambassador usually quits the country, against which hostilities are intended, without taking leave of the government. But this did not happen in the present instance, for Lord Gower communicated his letter of recall even to the *new* government of France: nor did Le Brun in his answer express the least suspicion, that it was the design of the British cabinet to violate the neutrality toward France. On the contrary, he declared, not only that the French nation confided in "the justice, the moderation, and the impartiality of the British cabinet," but likewise that "this confidence was *founded on facts* ¹¹," and in his report on the situation of France in respect to the different powers of Europe, delivered to the national assembly on the 23. of August, he asserted that on the subject of neutrality the British ambassador "had left a *satisfactory testimony of the sentiments of his court* ¹²,". Indeed the whole conduct of

11. Dans cette confiance intime fondée sur les faits etc.
See Note 2.

12. "Il reste à parler de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande :
"ces deux puissances annoncent toujours le desir de rester

the British government afforded ample proof, that it was not its intention to seek a quarrel with France: for had it really entertained any such design, it would not have neglected the most favourable opportunity, that ever offered, of humbling its rival, the month of August 1792. A glorious peace with Tippoo Saib, which was already known in Europe, afforded full scope to the operation of the British arms: France stood unsupported by a single ally, like England at the commencement of the American war: yet though France had taken ungenerous advantage of the one period, England refused even to retaliate at the other, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of the confederate powers¹³. Nay so favourable was the conduct

“dans les termes de stricte neutralité. L’Ambassadeur britannique, en s’éloignant momentanément de la France, nous laisse à cet égard un témoignage satisfaisant des sentimens de sa Cour., Moniteur 25. Août 1792.

13. We have already seen that the British government was solicited in 1791 to join a coalition against France, and that the proposal was rejected. That it was again invited by various powers in the summer of 1792 and with the same success, appears from the speech of Mr. Dundas in the House of Commons on the 14. of December 1792. See likewise Mr. Miles’s Letter to le Brun, the French minister, dated 18. Dec. 1792, in the Authentic Correspondence, Appendix P. 75.

of Great Britain toward France, that the free exportation of arms and provisions was still permitted, and ceased not till the decree of the 19th of November, with its concomitant circumstances, had placed beyond a doubt the hostile disposition of France.

How then can any man with justice assert that the British government was guilty of a breach of neutrality toward France in August 1792? The mere recall of an ambassador from a foreign court, if attended with no indications of hostility, cannot possibly be construed into a breach of peace. Almost all the other ambassadors left Paris about the same time with Lord Gower: even the Danish ambassador, Baron Blohm, received letters of recall, and the only reason, why he did not leave Paris, was that he was too ill at that time to undertake a long journey. No one has ever reproached the Danish court with having violated, by the command sent to the Danish ambassador, its neutrality toward France. Why then shall the English government be accused, for sending a similar command? An appeal has indeed been made to the second article of the treaty of commerce between France and England: but the proof, which has been founded on this article, rests on a false interpretation of it. For by this article was stipulated, not that the mere recall of an ambassador, either from Paris or from London,

should be regarded as a breach of peace, but simply that in case the two powers should happen to be at variance, and a rupture should be likely to ensue, hostilities should not be considered as actually commenced, till the ambassadors of both powers were either recalled or dismissed ¹⁴. Now the case assumed in this article did not take place in August 1792, and consequently the article itself is not applicable to the recall of Lord Gower. Besides, the French minister in London was still permitted to remain there: for he continued in England not less than five months after the period in question, and even communicated with the British ministry, though his communications, for obvious reasons, could not be considered as strictly official ¹⁵.

14. "Si quelque jour il survient quelque mauvaise intelligence, interruption d'amitié ou rupture entre les couronnes de leurs majestés, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise (laquelle rupture ne sera censée exister que lors du rappel ou du renvoi des ambassadeurs et ministres respectifs) etc., *Martens Recueil des principaux traités*, Tom. II. p. 681.

15. It is likewise to be observed that the whole of the British embassy did not leave Paris with Lord Gower: for Mr. Lindsay, the secretary of legation staid behind, and would probably have continued his residence there, if the murder of two British subjects under the pretext of their being aristocrats, and the butcheries of the 2. of September, had not excited apprehensions for his personal safety.

But it is said: if the French nation thought proper to establish a republic, what necessity had the British government to trouble itself about the forms of a letter of credence? An ambassador might have been accredited to the nation at large, without regard to the persons, who in August 1792 conducted its affairs! — But in the first place we must ask, what is meant by an ambassador's being accredited to the nation at large. No ambassador can negotiate with the whole body of the people; his conferences must be confined to the persons, who are in actual possession of the executive authority. These persons may indeed assert that they act in the name of the whole nation: and in a republic, in which order and durability of government is to be found, the actual rulers may assert it without contradiction. But in 1792 and 1793 the administration of public affairs in France was highly defective, as well in order, as in durability: one party rapidly succeeded another, and each party pretended, while in power, to act in the name of the nation, but was branded, when fallen, with the appellation of a faction. By what criterion then was the British government to determine, to which of the parties the honourable title of nation, and to which the disgraceful name of faction was due? Had the Girondists been asked, they would have answered, *we* represent the nation: and the very same answer would have been given by

the Anarchists, who considered *themselves* as the nation, and the Girondists as a faction ¹⁶. In this situation

16. The public administration of affairs at that time is represented by Brissot in his work. A ses commettans in very striking colours: The following passages may serve as examples. P. 2. Des loix sans execution, des autorités constituées, sans force et avilies, le crime impuni, les propriétés attaquées, la sûreté des individus violée, la morale du peuple corrompue, *ni constitution, ni gouvernement, ni justice.* — P. 33. Maintenant je le demande à tout homme de bonne foi: où donc est maintenant la puissance suprême? Est-ce dans la Convention, ou dans le Tribunal révolutionnaire? Est-ce dans ce tribunal, ou dans Marat? Est-ce dans Marat, ou dans les factieux, qui le protègent? — P. 37. Ce n'est pas encore dans la commune de Paris que réside l'exercice de la souveraineté nationale, c'est dans un club, ou plutôt dans une vingtaine de brigands, qui dirigent ce club, qui font courber devant eux toutes les autorités constituées par la nation. — P. 39. Je le demande à tout homme, qui a étudié les bases des républiques, peut-il exister à côté d'un foyer aussi actif de conspirations, qui communique à ceux de la municipalité des sections et des autres clubs de l'empire; peut-il exister une convention libre et indépendante, un gouvernement, une justice? — P. 41. Tous les pouvoirs sont nécessairement au club; voilà le corps législatif, ou plutôt voilà le corps au dessus de la loi, au dessus de toutes les autorités constituées, voilà le souverain de la France entière. J'ai fait voir que le club des anarchistes était le souverain de la convention; il est encore des ministres depuis le 10. Août.

the British government could not treat with the party, which was in power, and which called itself the nation, without incurring the danger of being accused by the succeeding ruling party of having treated with factiousists. The new party might have even asserted that Great Britain intermeddled in the internal affairs of France ¹⁷: and, according to the doctrine of the national assembly itself, this was one of the greatest offences, which one nation could commit toward another.

Besides, all diplomatic connexions with so fluctuating an administration appeared to be useless: a treaty made with one party might have been regarded as not valid by the other: and therefore Great Britain could

— P. 46. Je reviens aux ministres qui, puisqu'il faut enfin trancher le mot, *ont été et sont plutôt les ministres des jacobins de Paris, que ceux de la nation.* It is true that the description, which Brissot here gives of France applies immediately to the spring of 1793: but it is equally applicable to the latter half of 1792, and one passage in particular is expressly dated from the 10. of August.

17. For this reason, in the Letter to Lord Gower, immediately after the passage quoted above in Note 7 was added: "His majesty is therefore of opinion that you ought not to remain any longer in Paris, as well on this account, as because this step appears to him the most conformable to the principles of neutrality, which he has hitherto observed.,,

not expect under such circumstances that any convention with France would have a lasting effect ¹⁸. Nor was it certain in August 1792 that the king of France would not be re-instated: for no one expected after the celebrated Declaration at Coblenz of the 25. of July, that the close of the Prussian campaign would so ill correspond to the commencement of it. And if Louis XVI. had been restored to his former authority, the British government, by a connexion with either of the republican parties in France, would have materially injured its own interests in regard both to the king and to the allied powers, which no one had a right to expect, since there is a duty, which we owe to ourselves, as well as to our neighbours. But even if this duty be set aside, and even if no attention was due to the possibility of a revolution in favour of the deposed king, at least regard was to be had to another revolution, which was expected by the republicans

18. Briffot, in the above quoted work p. 103. says: "Les puissances étrangères, qui voudraient traiter avec nous, dans l'état où nous sommes, pourraient-elles concevoir un espoir semblable? Non; elles se disent: la France est divisée par des factions; l'une triomphe aujourd'hui, demain ce sera l'autre. Traitez avec l'une, l'autre casse le traité. Rien n'est stable; attendons cette stabilité, et nous traiterons., And p. 112 he says: "*On ne traite point avec l'anarchie.,*"

themselves: for Brissot in his Address to the republicans of France, which is dated October 1792, declared, that as the first revolution destroyed despotism, and the second overturned royalty, a third was necessary to put an end to anarchy ¹⁹. Consequently the most prudent conduct which Great Britain could observe was to continue neutral toward all parties ²⁰, and not to renew the diplomatic connexions with France, which the revolution of the 10. of August had interrupted, till a stable government, or a settled constitution, whether monarchical or republican, was fully established. But the new constitution, which it was the business of the national convention to determine, and then present to the primary assemblies for their approbation, was not even drawn up before February ²¹

19. His own words are: "J'ai toujours pensé qu'il nous fallait trois révolutions: la première a renversé le despotisme, la seconde la royauté, la troisième détruira l'anarchie.,,

20. See Note 17.

21. It was first presented to the convention on the 15. of February 1793 by Condorcet in the name of the constitutional committee. See the *Moniteur* 17. and 18. Feb. 1793. But though presented, it was not adopted by the convention: for that which is called the constitution of 1793. and was really adopted was drawn up much later in that year. And even this constitution was not only suspended within a short time after its adoption, but is considered by the present ru-

1793: and after that period the residence of a British ambassador in Paris was no longer a question, since on the first of that month the convention had already declared war against Great Britain.

Lastly the personal safety of the British ambassador in Paris was not unworthy of consideration. But in a city, in which the licentiousness of a blood-thirsty populace either was not, or could not be restrained within due bounds, in a city where the most horrid murders were committed without regard either to age or character, and where even British subjects had fallen

lens of France as so defective, that on the 16. of April 1796 a law was made, which condemned to *death* all persons, who by their *writings or speeches* should attempt to re-establish it: for on that day the following law, proposed by Treillard, was unanimously decreed by the council of five hundred, and immediately ratified by the council of elders.

“Sont coupables de crime contre la sûreté intérieure de la république et contre la sûreté individuelle des citoyens, et seront punis de la *peine de mort*, conformément à l'article 612 du code des délits et des peines, tous ceux qui par leurs discours, ou par leurs écrits, soit imprimés soit distribués, soit affichés, provoquent la dissolution de la représentation nationale ou celle du directoire exécutif, ou le meurtre de tous ou aucuns des membres qui le composent, ou le rétablissement de la royauté, ou celui de la constitution de 1793, etc.,” *Moniteur* 20. Avril 1796.

a prey to the fury of a Parisian mob, no British ambassador could have remained with safety. On *this* ground therefore, as well as on the preceding, his departure from Paris was the most adviseable step, which under those circumstances could have been taken.

From the present period to the middle of November, no events took place, which belong to an history of the relations between Great Britain and France. During this interval, which comprised about three months, the former remained a quiet spectator of all that passed on the continent: and the latter was too much engaged with Austria and Prussia to pay much attention to Great Britain ²². But in the middle of November the scene changed, and at that time, as will appear from the following chapter, was laid the foundation of the war, which still subsists between the two countries.

22. I designedly say "*much* attention,,," because even before the end of September France began the augmentation of its marine.

CHAPTER X.

French conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the coasts of several Italian states. Other naval armaments in France. Opening of the Schelde. Decree of the 19. of November, by which assistance was promised to all nations, that were willing to take up arms against their governments. Deputies from certain British societies appear at the bar of the French national convention, and signify their intention of establishing a national convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on the part of the French convention. Measures taken in consequence, and commotions in Great Britain.

Toward the middle of November 1792 the arms of France were victorious in every quarter. The decisive battle of Gemappe, which was fought on the 6. of this month, had rendered the French absolute masters of the Austrian Netherlands; and General Custine was not only in possession of Mayntz and Franc-

fort ¹, but was making vigorous preparations to penetrate still further into Germany ². The dutchy of Savoy had been already conquered, and before the expiration of the month it was formally incorporated into France ³. At the same time the Toulon fleet, under the orders of Admiral Truguet harassed both the coast of Piemont, and that of other Italian states. Nor was this fleet, which consisted of fifteen sail of the line ⁴, the only naval armament, which France had fitted out at this period: for it appears from the report delivered to the national convention by the marine minister, Monge, on the 23. of September 1792, that even then not less than *twenty one ships of the*

1. It was not before the 2. of December, that Francfort was re-captured.

2. All these facts are so well known, that it would be superfluous to quote authority for them.

3. "Gregoire lit un projet de décret sur l'incorporation de la Savoie. La question est mise aux voix par assis et levé. *Un seul membre se leve contre.*," Moniteur 28. Nov. 1792. The circumstance, that there was only one dissenting voice on this question, is so much the more remarkable, as the incorporation of Savoy was in direct contradiction to the solemn pledge, repeatedly given by the French rulers, "that they renounced all conquest and aggrandizement.,

4. Brissot à ses commettans p. 42. NB. Whenever I quote this Work, I mean the original Paris edition.

line, thirty frigates, ten ships armed en flute, and forty two smaller ships of war were actually at sea ⁵. It appears further from the same report, that, thirty four ships of the line, in addition to the preceding, were in a state to be instantly commissioned, that nineteen more were capable of being refitted, that seven were building, of which three were ready to be launched, and that out of one and forty frigates twenty three were in such a state of forwardness, that they were capable of being put in immediate commission, beside six which were on the stocks. Such was the naval armament, and such were the preparations, which were made in France for a still further augmentation of it, at a time when Great Britain had only sixteen thousand sailors and marines in pay, which were hardly sufficient to man even twelve ships of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, sloops, and cutters.

5. Séance du 23. Septembre "M. Monge fait un rapport sur le departement de la marine. Il en résulte que la république *fnit flotter sur mer* 102 pavillons tricolors; savoir 21 gros vaisseaux, 30 fregattes, 18 corvettes, 24 avisos, 10 flottes ou gabarres; que 34 autres vaisseaux de ligne sont prêts à être armés, 19 susceptible de radoubement, 7 sont en construction, dont 3 prêts à être mis en mer, que sur 41 fregattes, 23 sont en état d'être armés sur le champ, outre 6 qui sont sur les chantiers.,, Moniteur 25. Sept. 1792.

The rapid progress of the French arms, and the vigorous preparations, which were making for new conquests, unavoidably excited the attention of the British government. The plan of subjugation and aggrandizement, which had hitherto lain concealed in embryo, began now to unfold itself; and the system, which the French rulers have since followed with so much success, became visible to the eye of the sagacious observer. By the incorporation of Savoy they had trodden under foot the principle, on which they had solemnly pledged themselves to found the new fabric of French politics: and it was now become evident, that the promised renunciation of conquest and aggrandizement was nothing more than a mask, under which they endeavoured to cover their real designs. In the Netherlands however they thought it prudent not to lay aside the mask at once, as they did in Savoy: they declared the Belgians a free and independent people, and expressed only a desire of affording them the protection of a friendly neighbour. But the Belgians possessed too small and too open a country to be able, in the neighbourhood of France, to form a perfectly independent state: and it was certain, that their new protectors would at the same time exercise the power of governors. In respect to England therefore it was a matter of indifference, whether Belgia bore the title of an independent state, or that of

a French department, since in the former, as well as in the latter case, the coast of Flanders, like the coast of France itself, must necessarily become an hostile coast to England. The declaration however of Belgia's independence was nothing more than a prelude to its union with France, and the only reason, why its incorporation did not immediately follow that of Savoy, was the necessity of deceiving the *people*, though not the government, of Great Britain: for the war against Great Britain had been declared only two days, when the commissioners of the French convention, assembled at Brussels, decided that Belgia should be incorporated with France ⁶.

Ten

6. The documents relative to this subject are printed in Chauffard Memoires historiques et politiques sur la révolution de la Belgique et du pays de Liege. (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 78 — 85. Chauffard's own vote was delivered in the following words: "Je vote la réunion de la Belgique à la France. — On m'oppose le vœu du peuple; *le vœu d'un peuple enfant ou imbecille serait nul*, parceque qu'il stipulerait contre lui-même.,, The vote of Chepy is likewise worthy of notice: "Je vote pour que la réunion de la Belgique à la république Française soit operée par la puissance de la raison, par les touchantes insinuations de la philanthropie, de la fraternité, et *par tous les moyens* de tactique révolutionnaire; et au cas que nos efforts soient infructueux, *et que l'on continue à nous opposer le système désespérant*

Ten days after the battle of Gemappe had put the Austrian Netherlands in the possession of the French, the executive council resolved, that the Schelde, in which the Dutch by virtue of various treaties, possessed the exclusive right of entering with ships of a certain burden, and especially ships of war, should be opened ⁷. It would be useless to examine, whether these treaties, as the executive council asserted, were contrary to the

“de la force d’inertie, j’estime que le droit de conquête, devenu pour la première fois utile au monde et juste, doit faire l’éducation politique du peuple Belge et le préparer à de brillantes et heureuses destinées.” Further, that notwithstanding the all-promising manifesto, with which the entry of the French army into Belgia was accompanied, it was by no means the intention of the French government to establish an independent republic there, appears from the following confession of General Dumouriez: “L’intention secrète à Paris n’étoit point que le peuple Liegeois, et encore moins celui de la Belgique se réunît en corps de nation pour se donner une constitution et des loix; on craignoit qu’une fois assemblés, ces deux peuples ne concentrasent leurs forces et ne fondassent une république indépendante.” Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 348.

⁷. This resolution was made by the executive council on the 16. of November 1792, and on the 21. was presented to the national convention, which received it with great applause. See Moniteur 22. Nov. 1792.

law of nature or not ⁸. It is sufficient that such treaties existed: France itself had guaranteed them ⁹, in conjunction with other powers: and they could not be violated, without destroying that law of nations, which from the time of the general treaty of Westphalia had united the European states into a kind of great republic.

8. The executive council adopted, as the basis of the resolution, the following principle: "that rivers are the common and inalienable property of *all* those nations, through whose territories they flow., Now the Schelde from only a league below Fort Lillo to the mouth of it flowed through Dutch territory, for on the north side lay the province of Zealand, and on the south side Dutch Flanders: and every nation considers itself as possessing the right to exercise sovereignty over a river, as far as its own territory extends. The French themselves at least would certainly not suffer any nation to deprive them of this right in regard to their *own* rivers: and if in the year 1792 the inhabitants of Geneva, or of the country of Valais had applied to the Rhone the principle, which the executive council applied to the Schelde, and had said: "the Rhone flows through our territory, consequently we have as good a right as you to the free navigation of it from Lyons to the Mediterranean,, the inference would certainly have been rejected as devoid of foundation.

9. See the second article of the treaty of 1785 between France and Holland in Martens Recueil des principaux traités, Tom. II. p. 614.

In declaring that the Dutch should no longer exercise their accustomed sovereignty over the Schelde, the French government had two objects in view, an immediate, and a distant one. The immediate object was to send French ships of war into the Schelde, to bombard the citadel of Antwerp; and this object was very soon attained, for on the 1. of December 1792, a French frigate, a brig, two gun-vessels, and three other armed vessels from Dunkirk entered the Schelde in defiance of the solemn protestation of the States General ¹⁰. The distant, but main object, was to convert the mouth of the Schelde into a station for French ships of war, in order to acquire a naval advantage in the North sea, which France had hitherto

10. In a Note delivered by the States General to the imperial ambassador at the Hague, was contained the following passage: "Que L. H. P. ont prié S. A. le Prince d'Orange etc. d'ordonner à l'officier qui commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné à l'embouchure de l'Escaut, de ne pas accorder le passage, mais d'informer le commandant Français, qu'en vertu de traités la rivière d'Escaut est close pour les vaisseaux de guerre., Moniteur 16. Dec. 1792. And immediately in the same article is added: "On apprend que, ce nonobstant, une fregatte Française, l'Ariel, un bricq, deux chaloupes canonieres, et trois barques de pêcheur Dunquerqueises armées, ont remonté l'Escaut le 1. de ce mois.,

not possessed. This design did not escape the notice of the British ministers: and it could not be a matter of indifference to them, whether France, which at that time had no harbour on the northern coast, in which ships of the line could enter, acquired this advantage or not, because it exposed not only the British commerce, but the eastern coast of Britain itself to a new and very material danger.

By another resolution of the executive council likewise of the 16. of November, the commander in chief of the French army in the Netherlands was ordered to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, in case they retreated thither ¹¹. It is unnecessary at present to examine, whether according to the usual practice of war, it is allowable in any instance

II. "Extrait du registre des deliberations du conseil exé-
"cutif provisoire. Du 16. Novembre 1792, l'an
"premier de la republique.,,

"Le conseil exécutif provisoire délibérant sur l'état actuel
"de la guerre, notamment dans la Belgique — arrête qu'en
"conséquence de la deliberation du 24. Octobre dernier, il
"fera donné ordre au général commandant en chef l'expédi-
"tion de la Belgique, de continuer à poursuivre les ennemis
"même sur le territoire Hollandois, dans le cas où ils s'y se-
"raient retirés.,,

Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache,
(Paris 1793 8.) p. 71.

to attack an enemy on neutral ground: for whether it be allowable or not, the haste, with which this resolution was made, shews that the executive council regarded the neutrality of Holland as a matter of absolute indifference. They would otherwise have made previous representations to the States General, they would have waited till the Austrian army had been permitted to take refuge on the Dutch territory, and they would not have made the resolution at a time, when the Austrians were retreating to Liege, and every movement indicated, that it was not their design to enter Holland.

But all the measures, which the French government had hitherto taken, though they necessarily excited uneasiness in the British cabinet, were trifles in comparison of other measures, which were adopted in the same month: for at this very time was formed the determination to overturn the British government, and the British constitution. By the correspondence of the Jacobin club with various societies the seeds of discord and sedition had been already sown in great abundance; and the principle adopted by the French rulers, "that the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors"¹², had been already applied in England

12. "Que pensaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté,

with great industry and success. For in the first place, on account of the political liberty, which existed in England, it was easier to set the people in commotion, than the people of any other state in Europe¹³: and in the next place, no object appeared so desirable to the French, as the utter destruction of their ancient and formidable rival, which the excitement of a civil war, afforded both the easiest and the surest means of attaining. During a considerable time their operations were carried on in the dark: but as soon as they were become all-potent conquerors, and the national convention had acquired sufficient power to act an open part, it was no longer thought necessary to make a secret of their designs. The decisive battle of Gemappe

*“non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l’Europe ?
 “Ils croyaient qu’on pouvait l’établir par-tout, en soulevant
 “les administrés contre les administrans, en faisant voir aux
 “peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces soulèvements., Brissot
 à ses Commentans p. 81.*

13. So early as the 5. of January 1792, Isnard had said:
*“Voici l’instant qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des
 “despotes et des nations; c’est vous que le ciel réservait à
 “ces grands événemens: élevez vous au niveau de vos des-
 “tinées., and a few lines after: “est-il bien vrai qu’un lan-
 “gage national ne serait entendu dans aucune contrée? ah
 “sans doute les Anglais seraient un peuple digne de l’enten-
 “dre., Moniteur 6. Jan. 1792.*

and the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands presented the most favourable opportunity for a public declaration: and accordingly on the 19. of November 1792 the national convention announced by a formal decree, which was translated into all the European languages, *that France was ready to assist every nation, which was willing to rebel against its own government* ¹⁴.

14.

"Séance du Lundi 19. Novembre.

"Lépaux propose, et la Convention adopte la rédaction suivante. La Convention nationale declare, au nom de la nation Française, qu'elle accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui *voudront* recouvrer leur liberté; et charge le pouvoir exécutif de donner aux généraux les ordres nécessaires pour porter secours à ces peuples, et défendre les citoyens qui auraient été vexés, ou qui pourraient l'être pour la cause de la liberté.

"Sergent. Je demande que ce décret soit traduit et imprimé dans toutes les langues.

"Cette proposition est décrétée., Moniteur 20. Nov. 1792.

Brissot, though he made no objection to this decree at the time when it was proposed, for it passed with enthusiasm (le decret passa d'enthousiasme) as he himself says, called it afterwards on mature reflexion, "l'absurde et impolitique decret du 19. Novembre, qui a *justement* excité les inquietudes des cabinets étrangers.,, A ses Commettans, p. 68: It is remarkable that the person, who proposed this decree, was elected one of the first five Directors, though in other respects he is by no means a distinguished character.

The measures adopted by the national convention even previous to this decree, but more particularly the decree itself, produced in England the desired effect, and set various societies, who were already disaffected to government, in agitation. So early as the 7. of November ¹⁵ an address voted by five thousand persons, members of the united societies of London, Manchester and other places ¹⁶, was delivered to the national convention, containing the following passages. "They are of opinion (namely, they who voted the address) that it is the duty of true Britons to support and assist to the utmost of their power the defenders of the rights of man, the propagators of human felicity, and to swear inviolable friendship to a nation, which proceeds on the plan which you have adopted., — (It is to be observed that this plan was the abolition of royalty). — "What is liberty? What are our rights? Frenchmen, you are already free: *and Britons are preparing to become so. A triple alliance, not of crowns,*

15. Even on the 14. of August several Englishmen appeared at the bar of the national assembly, and congratulated the French on the energy which they had displayed on the 10. of August (*de l'énergie qu'ils ont montrée dans la journée du 10. Août*). *Moniteur* 17. Aug. 1792.

16. "Cette adresse a été votée par 5000 Anglais réunis dans les sociétés de Londres, Manchester etc., *Moniteur* du 8. Nov. 1792.

"but of the *people* of America, of France, and of *Great Britain* etc. ^{17.}," This language was very intelligible: but no sooner was the decree of the 19. of November generally known, than a more open and daring language was adopted, for within nine days after the publication of this decree, deputies from certain British societies appeared at the bar of the national convention, and signified their intention of adopting the form of government introduced in France, and of establishing a *national convention in Great Britain*. "We hope," said the orator of the first deputation, "that the troops of liberty will never lay down their arms, as long as

17. "Ils croient qu'il est du devoir des vrais Bretons, de soutenir et assister de tous leurs moyens les défenseurs des droits de l'homme, des propagateurs du bonheur de l'humanité, et de jurer à une nation, qui procède d'après le plan que vous avez adopté, une amitié inviolable. — Qu'est ce que la liberté? Quels sont nos droits? Français vous êtes déjà libres; mais les Bretons se préparent à le devenir. "La triple alliance, non de couronnes, mais des peuples de l'Amerique, de la France, et de la Grande Bretagne etc.,
Moniteur 8. Nov. 1792. The address is signed, Maurice Margarot, President: Thomas Hardy, Secretary: and contains several other passages equally expressive of a determination to abolish royalty in England. They who have not access to the Moniteur, will find the whole address, in English, in Rivington's Annual Register 1792. State Papers, p. 344.

“tyrants and slaves shall continue to exist”¹⁸. — Our
 “wishes, citizen-legislators, render us impatient to see
 “the moment of this *grand change*. — Nor are we
 “alone animated by these sentiments: we doubt not,
 “that they would be equally conspicuous in the great
 “majority of our fellow countrymen if the public
 “opinion were consulted there, *as it ought to be*, in a
 “NATIONAL CONVENTION”¹⁹. To this address

18. Every rational man must deplore the existence both
 of tyrants and of slaves: but *these* gentlemen by the word
 “tyrant,, understood every king, however mild his govern-
 ment, or however limited his authority; and by the word
 “slave,, they understood every inhabitant of a country,
 where kingly government was established. Thus do men
 become the dupes of mere *names*, as if the word “king,,
 necessarily involved the idea of slavery, or the word
 “director,, the idea of liberty. It is not the title, but the
 power annexed to it, which is to be taken into considera-
 tion: the sovereign of Great Britain is called king, the
 sovereigns of France are called directors: yet Great Britain
 is still the land of liberty, and France is now the land of
 abject slavery.

19. “Nous espérons que les troupes de la liberté ne les
 “(i. e. les armes) poseront, que lorsqu’ils n’y aura plus de
 “tyrans ni d’esclaves. — Nos vœux, citoyens législateurs,
 “nous rendent impatiens de voir le moment heureux de ce
 “grand changement. — Nous ne sommes pas les seuls ani-
 “més de ces sentimens, nous ne doutons pas, qu’ils ne se

the President made the following reply in the name of the French convention. "Citizens of the world, etc. — "principles are waging war against tyranny, which will "fall under the blows of philosophy. *Royalty in Europe* "is either destroyed, or on the point of perishing on the "ruins of feodality: and the declaration of rights, placed "by the side of thrones is a devouring fire, which will "consume them. *Worthy republicans*, congratulate yourselves on thinking, that the festival, which you have "celebrated in honour of the French revolution, is *the* "prelude to the festival of nations.,,"

But the language held on the same day by the deputies of the society for constitutional infor-

"manifestassent également chez la grande majorité de nos "compatriotes, si l'opinion publique y étoit consultée, *comme* "elle devait l'être, dans une convention nationale.,, Séance "du 28. Novembre. Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792.

Le President à la deputation,

"Citoyens du monde etc. Les principes font la guerre "à la tyrannie, qui tombera sous les coups de la philosophie. "La royauté est en Europe ou détruite ou agonisante sur les "décombres féodaux; et la déclaration des droits placée à "côté des trônes est un feu dévorant, qui va les consumer. "(Applaudissemens). *Estimables republicains*, félicitez vous "en pensant, que la fête que vous avez célébrée en l'hon- "neur de la révolution Française, est le prelude de la fête des "nations.,, Ib.

mation ²⁰, as well as the language of the President, in his reply to *them*, was still more expressive. "Citizens of France,, said the orator of the deputation, "we are sent by a patriotic society in London to congratulate you, in their name, on the triumphs of liberty. — After the example, which France has lately given, *revolutions will be rendered easy*: and it will not be extraordinary, if in a *short space of time* addresses of congratulation be sent to a NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ENGLAND ²¹., At these words the French convention applauded. The address itself was then read by one of the secretaries, which, after much abuse of the English, and much panegyric on the French government, concluded with a sentence con-

20. The same society in its address to the jacobin club, which was sent a few days before the royal proclamation of the 21. of May was issued, displayed similar principles, though not so openly, as after the decree of the 19. of November.

21. "Citoyens de France, nous sommes députés par une société patriotique de Londres, pour vous féliciter en son nom des triomphes de la liberté. — D'après l'exemple que vient de donner la France, *les revolutions vont devenir faciles*; il ne serait pas extraordinaire, *que dans un court espace de tems il arrivât aussi des félicitations à une Convention nationale d'Angleterre.*, (Applaudissemens). Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792.

taining the following words: "others will *soon* march in *your* footsteps, in this career of *useful changes* ²²., And these *useful changes*, according to the interpretation of the deputies themselves, were to consist in the establishment of a national convention, and consequently in the *total* abolition of the British constitution ²³. As soon as the speech of the deputies was

22. D'autres marcheront *bientôt* sur vos traces dans "cette carrière d'*utiles changements*., Ib. The address is signed: Sempill, President. D. Adams, Secretary. In the *Moniteur* it is signed likewise by Joel Barlow and John Frost, the deputies, who delivered it to the French convention.

23. It is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the public acts of this and other similar societies, which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, and lie open to the whole world, both eminent orators and eminent writers should so long have persisted in the assertion, that nothing more was intended than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been asserted even till the breaking out of the Irish rebellion, that the United Irishmen had no other object in view than a reform in the Commons House of Parliament. But at present we all know from the Report of the Secret Committees of the two houses of the Irish Parliament, published in August 1798, and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor, Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a mask, under which the United Irishmen endeavoured to cover their real designs, that they were in fact closely allied with the

ended, and the address itself had been read, the President of the French convention returned an answer,

enemies of Great Britain, and that in the summer of 1796 Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to Francfort, as deputies from the Irish Union, to settle with General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, which was then in agitation, and which was attempted, though unsuccessfully, before the close of the year. And still more extraordinary is it, that members of the British senate, hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himself made these acknowledgements could venture to declare in a court of justice, that they were acquainted with the political character of this man, and that they believed him to be sincerely attached to the principles, which placed the present family on the throne. The impositions, which have been practised since the French revolution by the term "parliamentary reform,, appear further from a memoir delivered in 1797 by Lewines, the ambassador of the United Irishmen, to the French minister for foreign affairs at Paris, in which was the following passage. "*The delusions* of Reform and Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay etc.,, See the Report of the Secret Committee of the Irish House of Commons in August 1798, an extract from which is printed in the Times of the 27. of August. Thus have the common people in Ireland, who, as Oliver Bond acknowledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been rendered the dupes of those, who, as the same person added, "thought for them,, or, in plain terms, wished to sacrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The

which contained the following passages. "The defenders of *our* liberty will one day become the defenders of *your own*. — The shades of Pym, of Hampden, and of Sidney hover over your heads: and without doubt *the moment is approaching*, when the people of France will come to offer their congratulations to THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF GREAT BRITAIN ²⁴."

Such answers to such societies ²⁵, united with the

same *delusions of reform* were attempted to be practised in England, when the above - quoted addresses were presented to the French convention in November 1792: but, fortunately for Great Britain they produced not the intended effect.

24. "Les défenseurs de *notre* liberté le feront un jour de *la votre*. — Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sidney, planent sur vos têtes: *et sans doute il approche le moment, où les Français iront féliciter la Convention nationale de la Grande Bretagne.*," Moniteur 29. Nov. 1792. The convention then decreed, that the addresses, with the answers of the President, should be translated into all languages. *Ib.*

25. On the 29. of November another address was presented to the convention from a society at Rochester, in which after much declamation against the British government, mention was made, in very intelligible though general expressions, of people, "who wished to receive from the French nation the benefit of liberty," (*qui aspirent à recevoir de lui le bienfait de la liberté*). Moniteur 30. Nov. 1792. Another passage in this address, "résolu que le président de la société

decree of the 19. of November ²⁶, were equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British government: and the general promise of assistance, which had been given to revolutionists of all nations, was by the conduct of the national convention on the 28. of November confirmed, and applied to Great Britain in particular. This was the reward of all the benefits, which had been conferred on France: this was the return, which was made for the refusal to join the coalition

*“invitera tous les amis de l’égalité, toutes les sociétés correspondantes en France, à employer leur zèle, leurs efforts, leurs sollicitations auprès du conseil exécutif etc., affords an additional proof, not only that societies in England corresponded with societies in France, but likewise that these societies stood in immediate connexion with the French executive council. — Beside this address and the three others above-mentioned, several more were sent to France about this time: for Lord Grenville in his speech of the 13. Dec. 1792 said: “he held in his hand no less than *ten* addresses, presented to the national convention of France by subjects of this country., See the New Annual Register 1793. British and foreign History p. 22. See also Rivington’s Annual Register 1792. State Papers, p. 344 — 352.*

26. The explanation of this decree, which was afterwards given by the French executive council, will be examined in a subsequent chapter, where it will appear that the explanation was founded on the blackest hypocrisy.

coalition, for the salvation of the French colony of St. Domingo, for the permission to import from England bread and arms, and for the preservation of neutrality even at a time, when France might have been attacked with the utmost advantage. But what gratitude could be expected from men, who convert religion and morality into subjects of ridicule? They acted only, at that time, as they have acted ever since: for their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that from the moment they acquire the means of conquest, neither neutrality, nor justice, nor gratitude prevent them from the execution of their designs.

It is true, that the national convention pretended an especial friendship for the *people* of Great Britain. But what right did they possess to interfere in the internal affairs of a neutral country, and to separate the people from the government? According to their own maxims, this was the greatest offence, of which one nation could be guilty toward another. The British government had not acted in this manner toward France: for so late as the end of August Le Brun himself acknowledged, that "it had conducted itself to that very period with justice, with moderation, and impartiality ²⁷." But let us ask, what they meant by

27. Le Brun's own words were, "la justice, la moderation, et l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu'à présent." See his Note to Lord Gower quoted Ch. IX. Note 2.

friendship for the people, and enmity to the government of Britain; and how they could attack the latter, yet leave the former unmolested. It is not the members of a government, which usually take the field, when a country is invaded, but the soldiers, and the other inhabitants, who fight under the orders of government: the very persons therefore, for whom the French pretended a particular friendship, were those, who were immediately exposed to the effects of their enmity. Who therefore can be so blind, as not to see, that such declarations were nothing more than attempts to delude the unwary, and to convert them into instruments of French ambition? If we further ask, in what the amity of the French rulers for the *people* of foreign countries really consists, the answer is obvious. Agreeably to their pretended doctrine, they declared war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet reduced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to beggary: they declared war, as they asserted, only on the oligarchs of Bern, and then subjected even the democratic cantons of Switzerland to slavery: they declared war on the senate of Venice, and sold the *people* to a foreign master. Such is the friendship of these promoters of the rights of man, and such is their regard for what they call the sovereignty of the people. It was surely therefore the duty of the British government to rescue the natives of our free

and happy island from the influence of *such* friendship ²⁸.

In fact, the means which have been adopted by the republican governors of France, to gratify their ambition, and extend their conquests, are the most detestable, which human ingenuity can invent. The monarchs of France, especially Louis XIV, had indeed likewise attempted to subjugate the neighbouring states: but they went more openly to work, and deluded not the inhabitants of the countries, which they inva-

28. It is true, that the number of those, who have suffered themselves to be deceived by the specious professions of the French rulers has been very considerable even in Great Britain: but at present, after an experience of seven years has enabled us to compare promises with the performance of them, I believe that every man, who *chooses* to see, *must* see the error. On this subject I can quote so high an authority, as that of Mr. Sheridan himself, who in the admirable speech, which he delivered in the House of Commons on the 20. of April 1798, said: "If then they attempt to invade us, they will no doubt come furnished with flaming manifestoes. The Directory may instruct their generals to make the fairest professions of how their army is to act, *but of these professions surely not one can be believed,*," And a few lines after, he added with great energy: "*Can there be supposed an Englishman so stupid, so besotted, so befooled, as to give a moment's credit to such ridiculous professions?*", See the Morning Chronicle 21. April 1798.

ded, by promises of felicity, which they were determined not to fulfil. They made no ostentation of propagating the rights of man: yet they oppressed them infinitely less than the modern despots of republican France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention and the Directory: but their intrigues were less injurious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of princes, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on whole nations. The republican governors of France set the vilest of the human passions in commotion, they work on the illiterate multitude, who are not aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of their employers, and that they themselves, as well as those, against whom they are employed, will at last become the miserable slaves of their pretended deliverers. The national convention toward the close of the year 1792 had its secret agents in almost every quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of systematic deception to seduce especially the lower orders of society. Chaußard, who was well acquainted with the principles of the new French government, and was himself one of the agents in the Austrian Netherlands, speaking of the revolution professors ²⁹, as he calls them, says: "it is not at the tables of the great, but

29. "Professeurs de révolution.,,

under the thatch of the cottager, that the toasts of liberty must be given ³⁰.,, He has described likewise the means, which were adopted to bring the people of foreign countries into the views of the French convention: and these means consisted in promises of unlimited freedom, and an absolute exemption from all taxes ³¹. By such insidious and delusive professions, by assurances of wealth and liberty, have the modern governors of France reduced those, who have been

30. "Ce n'était point aux banquets des administrateurs, qu'il fallait porter les *toasts* de la liberté; c'était sous le chaume du pauvre.,, *Chaussard* Memoires historiques etc. p. 53.

31. 1b. To set the populace more effectually in commotion, a procession of butts of bier, ornamented with branches, and bearing the inscription, "free and exempt from duties.,, was held at Brussels for this very purpose. *Chaussard's* own words in the place just quoted are: "Ces tonneaux chargés de palmes promenés en pompe, portant pour inscription: *Libres et affranchis de droits*, escortés d'une cour plus pompeuse, que celle des monarques, c'était celle du peuple; ces acclamations de joie et de franchise, ces flots de la liqueur nationale écumeux et ruisselans, tout présentait une leçon en action, tout cela parlait plus haut et plus éloquemment encore que la philosophie.,, See likewise the first article of the decree of 15. Dec. 1792, where the same delusive promises are given.

weak enough to believe in them, to the lowest indigence and the meanest servitude ³².

The engines, which they set to work with so much success in the Netherlands, they endeavoured likewise to employ in England: for at the end of November and the beginning of December 1792 London abounded with revolution professors, as Chauffard called them, or missionaries, as they were termed by Gregoire ³³, who were amply supplied with money for the purpose of bribing and seducing the lower or-

32. Dumouriez himself says: "C'est le 15. Decembre que fut donné le fameux decret qui prouvait aux Belges et à tous les peuples, qui avaient appelé les Français ou qui les avaient reçus, *que la convention n'envoyait les armées chez eux que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.* — On disait aux Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les traitait en esclaves., Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 373. 374.

33. In a report, which Gregoire delivered to the national convention on the 27. Nov. 1792, he said: "Veut-on nous dire, que les peuples ayant des constitutions différentes les fonderont toutes sur les principes de l'égalité, de la liberté, et se chériront en frères? C'est le cas d'appliquer le conseil d'un ministre à l'abbé St. Pierre. *Envoyez préalablement des missionnaires pour convertir le globe.* Plusieurs contrées de l'Europe et de l'Amerique aggrandiront bientôt le domaine de la liberté., Moniteur 28. Novembre 1792. But Camille Jordan has given these missionaries their true name, and called them *apostles of rebellion.* "Continuant à professer toutes les maximes revolutionnaires et inondant tous

ders of the people. Various circumstances attending this infamous plot are well known: but as no one seems to have been more intimately acquainted with it, than the author of a tract published in the Collection of the works, which have been written in defence of Louis the Sixteenth ³⁴, it will not be superfluous to quote the following passage ³⁵. "The king of England," says the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, the agents, the societies, the correspondences, the emissaries, the periods of their meeting, their journies, and their resolutions. He knew that the plan was laid, to seize the Tower, to plunder the arsenal, to break open the prisons, to pillage the public buildings and the houses of the rich, and to cut off at one stroke the several branches of the constitution. His Majesty knew that the execution of the plan was fixed for Saturday the first, or Monday the third of December: he saw likewise a model of the daggers, with which the insurgents were to be armed, and this model was found in the hands of a Frenchman. He knew where twenty thousand pounds of iron lay in

les pays de leurs apôtres de rebellion etc., Camille Jordan à ses Commettans sur la revolution du 18. Fructidor, p. 90.

34. Collection des meilleurs ouvrages, qui ont été publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI. Paris 1793. T. II. 8. This tract is printed in Tom. II. p. 251 — 286.

35. P. 272. 273.

"such a state of readiness, that in the space of six and
"thirty hours the whole could be forged into pikes.
"He knew what member of the national convention
"complained, that the plot was not conducted with
"sufficient vigour, who wrote to one of the agents, that
"he did not work as he ought, and that he did not
"earn the money of the republic. His Majesty knew
"what other members of the French convention formed
"a plan for the insurrection and the arming of the
"negroes, to ruin the english colonies, and to annihi-
"late, whatever it might cost, the power of England.
"He knew what emissary, after remaining only four
"and twenty hours in London, set off for the Hague,
"with orders to revolutionize Holland. He knew what
"other emissary wrote to France in the middle of No-
"vember, with assurances that the insurrection should
"soon break out, but wrote again in the middle of
"December, that all hopes of an insurrection were lost.
"His Majesty knew, which of the emissaries warned
"his agents, to take care, as the first attempt had fai-
"led, how they engaged in a second. He knew the
"number and the names of the French cannoniers, who
"being no longer of use in England, after the plot had
"failed, were ordered to embark for Ireland on Mon-
"day the 17. of December: he knew which of the
"leaders recalled this order, and sent them to France,
"whither he repaired also himself.,

Here we have a minute description of several remarkable circumstances relative to the plot, which was laid to excite an insurrection in London toward the close of the year 1792, a plot, of which the existence ³⁶ may be proved from the actions, speeches, and confessions of the French rulers themselves. For that the avowed principles, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors,,", "missionaries and revolution-professors must be sent out to convert the globe,,", "every nation, which chooses to rebel against its government shall receive assistance from France,,", were particularly applied to England, appears from the above-described conduct of the national convention on the 28. of November ³⁷. The application of these principles to England and Ireland appears further from the confession of Brissot himself: for in his Address to his Constituents he said: "it was necessary to encourage

36. As the bare *existence* of the plot is sufficient for the present history, it is immaterial, whether credit be given to the above-mentioned *circumstances* or not. Nor do I quote them as absolutely certain, because they are not taken from an official document.

37. From the documents on this subject, which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, there lies no appeal: and these documents alone are a sufficient proof that the national convention co-operated in the plan to overturn the British constitution.

the movements of liberty in Ireland ³⁸,, “we could set England in alarm *by exciting a fermentation in its own bosom* ³⁹. And that the French emissaries in London were supplied with considerable sums by the national convention, to enable them to operate with the utmost vigour, appears likewise from the same work. For Brissot says: “These republicans have never ceased to “assert, that, if we expect to succeed we must have *money for secret expences*, partly for the purpose of dividing “the cabinets, and partly for the purpose of *exciting the* “people against their tyrants. We want it for the North, “we want it for the South, we want it for *the Indies* ⁴⁰.,

38. “L’Irlande dont il fallait *encourager les mouvemens, de la liberté*., Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 73.

39. “Nous pouvions inquieter l’Angleterre *en excitant la fermentation dans sons sein*., Ib. 78. That attempts were made to excite an insurrection in England long before the declaration of hostilities (which is very different from assisting a disaffected party when two nations are already at open war) appears likewise from the circular letter of the marine minister Monge dated 31. Dec. 1792, which will be quoted in a following chapter.

40. “Ces républicains ne cessaient de dire: Si l’on veut “réussir, il faut du secret, il faut de l’argent pour les *dépenses* “*secrètes*, soit pour diviser les cabinets, soit pour *exciter les* “peuples contre leurs tyrans. Il en faut pour le Nord, il en “faut pour le Midi, il en faut pour les Indes., A ses Commettans p. 74.

This passage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few lines after, Brissot adds: "It was Cambon and Barrere, "who caused the decree to be made, by which the "executive council was authorized to take, under the "head of army extraordinaries, *unlimited sums for these "secret operations* ⁴¹." Lastly Brissot acknowledges that before the declaration of war not less than *twenty five millions of livres* had been sent to England from the national treasury, and that Cambon, the president of the committee of finance, had kept their destination a secret ⁴².

That a plot therefore, to overturn the English government and constitution toward the close of the year 1792, not only existed, but that the national convention took a very active part in it admits of no

41. "C'est Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre un "decret pour autoriser le Conseil executif à prendre des *sommes illimitées* sur l'extraordinaire des guerres, pour ces *operations secretes*., Ib.

42. "A cette epoque (lors de la declaration de guerre) "la trésorerie dirigée par Cambon, avait pour 25 millions de "numeraire achetés en Angleterre, et qui furent exposés à "être pris. Que sont-ils devenus? On l'ignore., Ib. 97. Immediately before this passage, he had said that five other millions had been deposited in the House of Bourdieu and Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out they fell into the hands of the English government.

doubt ⁴³. The members of the national convention in general, and of the executive council in particular, believed likewise that nothing was more easy at that time, than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in

43. Another unanswerable proof of the part, which the French government took in this plot, is contained in the two following passages of a Letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun on the 2. of January 1793. "*Rappelez donc tous vos émissaires ; que la propagande finisse, et ne cherchez plus à troubler la tranquillité publique dans ce pays. — Au nom de Dieu, si vous voulez éviter un embrasement universel, ne vous mêlez pas de notre gouvernement ; si nous sommes moins libres que vous, même si nous étions dans l'esclavage le plus affreux, laissez nous nos fers, et puisqu'ils ne nous gênent pas, pourquoi vous inquietent-ils ? Je m'étends d'autant plus sur cet article que je n'ignore pas les espérances mal fondées que vous avez conçues d'une révolte générale, et pendant que vous encouragez de tels projets, il me sera impossible de vous aider, et même d'entretenir aucune correspondance ni avec vous, ni avec le Conseil exécutif.,*" See p. 96. of the Appendix to the work entitled: Authentic Correspondence with M. Le Brun, the French Minister and others to February 1793 inclusive; published as an Appendix to other matter not less important, with a preface and explanatory notes. By W. Miles. London 1796. 8. Mr. Miles further observes (Appendix p. 59.) that persons were employed to propose, in the debating societies in London, such questions as were suitable to the views of the national convention.

England as in Ireland: for they considered the numerous addresses, delivered to them in November 1792, as expressive of the sentiments of the people at large; in which opinion they were undoubtedly mistaken, the great majority of the nation being even at that period well affected to the ancient constitution. Mr. Miles, who during the time that he was intrusted with a mission to the Prince Bishop of Liege had contracted an intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French minister for foreign affairs, who continued his correspondence with Le Brun and other men of consequence in France, till the national convention thought proper to break with England, who had frequent intercourse in the latter part of the year 1792 with French agents in London, and even acted as mediator between them and the British ministry, who may be supposed therefore to have been well acquainted with the views of the French government, and who is certainly not, as appears from his present writings, unjustly partial to the present administration, says expressly in a passage, where he speaks of the month of November; "It is "worthy of observation that the executive council had "made up their minds *at this time* on the part they had "resolved to take ⁴⁴." And then observing that "the executive council looked upon a revolt as inevitable,,,

he proceeds to give account of a note, which he committed to writing in November 1792 in the presence of a French agent, and says: "I have printed the Note
 "exactly as it was taken in the presence of the person,
 "with whom I conversed, omitting nothing but some
 "wild assertions ⁴⁵ respecting these societies ⁴⁶, which
 "he, as well as the rest of his countrymen, considered
 "as means in the last resort, to force the British cabinet to chuse between dishonourable concession and a
 "war, which they considered would place the minister
 "so completely between two fires, that government
 "assailed at the same time by civil insurrection and
 "foreign hostility, would inevitably fall, and this country incapable of mischief, would fall into impotency
 "and ruin by its own distractions. *Such I aver on the
 "faith of an honest man, were the delusive hopes entertained by Le Brun, and many others, who, unfortunately for both nations, had more power and influence*

45. Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of respect to this person, whom he calls (p. 87.) his friend. But though they are omitted in the Note (which is printed in the Appendix p. 57 — 60.) it is very easy to collect their meaning from what Mr. Miles himself relates p. 88. 89. in the passage which I here quote.

46. Certain English societies, which Mr. Miles however has not mentioned by name.

"at that moment than sense and discretion" 47., In vain did Mr. Miles attempt to undeceive Le Brun, and to convince him that his expectations of a general in-

47. The assertions and speeches of the French rulers themselves clearly prove, that Mr. Miles was not mistaken. Kerfaint, one of the principal orators of the national convention delivered a speech on the 1. of January 1793, in which the following passages occurred: "*Les inquietudes du premier ministre Pitt, maître absolu de l'Angleterre, depuis huit ans, et que les orages d'une révolution, ou ceux d'une guerre menacent également de sa chute etc.*," — "*L'Irlandais semble tourner ses regards vers nous, et nous dire: Venez, montrez vous, et nous sommes libres.*," — "*Le sentiment des vérités, que je viens de développer est répandu dans une foule de bons esprits en Angleterre: le gouvernement doit en redouter l'explosion, et les evenemens de la guerre doivent la hater.*," — "*C'est sur la ruine de la Tour de Londres, que vous devez signer avec le peuple Anglais détrompé le traité qui réglera les destines des nations, et fondera la liberté du monde.*," *Moniteur* 3. Jan. 1793. Even in November 1792 a French agent said to Mr. Miles that: "Such was the actual state of Great Britain, that we did not dare to call out the militia," (*Authentic Correspondence*, p. 96): and in Condorcet's *Journal*, though I do not recollect the particular number, it was asserted in positive terms, that the English nation was on the eve of abolishing royalty, and of establishing a national convention. In the reports both of Brissot and of Le Brun in December 1792 and January 1793 to the French convention, and even in Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville of the 27. of December, may be

urrection in England were ungrounded: in vain did he attempt to convince the French minister of the absurdity of declaring war against a powerful nation, which, with exception to a few democratic societies, was sincerely attached to the existing constitution, and ready to sacrifice the last drop of blood in its defence⁴⁸. Le Brun, in defiance of all representations, persisted in

sound expressions, which indicate the same expectation. And this expectation had necessarily very great influence on the system of fraternisation, which was particularly calculated for England. See what Mr. Miles says on this subject, Appendix p. 115. Lastly, as soon as war was declared, and the leaders of the French convention had no longer need to conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, not only that the expected rebellion was the grand inducement to their declaration of war, but that they believed the deluded English would be kind enough to become the instruments and the dupes of French ambition. For no sooner was the hostile decree pronounced on the 1. of February 1793 than Barbaroux said in positive terms: "*J'ai voté la guerre contre le cabinet de Saint James, parceque j'ai l'espérance de voir le peuple Anglais sortir enfin de la stupeur, où l'a plongé la longue habitude de son esclavage constitutionnel, et nous venger lui même d'une Cour etc.*", Monit. 3. Feb. 1793.

48. On the 19. of December Mr. Miles wrote a Letter to Le Brun, which ended with the following passage. "Mr. Mar-
"tet vous donnera sans doute des éclaircissemens sur bien des
"choses que vous ne pouvez savoir que par lui. Il ne vous

in the error, into which both himself and his colleagues had fallen: the resolution, which had been taken in consequence remained unaltered: and a war with England was irrevocably decided in the French cabinet 49.

“dissimulera pas l'attachement du peuple pour la constitution, et sa loyauté pour le Roi et son gouvernement. Il vous dira que loin d'adopter les rêveries bizarres, qui sont à la mode actuellement en France, il est déterminé coûte qu'il coûte de laisser choses comme elles sont, et de ne permettre, qu'on porte à la constitution aucune atteinte sous prétexte de réforme; par conséquent, on vous a cruellement trompé en vous assurant *que le peuple Anglais mécontent et opprimé n'attend que le signal pour se révolter* *),,; au contraire, il est content, heureux, et attaché au Roi, aux loix, et à sa patrie, et prêt à les défendre jusqu'à la dernière goutte de son sang. Voilà le vrai état des choses. *Jugez d'après cela, s'il vous convient de déclarer la guerre à une nation unanime et si puissante?*, J'attends votre réponse avec empressement., Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 65.

Whether Le Brun sent an answer to this Letter Mr. Miles has not mentioned: but, if he did, it must have been a very unsatisfactory one, as Mr. Miles judged it necessary to write to him again on 2. Jan. 1793, and to say to him what has been already quoted in Note 43.

*) “Report of Le Brun to the Convention., Note of Mr. Miles.

49. Dumouriez himself says: “Le Brun pria même le général (Dumouriez) d'écartier tout ce qui concernait les négociations avec l'Angleterre et la Hollande: il n'en fut pas du tout question.,, Mem. de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 108. 2. ed.

CHAPTER XI.

Official communications between the governments of Great Britain and Holland, on the progress of the French arms in the Austrian Netherlands. Uneasiness produced by the resolution to open the Schelde. Further alarm in Great Britain occasioned by the decree of the 19. of November, and the concomitant measures taken by the national convention in conjunction with certain British societies. Proclamation of the 1. of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same date, for the meeting of Parliament. Spirited declaration of the bankers, merchants and other inhabitants of the city of London in favour of the constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and speech from the throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal defence of Great Britain.

Reflexions on this subject.

Toward the close of the year 1792 Great Britain and Holland were nearly in the same political situation, and the interests of the two countries were so interwoven with each other, that an attack on the one might be justly considered as an attack on the other. In both countries there was a considerable French

party, though in Holland it was not only more numerous, but possessed the power of impeding the operations of the Dutch government by means which were inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the two countries against the machinations of the French convention made one common cause: for it was easy to foresee that the ruin of Britain would inevitably draw after it the ruin of Holland, and that the conquest of Holland would place its ally at least in a very dangerous situation. Further they were closely cemented by the treaty of 1788, by which they had engaged, in case of an attack from any European power, to protect each other by sea as well as by land, and reciprocally to guarantee all the countries, places, and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto possessed ¹. In consequence of this intimate union, and reciprocal obligation, the British ambassador at the Hague, seven days after the battle of Gemappe, when the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government, the following note to the States General ².

1. See the second article of this treaty in Martens Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. III. p. 128.

2. The French original is printed in the Moniteur 27. Nov. 1792. It is dated there Nov. 16.: but 16 appears to be an error for 13, not only because the answer of the States General is dated Nov. 16, and it is not probable that the

“The undersigned ambassador extraordinary and
“minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty, has
“received the King’s order to inform their high might-
“nesses the States General of the United Provinces,
“that his majesty seeing the theatre of war brought so
“near to the frontiers of the republic by the recent
“events, which have happened, and being sensible of
“the uneasiness, which may naturally result from such
“a situation thinks it due to the connexion, which sub-
“sists between him and the republic, that he should
“renew to their high mightinesses, on this occasion the
“assurances of his inviolable friendship, and of his de-
“termination to execute, at all times, with the utmost
“good faith, all the different stipulations of the treaty
“of alliance so happily concluded in 1788 between his
“majesty and their high mightinesses. In making to
“their high mightinesses this declaration, the king is
“very far from supposing the probability of any inten-
“tion, on the part of any of the belligerent parties, to
“violate the territory of the republic, or to interfere
“in the internal concerns of its government. The king
“is persuaded, that the conduct, which in concert with
“his majesty, their high mightinesses have hitherto ob-

answer was given on the same day, but because Lord Auck-
land himself, in his Note of the 25. Jan. 1793 mentions it
as dated 13. November. Mr. Dundas likewise in his speech
of 14. December quoted it by the same date.

“served, and the respect, to which the situation of his
“majesty and the republic justly entitles them, are
“sufficient to remove any ground of such apprehension.
“His majesty therefore confidently expects, that no
“events of the war will lead to any circumstance from
“without, which may be injurious to the rights of their
“high mightinesses; and he strongly recommends to
“them to employ, in concert with his majesty, an un-
“remitted attention and firmness to repress any at-
“tempts, which may be made to disturb the internal
“tranquillity of the provinces. His majesty has directed
“this communication to be made to their high mighti-
“nesses, in the full persuasion, that nothing can more
“effectually conduce to the interests and happiness of
“both countries, than the continuance of that intimate
“union, which has been established between them for
“the maintenance of their own rights and security, and
“with a view to contribute to the general welfare and
“tranquillity of Europe.,,

(Signed) Auckland.

This note was nothing more than a measure of precaution, which the existing circumstances required: it contains nothing, which could give offence to the French government, not even a supposition of hostile designs³,

3. The two orders of the French executive council, the one to open the Schelde, the other to attack the Austrians

and displays a moderation, which forms a striking contrast with the language adopted at this time in the national convention relative to the British government. On the 16. of November the States General returned the following answer ⁴.

"Their high mightinesses are most strongly impressed
 "by the renewal of the assurances, which his Britannic
 "Majesty has now been pleased to make, of his inviolable
 "friendship for this republic, and his determination to
 "execute at all times, with the most scrupulous good
 "faith, all the different stipulations of the treaty of
 "alliance so happily concluded in 1788 between his
 "majesty and their high mightinesses. The states ge-
 "neral have never doubted these generous sentiments
 "on the part of his Britanic majesty: but the declara-
 "tion, which his majesty is pleased to make of them at
 "the present moment cannot but be extremely agreeable
 "to their high mightinesses, and inspire them with the

on the Dutch territory if they retreated thither, were not given, as appears from the preceding chapter, before the 16. Consequently on the 13. there existed no public document, which *officially* proved a disposition on the part of the convention to violate the neutrality in respect to Holland: and therefore prudence required, that the British government should rather imply the contrary, as was really done.

⁴ The original is printed in the *Moniteur* 30. Nov. 1792.

"liveliest gratitude and the most devoted attachment to
"his Britannic majesty. The states general moreover
"perfectly agree with his majesty in the persuasion that
"there is not the least reason to attribute to any of the
"belligerent powers hostile intentions against the re-
"public: and indeed their high mightinesses are equally
"persuaded with the king, that the conduct and the
"strict neutrality, which in concert with his majesty
"they have hitherto so carefully observed, and the re-
"spect, to which the situation of his majesty and the
"republic justly entitle them, are sufficient to remove
"any ground of such apprehension. With respect to
"the internal tranquillity of the republic, their high
"mightinesses are perfectly sensible of the necessity of
"continuing to secure to its inhabitants so invaluable
"an enjoyment, and they are not negligent of any
"means, for the attainment of that salutary end. The
"states general, in concert with the provinces of the
"union, have already taken, and continue to take, the
"necessary measures for preventing any interruption of
"this tranquillity in the present circumstances. They
"have the satisfaction of being able to assure his majesty,
"that their efforts have so far been crowned with the
"desired success; and they have reason to flatter them-
"selves, that with the blessing of Providence those
"efforts will be equally fortunate in future. Finally
"their high mightinesses do not hesitate to declare, that

"they agree with his Britannic majesty in the persua-
 "sion, *that nothing can more effectually conduce to the*
 "*happiness and mutual interests of the two nations, than*
 "*the continuance of that intimate union, which has been*
 "*established between them, and which their high mightinesf-*
 "*ses on their part will neglect no opportunity of cementing*
 "*and strengthening, for the maintenance of the mutual*
 "*rights and interests of the two countries, and for the*
 "*security of the general welfare and tranquillity of*
 "*Europe* 5."

(Signed) W. H. Wassenauer.

(Counterigned) H. Fagel.

But on the very day, on which the States General expressed their expectation, that the neutrality, which they themselves had preserved, would not be violated by other nations, it was grossly violated on the part of

5. This last sentence proves, what some persons have called in question, that the Dutch government, from the very commencement of the communications between Great Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary for the two countries to make one common cause. Indeed the necessity of it was so obvious, that no one, who did not wish, that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn the Dutch constitution, could have supported a contrary opinion.

France: for it was on this day, as appears from the preceding chapter, that the executive council made the two resolutions, to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Provinces of their sovereignty over the Schelde. The first resolution indeed created very little uneasiness, because, when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the Austrians were already retreating toward Aix la Chapelle, and gave no indications of a design to retire toward Holland: but the other resolution excited a general alarm throughout the United Provinces, because it was obvious, that the execution of it would be highly detrimental, if not destructive, to the Dutch commerce, and consequently to the general welfare of the nation. "It would be difficult,, says a Dutch correspondent in a letter dated Hague 30 November, and printed in the *Moniteur* 9. December 1792, "to form an idea in France of the terrible commotion which this decree has excited. At Amsterdam and Rotterdam the principal merchants have experienced a sudden coolness for the French cause, which is not at all surprising. Perhaps they propose to make a common cause with the Stadtholder, and to prevent the execution of the decree by force of arms. With respect to the government, *they have instantly dispatched several couriers to England to demand succour:* and all means are employed to make Great Britain

"sensible, that its own interests are equally affected
 "with those of Holland ⁶., The States General protested
 likewise publickly against the decree and commissioned
 the Stadtholder to send positive orders to the captain of
 the guardship, which lay at the mouth of the Schelde,
 to prevent all French ships of war from entering it,
 and to inform the commanders, that by virtue of trea-
 ties the Schelde was shut to all armed vessels ⁷. Yet,

6. La Haie Nov. 30. "On aura peine à se faire une idée
 "en France de la terrible commotion, que ce decret a excité
 "en quelques esprits. A Amsterdam et à Rotterdam les prin-
 "cipaux négocians en ont éprouvé un refroidissement subit
 "pour la cause Française, cela n'a rien d'étonnant. Peut-être
 "songent-ils à faire cause commune avec le Stadthouder,
 "pour arrêter par la force des armes l'exécution de ce décret.
 "Quant au gouvernement, il a depeché d'abord divers cou-
 "riers en Angleterre pour en reclamer des secours: et tous
 "les moyens sont mis en oeuvre pour faire sentir à la Grande
 "Bretagne, que son intérêt y est tout aussi compromis que
 "celui de la Hollande., Moniteur 9. Dec. 1792. As this letter
 is printed in the Moniteur, and was therefore undoubtedly
 written by a person attached to the French cause, no one
 can well object that the description, in this instance, exceed-
 ed the reality. However, as it is not an official document,
 I shall make no further use of it.

7. The following is the official note, which the States
 General delivered to the imperial ambassador at the Hague
 at the beginning of December 1792. "Que depuis le com-
 "mencement des troubles survenus entre la maison d'Autriche

notwithstanding this protest, several French ships of war forced a passage on the 1. of December, in order to bombard the citadel of Antwerp.

“et la France, L. H. P. ont observé la plus stricte neutralité,
 “et ont taché d’en concilier les devoirs avec l’amitié et les
 “égards, qu’elles ont de tout tems manifesté pour S. M. I.
 “Que les États généraux sentent, que ce serait s’écarter de
 “cette neutralité, que de permettre à des navires français de
 “remonter l’Escaut pour attaquer la citadelle d’Anvers. Que
 “L. H. P. n’ignorent pas non plus combien cette démarche
 “serait contraire aux traités subsistans; et que c’est d’après
 “ces principes, qu’elles n’ont pu accorder la demande du com-
 “mandant des chaloupes canonieres françaises de remonter l’Escaut
 “jusqu’ à Anvers, mais qu’elles ont prié S. A. le prince
 “d’Orange et de Nassau, comme amiral-general de cette ré-
 “publique, d’ordonner à l’officier qui commande le vaisseau
 “de garde, stationné à l’emboûchure de l’Escaut *de ne pas*
 “accorder le passage, mais d’informer le commandant Français,
 “qu’en vertu de traités la riviere d’Escaut est close pour les
 “vaisseaux de guerre.,” *Moniteur* 16. Dec. 1792. Here we have
 a formal protest, on the part of the Dutch government, against
 the opening of the Schelde: and this *official document* is alone
 sufficient to confute the assertion that the States General were
 wholly indifferent on the subject (which even without this
 document would be almost incredible), and that the British
 government determined to support their rights, when they
 themselves did not wish for any such support. It is true that
 a great part of the Dutch, namely the French party in Hol-
 land, were so far from desiring assistance from England, that

The decree for the opening of the Schelde, and the force which was employed to put it in execution, could not be regarded with indifference by the British government. The dangerous consequences of it to England, when France is in possession of the Low Countries, have been already represented in the preceding chapter. At this time the political situation of England was very different from that of the year 1785, when the Emperor Joseph likewise proposed to open the Schelde. For as long as the Netherlands were possessed by the Emperor, the opening of the Schelde could do no injury to England: Austria was not a maritime power, could not therefore convert the Schelde into a station for ships of war, and England could at all times, with only a few frigates, have closed the Schelde, and put an end to the imperial commerce. Further, there was reason to believe that it was not so much Joseph's intention, really to open the Schelde,

they would, if possible have repelled it. But at that time the French party in Holland by no means constituted the Dutch government, and when two nations negotiate, whether they are monarchical or republican, the negotiations must be conducted by their respective governments. Nor could this party in the year 1792, though numerous and formidable, be considered as the Dutch nation: for the Stadtholderian party, especially if regard be had to landed property, was at that time very considerable.

as to frighten the Dutch, and to induce them to ward off the danger by the payment of some millions of florins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty of England in the year 1785 to assist the Dutch against the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately at war, the definitive treaty of peace was not signed before the 20. of May ⁸ 1784, and in the short interval, which elapsed, no treaty of alliance had been made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really bound to assist, in protecting not only the territory of the United Provinces, but likewise their franchises and liberties, of which that which they exercised over the Schelde was one of the principal ⁹. With great injustice therefore has the British government been accused

8. Martens' Recueil des principaux traités. T. II. p. 520.

9. The second article of this treaty is: "Dans le cas, où une des deux parties contractantes serait hostilement attaquée par quelque puissance Européenne, dans quelque partie du monde que ce puisse être, l'autre partie contractante s'engage de secourir son allié, tant par mer que par terre, pour se maintenir, et se garantir mutuellement dans la possession de tous les Etats, Domaines, Villes et Places, *Franchises et Libertés*, qui leur appartenaient respectivement avant le commencement des hostilités.,, And in the fifth article is said: "Elle l'assistera même de toutes ses forces, si les circonstances l'exigent.,, See Martens' Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. III. p. 128. 129.

of inconsistency, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when the Emperor attempted to open the Schelde in year 1785, and yet not shewing a similar indifference, when the same resolution was formed by the French government in year 1792. The mere circumstance, that the French were become masters of the Austrian Netherlands, by whatever name the dependence of these countries on France might be decorated, could not but excite uneasiness in the British ministry: and when we consider that the Schelde was to become a station for French ships of war, they would have acted faithlessly, as well to their own country, as to the allies of England, if they had not at least attempted to prevent the execution of the design. The superiority likewise, which this station gave the French on an invasion of Holland, an invasion which was in agitation so early as December¹⁰ 1792, was much too great to be disre-

10. In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the war minister, dated Paris 6. Dec. 1792, occur the following expressions. "*Ainsi si l'armée de la Belgique se porte sur la Hollande, et ne passe point la Meuse etc.,*" — "*Les divers motifs ci dessus, Général, ont déterminé le conseil à persister dans son ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme mesure d'urgence, et qui devait dévancer l'expédition de la Hollande etc.,*" Correspondance de Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 137. These expressions clearly prove that even at that time an attack on Holland was in agitation. Chaufard likewise (Mémoires p. 278.) uses the expression "opéra-

garded by the British government. And it was of the highest importance to England, to prevent, if possible, the French from becoming masters of Holland, as it was obvious, that, with the additional advantage of the Dutch coast and the Dutch navy, they would take the earliest opportunity of attacking England with double force ¹¹.

tions exécutées dans la Flandre, et projetées sur la Hollande., And Brissot though before the declaration of war he denied, with his wonted hypocrisy, that the French government had any design of invading Holland, made no scruple to complain afterwards (*A ses Commettans p. 79.*), that Holland was not sooner attacked.

11. Brissot himself, in his speech of the 12. Jan. 1793, made the following acknowledgement, in speaking of the English nation. “Sans doute elle avait raison, lorsque la France était sous le despotisme: elle avait raison à s’opposer à l’extension en Hollande de l’influence de la France: cette influence ne tendait qu’à augmenter ses forces., *Moniteur* 15. Janvier 1793. He immediately added indeed: “mais si jamais la République Française était appelée à rendre la liberté à la Hollande, ce ne serait pas pour augmenter son influence; elle n’en veut aucune sur les états étrangers., But the sophistry of this distinction could deceive only those, who either were, or chose to be, blind: and at present every one knows by experience, whether republican France displays less ambition, and less desire to extend its influence over foreign countries than monarchical France formerly displayed.

When we further take into the account the decree of the 19. of November, with all its concomitant circumstances described in the preceding chapter, we must acknowledge, that the British government had not a moment to lose, and that vigorous preparations were necessary to rescue Great Britain from the destruction, with which it was threatened. On the 1. of December therefore, as soon as intelligence arrived in London of the public encouragement which had been given by the national convention on the 28. of November, to those societies, who had announced their design of overturning the British constitution, the following proclamation was drawn up and immediately published.

"Whereas by an act passed in the 26. year of our
"reign, intituled, an act for amending and reducing
"into one act of parliament the laws relating to the
"Militia in that part of Great Britain called England,
"it is enacted that it shall be lawful for us, in the ca-
"ses and in the manner therein mentioned, the occa-
"sion being first declared in council and notified by
"proclamation, if no parliament shall be then sitting, to
"order and direct the drawing out and embodying of
"our militia forces or any part thereof: *and whereas*
"*we have received information that in breach of our laws,*
"*and notwithstanding our royal proclamation of the 21.*
"*day of May last, the utmost industry is still employed*
"by

*“by evil-disposed persons within this kingdom, acting in
“concert with persons in foreign parts, with a view to
“subvert the laws and established constitution of this realm,
“and to destroy all order and government therein, and
“that a spirit of tumult and disorder, thereby excited, has
“lately shewn itself in acts of riot and insurrection: and
“whereas under the present circumstances it is more
“particularly necessary, that, for the immediate sup-
“pression of such attempts, some addition should be
“made, as the exigency of the case may require, to
“the force which may be in readiness to act for the
“support of the civil magistrate: we therefore being
“determined to exert the powers vested in us by law
“for the protection of the persons, liberties and proper-
“ties of our faithful subjects, and fully relying on their
“zeal and attachment to our person and government,
“and to the happy constitution established in these
“kingdoms, have thought fit to declare in our council
“our royal intention, for the causes and on the occasion
“aforesaid, to draw out and embody such part of our
“militia forces, as may more immediately enable us to
“provide for the said important objects. And we do
“hereby in pursuance of the said-recited act, notify to
“all our loving subjects our said intention, and the
“causes and occasion thereof,,*

On the 1. of December was issued likewise another proclamation, by which the meeting of parliament

was fixed for the 13. of this month ¹². But before the parliament assembled, a very numerous meeting of the merchants, bankers and traders of the city of London was held at Merchant Taylors Hall, at which the following *Declaration in support of the constitution of Great Britain* was unanimously resolved ¹³.

“We the merchants, bankers, traders, and other
 “inhabitants of London, whose names are hereunto
 “subscribed, perceiving with the deepest concern, that
 “attempts are made to circulate opinions contrary to the
 “dearest interests of Britons, and subversive of those
 “principles, which have produced and preserved our
 “most valuable privileges, feel it a duty we owe to
 “our country, ourselves, and our posterity, to invite
 “all our fellow subjects to join with us, in the expres-
 “sion of a sincere and firm attachment to the constitu-
 “tion of these kingdoms, formed in remote, and im-
 “proved in succeeding ages, and under which the glo-
 “rious revolution in year 1688 was effected; a consti-

12. It is printed in the New Annual Register 1792. Public Papers, p. 59. It contains nothing more than usual, except the mention of a law, which enacts, that if the militia be called out, when the parliament is not sitting, and the prorogation will not expire within fourteen days, a proclamation shall be issued for its assembling within that time.

13. *Ib.* p. 67.

"tution wisely framed for the diffusion of happiness
"and true liberty, and which possesses the distinguished
"merit, that it has on former occasions been, and we
"trust in future will be found, competent to correct its
"errors, and reform its abuses: our experience of the
"improvements in agriculture and manufactures, of the
"flourishing state of navigation and commerce, and of
"increased population, still further impels us to make
"this public declaration of our determined resolution to
"support, by every means in our power, the ancient
"and most excellent constitution of Great Britain, and
"a government by *King, Lords, and Commons*, and to
"exert our best endeavours to impress on the minds of
"those connected with us a reverence for and a due
"submission to the laws of their country, which have
"hitherto preserved the liberty, protected the property,
"and increased the enjoyments of a free and prosperous
"people.,,

About the same time various associations were formed in support of the ancient constitution of *King, Lords, and Commons*, in opposition to those societies, who on the 28. of November had solemnly announced their design of introducing *a national convention*. Active measures were taken also both by government and by the magistrates of London to counteract the effects of the projected insurrection. The guard at the Bank was augmented, the Tower was put into a state of

defence, and several regiments were assembled in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. On the 13. of Dec. the parliament met and was opened by the following speech from the throne.

“My Lords and Gentlemen

“Having judged it necessary to embody a part of
“the militia of this kingdom, I have, in pursuance of
“the provisions of the law called you together within
“the time limited for that purpose, and it is, on every
“account a great satisfaction to me to meet you in par-
“liament at this conjuncture. I should have been hap-
“py, if I could have announced to you the secure and
“undisturbed continuance of all the blessings, which
“my subjects have derived from a state of tranquillity :
“but events have *recently* occurred, which require our
“united vigilance and exertion, in order to preserve
“the advantages, which we have hitherto enjoyed.
“The seditious practices, which had been in a great
“measure checked by your firm and explicit declaration
“in the last session, and by the general concurrence of
“my people in the same sentiments, *have of late been*
“*more openly renewed, and with increased activity.* A
“spirit of tumult and disorder, the natural consequence
“of such practices, has shewn itself in acts of riot and
“insurrection, which required the interposition of a
“military force in support of the civil magistrate. The

"industry employed to excite discontent on various pre-
"texts, and in different parts of the kingdom, has ap-
"peared to proceed from a design, to attempt the de-
"struction of our happy constitution, and the subver-
"sion of all order and government: *and this design has*
"*evidently been pursued in connexion and concert with*
"*persons in foreign countries.* I have carefully observed
"a strict neutrality in the present war on the continent,
"and have uniformly abstained from any interference,
"with respect to the internal affairs of France: *but it*
"*is impossible for me to see, without the most serious un-*
"*easiness, the strong and increasing indications, which*
"*have appeared there of an intention to excite distur-*
"*bances in other countries, to disregard the rights of*
"*neutral nations, and to pursue views of conquest and*
"*aggrandizement, as well as to adopt toward my allies*
"*the States General, who have observed the same neutra-*
"*lity as myself, measures which are neither conformable*
"*to the law of nations, nor to the positive stipulations of*
"*existing treaties.* Under all these circumstances I have
"felt it my indispensable duty to have recourse to those
"means of prevention and internal defence, with which
"I am entrusted by law; and I have also thought it
"right to take steps for making some augmentation of
"my naval and military force, being persuaded that
"these exertions are necessary in the present state of
"affairs, and are best calculated both to maintain in-

“ternal tranquillity, and to render a firm and tempe-
“rate conduct effectual for preserving the blessings of
“peace. Nothing will be neglected on my part, that
“can contribute to that important object consistently
“with the security of my kingdoms, and with the faith-
“ful performance of engagements, which we are bound
“equally by interest and honour to fulfil.”

When we consider the magnitude of the danger, which immediately as well as mediately, threaten the British empire, we must admit that his Majesty's speech was couched in terms of great moderation: and this moderation will appear still more conspicuously, if it be compared with the insulting and menacing language, which had been lately held by the president of the national convention. The speech contained no proposal of a declaration of hostilities, but expressed an ardent desire for the preservation of peace. It is true, that an augmentation was proposed both of the naval and military force: but this augmentation was absolutely necessary for the preservation of Britain, and presented the only hope, which now remained, of securing the continuance of peace with France; because, when one nation is threatened by another, especially by a nation, which displayed such ambition and thirst of conquest, it cannot possibly expect to prevent the intended attack by any other means, than by vigorous preparations

of defence. If, instead of having recourse to preparations of defence, an ambassador had been sent to Paris, to make representations to the national convention, which had already, in the most solemn and public manner, declared itself hostile to the British government, and consequently to the British nation¹⁴, the danger would not have been averted, but augmented: the convention would have regarded the measure as a token of fear, the pride and ambition of the French

14. Whatever theory be adopted in regard to the origin of the power exercised by a government, or to the source from which that power is derived, every one must admit, that as long as the majority of a nation does not wish for a revolution, a declaration of hostilities against its government and constitution is a declaration of hostilities against the nation at large. But there can be no doubt, that the great body of the British nation, even in the year 1792, was sincerely attached to the present constitution: and that, though the societies, who wished to establish a national convention, were really formidable in consequence of their unremitting assiduity and their connexions with France, they were not, with all their proselytes and advocates, to be compared, either in point of property, or even in point of number, with those, who wished to preserve the ancient constitution. For this objection however, the French rulers had an excellent salvo. "Les révolutions, répondait-on, ne se font qu'avec les *minorités*: c'est la *minorité* qui a fait la révolution Française., Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 87.

rulers would have received new nourishment, and the resolution expressed on the 28. of November would have been more strongly confirmed. The result of a conference, which Mr. Pitt, a few days before the meeting of parliament, had already had with Mr. Maret ¹⁵, affords ample proof of this assertion: for Mr. Pitt's bare consent to negotiate with an agent of the executive council, was openly attributed in the national convention by Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, to a supposed dread of the French power on the part of the British ministry. Besides, what reception could an ambassador of his Britannic majesty have expected from the president of the French convention who had received with every mark of friendship, and every token of applause, the deputies of those societies, who declared their resolution of overturning the British government and constitution? The United States of America, against whom the present Directory of France acts the same insidious part, as the national convention acted against England in the year 1792, have in 1797 attempted an embassy under similar circumstances: and it has ended, as every man acquainted

15. This conference, with the result of it, will be related at large in the thirteenth chapter, where all the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France will be particularly examined.

with the politicks and principles of the modern French rulers naturally expected. For the American ambassadors, instead of obtaining satisfaction for past injuries, and security for the future, were not admitted even to an audience, and were obliged to return, after their mission had answered no other purpose, than to increase the weight of the indignities, which had been already offered to their government and nation. But there is no necessity for having recourse to analogical arguments: for the national convention solemnly declared on the 15. of December 1792, that they acknowledged no political institution, which was inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people, and consequently, according to their own repeated explanations, no kingly government ¹⁶. If therefore a British ambassador had been sent to Paris in December 1792, at a time when projects of revolution and conquest had reduced the

16. In the introduction to the decree of the 15. of Dec. (of which more will be said in the following chapter) was declared: "*La convention nationale — fidele aux principes de la Souveraineté des peuples, qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaître aucune institution qui y porte atteinte, etc.,*" *Moniteur* 17. Dec. 1792. — It is a curious circumstance, that it was on the very day, on which the national convention virtually refused to acknowledge any kingly government, that Mr. Fox made his motion in the House of Commons for sending an ambassador from his Britannic majesty to France.

national convention to a state of political intoxication, he would in all probability have been received with an address of the following kind. "Do you come, "Sir, from the British people, or do you come from "the king? If you come from the people, we are "ready to receive you, and to shew the same friend- "ship and fraternity, as we shewed to the deputies "in the month of November. But if you are sent "by the king,, (to which the ambassador must have replied in the affirmative) "our answer has been "already given: we acknowledge no other sovereignty, "than that of the people., Thus would the British government, in sending at that time an ambassador to Paris, not only have failed of removing the causes of complaint, but would have brought on the whole nation new injuries and insults. Besides, when an unarmed nation negotiates with an armed nation, the latter will always prescribe laws to the former, especially if the unarmed nation takes the first step: for it is to be observed, that as soon as a negotiation was opened by the French minister in London, the British ministry continued it. They did not therefore absolutely refuse to negotiate with France: and the negotiation could be conducted full as well in London as in Paris. But we shall see in one of the following chapters, what was the result of it: we shall see, that the declarations of the French government were in direct contradiction to

its actions, that the former were as false, as the latter were unjust, and that the whole negotiation had no other object, than to amuse the British ministry, till the plan for the destruction of Great Britain was ripe for execution. An armament therefore, by sea as well as by land, was the only means of warding off the impending danger: and this inference was so obvious, that in the House of Lords the address to his majesty was voted without a division, and even in the House of Commons the opposition was reduced to fifty members ¹⁷. The two houses of parliament, or at least a very great majority, saw further, that, beside an armament by sea and land, other measures were necessary, in order to prevent on the one hand the breaking out of the intended insurrection, and on the other hand to disarm as much as possible the French government, and to throw impediments in the way of its already avowed hostile designs. Of the former kind was the alien bill, and the bill for presenting the circulation of French assignats in England: of the latter kind were the two bills, by which the exportation of corn, arms, and military stores to France were prohibited. But as each of these bills was made a subject of complaint, it will not be superfluous to take a cursory review of them.

17. New Annual Register 1792. British and foreign history, p. 21. 23.

The alien bill was brought into the upper house by Lord Grenville on the 19. of December 1792, and on the 4. of January 1793 it finally passed the commons¹⁸. On this bill, which equally affected strangers of every country, and included royalists as well as democrats, no government in Europe made the least complaint, except the French. It was regarded as a matter of national police, which every nation is entitled to regulate according to the existing circumstances: and it was acknowledged, that more than usual precaution was requisite to counteract the machinations of the numerous emissaries, with which England was at that time overrun. But the national convention made most bitter complaints, which was not at all extraordinary, as the alien bill presented a very material obstacle to its correspondence with the societies, with which it acted in concert. As this reason however could not be openly alleged, it was necessary to seek a pretext for complaint elsewhere: and they discovered a most excellent one, as they supposed, in the fourth article of the treaty of commerce¹⁹. But this article, though

18. Ib. p. 36 — 43.

19. The article runs thus. "Il sera libre aux sujets et habitans des états respectifs des deux souverains d'entrer et d'aller librement et sûrement, *sans Permission ni Saufconduit général ou spécial*; etc., Martens Recueil des principaux traités. Tom. II. p. 682. To this article the French minister,

it has been quoted for the same purpose likewise by British orators and British writers, was the most unfortunate, which could have been adopted: for it had been violated, seven months before the period in question, by a decree of the national assembly ²⁰, which still continued in force; and consequently the article was no longer binding on Great Britain. On the 18. of May, namely, the national assembly had passed a decree, relative to strangers resident in France, which perfectly corresponded to the alien bill proposed in the British parliament in the following month of December ²¹: for by that decree was ordained, that every

Le Brun, appealed in his speech in the convention of 31. Dec. 1792, and Mr. Chauvelin in a Note to Lord Grenville of 7. Jan. 1793. See the *Moniteur*, Jan. 3. 17. 1793.

20. Yet Mr. Chauvelin, in his Note to Lord Grenville of the 7. Jan. 1793, had the assurance to say: "*C'est ainsi que le gouvernement Britannique a le premier voulu rompre un traité à qui l'Angleterre doit une grande partie de sa prospérité actuelle, onéreux pour la France, arraché par l'adresse et l'habileté à l'imperitie ou à la corruption des agens du gouvernement, qu'elle a détruit, traité qu'elle n'a cependant jamais cessé d'observer religieusement.*" Le Brun likewise ventured to assert the same in his speech of 31. Dec.

21. Though the decree of the 18. May 1792, or the French alien act, had probably escaped the notice of those members of the British senate, who opposed our own alien act, yet it could not have been forgotten by the French

stranger (without any exception in favour of the English) who had arrived in Paris after 1. Jan. 1792, should, within eight days after the publication of the decree, declare to the committee of the section, where he lodged, his name, his character, his usual place of abode, and his abode in Paris, and likewise present his passport, if provided with one: and it was further enacted, that every stranger, who neglected to make the required declaration, should be fined an hundred livres, and sentenced to an arrest not exceeding three months ²²,

ministers; and therefore, when *they* objected to the English alien bill on the ground of its being a violation of the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, they made the objection with the consciousness of having already broken it themselves. This is one of the many instances of hypocrisy and duplicity displayed by the virtuous republicans of France in their dealings with England.

22. In a preceding debate on the French alien bill, Carnot proposed that every stranger, who neglected to make the required declaration within twenty four hours after his arrival in Paris, should be imprisoned to the end of the war: and this proposal, though it was modified on the 18. of May, when the decree finally passed the assembly, was received at the time with great applause. In the words of the original Carnot's proposal run thus. "Tout voyageur, "étranger et particulier, qui n'habite point Paris depuis le "1. Mars dernier sera tenu dans les 24 heures de remettre à "la police un bulletin signé de deux citoyens actifs, conte-

but that whoever made a false declaration, should be fined a thousand livres, and condemned to an arrest not exceeding six months ²³. Further every Englishman, who travelled at that time in France, can attest, that he was not permitted to go from one place to another, till he was furnished with a passport as accurately descriptive of his person, as when a thief is advertised in a public newspaper: and it was even dangerous to deviate from the route, which had been once assigned, and which was specified in the passport ²⁴,

“nant l'indication de son nom, de son état, de sa demeure, sous peine de prison jusqu'à la fin de la guerre., (On applaudit). Moniteur 17. May 1792.

23. The first and fifth articles of the decree of the 18. May are as follows.

1. “Toute personne venue à Paris depuis le 1. Janvier 1792 fera dans la huitaine de la publication du présent décret, au comité de sa section la déclaration de son nom, son état, son domicile habituel, et son domicile à Paris; et il exhibera son passeport, s'il en a un.

5. “Les étrangers, qui ne feront pas la déclaration exigée, seront condamnés à une amende de 100 livres, et à une detention, qui ne pourra être de plus de trois mois. Ceux qui font de fausses déclarations seront condamnés à 1000 livres d'amende, et six mois de detention., Moniteur 19. Mai 1792.

24. The French passports delivered to Englishmen in the year 1792, long before our own alien bill was introduced,

The municipal officers were likewise so strict in the examination of passports, that the British ambassador himself, when he returned from Paris in August 1792, was detained more than once on the road, and was obliged to send messengers to Paris, in order to remove the difficulties, which were thrown in his way ²⁵. On these police regulations in France, which were a violation of the fourth article of the commercial treaty, to say the least of them, in an equal degree with any thing contained in the alien bill afterwards introduced in England, the English government made no complaint, because it was declared in the national assembly, that they were absolutely necessary, to preserve internal tranquillity ²⁶. But similar regulations were at least

contained a clause not generally known, namely an order to arrest every one who departed from the specified route ('*s'il se détourne de la dite route, de le mettre en état d'arrestation.*,) Whether *all* the French passports delivered to Englishmen at that time contained this clause I cannot say: but I myself know an instance at least of one, and have no reason to suppose that it formed an exception to the general rule.

25. For this assertion I have no other authority, than the newspapers of the day: but, as it has never been contradicted, we may conclude that it is true.

26. On the 15. of May 1792, when the French alien bill was proposed, the necessity of it was alleged in the following

least as necessary in December 1792 to preserve the internal tranquillity of England. Consequently, as the English government made no objection to the ground, on which the French alien bill was framed, notwithstanding the fourth article of the commercial treaty, by which it had been stipulated, that every Englishman should travel, without a passport, without detention, and as freely in France as in England, the French government ought likewise to have admitted the validity of the reasons in favour of the English alien bill. This however they thought proper to refuse, and by so doing subscribed their own condemnation: for their appeal to the treaty of commerce involved a tacit acknowledgement, that this very treaty had been already violated on the part of France by the decree of the 18. of May, and consequently could no longer

terms. "*Une des causes des inquietudes de cette grande cité vient de la circulation rapide d'étrangers, que la curiosité, le besoin, ou leurs affaires y attirent; elle doit accueillir sans doute tous ceux qui viennent accroître la masse de ses richesses, mais non recevoir les monstres, qui voudraient déchirer son sein. Les habitans de Paris n'ont pas de plus mortels ennemis, que ceux qui se couvrent d'un nom sacré pour former les projets les plus horribles.*" *Moniteur* 17. May 1792. This description applies to the situation of London in December 1792 still better than it applied to that of Paris in May 1792.

be enforced on Great Britain. In whatever light therefore the British alien bill be viewed, the national convention had no right to complain of it ²⁷: and, when we further take into the account, that when the French alien act was made, which no more excepted British subjects, than the British alien act excepted French subjects, the British government had not deviated from the strictest neutrality ²⁸, but that before the British

27. See Le Brun's acknowledgement, made at the end of August 1792, and quoted at the beginning of Ch. IX. It deserves likewise to be noted, that Chauvelin's Letter of the 28. April, containing the most positive assurances of the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet was read in the national assembly on the 7. of May, only a week before the French alien bill was proposed. See Ch. V. Note 2.

28. Another objection however occurs to me, which I cannot pass over in silence. It has been said, that the English ministry ought to have offered to the executive government of France some explanation on the alien bill. But it may be asked in reply: Why was it necessary that the government of Great Britain should make a diplomatic communication on this subject to that of France, when the French government, at the time its own alien bill passed, made so such communication to the government of Great Britain? And if we further ask, in what the required explanation should have consisted, they, who censure the omission of it, will find it difficult to give a satisfactory answer. For the explanation must either have implied, that the national convention acted in concert with persons, who were

alien bill was introduced, [the national convention had publicly expressed its readiness to assist in the overthrow of the British constitution, the charge, which has been laid to Britain, recoils with ten-fold force on France.

While the alien bill was still under the consideration of parliament the assignat bill was brought in by the attorney general on the 26. of December, and passed in a few days with hardly any opposition from either house. This bill, of which the object was to make both the payment and the tender of French assignats illegal, was equally necessary with the preceding: for, not to mention the immense loss, which would have been finally sustained by a continued circulation of French assignats²⁹, the national convention, as long as its paper was taken in payment, could create at its pleasure even in Great Britain whatever sums it thought proper, and employ them as the means

attempting to overturn the British constitution, or it must have implied the contrary. But an explanation, which implied the former position, would certainly not have satisfied either the French or their friends: and an explanation, which implied the latter, would have contained an absolute falsehood.

29. I have been informed from very good authority, that the city of Hamburg lost not less than four and twenty millions of livres, or a million of pounds sterling, by the French assignats.

of effecting the intended insurrection. Merely during the time that Cambon was at the head of the committee of finance, assignats were issued to the amount of three thousand millions of livres ³⁰: and hence we may conclude, that the quantity, which circulated in England in December 1792, was not inconsiderable. Further, that Cambon sent thither, immediately from the national treasury, at least as much paper, as was necessary to purchase five and twenty millions of livres, appears from a passage quoted in the preceding chapter ³¹ from Brissot's address to his constituents: and that these five and twenty millions were purchased with *secret* views, is evident from the circumstance, that no account, as Brissot himself acknowledges ³², was ever given of them. Lastly, that the *secret* views of the French rulers, in making these remittances to England, was to promote the rebellion, which they expected would soon break out, appears likewise from

30. "Son genie est dans un mot: émettre et toujours
"émettre des assignats. Il en a augmenté la masse de plus de
"trois milliards en dix-huit mois., Brissot à ses Commettans,
p. 95.

31. Note 42. The expression used by Brissot: "Vingt cinq
"millions de numeraire *achetés* en Angleterre., clearly pro-
ves that the remittance was made, not in hard cash, but in
assignats, or other promissory notes from the French treasury.

32. Ib.

their own confessions ³³. Under these circumstances the introduction of the assignat bill was a very wise and a very necessary measure, as it deprived the French government of one of the most powerful engines, which it intended to employ in overturning the British constitution.

Before the close of December the two other bills were brought into parliament, by which the exportation of arms and corn from Great Britain to France was prohibited. The necessity of this prohibition was so obvious, that it is extraordinary how any one could call it in question: for as soon as one government has reason to believe, that another is hostilely inclined, (and the hostile designs of the national convention against the British government and constitution was already recorded in its own public acts) it would be the height of infatuation, if the former continued to augment the strength of the latter by a further supply

33. See Note 40 and 41 to the preceding chapter. The French assignats were considered also as fit instruments for ruining the bank of England, as Chauffard acknowledges, p. 17: and that they were likewise applied to the purpose of draining Great Britain of bullion as well as of coin, appears from Chalmers' Estimate of the comparative strength of Great Britain, where it is shewn that in the year 1792 not less than 2,909,000 ounces of silver were purchased with assignats, and sent to France.

of the two grand materials of war, arms and bread. On the prohibition of the exportation of arms, neither M. Chauvelin nor the national convention made the least complaint, being conscious that a complaint of this kind would be too gross even for themselves: but as some writers have really ventured to make it, and to assert, that the arms and ammunition bill was a violation of the treaty of commerce, it will not be superfluous to note, that the national assembly, thirteen months before the period in question, had strictly prohibited the exportation of arms and ammunition of every kind from France ³⁴, and consequently that, *if* such a prohibition was a violation of the treaty of commerce, France itself had already violated the treaty likewise in *this* point, and hence had forfeited all pretensions to the observance of it on the part of England.

With respect to the corn bill, it must be observed, that the exportation of wheat grown in England is subject to different regulations from that of foreign wheat, which has been imported into England. To prevent scarcity in our own country, his majesty, with the advice of his privy council, is empowered by an act of parliament, made long before the present war, to prohibit by a public order the exportation of British wheat. An order of this kind was issued on the 15. of

34. See the 13. Article of the decree of 8. Nov. 1791.

November 1792, and was printed in the London gazette: it was a *general* order, and affected all other countries, as well as France: and it was nothing new, because at all times, when circumstances require it, a stop is put to the exportation of British wheat. The French themselves had already adopted a similar measure: for during the whole of the year 1792 no wheat of French growth was exported from France, because they wanted it for their own consumption. On the order therefore, which was published on the 15. of November the French government could make no complaint: and Mr. Chauvelin himself, in his Letter to Lord Grenville of the 7. of January ³⁵, admitted, that it was nothing more than "the effect of the foresight and prudence of the English administration ³⁶." But the act of parliament which passed at the end of December included foreign corn, which had been

35. To prevent mistakes, it is necessary to observe, that Mr. Chauvelin sent two Letters to Lord Grenville on the 7. of January 1793. They are, both of them, printed in the *Moniteur* 17. Jan. 1793: but the former, which related to the alien bill, and has been already quoted, is there termed, "*Note remise par le citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville.*," the latter, which relates to the corn bill, and is meant in the present place, is termed "*Lettre du citoyen Chauvelin à Lord Grenville.*,"

36. His own words were "*un effet de la prévoyance et de la sagesse de l'administration Anglaise.*,"

imported into England, and prohibited the exportation of it in any vessel bound to France ³⁷. This act affected therefore France alone, and consequently, had the national convention acted amicably toward Great Britain, would have been an instance of blameable partiality. But who will venture to blame this partiality, who has read the facts recorded in the preceding chapter ³⁸? An enemy has no right to expect, that he should be treated as a friend: and as the national convention had publicly professed itself, a whole month before the corn bill passed, an enemy to the British government, it could not be supposed that the latter would further to contribute to the support of the former. Besides, there is great reason to believe, that the orders given by the French government toward the

37. About a week before the bill was brought into the house of commons, government had issued orders to stop the sailing of vessels laden with corn for France, till the parliament should come to a decision on the subject, for which reason the bill was called the "corn indemnity bill.,

38. Mr. Chauvelin however, whose *temperateness* of language has been highly extolled, presumed in his Letter to Lord Grenville of the 7. of January to term it, "*un acte de perfidie*., He must undoubtedly have taken for granted that the British ministers were wholly unacquainted, not only with the *secret* machinations of the French convention, but even with the *public* declarations made on the 28. of Nov.

close of the year 1792 for the purchase of corn in England had not merely the supplying of France for its object: for, though there was already as much wheat in France, as was necessary for the consumption of the country ³⁹, it was purchased in England by the French minister of the interior, at the beginning of December, at a much higher price, than it could have been purchased elsewhere ⁴⁰. The French government therefore had without doubt *secret* views: and these secret views were, to occasion a scarcity of corn in England, to excite thereby a general discontent, and thus promote the wished for insurrection ⁴¹. Did

39. This is expressly asserted in the report made by the Comité des subsistances to the national convention on the 29. of November. See the Moniteur 1. December 1792.

40. In the sitting of the 6. of December 1792 Marat brought the following complaint against the minister of the interior. "Un citoyen honnête, qui a été dans le commerce des grains s'est présenté au ministre de l'intérieur; il lui a offert de procurer des grains à 27 livres le septier, tandis que le ministre les achète à 54 livres dans les ports d'Angleterre., Moniteur 8. Dec. 1792. It is true, that Marat's word is in general of no great authority: yet he would have hardly been so absurd, as to assert so simple a fact before the national convention, which, had it been false, the minister of the interior could and would have instantly confuted.

41. Brissot himself says (A ses Commettans p. 78.) "Ainsi nous pouvions gêner les approvisionemens de nos

France deserve then to be treated on the same footing with friendly nations: and is the complaint about partiality founded on justice? No one, who has a regard for truth, will venture to assert it, or to maintain that the British government ought to have diminished its own, and have increased the strength of its enemy. Self preservation is not only a right, but a duty: and the preservation of the British government and constitution was a duty, which ministers owed to the nation at large.

It is evident therefore, that the four acts of parliament, which have been the subjects of the preceding inquiry, were nothing more than measures of precaution, which the danger then impending over Great Britain required. And as to the naval armament, which was ordered at this time, it was so very moderate, that it did not equal the number of ships, which the French had already in commission. Only nine thousand seamen and marines were voted on the 20. of December in addition to the peace establishment, which was sixteen thousand ⁴²: and no further addition was made till ten days after the national conven-

*“ennemis, en désolant leur commerce, et exciter des
mouvemens chez eux par la disette et la cherté de ces pro-
visions.”*

42. See the supplies granted by Parliament for the year 1793, in the New Annual Register. Public papers p. 121.

tion had declared war ⁴³. But five and twenty thousand seamen and marines were hardly sufficient to man eighteen ships of the line, with the proportionate number of frigates, sloops, and cutters: whereas the French, even three months before the present period, had not less than twenty one ships of the line, thirty frigates, eighteen sloops, four and twenty cutters, and ten ships armed en flute, not only in commission, but actually at sea ⁴⁴. The guards and garrisons in Great Britain amounted in December 1792 to only fifteen thousand seven hundred men: and even this small number was not augmented, before the declaration of war, with more than sixteen hundred ⁴⁵. Hence in that part of his majesty's speech, which was particularly addressed to the house of commons, it was esti-

43. *Ib.*

44. See the report of the minister of the marine on 23. Sept. 1793, quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 5. Brissot likewise (*A ses Committans* p. 57) says: "*L'Angleterre, qui n'a commencé d'armer que trois mois après nous etc.,*" and p. 56. "*Dès le mois d'Octobre on avait prévu la possibilité d'entrer en guerre avec les puissances maritimes; le comité diplomatique et de défense générale en avaient prévenu Monge; on avait mis à sa disposition des sommes considerables.,*"

45. Compare the army Supplies granted by Parliament on February 16. 1793 with those which were voted December 26. 1792.

mated, that the preparations then making would be amply defrayed "from the excess of the actual revenue beyond the ordinary expenditure ⁴⁶." But it appears from the fourth chapter of the present work, that this excess, which had been added to the sinking fund, did not, after the reduction of the taxes, that had taken place in the preceding session, amount to more than two hundred thousand pounds: and with two hundred thousand pounds it was not possible to fit out a fleet, which, if we consider the forward state of the French navy at that time, could do more than act on the defensive. The French minister for foreign affairs, in his report to the national convention on the 19. of December, speaking of the preparations then making in England, said himself: "*There is nothing in these armaments, which ought to alarm us, since they exceed by only four ships of the line the number which has been commissioned in the preceding years; since among the sixteen ships now in commission there are at least ten, which are known by the name of guard-ships, that is, the oldest and the least serviceable in the English navy; and lastly, since the king has declared that these armaments would require no additional taxes, and that they would be defrayed by the additional sum appropriated to the extinction of the*

"national-debt ⁴⁷., On the 31. of December the same French minister, after several ships of the line had been put in commission, in addition to the four, which he had mentioned on the 19., still acknowledged that France had no great reason to be alarmed ⁴⁸. Indeed he could not with truth have asserted the contrary: for he well knew that France had a more considerable fleet in readiness than Great Britain was then preparing, and that great exertions were making for a further augmentation of it. With great injustice therefore,

47. "*Ces armemens n'ont rien qui doive nous allarmer, puisqu'ils n'excedent que de 4 vaisseaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années précédentes; puisque sur 16 vaisseaux en armement il y a au moins 10 connus sous la denomination de garde-côtes, c'est à dire, les plus vieux et les plus détériorés de la marine Anglaise; puisqu'enfin le roi a déclaré, que ces armemens ne nécessiteraient aucun impôt extraordinaire, et qu'il suffirait, pour y subvenir, des fonds destinés à l'amortissement annuel de la dette nationale.*", *Moniteur* 21. Dec. 1792.

48. His own words were: "*préparatifs qui toutefois ne sont pas encore trop effrayans, si nous considérons que les ordres pour l'armement de 13 vaisseaux de ligne n'ont été donnés que depuis quinze jours, si nous songeons à la grande difficulté de compléter l'équipage de ces gros vaisseaux par le manque de matelots etc.*", *Monit.* 3. Janv. 1793. Even on the 12. of January 1793 Brissot made a similar acknowledgement, which will be quoted at length in the following chapter.

and with equally great inconsistency, were complaints made of the naval armament of Great Britain in Dec. 1792. For even if the national convention had betrayed no desire of conquest on the continent, had seized neither on Savoy nor on the Netherlands, had neither subdued a part of Germany, nor threatened Holland with an invasion, the mere circumstance, that France had fitted out a formidable fleet, would have justified an equal armament on the part of Britain: and since the national convention on the 28 of November had formally declared itself the enemy of the British government, the latter was not only justified, but in duty bound, to counteract the machines, which were then at work for its destruction. The reproach therefore, which was made to the British government on account of the naval armament in December 1792, deserves, like many other censures, which have been made to it during the present war, to be wholly inverted: and France itself must be reproached, not only with having armed at sea three months before Britain even made a commencement ⁴⁹, but with having ordered the armament at a time, when by the acknowledgement of the national convention, the British government had not transgressed the strictest limits of neutrality ⁵⁰.

49. See Note 44.

50. The introduction to the decree of 13. Jan. 1793 is

In this situation of affairs, while the British government was taking only measures of defence, a war between France and Great Britain might have been still avoided, had it been the will of the national convention, and the executive council⁵¹. That it de-

as follows. "La convention nationale informée par le Ministre des affaires étrangères des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce pays relativement au caractère de neutralité, qu'il avait conservée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc., Monit. 16. Janv. 1793. By this acknowledgement the national convention has undesignedly subscribed its own condemnation.

51. The following is an extract from a Letter written by Mr. Miles on 2. Jan. 1793 to Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs: "Je vous ai tracé la route que vous avez à suivre; et si vous suivez mes conseils, le Cabinet Anglois ne s'avisera pas de vous déclarer la guerre. Mais soyez de bonne foi; ne me trompez pas; n'écoutez pas ces petits messieurs qui vous entourent, et vous flattent, et qui aimeraient mieux jouer du plus fin, que de marcher droit. Rappelez vous toujours, que vous tenez entre vos mains par le hazard le plus extraordinaire et le plus bizarre la destinée, pour ainsi dire, de l'Europe entière, et qu'en vous écartant des principes que je vous ai tracés dans une lettre précédente, et que Maret vous a certainement répétés selon les instructions que je lui ai données, vous prononcerez un arrêt de mort contre des millions peut-être de vos semblables. Pouvez vous, osez vous y penser sans frémir? La paix, je vous le repete, est facile à conserver; et la paix.

pended entirely on the French government, whether peace should be preserved or not, has been admitted by

“une fois assurée, voilà la pierre fondamentale posée de cette
 “alliance entre nos deux pays, alliance que j’ai tant désirée,
 “et que pour l’obtenir je suis prêt de sacrifier ma vie. La
 “Nation Anglaise est bien disposée vers la France, et comme
 “la nation compte pour beaucoup dans ce pays-ci, le gou-
 “vernement n’osera jamais marcher en sens contraire : mais
 “de votre côté il ne faut pas effaroucher ni fatiguer le peuple
 “en décrétant une Constitution à laquelle elle est attachée
 “d’une manière que rien ne peut ébranler. Voilà cependant
 “l’écueil, sur lequel je crains que vous n’alliez échouer, et
 “sans parler de l’indécence qu’il y aurait à vouloir s’immiscer
 “dans les affaires intérieures d’une autre nation, il faut con-
 “venir qu’une démarche si peu mesurée serait aussi indécente,
 “qu’injuste et dangereuse. Le malheur est que vous semblez
 “avoir la manie de vous mêler de tout ; et souvenez vous,
 “mon ami, qu’en se mêlant de tout, on gâte tout. — Ecou-
 “tez moi encore une fois et une fois pour tout ; ne rendez
 “pas la guerre nécessaire, ni comme mesure de précaution, ni par
 “nécessité, pour repousser une agression de votre part, et vous
 “ne l’aurez pas ; comptez là dessus et je répondrai du reste.
 “J’entrevois même des dispositions très favorables en faveur
 “de la paix : ne forcez donc pas Mr. Pitt par votre impru-
 “dence à se déclarer contre vous., Authentic Correspondence etc. Appendix p. 94 — 97. On the false report, which was propagated with great industry, that Mr. Pitt had then intermeddled in the internal affairs of France, in order to effect a counter-revolution, Mr. Miles had already written to

by French writers, who were not only intimately acquainted with the state of politicks at that time, but were themselves in high and official employments. I will quote at the bottom of the page ⁵² only a few

Le Brun on 18. Dec. 1792 as follows. "Le rapport également
 "denué de tout fondement que Mr. Pitt était l'ennemi juré
 "de la revolution, fut reçu avec cette facilité aveugle, qui
 "donne toujours aux mensonges la victoire sur la verité.
 "J'ose vous renvoyer à toutes les déclarations publiques et
 "reconnues du ministre Anglais, depuis le commencement
 "de la révolution, pour vous convaincre, qu'il s'est fait un
 "devoir de ne point se mêler des affaires interieures de votre
 "gouvernement. Je crois qu'il a toujours rejeté avec fer-
 "meté toutes les propositions d'attaques qui lui ont été faites
 "contre les Français, et qu'il n'a jamais voulu s'engager en
 "aucun projet de contrerevolution; s'il s'est fait un devoir
 "de ne jamais se mêler de vos affaires, il se fait aussi une
 "gloire, d'être resté attaché à ses principes sages et equita-
 "bles.,, Ib. p. 75.

52. "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde, proposait qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaisseaux de guerre, ce qui supposait nécessairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, et qu'il est été très-facile et très nécessaire d'éviter.,, Memoires de Dumouriez, Tom. I. p. 105. ed. 2. — "Dans cette position on aurait pu négocier une paix avantageuse. L'Empire et le Corps Helvetique n'auraient certainement pas rompu la neutralité que ce dernier peuple a conservée jusqu'à présent. *La Hollande et l'An-*

passages from the writings of Dumouriez and Brissot, which remove the question beyond the possibility of doubt. That the views of Mr. Pitt were pacific, and that he really wished to avoid a war with France, is a fact, which even his enemies have been obliged to admit: for Kerfaint, a leading man in the national convention, and who was moreover decidedly in favour of a war with England, entered on 1 January 1793 into a very minute examination of the views and interests both of the ministerial and the opposition party in England, and thence deduced the following conclusion: "*Pitt therefore does not wish for war* ⁵³." It was

gleterre ne se seraient pas non plus déclarées. L'Europe serait en paix, et la nation française n'aurait pas comblé tous ses crimes par le meurtre de la famille royale, par la destruction de la religion et des lois, et par une anarchie barbare., Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 251. — "Cette guerre (avec l'Autriche) promettait les plus heureux succès; la chute de la maison d'Autriche, la liberté des Pays-Bas devait en être l'infaillible conséquence, si l'on avait en la prudence d'éviter une guerre maritime., Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 68. Brissot wrote this in May 1793: and his acknowledgement, that France might have avoided the war with England, is the more worthy of notice, as he himself, only a few months before, had been one of the principal advisers of the declaration of it.

53. His own words were: "*Pitt ne veut pas donc la guerre., Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. Yet this very Kerfaint said*

indeed impossible that he should: for he must have foreseen that the execution of his favourite projects, the diminution of the national debt, the abolition of taxes, and the promotion of the general welfare of Great Britain, would be impeded by the expences resulting from a war with France. No man can wish to be disturbed in his darling occupation, no man can

in a subsequent part of his speech: "*C'est sur la ruine de la Tour de Londres que vous devez signer avec le peuple Anglais dé trompé le traité qui réglera les destins des nations.*"

The pacific views of the British cabinet, and the hostile views of the French government were acknowledged therefore without reserve at one and the same time. Carra likewise, who was not only a violent but even virulent adversary of the British administration, said in his speech of the 2. Jan. 1793: "*Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'est jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour, et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'est réellement pas de nous faire la guerre, mais seulement d'intimider la convention nationale.*"

Moniteur 4. Jan. 1793. That the British government wished to deter the national convention from the execution of its ambitious projects, could hardly be thought blameable even by the French themselves. On the 12. of January 1793. Brissot also in a speech, which is however full of sophistry and contradictions, said: "*Je n'étendrai pas plus loin ces réflexions qui doivent vous prouver, que vous ne devez pas craindre de voir le cabinet d'Angleterre se joindre à vos ennemis.*" Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793.

desire to be prevented from finishing a work, which he himself beholds with admiration, nor is it possible to derive gratification from destroying the fruits of one's own ingenuity and labour. Lastly the armament itself, which was so arranged, that the expences of it should be defrayed by the excess of the revenue above the ordinary expenditure, without either loan or taxes, shews how firmly he held, and how unwilling he was to part with his adopted plan. But the national convention wrested it from his hands; and, as will appear from the following chapter, left him no other choice than either to prepare for a serious combat, or to lay his country at the feet of France ⁵⁴.

54. Chronological order would require, that a few words should be said here in regard to the well-known Mr. Maret, who was in London at the beginning of December 1792. But as the thirteenth chapter will be wholly devoted to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, the story, that Mr. Maret was at this time authorized by the French executive council, to treat with the British ministers, will be there examined, and confuted.

CHAPTER XII.

Decree of the 15. of December 1792, and the interpretation of it by the executive council. New exhortation to all nations, who were inclined to insurrection. Menace in the national convention of an appeal from the government to the people of Great Britain, with Brissot's interpretation of it. Barailon's proposal, to except Great Britain from the decree of the 19. of November, rejected by the national convention. Circular letter of the marine minister, Monge, to the inhabitants of the French sea ports, to rouse them to a war with Great Britain, and to attempt the conquest of it. Attack on a British ship of war before the harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the United States of America, with proposals of an alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French executive council to General Miranda, on the 10. of January 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand, at furthest within twelve days. Armament of thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates, in addition to the twenty two ships of the line and the thirty two frigates

already in commission, in order to act against Great Britain.

While the British government was engaged in taking measures of defence, in consequence of the danger with which it was already threatened, the national convention still continued its hostile projects, and gradually converted the probability, that it was determined to involve Great Britain, as well as Holland, in a war with France, into absolute certainty.

By the decree of the 19. of November, and the conduct of the national convention on the 28 of the same month, its sentiments relative to Great Britain had been already laid open to public view: but as various persons, either through ignorance, or with the view of throwing ridicule on the uneasiness expressed by the British cabinet, had represented that decree as an empty gasconade, and since this notion, had it become prevalent, might have excited in the minds of many, who were inclined to insurrection, a distrust in the promised assistance of France, the national convention judged it necessary, by a new decree of the same kind, to satisfy the world, that its intentions of overturning the neighbouring governments, were really serious. On the 19. of December therefore a decree was made, which was prefaced by the following introduction. "The national convention, after having

"heard the report of the united finance, military, and
 "diplomatic committees, *faithful to the principles of the*
"sovereignty of the people, which does not permit them to
"acknowledge any institution that militates against it ¹, and
 "willing to fix the regulations to be observed by the gen-
 "erals of the armies of the republic, in those countries to
 "which they may carry their arms, decrees as follows ²."

The decree itself consists of eleven articles, and contains instructions to be observed by the French generals and commissaries, in every country, into which the French arms might be able to penetrate. The executive council, that the purport of this decree might not be mistaken, accompanied it moreover with a commentary: and, as both the one and the other are worthy of notice, it will be necessary to quote a few

1. Thus the national convention virtually declared, that it acknowledged no kingly, and consequently not the British government: for kingly government, of every description, had been repeatedly reprobated, as an institution inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people.

2. Séance du 15. Decembre. "La Convention nationale
 "après avoir entendu le rapport de ses comités de finance,
 "de la guerre, et diplomatique réunis, fidele aux principes
 "de la Souveraineté des Peuples, *qui ne lui permet pas de re-*
"connaître aucune institution qui y porte atteinte, et voulant
 "fixer les règles à suivre par les généraux des armées de la
 "République dans les pays où ils portent les armes, décrète
 "ce qui suit., Moniteur 17. Dec. 1792.

passages from each ³. The first article begins thus. "In those countries, which are, *or sha'll be* ⁴ occupied "by the armies of the French republic, the generals "shall immediately proclaim, in the name of the French "nation, the sovereignty of the people, and *the aboli-* "tion of all constituted authorities etc. ⁵," Here we have

3. The text of the decree, together with the commentary, is printed in Chauffard *Memoires historiques et politiques* p. 180 — 228. The text itself is printed in Italic, the commentary in Roman characters, in order to distinguish them: the whole is signed by the six ministers, who formed the executive council, Le Brun, Roland, Claviere, Monge, Garat, Pache: and commentary and text are there dated 8. January 1793. Of this celebrated decree there are various editions, which do not all agree, the reason of which is, that it received on the 17 and 22. of December some alterations and additions, whence it is called in Chauffard's particular instructions dated 31. December, "*le décret de la convention nationale des 15. 17. et 22. Decembre.*," (Chauf-sard p. 156). Hence likewise in the *Moniteur* 17. December the two last articles are not contained. Now as that text of the decree in question, which was signed by the executive council, and delivered to the commissaries for the Netherlands, of whom Chauffard was one, must be regarded as the authentic text, I have strictly adhered to it.

4. This expression shews, that the decree was applicable to *all* countries, and consequently to Great Britain.

5. "Dans les pays qui sont, ou qui seront occupés par les "armées de la République les généraux proclameront sur le

a positive and decisive declaration, that the national convention was resolved to overturn the constitution of every country, which had either folly enough to receive, or not force enough to repel a French army ⁶: but the executive council, in order to give it more energy, added in the commentary: "It is necessary, that not even the *shadow* of these authorities remain ⁷., The means likewise, by which even the shadow of the ancient authorities should be made to vanish, were assigned by the executive council: and these means consisted in the following order to their commissaries. "They shall not only encourage the writings destined "to this instruction (namely the instruction of the "people), the patriotic societies, and all the establishments consecrated to the propagation of liberty ⁸, but

"champ, au nom de la nation Française, la souveraineté du "peuple, la suppression de toutes les autorités établies etc.,
Chaussard p. 187.

6. In *this* respect, every man must confess that the modern rulers of France have kept their word.

7. "Il ne faut pas que *l'ombre même* de ces autorités subsiste.,
Chaussard p. 189.

8. It is well known, that in England particularly this encouragement was given in every imaginable mode. But in England there was already as much liberty, as any rational man could wish: and it was this rational liberty, this liberty founded on law, that the national convention, under the

“they themselves shall likewise have immediate communication with the people: they shall prevent, by frequent explanations, the false interpretations ⁹, the false reports, and all the falsehoods, by which evil-minded persons may endeavour to lead astray the public opinion. In short, it is with the view of assisting the commissaries in this important part of their ministry, that the council has thought proper to associate with them a certain number of agents, more particularly destined to these instructive communications with the inhabitants of the countries. Further, *in the different countries, to which they shall be sent* ¹⁰,

pretence of promoting it, wished to destroy, that free-born Britons might become the slaves of French tyrants.

9. No interpretation could place the conduct of the French in a more unfavourable light, than the true one: for that must certainly be considered as the true interpretation, which the executive council itself gave. The bitterest enemies of France therefore had no need of false interpretations.

10. As the above-quoted expression, “*qui seront occupés*,” proves the universality of the decree, so this expression (*divers pays où ils seront envoyés*) proves the universality of the commentary, and shews, that though it was first used in Belgia, it was by no means designed for that country alone. Further, throughout the whole decree no particular mention is made of that country under any name whatsoever; and all the expressions are of such a kind, that

"shall be transmitted to them lists of those citizens,
 "who are known for their patriotic sentiments, and
 "who are the most capable of co-operating in the mis-
 "sion of the commissaries ¹¹.,

In the first article of this decree was further pro-
 mised to all nations who should receive a French army,
 they are equally applicable to every country. In the parti-
 cular instructions given to Chaussard was said likewise, "*tous*
les peuples chez lesquels la république Française a porté, et
portera ses armes.., Chaussard p. 157. Lastly Chaussard him-
 self, p. 25. has declared in positive terms, "*Les instructions*
étaient générales.., — This note deserves the attention of
 those gentlemen, who were so fond of applying to the British
 ministers, at the period in question, the title of *alarmists*.

II. "Non seulement ils encourageront les écrits destinés
 "à cette instruction, les sociétés patriotiques et tous les
 "établissémens consacrés à la propagation de la liberté, mais
 "encore ils communiqueront eux-mêmes avec le peuple; ils
 "préviendront par des explications fréquentes les fausses in-
 "terpretations, les faux bruits, et tous les mensonges par
 "lesquels les malveillans cherchoient à égarer l'opinion.
 "Enfin c'est pour seconder les commissaires dans cette partie
 "importante de leur ministère, que le Conseil a cru devoir
 "leur adjoindre un certain nombre d'agens destinés plus par-
 "ticulièrement à ces communications instructives avec les
 "habitans de ces pays. Il leur sera en outre remis des listes
 "des citoyens des divers pays où ils seront envoyés, connus
 "pour leurs sentimens patriotiques, et les plus capables de
 "concourir à la mission des commissaires., Chaussard, p. 191.

"the suppression of all taxes ¹²., and in the second article was promised, "peace, aid, fraternity, liberty, and equality ¹³., So far the decree has a very fine

12. Immediately after the words "*la suppression de toutes les autorités établies*.,", quoted in Note 5, was added, "*des impôts ou contributions existans*., By such alluring promises, and by assurances of exemption from all taxes, the national convention hoped to seduce the ignorant and the unwary to its own interest, and to encourage them to rebel against their governments. But the artifice was so gross, that it is really astonishing, that so many persons have been credulous enough to enter into the snare, especially as the decree itself carried with it its own antidote. For in the fourth article it is said: "*Les généraux mettront de suite sous la sauvegarde et protection de la république Française tous les biens meubles et immeubles appartenant au fisc, au prince, à ses fauteurs, adhérens, et satellites volontaires, aux établissemens publics, aux corps et communautés laïques et ecclésiastiques*., *Chaussard p. 196.* The expression "to put under the safeguard of the French republic., needs no explanation. Further it was said in the seventh article: "*Le Conseil exécutif nommera aussi des Commissaires pour se concerter avec les Généraux et l'administration provisoire nommée par le peuple sur les mesures à prendre pour la défense commune, et sur les moyens à employer pour se procurer les habillemens et subsistances nécessaires aux armées, et pour acquitter les dépenses qu'elles ont faites, ou feront, pendant leur séjour sur son territoire*., *Chaussard, p. 207.*

13. "Ils (les Généraux) annonceront au peuple qu'ils lui

appearance: and one should suppose, that it was the will of the national convention to fix the sovereignty of the people in all countries on so firm a basis, that they should at all times, and in all respects, enjoy the full power of acting according to their own fancy. It is true, that the first and second articles of this decree were equivalent to a declaration of war against all existing governments: but then they *seemed* at least, like the decree of the 19. of November, to favour the subjects of each country, whom the generous governors of France were willing to take under their high protection. The decree of the 19. of November had even left to every nation the choice of rebelling against its government, or not, a choice, which could not be refused, without manifestly infringing on the *sovereignty* of the people. But on the 15. of December the revolutionary zeal of the national convention arose to such an height, that they deprived at once the *sovereign* people of all choice in regard to insurrection, and in the eleventh article of the decree in question made the following declaration. "The French nation declares, *that it will treat as an enemy* that people, which refusing or renouncing liberty and equality, should chuse to preserve, or recall, or treat with its prince,

"and privileged orders ¹⁴," Here we have a formal declaration of war, not only against every existing government, but likewise against every *people* that did not chuse to change their political constitution. But the great majority of the people of Britain were warmly attached to their present form of government, and by no means wished for a revolution: consequently the eleventh article of the decree of December 19 contained a declaration of war against the *people*, as well as against the king of Great Britain. Nothing can be more clear, than this article: but though it was not wanting in perspicuity, the executive council judged it necessary, by the following commentary to give it a greater degree of energy. "It is evident, that a people 'so enamoured of its chains ¹⁵, and so obstinately at-

14. "La nation Française déclare, *qu'elle traitera comme 'ennemi' le peuple, qui refusant la liberté et l'égalité ou y 'renonçant voudrait conserver, rappeler, ou traiter avec le 'prince et les castes privilégiés.*", Chauffard, p. 225.

15. But if any nation was really enamoured of its chains, what right had the rulers of France to rob it of the object of its admiration? And what right had they to determine, in the name of any nation, the question, whether the bands, which united it in civil society, were to be termed chains, or not. This was a question, which every nation had probably a right to determine for itself, without calling in the aid of French arbitration. If it be further asked, in what the liberty consists, which these gentlemen every where sub-

“rached to its state of brutishness, as to refuse the restoration of its rights, is the accomplice, not only of its own despots, but even of all the crowned usurpers, who divide the domain of the earth and of men ¹⁶; that such a servile people is the declared enemy, not only of the French republic, but even of all other nations, and therefore that the distinction, which we have so justly established between government and people, ought not be observed in favour of a people of this description ¹⁷; in short, that the right of na-

stitute in the place of what they call slavery, the answer can be most easily given by the Dutch and the Swiss. These unhappy people would answer, if they dared to speak: “We now enjoy the liberty of emptying our purses, of abandoning our trade and manufactures, of sacrificing our privileges, of seeing the true lovers of our country murdered or banished, of returning thanks for the gracious chastisement inflicted on us, and of applying to our executioners the appellation of deliverers.

16. No crowned head on earth enjoys this privilege in an equal degree with the five uncrowned lords of France.

17. Unhappy people, that must be treated with all the rigours of war, for no other reason, than because it is contented with its government! The source of its happiness shall be dried up *because* its thence derived its happiness! Such are the blessings bestowed by the great nation. Well therefore did Dumouriez say: “C’est le 15. Dec. que fut donné le fameux Décret, qui prouvoit aux Belges, et à tous les

"rural defence, the duty of insuring the preservation
 "of our liberty and the success of our arms ¹⁸, the
 "general interest of restoring peace to Europe, *which it*
"cannot obtain but by the annihilation of the despots and
"their satellites ¹⁹, all conspire in inducing us to treat
 "such a people according to the rigour of war and of
 "conquest ²⁰."

It

"peuples, qui avoient appellés les François ou qui les avoient
 "reçus, que la Convention n'envoyoit les armées chez eux,
 "que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.,, Vie de Dumouriez,
 Tom. III. p. 373. He even protested against the decree, as
 he himself relates, Memoires Tom. I. Pref. p. XV. though
 without effect: for, as he further relates p. 101. "Le décret
 du 15. Decembre, bien loin d'être désapprouvé dans le Con-
 seil, étoit appuyée par tous les membres.,,"

18. That is, in plain English, "the promotion of our
 plans of conquest and aggrandizement.,,"

19. Is not this a manifest declaration, that the rulers of
 France were resolved, not to lay down their arms, till all
 the governments of Europe were gradually overturned? And
 have they not acted to the present hour agreeably to that
 resolution?

20. "Il est évident qu'un peuple assez amoureux de ses
 "fers, assez entêté de son abrutissement pour refuser la resti-
 "tution de tous ses droits, est le complice, non seulement
 "de ses propres despotes, mais même de tous les usurpateurs
 "couronnés, qui se partagent le domaine de la terre et des
 "hommes; que ce peuple servile est l'ennemi déclaré non
 "seulement de la république Française, mais même de toutes

It was further ordered on the 15. of Dec. that the French generals, on entering any country, at the same time that they published the decree, should publish likewise a proclamation, which began in the following manner. "The French people to the..... people ²¹. "Brethren and friends, we have conquered our liberty "and we will maintain it. Our union and our force are "our guarantees. We offer you the enjoyment of this "inestimable blessing, which has always belonged to "you, but of which you have been criminally deprived "by your oppressors. *We are come, to expel your* "tyrants ²²."

"les autres nations : qu'ainsi la distinction si justement établie "par nous entre les gouvernemens et les peuples ne doit "point être observée en faveur de celui-ci ; qu'en un mot le "droit de la défense naturelle, le devoir d'assurer la conser- "vation de notre liberté et le succès de nos armes, l'intérêt "universel de rendre à l'Europe une paix, *qu'elle ne peut ob-* "tenir que par l'anéantissement des despotes et de leurs satellites, "tout nous fait une loi, de traiter un tel peuple suivant la "rigueur de la guerre et de la conquête., *Chaussard, p. 225.*

21. A vacant space was left, which was to be filled up with the name of each people, where the French generals should come. This is an additional proof of the universality of the decree. See the Notes 4. 10.

22. "Le Peuple français au Peuple..... Freres et amis, "nous avons conquis la liberté et nous la maintiendrons. "Notre union et notre force en sont les garans. Nous vous

That in all these measures the national convention had its eye particularly fixed on Great Britain and Holland, is too obvious to need a proof: but should any one be really disposed to entertain a doubt on this subject, the following passage in the opinion delivered and published by Chauflard ²³ *on the decree in question* will probably remove it. "Without doubt it was the "interest of France, to raise, to conquer the commerce "of the Belgic provinces, swayed and neutralised by "that of Holland: thence to alarm and menace the "United Provinces, to plant our assignats in their very "counting houses, *there to ruin the bank of England* ²⁴, "and in short to complete the revolution of the money "system. It was of consequence to France, to engross, "as it were, the vast workhouses of trade, these manu- "factures of national prosperity ²⁵." Such were the "offrons de faire jouir de ce bien inestimable, qui vous a "toujours appartenu et que vos oppresseurs n'ont pu vous "ravir sans crime. *Nous sommes venus, pour chasser vos tyrans.*.,
Moniteur 18. Dec. 1792.

23. Memoires historiques et politiques, p. 11 — 30.

24. Yet complaints were made about the assignat-bill!

25. "Sans doute il importoit à la France de relever, de "conquérir le commerce des provinces Belghiques, dominé, "neutralisé par celui de la Hollande; et de là d'inquiéter, de "menacer les Provinces-Unies, d'implanter jusques sur leurs "comptoirs l'assignat, d'y ruiner la banque de Londres, et en- "fin d'achever la révolution du système monétaire. Il impor-

remarks made by the French commissary Chauffard on the decree of the 15. of December: and they suffi-

“toit à la France d'accaparer, pour ainsi dire, ces vastes at-
 “teliers de commerce, ces manufactures de prospérité natio-
 “nale.,, Chauffard p. 17. And in a note to the words “d’y
 ruiner la banque de Londres,, which is printed in the Ap-
 pendix p. 417 he says: “Si le projet de pousser les armes de la
 “république jusqu'à Amsterdam avoit eu lieu, il auroit été fa-
 “cile de s'emparer de la plus grande partie des effets sur la
 “banque de Londres. La banque étoit ébranlée, si on lui eût
 “présenté à la fois tous ces effets dont Amsterdam est le
 “centre et le pivot.,, It may be observed in general, that
 the leading men at that time in France made so little a secret
 of their designs against Holland, and consequently against
 England (for, as we have just seen, the ruin of the latter
 was to be effected by the ruin of the former), that Cambon,
 in the committee of general defence, said openly to Abema
 and Van Staphorst, two deputies of the Dutch patriots:
 “Vous n'avez point de biens ecclésiastiques à nous offrir,
 “pour nous indemniser: c'est une révolution de porte-feuilles,
 “qu'il faudra faire.,, Brissot à ces Commettans, p. 88. This
 was uttered in the true spirit of the national convention: for
 wherever estates of nobility and clergy have been wanting,
 the property of merchants and of all other men, who had
 any thing to lose, has supplied their place, as Boyer Fon-
 frede said at the time, when the proposal, to respect the
 Amsterdam merchant ships, was rejected under the pretence
 of their belonging to aristocrats: “La masse des Hollandais
 “est riche, elle n'est donc pas amis de nos principes, et en

ciently prove, that at least *one* of the tendencies of this decree was the destruction of Great Britain.

But as the measures of precaution, which the British cabinet had already begun to take, were impediments to the execution of this grand design, it was judged necessary to have again recourse to the favourite maxim, which has rendered so much service to modern France, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors.,, For this purpose the executive council, according to Le Brun's own report to the national convention on the 19. of December, gave *express order* to the minister Chauvelin "to embrace every opportunity "of assuring the English *nation*, that, notwithstanding "the ill humour of its *government* ²⁶, the French people "desired nothing more ardently, than to merit *its* (the "English nation's) esteem ²⁷.,, At the same time Le

"admettant quelques exceptions, *si vous y avez des amis, ils "doivent être seulement dans la classe des sans-culottes.,, Moniteur* 5. Febr. 1793.

26. The English government therefore, after the national convention had openly avowed its intention of overturning the constitution, should have remained in *good* humour!

27. "Le Conseil exécutif provisoire a continué "d'entretenir à Londres un ministre de la république Française ; et il l'a *expressément* chargé de saisir toutes les occasions, "pour assurer la *nation Anglaise*, que malgré la *mauvaise humeur de son gouvernement*, le peuple Français ne désire rien

Brun, who was himself member of the executive council, and minister for foreign affairs, gave notice in this report to the national convention, that Mr. Chauvelin, in case the armament, (which, by Le Brun's own acknowledgement in the very same report, had nothing which ought to cause an alarm²⁸), should be continued, was ordered to declare *"that a solemn appeal would be made to the English nation"*²⁹. And at the utterance

*"plus ardemment, que de meriter son estime, et de confer-
 ver la bonne harmonie et l'amitié qui doivent à jamais unir
 deux nations genereuses et libres. La Convention nationale
 a reçu à diverses reprises des témoignages éclatans de la
 reciprocité de cette bienveillance, et de la part sincere, que
 le peuple Anglais prenait aux succès de nos armes et au
 triomphe de la liberté Française. Mais ces mêmes événe-
 mens glorieux agissaient dans un sens très opposé sur le
 ministère de Saint-James., Monit. 21. Dec. 1792. That the
 expression "son estime,, applies not to the government, but
 to the people of England, is evident from the context.*

28. *"Il en résulte jusqu'ici que ces armemens n'ont rien
 que doive nous allarmer, puisque il n'excèdent que de quatre
 vaisseaux de ligne ceux qui ont eu lieu dans les années pré-
 cedentes., Ib. It has been already proved in the preceding
 chapter, that even before Great Britain began to arm, France
 had an hundred and two ships of war, of which twenty one
 were of the line, not only commissioned, but actually at sea.*

29. Le Brun's own words, in his report of the 19. of December, were: *"Nous ne manquerions pas de faire un
 appel solennel à la Nation Anglaise., Ib.*

of these words the national convention applauded ³⁰. But what was truly ridiculous, and would really excite a smile, if the indignation excited by hypocrisy did not suppress it, Le Brun introduced them with the assertion, "that they would then have exhausted every explanation, which could demonstrate *the purity of their views and their respect for the independence of other nations* ³¹," This assertion is an example of insolence and hypocrisy, which is hardly to be found but in the annals of republican France: for it was made in the very week, in which the national convention had openly and solemnly declared its intention, not only of overturning all kingly governments, but of treating *whole nations* as enemies, which should refuse to take up arms against their lawful sovereigns. Nor did Brissot display less insolence and hypocrisy in his remarks on the menaced appeal: for in his report to the national convention, on the 12. of January 1793, after having related, that the executive council had signified on the 27. of December, through the organ of the minister Chauvelin, "its firm resolution of opening the eyes of the people of England by an appeal, which should be

³⁰. Immediately after the just-quoted words, is added in the Moniteur: "On applaudit.,,"

³¹. "Comme alors nous aurions epuisé toutes les explications propres à démontrer *la pureté de nos vues et notre respect pour l'indépendance des autres puissances.*.,,"

made to them ³²,, he proceeded to express his surprise, that the English ministers were offended at this menace, and regarded it as an incitement to insurrection ³³,

32. "Le 27. Décembre le Conseil exécutif a fait notifier "au gouvernement Anglais par l'organe de notre Ambassa-
"deur, un écrit par lequel il repousse vigoureusement toutes
"les inculpations élevées contre lui, par lequel il se plaint
"des préparatifs hostiles de la cour d'Angleterre, et annonce
"la ferme résolution d'ouvrir les yeux du peuple Anglais dans
"un appel qu'il lui fera., Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793. To this
menace, which, had it been made by a British minister at
Paris, would have been answered by an order to quit the
country, if not by order to arrest the person of the British
minister, Lord Grenville replied on the 31. of December,
with equal moderation and dignity. "Quant à ce qui regarde
"moi et mes collègues, c'est à sa Majesté que ces ministres
"doivent le compte de leur conduite; et je n'ai point de ré-
"ponse à vous donner là dessus, non plus qu'au sujet de l'ap-
"pel que vous vous proposez de faire à la Nation Anglaise.
"Cette nation, d'après la constitution qui lui assure sa liberté
"et sa prospérité, et qu'elle saura maintenir contre toute at-
"taque directe ou indirecte, n'aura jamais avec les puissances
"étrangères ni relation ni correspondance que par l'organe
"de son Roi, d'un Roi qu'elle chérit et qu'elle respecte, et
"qui n'a jamais séparé un instant ses droits, ses intérêts, et
"son bonheur des droits, des intérêts, et du bonheur de son
"peuple., Moniteur 14. Janv. 1793.

33. In what other light then was it possible, that they
should have regarded it?

though, as Brissot added, it was nothing more, than
 "an appeal to the reason and justice of a great nation,
 "which was duped by the tricks of its ministers, who
 "wished to embroil it with a people, whose cause was *its*
 "*own*, and which had sworn hatred only to *tyrants* ³⁴,"
 Language thus insulting to the British cabinet would
 surely not have been heard in the national convention,
 if the government of France had been desirous of
 avoiding a rupture: and its falshood, notwithstanding
 the veil of sophistry ³⁵, in which it is involved, is so
 obvious, especially when we consider that the word
 "tyrant,, in the mouth of the French rulers, is equi-

34. "Rappellerai-je cette fausse interpretation de cet ap-
 "pel à la nation Anglaise dont le ministre des affaires étran-
 "geres a menacé le cabinet de Saint-James, s'il persistait
 "dans ses projets hostiles, appel, dans lequel ée cabinet a feint
 "de voir un signe d'insurrection, tandis que ces mots signifie-
 "rent un appel à la *raison*, à la *justice d'une grande nation*,
 "*dupe du charlatanisme de ses ministres*, qui veulent la brouil-
 "ler avec un peuple, dont la cause est la *sienne*, et qui n'a
 "juré de haine qu'aux *tyrans*., Monit. 15. Janv. 1793. In a
 former part of this speech, Brissot had said: "Il importe que
 la nation Anglaise, qui n'est égarée que par son gouverne-
 ment, soit promptement désabusée. C'est par respect pour la
fraternité qui nous unit, que nous devons lui peindre avec
 franchise les manoeuvres de son gouvernement.

35. Brissot's sophistry, though it produced a great effect
 at the time, is now become proverbial.

valent to "king,, that the pretended apology affords a new proof, that the appeal to the people of Great Britain had no other object, than to promote the already expected insurrection.

On the 24. of December, five days therefore after Le Brun had given notice of the appeal, Mr. Barailon, one of the few temperate members of the national convention, observed that the decree of the 19. of November had excited uneasiness in the British government, and in order to remove this uneasiness, he proposed the addition of a clause, by which the decree should be restricted to those countries, with which France was actually at war. But the national convention not only rejected the proposal, but rejected it even without a debate: for the previous question was immediately demanded, and it was determined "that there was no room for deliberation ³⁶., Now as the British

36. Barailon. "Ce décret a déjà fait beaucoup d'ennemis; il les multipliera encore. Le ministère Anglais en a témoigné son mécontentement au nôtre, qui a été forcé de l'interpréter dans le sens le plus raisonnable. Je demande que dans le décret du 19. Nov., après ces mots, "la convention nationale déclare, au nom de la nation Française, qu'elle accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples,, on ajoute, "contre les tyrans desquels elle sera en guerre.,

La question préalable est invoqué contre cet amendement.

Il est decreté, *n'y avoir pas lieu à deliberer.*

government was particularly mentioned by Mr. Barailon, and the proposal was made with the view of removing its uneasiness, the decisive rejection of the proposal was equivalent to a formal declaration, that the national convention was resolved to apply the decree to Great Britain.

Nor did eight days elapse, before a very remarkable application of it to Great Britain was actually made: for on the 31. of December the marine minister, Monge, sent a circular letter ³⁷ to the sea-port towns of France, containing the following passage. "The king and his parliament wish to make war on us ³⁸. "But will the English *republicans* suffer it? These free men already shew their discontent, and their abhorrence of bearing arms against their brethren, the

37. It is superscribed: "Lettre du ministre de la marine aux amis de la liberté et égalité dans les villes maritimes.,, Paris 31. Decembre 1792: and it is printed in the *Moniteur* 20. Jan. 1793. It was not printed immediately, because the French government wished to wait the effects of it: but before the 20. of January favourable answers had been transmitted from some of the sea ports. The answer sent by the community of St. Malo on the 17. of January, expressive of their readiness "to co-operate with the executive power.,, will be quoted in the fourteenth chapter.

38. Of this assertion Monge neither did, nor could give a proof: for the circumstance, that a government puts itself in a posture of defence, when threatened with imminent danger, is no argument that it *wishes* for war.

"French. Well then! we will fly to their assistance;
*"we will make a descent in that island ³⁹; we will hurl
 "thither fifty thousand caps of liberty; we will plant there
 "the sacred tree ⁴⁰, and stretch out our arms to our bro-
 "ther republicans ⁴¹; the tyranny of their government
 "shall soon be destroyed. May we all be strongly animated
 "with this thought ⁴²!*"

39. A landing in England with a considerable army was even at that time regarded as a matter very easy to be executed: for Kerfaint in his speech of the 1. of January 1793 said: "Les barques de nos pêcheurs (sont) toujours prêtes à
 "y transporter cent mille Français, car c'est par cette expedi-
 "tion que nous devons terminer cette querelle, et c'est sur la
 "ruine de la Tour de Londres etc., Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793.

40. Had the sacred tree been planted in Great Britain, and borne the same fruits as it has borne in the Netherlands, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Germany to the left of the Rhine, and likewise in France itself, we should have been no great gainers by the exchange of the old British for the new French tree of liberty.

41. In order to crush them to atoms.

42. "Le roi et son parlement veulent nous faire la guer-
 "re; les républicains Anglais le souffriront-ils? Déjà ces
 "hommes libres témoignent leur mécontentement et la ré-
 "pugnance qu'ils ont à porter les armes contre leurs freres,
 "les Français. Eh bien! nous volerons à leurs secours;
 "nous ferons une descente dans cette île; nous y lancerons cin-
 "quante mille bonnets de la liberté; nous y planterons l'arbre
 "sacré, et nous tendrons les bras à nos freres républicains.

Nor was it not long before this thought very strongly animated the garrison of Brest: for in the first week of January an attempt was made by the batteries of that port to sink a British sloop, which was cruising before the outward harbour. The attack on this vessel was an act of open hostility, and it was undoubtedly made with the approbation of the French government, for otherwise some apology, or at least some explanation would have been given of it. If the commanding officer in the forts at Brest suspected that the sloop had been sent with the view of reconnoitring the Brest fleet, he might have sent off a boat with orders to the captain to quit the road. But to hoist, as appears from the account given in the *Moniteur* ⁴³,

“La tyrannie de leur gouvernement sera bientôt détruit. Que chacun de nous se pénétre fortement de cette idée.,” *Moniteur* 20. Janv. 1^{re} feuille.

43. The following relation of this affair is printed in the *Monit.* 23. Janv. 1793. “Plymouth le 5. Janvier. Le Childers étant à croiser vendredi à deux heures de l’après-midi devant Brest s’avança à trois quarts de mille des batteries de ce port. Il était sans couleurs. Une des batteries lui tira un coup à boulet, qui passa heureusement par dessus, sans lui causer aucun dommage. Le Childers alors arbora pavillon Anglais. Mais le fort arbora aussitôt les couleurs nationales, avec un pendant rouge sur l’enseigne. Les autres forts suivirent son exemple. Pendant ce tems là le Childers avait été entraîné par la marée à un demi mille environ de ces forts, et obligé

the flag of war over the French flag, as soon as the British captain had hoisted the British flag, and not merely to fire a single gun, as a signal for departure, but to make a cross fire from several batteries, with the view of sinking the sloop, was to treat it in every respect as the ship of an enemy. And if the French government had been desirous of avoiding a rupture with Great Britain, it would have at least attempted to make some excuse to the British cabinet, which necessary felt itself insulted, as well as the nation at large. But no attempt of this kind was made: and this very neglect afforded a new proof of the sentiments entertained by the executive council and the national convention.

About this time it was resolved, to send Mr. Genet as ambassador to the United-States of America, in order to engage them to enter into a war with Great Britain, in conjunction with France. His instructions, (published by Mr. Genet himself in the following month of December) were signed the 3. of January 1793, to which some additional instructions were annexed on the 17 of that month ⁴⁴. So early as the

à cause du calme d'avoir recours aux rames, pour ne pas arriver trop près. Tout à coup, les batteries, à un signal qui fut fait, commencèrent sur lui un feu croisé, qui l'eût criblé, si un vent frais, qui s'éleva, ne l'eût mis à même de se dégager.

⁴⁴. I have not been able to procure the edition of Mr

21. of December 1792 the executive council had given notice to the national convention, that they had fixed on Mr. Genet, to go as ambassador to the United States of America, with the view "of drawing closer the bands which united the two nations ⁴⁵," Now when we consider the avowed object of the French government in regard to Great Britain, this closer drawing of the bands, which united France and America, could have no other meaning than the engaging of the latter to concur in the hostile designs of the former: but, should any one really entertain doubts on this subject, the instructions, which Mr. Genet received from the executive council will certainly remove them. For after several passages, which have undoubtedly reference to

Genet's instructions, which he himself published: but extracts from them, on which we may certainly depend, are given in Mr. Harper's "Observations on the dispute between the United States and France,,," printed at Philadelphia in 1797 and reprinted in London in 1798. For the date of Mr. Genet's instructions see p. 95. of the fourth London edition.

45. Séance du 21. Decembre. Un secretaire fait lecture d'une lettre du ministre des affaires étrangères ainsi conçue. "Citoyen President, les preuves de talent et de civisme qu'a "données le citoyen Genet dans les différentes missions, dont "il a été chargé, ont déterminé le Conseil Executif à recom- "penser son zele en le nommant ministre plenipotentiaire au- "près des Etats Unis d'Amerique. Il doit travailler à resserrer "les liens, qui unissaient les deux nations.,, Monit. 23. Dec. 1792.

Great Britain, such as, "to punish those powers, which
 "still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial
 "system, by declaring that their vessels shall not be
 "received in the ports of the contracting parties,, it is
 "expressly said, "*we (the French) have at this moment*
 "*a particular interest in taking steps to act efficaciously*
 "*against England and Spain, if, as every thing announ-*
 "*ces, those powers should attack us. In this situation*
 "*of affairs, we ought to excite by all possible means the*
 "*zeal of the Americans, etc.,* Great commercial advan-
 "tages are then promised to the United States, "in ex-
 "pectation that the American government will finally
 "make a common cause with us, to take such steps as
 "exigencies may require ⁴⁶., According therefore to
 the clear and express words of the instructions, the
 object of Gener's mission was to effect an alliance be-
 tween France and America, in order to act against
 Great Britain. It is true, that this alliance was proposed
 under the title of a mere defensive one: but it is evi-
 dent, that the words, "if those powers should attack
 us,, were inserted for no other purpose than to pre-
 serve an appearance of justice, it being wholly incon-
 sistent with diplomatic caution, to have said in plain
 terms, "we have formed the resolution to overturn

46. All these passages, with others to the same purport,
 are quoted in Mr. Harper's Observations, p. 32. 33.

"the British government and constitution, we request you therefore to assist us in the accomplishment of this end.,, But that the French government, before the 3. of January 1793, the day, on which Mr. Genet's instructions were signed, really had formed this resolution, and that, on the other hand, the measures, which had been taken by the British government, were nothing more, than what was necessary for self defence, has been proved by documents, which no one can call in question. Consequently, it was the object of the executive council, in sending Mr. Genet to America, to effect, according to the *letter* of his instructions, indeed only a defensive, but according to their *spirit*, an *offensive* alliance against Great Britain ⁴⁷.

We have hitherto seen only preparatory steps to the execution of the great plan, which consisted, first in the overthrow of the British and Dutch governments, and

47. The prudent Washington soon perceived this, and did not suffer himself to be drawn into the snare: on which Mr. Genet not only made bitter complaints, but endeavoured to act the same part toward the American, as his principals at home acted toward the British government; that is, he applied the favourite maxim, "the governed must be excited against their governors.,, See his Notes to Washington and Jefferson, printed in the New Annual Register 1793. Public papers, p. 108. 111. and Harper's Observations p. 9.

and then in the subjugation of the two countries. We have seen, that the national convention on the 28. of November 1792 had openly declared its sentiments in regard to the British government, that the decree of the 19. of November, which was both confirmed and amplified by that of the 15 of December, had been particularly applied to Great Britain by the resolution of the national convention on the 24. of December, that the French minister for foreign affairs had menaced the British government with an appeal to the people, that another French minister of state had threatened a landing in Great Britain with fifty thousand caps of liberty, and that these menaces were supported by a considerable fleet, which was already at sea, even before Great Britain began to arm, not to mention other measures, which have been already described, and the insolence and contempt, with which kingly government of every description was treated in the national convention. Nor were the hostile designs of France less visible in regard to Holland. The resolution to open the Schelde, and the forcing of a passage up to Antwerp, in defiance of the protestation of the Dutch government, were acts of open hostility against an independent state: and that before the close of 1792 a plan was in agitation, for an actual invasion of Holland, appears from several expressions in the Letter written on the 6. of December by the war minister, Pache, to

General Dumouriez ⁴⁸. The hostile designs of France in respect to Holland appear further from the circumstance, that a corps of Dutch patriots, as they were called, to the amount of ten thousand, were taken into the French service, under the name of the Batavian legion, that this corps was stationed on the frontiers of the Dutch territory, that a revolutionary committee of this legion was permitted to correspond with the French party in Holland, in order to promote the expected insurrection, and facilitate the entry of a French army, and lastly that a French agent was appointed to reside with the revolutionary committee, and communicate an account of its proceedings to the minister for foreign affairs in Paris ⁴⁹.

48. In this Letter the following expressions occur: "L'armée de la Belgique se porte *sur la Hollande*, et ne passe point la Meuse etc., — "Les divers motifs ci dessus, Général, ont déterminé le Conseil à persister dans son ancien arrêté; il a délibéré comme mesure d'urgence, *et qui devoit dévancer l'expédition de la Hollande.*," Correspondance du Général Dumouriez avec Pache Ministre de la guerre pendant la campagne de la Belgique en 1792 (Paris 1793. 8.) p. 138. Chaussard likewise p. 278 speaks of: "opérations exécutées dans la Flandre, et projetées sur la Hollande.,,"

49. "Les réfugiés Hollandais avaient assemblé un petit comité révolutionnaire à Anvers, où étoit aussi la légion Batave. Ils avaient plus de zèle que de lumières, et quoiqu'ils dépensassent beaucoup d'argent pour entretenir des correspondan-

After all these preparatory steps, the executive council was of opinion on the 10. of Jan. 1793, that the plan, as far as it related to Holland, was ripe for execution: for *on this very day* orders were send to General Miranda, who then commanded the French army in the Netherlands, in the absence of Dumouriez, *to invade Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand at furthest within twelve days.* Dumouriez himself was at that time in Paris, concerting measures with the executive council for the next campaign: and, as being commander in chief of the army in the Netherlands, he was commissioned to communicate the order of the council to General Miranda, which he did in the following terms ⁵⁰. "I send you at present *the resolution*

ces avec les diverses provinces de leur république, etc., Mémoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 5. ed. 2. — "Il fut décidé, que les réfugiés Hollandais se transporteraient à Anvers avec un *comité révolutionnaire* formé par eux. Bientôt une legion de *dix mille hommes*, que ces Hollandais avaient levés sous le nom de legion Batave, eut ordre de se porter sur la même ville, pour faire l'avant-garde de l'armée, en cas qu'on se décidât à pénétrer en Hollande. Un *agent du gouvernement* fut placé auprès de ce comité révolutionnaire *pour rendre compte au Ministre Lebrun*, chargé des relations étrangères, des mesures qu'on y prenait., Desodoards Hist. phil. de la Revolution Française, T. II. p. 1792. ed. 2. Paris 1797. 8. Dumouriez likewise gives the very same account, Mem. T. I. p. 126.

50. Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda is superscribed: "Le

"of the council: and as Valence comes to Paris, and as
"you command the army in the mean time, you are
"charged with the execution of the following plan,
"which you must arrange with the most profound se-
"crecy. In the first place General Bourdonnaye
"will be dismissed, that he may not counteract the
"project, which you have to execute, and all the troops
"in French maritime Flanders will be placed under
"your command, that all the parts may be put in
"motion by one will. At Bruges you have General
"Deflers, who is very good, to whom you will send
"your instructions, and charge him with the disposition
"of the troops in the lower Austrian Flanders, while
"General Pascal, commandant at Dunkirk, is intrusted
"with the disposition of the troops in the lower
"French Flanders. Arrange matters in such a
"manner, as to be able within twelve days at furthest,
"to approach Zealand, and get possession of Dutch
"Flanders, at the same time that you will order your
"troops to enter the island of Zuyd-Beveland and thence
"cross over to the isle of Walcheren, of which we wish
"to make ourselves masters, before the Stadtholder has

général Dumouriez au général Miranda, Paris le 10. Janvier:
 and is printed p. 3 — 8 of the following publication printed
 at Paris in 1793: Correspondance du Général Miranda avec
 le Général Dumouriez, et les ministres de la guerre, Pache
 et Beurnonville, depuis Janvier 1793.

"time to retreat thither, and before it is fortified,
 "and has received a garrison. *There is no time to lose:*
 "and, though the patriots pretend that the Zealanders
 "are prepared, and that in all Zealand there are not
 "more than fifty five companies of infantry, consisting
 "each of only forty men, and no cavalry, and conse-
 "quently that this expedition does not require above
 "three thousand men, I am of opinion, that we shall
 "want eight battalions of infantry, the Batavian legion,
 "Moulton's flotilla, two regiments of cavalry, eight
 "twelve-pounders, four howitzers, a company of flying
 "artillery, and sixteen battalion pieces. You will go
 "to Antwerp, where you will be joined by the Dutch
 "patriots, who will bring you their maps, and serve as
 "your guides, as they themselves have already acknow-
 "ledged the facility of the expedition. *The minister of*
 "*the marine gives orders to prepare furnaces and grates in*
 "*each of the three gun vessels, in order to fire with red*
 "*hot balls.* These three vessels draw but little water,
 "and will easily beat off the frigates by the superiority
 "of their four and twenty pounders, and their red hot
 "balls." After a few lines relative to a forced loan

51. "Voici à présent la résolution du Conseil: et comme
 Valence vient à Paris, comme vous êtes chargé par interim
 du commandement de l'armée, voici dont vous êtes chargé,
 et que vous devez arranger dans le plus profond secret. Imo
 On donne congé au Général Bourdonnaye, pour qu'il n'en-

at Antwerp, by which the expences of the expedition were to be defrayed, was then added. "Contrive likewise point ce que vous avez à faire, et on met à votre disposition toutes les troupes de la Flandre maritime, pour qu'une seule volonté fasse agir toutes les parties. Vous avez à Bruges le Général Deflers, qui est fort bon, à qui vous enverrez vos ordres et que vous chargerez de la disposition des troupes sur la basse Flandre Autrichienne, pendant que vous ferez faire celle de la basse Flandre Française au Général Pascal, commandant à Dunquerque. Arrangez les troupes de maniere à pouvoir *sous douze jours au plus se rapprocher de la Zélande, et s'emparer de la Flandre Hollandaise, pendant que vous ferez entrer vos troupes dans l'isle de Zuyl-Beveland, et de là dans l'isle de Walcheren, dont on veut s'emparer*, avant que le Stadthouder ait le tems de s'y réfugier, qu'elle soit fortifiée, et qu'elle ait reçu garnison. *Il n'est pas de tems à perdre*: et quoique les patriotes prétendent, que les Zélandais sont préparés, qu'il n'y a dans toute la Zélande que cinquante cinq compagnies d'infanterie tout au plus, à quarante hommes chacune, et point de cavalerie, et que par conséquent cette expedition n'exige que 3000 hommes, je crois qu'il faut huit bataillons d'infanterie, la legion Hollandaise, la flotille de Moulton, et deux régimens de cavalerie, huit pieces de douze, quatre obusiers, une compagnie d'artillerie à cheval, et seize pièces de bataillon. Vous irez à Anvers, vous y ferez joint par les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent vous apporter des cartes, et vous guider, ayant reconnu eux mêmes toutes les facilités de cette expedition. Le Ministre de la marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonnières,

"wise, that Desfiers assemble at Bruges four or five
 "thousand infantry, with four twelve-pounders, two
 "hundred cavalry, two howitzers, two four-pounders
 "for each battalion, *and advance with the utmost celerity*
 "to Middlebourg, and thence to the isle of Cadfand,
 "and Biervliet. Send me a courier, to inform me of
 "the difficulty or facility, which may present itself in
 "the execution of the plan. This you will know to a
 "certainty, when you have seen the Dutch patriots,
 "and have examined their maps and their projects.
 "*The whole depends on promptitude and secrecy* ⁵².,

Now, when we consider that the States General had hitherto observed the most strict neutrality, that

pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges. Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, et chasseront facilement les frégates, par la supériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges.,

52. "Arangez aussi dans votre plan, que Desfiers fasse à Bruges un rassemblement de quatre à cinq mille hommes d'infanterie, avec quatre pièces de douze, deux cens hommes de cavalerie, deux obusiers, deux canons de quatre par bataillon, *et se parte avec la plus grande promptitude à Middlebourg et de là dans l'isle de Cadfand, et Biervliet. Expediez moi un courier pour me donner connoissance de ce qui se rencontrera d'obstacles, ou de facilités, dans l'exécution de ce plan. C'est ce que vous saurez positivement, quand vous aurez vu les patriotes Hollandais, et que vous aurez examiné leurs cartes et leurs projets. Tout dépend de la promptitude et du secret.,*

they not only had given no indications of a design of attacking France, but on the contrary, on the supposition that the neutrality, which they themselves had observed, would secure them from an attack on the part of any other power, had taken no measures to put their garrison towns on the frontiers in a proper state of defence, we must acknowledge that the order of the executive council, which was given on the 10. of January, was an act of perfidy, which very little accorded with the boasted magnanimity of the French rulers, or with the declaration at that time too generally believed, that they fought only for their own preservation, and the political liberty of France. It was in fact worse than an *open* declaration: for an open declaration gives the attacked power at least a short notice of the intended hostilities, whereas the *secret* order given by the executive council had no other object, than to take a neighbouring country by surprise in the midst of peace. It is true, that the order was not executed immediately, because General Miranda, as he mentioned in his answer of the 15. of January ⁵³, could not instantly put his

53. Je crois votre plan bien difficile à exécuter, dans la situation de nudité et manque absolu de magasins, où nos armées se trouvent. Correspondance du Général Miranda, etc. p. 8. On the receipt of this Letter the executive council came on the 18. of January to the following resolution, which was communicated to General Dumouriez. "Le

troops in motion on account of the want of magazines: but this circumstance is of no more importance to our present inquiry, than when, after a *public* declaration of war, a general, to whom orders for an attack are sent by his government, does not find himself in, a situation, to comply with them at the instant. In our judgement of French politicks therefore, the whole depends on the time of the order, and not on the time of its execution. Consequently it must be admitted, that the executive council, on the 10. of Jan. 1793, declared itself in a state of war with Holland.

Conseil exécutif provisoire, Général, a reçu la lettre que vous lui avez écrite concernant l'opération de la Zélande, avec la copie de celle du Général Miranda. Le Conseil, après avoir délibéré sur leur contenu, a arrêté qu'il serait surcis de *nouveau* à l'expédition projetée sur la Zélande, et il vous prie de le mander au Général Miranda, en y ajoutant, qu'il désirerait que ce Général attendît les patriotes Hollandais, qui doivent se rendre à Liege, et qu'il prit des mesures pour vérifier les dispositions annoncées des Zélandais et leurs differens rapports. *Le Général Miranda conservera d'ailleurs la disposition des troupes qui ont été mises en mouvement pour cette opération*, et qui sont hors du territoire François., Ib. p. 10. The expression "de nouveau,, affords an additional proof, that even before the 10. of January an invasion of Holland had been in agitation: and the last period clearly shews, that the execution of the order given on that day was not abandoned, but merely *postponed*. This is further

But France, by declaring itself in a state of war with Holland, virtually declared itself in a state of war with England. The common interest, and the mutual obligations, which then united these two countries ⁵⁴, made them really *one* nation, in regard to an invasion on the part of France: and an attack on Holland in January 1793 was as much an attack on Great Britain, as a declaration of war against Holland in the present year would be a declaration of hostilities against France. This was not unknown to the national convention: and accordingly when war was *openly* declared three weeks afterwards, it was declared against Great Britain and Holland at the same time. Brissot likewise acknowledged in his speech of the 1. of February that a declaration of hostilities against the British government alone, involved in it a similar declaration against that of Holland ⁵⁵: consequently, as the confirmed by Dumouriez's Letter to Miranda of the 23. of January, in which it is said: "Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j'abandonnai comme vous le projet de Zélande, mais c'est une raison de plus de pousser très vigoureusement celui de l'attaque de Mastricht, Venlo et Nimegue. Ib. p. 14.

54. See what has been said in the eleventh chapter on this subject.

55. Brissot's own words were: "En déclarant, que la France est en guerre avec le gouvernement Anglais, c'est déclarer qu'elle l'est avec le Stadhouder., Monit. 3. Febr. 1793.

verse of this proposition must be equally true with the proposition itself, the interest being common, and the obligations mutual, it follows from Brissot's own concessions, that the order of the 10 of January was equivalent to a declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. Further; that the rulers of France not only had their eyes constantly fixed on these two countries at the same time, but that it was their design to make the ruin of the one subservient to the ruin of the other, appears both from their speeches and actions. "Assurances, that I received at this time from Paris,, , says Mr. Miles ⁵⁶, speaking of the 18. of January 1793, "convinced me that the great object of the executive council was to throw this country into an insurrection, and that the explosion was expected to happen first in Ireland. *The projected invasion of Holland*, preceded by the opening of the Schelde, as "a preparatory step to the fall of Amsterdam, were "measures, that would not have been attempted, but "for the firm persuasion that the people in England "were on the eve of revolt, and that a revolution "would inevitably happen the very instant, if not sooner, that war was declared. The entire conduct of "the convention, and of its executive council, the efforts of private individuals, *all tended to this solitary but important object,,*. In what manner the conquest

of Holland was to be made subservient to the destruction of England, may be seen in two passages of Chauffard's Memoirs. The one, by which it appears that the bank of England was to be ruined by certain finance operations in Holland, has been already quoted in this chapter ⁵⁷. The other passage, which Chauffard has taken from a speech delivered in the national convention, shews not only that the members of the convention regarded the fall of Holland as a preparatory step to the fall of England, but that they were well aware, their views were not unknown to the English government. For the orator, speaking of England and Prussia, said: "These two powers well know that France has the greatest interest to substitute a popular and representative government to the aristocratic and degenerate one, that actually exists in Holland; *that, with the forces of that country, France would irrevocably destroy the commerce of England,* and by means of its navy soon command the Baltic; that nothing more would be wanting, than a renewal, in that part of the North, of an alliance of situation then become necessary; *and, that after an intimate union of France and Holland, the supremacy of the English commerce in the two Indies would rapidly disappear,*" ⁵⁸.

57. Note 25.

58. "Ces deux puissances savent très-bien que la France

Under these circumstances it would have been perfectly justifiable to have declared war against France in the middle of Jan. 1793. The existence of the British empire was now at stake: for not only had the plan been laid for its destruction, but the wheels of the machine, by which its destruction was to be effected, were already in motion. It was not merely the ruin of an ally, the order for whose political annihilation had been signed on the 10 of January: it was not merely the loss of a balance of power, or the effects of an aggrandizement, which might be dangerous to Britain at a future period: it was the immediate downfall of Britain itself, of its constitution, its laws, its liberty, its commerce, which was now in agitation, and in agitation by an enterprising, a restless, and implacable foe. The measure of iniquity was already full: yet the British government, desirous of maintaining peace to the very last, still waited with

a la plus grande intérêt à substituer un gouvernement populaire et représentatif au gouvernement aristocratique actuel et dégénéré de la Hollande; qu'avec les forces de ce pays, la France écraserait sans retour le commerce de l'Angleterre et qu'avec ses forces navales elle dominerait bientôt dans la Baltique; qu'il ne faudrait que renouer dans cette partie du Nord une alliance de situation, dès-lors rendue nécessaire; et qu'après l'intime union de la France et de la Hollande, la suprématie du commerce Anglais dans les deux Indes disparaîtrait rapidement., Chaussard, p. 277.

patience, till the measure was not only full, but overflowed. That ministers therefore *precipitated* their country in a war with France, is an opinion, which nothing but party malevolence could suggest.

Lastly, within three days after the order was signed for the invasion of Holland, the national convention decreed, that in addition to the twenty two ships of the line, and the thirty two frigates, which were already in actual service, thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates should be instantly put in commission, beside forty five ships of the line and frigates, which were ordered to be built with the utmost dispatch ⁵⁹. Now it is impossible that merely self-defence could have been the object of this additional armament, which enabled France to operate in a very short time with fifty two ships of the line, and an equal number of frigates, not to mention the ships

59. The two first articles of the decree of the 13. Jan. 1793, are as follows.

1. Le Ministre de la marine donnera incontinent des ordres dans tous les ports pour armer 30 vaisseaux de guerre, et 20 frégates, indépendamment de 22 vaisseaux de ligne et 32 frégates déjà armées; ce qui portera l'armée navale à 52 vaisseaux de ligne et 52 frégates. Les vivres seront ordonnés en conséquence.

2. Il sera mis incessamment en construction 25 vaisseaux de ligne, 5 de cent canons, 6 de quatre vingt, 14 de soixante quatorze; et 20 frégates. Moniteur 16. Janv. 1793.

of inferior force, which amounted to more than fifty even in the preceding month of September ⁶⁰. For on the 13. of January 1793 France had a greater number of ships of the line and frigates in actual service, than the British cabinet had at that time even ordered to be put in commission ⁶¹: nor had these orders been given till three months after the French had begun to arm, and till after the national convention had publicly declared its design of overturning the British constitution, whereas the French naval armament was commenced at a time, when by the avowal of the convention itself on the very day, on which the additional armament was ordered, the British government had in no respect violated the laws of neutrality toward France ⁶². Further not only Le

60. See Ch. X. Note 5.

61. In the very same number of the *Moniteur*, in which the decree of the 13 of January is printed, by which it appears, that the French ships of the line and frigates *already* in commission amounted to *fifty four*, is given a list of the British ships of the line and frigates, which were either already commissioned, or had been ordered to be put in commission: and their *whole* number amounted only to *forty five*.

62. The introduction to the decree of the 13 of January 1793 ran thus. "La convention nationale informée par le ministre des affaires étrangères des préparatifs extraordinaires de l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite relativement au caractère de neutralité, qu'il avait conservée

Brun, the minister for foreign affairs, had on the 31, as well as on the 19. of December, represented the British armament, as a matter, at which France had no reason to be alarmed ⁶³, but, what deserves particularly to be noticed, Brissot *on the day which preceded the order for the additional French armament*, delivered a report to the national convention, in the name of the marine and diplomatic committees, relative to the British armament, in which there occurred the following passage. "*Can we suppose, that these demonstrations of war are serious*, when we see that the English ministry carry on the negotiations with those very agents whose official character they affect not to acknowledge; *when we see that they have ordered only the same number of men and of ships, which were ordered in the pretended armaments against Spain and Russia, and particularly when we see, that they abstain from the terrible expedient of impressing, without which it is impossible to man a fleet of any considerable force?*" ⁶⁴. Nor could the marine and diplomatic com-

jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc., Moniteur 16. Jan. 1793.

63. See Ch. XI. Notes 47. 48.

64. "*Peut-on croire que ces demonstrations de guerre soient serieuses, quand on voit le ministere Anglais continuer les negotiations même avec les agens, dont il feint de ne pas*

committees have spoken to a different purport: for they were conscious, that only nine thousand seamen had been voted by the British parliament, in addition to the peace establishment ⁶⁵. It is clear therefore that the additional French armament, which was ordered on the 13. of January had not merely self defence for its object: and it is equally clear, when we reflect on the conduct of the national convention, as described in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the present work, that it was destined to act offensively against Great Britain ⁶⁶.

reconnoître le caractère; *quand on voit n'ordonner que l'addition du même nombre d'hommes et de vaisseaux, qu'il ordonna dans les préparatifs simulés contre l'Espagne et la Russie, et s'abstenir sur tout de ce terrible moyen de la presse, sans lequel il lui est impossible d'équiper même une flotte peu considérable.,*
Moniteur 15. Janv. 1793.

65. No further addition was made till ten days after the French had declared war. See the supplies granted by parliament for the year 1793, printed in the New Annual Register, Public papers, p. 121.

66. The important and decisive facts recorded in this chapter, which place the sentiments and conduct of the French government in the clearest point of view, are *wholly omitted* by a celebrated opposition writer, whose pamphlet in the year 1797 met with a very unusual sale. The same pamphlet contains likewise *not a syllable* of what has been related in the latter part of the seventh chapter, where the

The French government however attempted by various explanations to give its actions a colour of justice, and to alleviate the uneasiness expressed by the British cabinet. We will examine therefore in the following chapter, in which the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France shall be fully considered, whether the explanations, given by the French government, were of such a kind, that the British cabinet could depend on them, or whether

hostile views of the republican rulers of France have been proved from their own declarations: nor does it take notice of the conduct of the national convention on the 28. of Nov. with many other acts recorded in the tenth chapter, which shew a decided resolution to overturn the British government and constitution. In like manner, the facts related in the first, second, fourth and fifth chapters, which prove beyond a doubt the pacific sentiments of the British cabinet, as also the numerous acknowledgements made on this very subject by the French themselves, with their concessions, that the British cabinet had observed the strictest neutrality, and that a war with Great Britain might have been avoided, if they had chosen it, all which acknowledgements and concessions have been quoted at large in the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth and eleventh chapters of the present work, are in the said pamphlet *passed over in total silence*. Nor is the reader even informed there, that the public declaration of hostilities proceeded from the part of France. — Yet it is called, on the title-page, a view of the *causes* of the war!

they were not designed, merely to amuse the ministers, and to impose on the nation, till the plan of the convention was as ripe for execution against Great Britain, as we have already seen that it was against Holland.

END OF VOL. I.



THE
HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
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FROM THE TIME OF
THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ,
TO THE
DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GREAT
BRITAIN.

WITH AN
APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

*A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.*

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.


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VOL. II.

CHAPTER XIII.

Diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, in December 1792 and January 1793, relative to the danger, with which the former was threatened by the latter, and to the measures of defence, which had been taken in consequence. Willingness of the British ministry, to negotiate with the agents of the French government. Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret: and its want of effect,

occasioned by the circumstance, that Mr. Maret had received no instructions whatsoever from the French government. Mr. Pitt's declaration to Mr. Maret, that "it would give him great pleasure, to treat with him as a confidential person from the French executive council,,. Refusal of the executive council to let Mr. Maret negotiate, or even converse on political subjects with the British ministry. Order sent to him by the executive council to depart immediately from London, and to return to Paris. Negotiation carried on by Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin. Result of this negotiation: and proof, that it was not in the power of the British government to prevent a rupture with France.

Though the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and France, had been so far interrupted, that the credentials of the British ambassador at Paris, which the deposition of Louis XVI rendered useless, had not been renewed ¹, and even in December 1792, when Great Britain had so many grounds of complaint, no British ambassador was sent to Paris ², yet on the

1. On this subject see the ninth chapter.

2. The reasons, why no British ambassador was sent to Paris in December 1792, have been assigned in the eleventh chapter.

other hand they were so far continued, that the British government not only permitted both the French minister Chauvelin, and other agents of the executive council to reside in London, but likewise consented to negotiate with them. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin had delivered no other letters of credence, than those, which he had received from the late king of France ³, and therefore, according to diplomatic strictness, he could not be considered as a person vested with an official employment. However, since he still retained the title of French minister, since he received regular communications from the new, as he had done from the old government of France, and since these communications were both accepted and answered by the British ministry, he so far supplied the place of a regularly accredited ambassador, that if the French government had been desirous of removing the grievances, of which the British government complained, they might have been as easily removed by the agency of a person in the situation of Mr. Chauvelin, as by the agency of an ambassador, who had received letters of

3. It was not before the 17 of January 1793 that the British cabinet was desired to accept of letters of credence for Mr. Chauvelin in the name of the executive council: and Mr. Chauvelin's negotiation with Lord Grenville began on the 27. of December 1792.

credence in due form from the executive council. Further Lord Grenville assured Mr. Chauvelin, "*that outward forms would be no hindrance to his Britannic majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both parties,*," and Mr. Pitt himself declared in like manner to Mr. Chauvelin, "*that it was his desire to avoid a war, and to receive a proof of the same sentiments from the French ministry,*,". This was acknowledged even by Brissot, in his report to the Convention of the 12 of January ⁴: and he further admitted, not only "that the British ministry had both given and courted explanations," ⁵, but that "they had pointed out the very terms of the interpretation, which would satisfy them in regard to the decree of the 19.

4. Brissot's own words were: "Lord Grenville attestait à votre ambassadeur, *que les formes n'arrêteraient jamais le Roi d'Angleterre, lorsqu'il s'agiroit d'obtenir des déclarations rassurantes et profitables pour les deux partis.* Pitt de son côté ne témoignait au commencement de Decembre, *que le desir d'éviter la guerre, et d'en avoir le témoignage du ministère Français,*," *Moniteur* 15. Janv. 1793.

5. "On provoquait et on donnait des explications.," *Ib.* It is extraordinary that in defiance of these confessions of Brissot, relative both to Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville a British writer could venture to represent ministers, as "scrupulously observant of the most novel punctilios, which could furnish the smallest pretence for repelling peace.,"

"of November,, 6. Their readiness therefore to negotiate with the new government of France, in order, if possible, to avert the horrors of a war, admits of no doubt: and, though they had not formally recognised the French republic, yet the very act of entering into a negotiation with the persons, who had the direction of it, was a virtual acknowledgement, that to these persons (whether justly or unjustly is another inquiry) belonged the executive authority of France. Had the British ministry, as their adversaries pretend, being resolved at all events to engage in a war with France, with a view of overturning the new government of that country, they would hardly have negotiated with its agents, they would hardly have given and have courted explanations, they would hardly have declared, that outward forms and diplomatic punctilios would present no obstacles to their treating on subjects, which regarded the welfare of both parties. It is a fact likewise, which is known to the whole world that Lord Grenville actually conducted

6. "Le ministere Anglais avait indiqué à un des agents de France à Londres les termes dans lesquels l'interpretation de ce décret devait être conçue pour rassurer pleinement le cabinet de Saint-James et le Parlement.,, 1b. Whether the French government *really* gave satisfactory explanations, is a question, which will be examined in the following part of this chapter.

a negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin, relative to the complaints, which the British government had to make on the conduct of France: but whether the grounds of complaint were removed or corroborated by this negotiation, is a question, on which the reader will easily decide, when the Notes of Mr. Chauvelin, of the French executive council, and of the British secretary of state are laid before him.

Before however we proceed to this negotiation, which commenced on the 27. of December 1792, it will be necessary to take notice of the conference, which Mr. Pitt had with Mr. Maret in the former part of this month ⁷, and which is circumstantially related by Mr. Miles ⁸, who was an intimate friend of the latter, and acted on this occasion as mediator between the two parties. A French agent, (not Mr. Maret)

⁷. I do not know the exact day, on which this conference was held: but it must have taken place in the first half of the month, because Mr. Maret, though he waited for an answer from the French executive council relative to this conference, departed from London on the 18, as appears from a Letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun on the 19, which begins thus: “Je vous ai déjà écrit par Monsieur Maret, qui est parti *hier* pour se rendre à Paris.,, Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 63. At the end of January Mr. Maret came again to London: but the history of this second journey belongs to the fifteenth chapter.

⁸. Authentic Correspondence, p. 89—95.

with whom Mr. Miles had frequent conferences, but whose name he has not mentioned, had assured Mr. Miles, that he was empowered by the French executive council, to demand an audience of Mr. Pitt, and had requested Mr. Miles to wait on the minister, and obtain his consent. This consent Mr. Pitt granted, without knowing even the name of the person, with whom he was to confer: for, what was very extraordinary, the French agent insisted, that his name should not be mentioned, "till he had positive assurance, that he would be received, and a rendezvous was given" ⁹. As this circumstance necessarily excited distrust, Mr. Miles before the meeting took place again pressed the agent not to deceive him, he represented the disagreeable consequences, which might ensue, if he were not really authorised by the French executive council, to demand the interview, to which Mr. Pitt had consented, and in case he were not already authorised, Mr. Miles proposed to defer the conference for a few days, during which a messenger might go to Paris and return with the necessary instructions. But the French agent again protested that he was already

9. *Ib.* p. 90. Mr. Pitt's condescension in granting an interview to an agent of the French executive council, even though this person insisted that his name should not be previously mentioned, shews how ardently Mr. Pitt desired to avoid a rupture with France.

empowered to hold a conference with Mr. Pitt ¹⁰. After all these preparations and repeated protestations, every one would have supposed, that this person would have been able on the day of meeting to produce such instructions from the French executive council, as would have empowered him to treat on the differences subsisting between Great Britain and France. But, strange to relate, when the meeting took place, and his instructions were demanded, it appeared, that *he had no authority whatsoever*: and to augment, if possible, the insult which he had thus offered to the British minister, he had the assurance to present another, as the person authorized to treat, who had no more authority, than the pretended plenipotentiary himself. This other person was the well-known Mr. Maret, who was come over to England merely in the domestic concerns of the Duke of Orleans, and who, as his intimate friend Mr. Miles expressly testifies, *never pretended to have had any other business* ¹¹. And that he had no authority whatsoever from the French executive council to treat on state affairs, may be proved not only by the testimony of Mr. Miles, but by the evidence of Mr. Maret himself: for on the 11. of January 1793, a few weeks after his return to Paris he wrote a letter to Mr. Miles

10. *Ib.* p. 91.

11. *Ib.* *ib.*

in which he made the following declaration, "*I had no authority to treat, I had no mission: and when I declared this to Mr. Pitt and to yourself, I declared the truth,*"¹².

A scene like that, which been just described, would have been sufficient to rouse the indignation of any man, who was not endowed with the greatest moderation. The two-fold deception, which took place on this occasion, and the falsehoods of which the French agent was not ashamed to be guilty, shewed that the emissaries of the executive council thought themselves at liberty to trifle with a British minister even at the expense of truth. If then, after the manifold indignities, which the British government had

12. Mr. Maret's own words were: "*Je n'avais ni autorisation, ni mission: et j'ai dit la verité en la déclarant à vous et à Monsieur Pitt.,* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 70. — On the 18. of December 1792, about a week after the conference had been held, Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun, expressed his surprise at the unexpected issue of it, in the following terms, "*Mr. * * * m'a toujours juré qu'il était autorisé à voir le Ministre, et je vous laisse à juger de ma surprise, quand j'ai vu sortir de derriere le rideau M. Maret, comme chargé d'une mission secrete, et que c'était lui, et non Mr. * * * qui devait voir Mr. Pitt. Si j'ai été étonné de tout ce qui est passé, j'ai du l'être bien d'avantage, quand j'ai appris que M. Maret n'était pas autorisé de traiter des affaires politiques.,*" *Ib.* p. 64.

already received from the national convention, this additional insult had provoked an absolute refusal to listen any longer to the representations of its agents, I much question, whether any Briton, who has the honour of his country at heart, would venture to blame it. Yet, notwithstanding these repeated affronts, Mr. Pitt, who sacrificed resentment to the desire of preserving peace, declared to Mr. Maret at this very conference, that in case he could obtain instructions, "*it would give him great pleasure, to treat with him, as a confidential person from the French executive council,*" ¹³. Greater willingness, and in fact, when we consider all circumstances, greater condescension on the part of a British minister was hardly possible: and the expression, "*a confidential person from the French executive council,*", is far from indicating a contempt for the new government of France, or a reluctance to treat with the agents of a council, "*whose heads had not been anointed from the holy oil cruse before the altar of Rheims,*" ¹⁴. Mr. Maret himself was so

13. Mr. Miles says, p. 94. that he has Mr. Maret's own authority for this assertion.

14. These ill-timed words of a celebrated leader of opposition were applied by Le Brun, in his report to the convention of the 19. of December (Moniteur 21. Dec. 1792) with great advantage to the French cause, which is in general under great obligations to the same orator.

well pleased with his reception, and derived from it such sanguine expectations of being enabled to act as a mediator of peace, which he sincerely wished to preserve ¹⁵, that he immediately dispatched a courier to Paris, in the hope of obtaining instructions to treat with the British government ¹⁶. But the French executive council not only refused to send the required instructions, but even ordered him to abstain from all conversation with Mr. Pitt on the subject of politicks, and to return immediately to Paris. "He was at my house,,," says Mr. Miles ¹⁷, "when the dispatch arrived, and I read it with the more surprise and indignation, on finding that Le Brun had reported to the convention, that Mr. Pitt, *alarmed* ¹⁸, had solicited

15. Authentic correspondence, p. 91. 92.

16. *Ib.* p. 94.

17. *Ib.* p. 95.

18. As Le Brun attributed to fear Mr. Pitt's readiness to treat with an agent of the French executive council, which he moreover strangely perverted, what inference would he have deduced, had a British ambassador been sent to Paris to demand explanations? Nor was Le Brun the only one, who ascribed Mr. Pitt's pacific disposition to the meanest motives, on which account Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun of the 2. of January 1793 made the following complaint. "Sa condescendance a été attribuée, non à la franchise, non à l'intérêt qu'il est censé prendre à la prospérité de sa patrie, non pas à un principe de bonne politique, fondé sur les

“red an interview with the secret agents of the executive council, but that he (Le Brun) had expressly forbidden them to have any communication with the English minister,,.

Dejected at the unexpected issue of this affair, Mr. Miles wrote to Le Brun on the 18. of December, the day that Mr. Maret departed from London, and said: “I am sincerely grieved to see all my efforts for preserving peace and uniting the two nations, likely to fail through ill founded prepossessions ¹⁹, misconceptions, and underhand manoeuvres ²⁰, as *danges de la probité et de l’humanité, mais à la foiblesse, ou à un motif encore moins excusable, qui ne lui fera jamais attribué que par des hommes sans vertu, et qui étant dépourvus de tout sentiment d’honneur, ne croient pas que de tels sentimens puissent exister chez les autres.* Selon eux, c’était à la crainte ou à la perfidie, que M. Maret devait son entrevue avec M. Pitt. Grand Dieu! quelle crainte aurait-il pu avoir? Une seule peut-être! Le poignard d’un assassin! Et qu’avait-il à gagner par la perfidie etc., Authentic Correspondence. Appendix p. 92.

19. Namely ill-founded prepossessions against the British ministry, which Mr. Miles in this letter endeavours to remove.

20. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) ascribes to the underhand manoeuvres of Mr. Chauvelin, to whom Mr. Maret communicated the conversation between himself and Mr. Pitt, the refusal of the executive council, to permit Mr. Maret to negotiate. At the same time, another motive operated probably with Le Brun, as will appear hereafter.

"rous, as they are contrary to the real interest of both
 "countries ²¹., In the same letter, speaking of Noel
 and Maret, he said: „I cannot but approve of their ci-
 "vility toward me, and their loyalty toward their
 "country: and if you had permitted the latter to com-
 "plete what he had so well begun, I believe you would
 "have had reason to be satisfied with his conduct. After
 "having assured you, that I had no personal interest in
 "the negotiation, for which I had nearly paved the
 "way, I hope you will yield to wise and prudent
 "counsels, and that you will not miss the opportunity,
 "which offers, of securing happiness to your country,
 "and tranquillity to Europe. Do not imagine, that
 "the people of England are disposed to revolt against
 "the government: do not imagine, that war is wished
 "for in this country: on the contrary, we wish to live
 "on good terms with France,, ²². In the same letter

21.

"Londres le 18. Decembre 1792.

"Je suis au desespoir, Monsieur, de voir tous mes efforts
 "pour conserver la paix et rapprocher les deux nations prêts
 "à s'échouer par des préventions mal-fondées, des mal-
 "entendus, et des intrigues fourdes et dangereuses, autant
 "qu'elles sont contraires aux véritables intérêts des deux
 "pays., Authentic Correspondence. Appendix p. 71.

22. "J'ai à me louer de leur conduite honnête à mon
 "égard et loyale envers leur patrie; et si vous eussiez permis
 "au dernier (Maret) d'achever ce qu'il a si bien commencé, je
 "crois que vous auriez eu lieu d'en être très satisfait. Après

likewise he declared to Le Brun, that, though Mr. Maret's conference with Mr. Pitt had through the fault of the executive council produced no effect, he had promised Mr. Noel, (who was then lately arrived in London, but before the end of the month went as French minister to the Hague) to procure for him also a conference, as soon as he should be authorized by the executive council ²³; and in another letter which wrote he on the following day, and which Mr. Noel himself transmitted to Paris ²⁴, he again reminded Le

“vous avoir assuré, que je n'ai aucun intérêt personnel dans
 “la negotiation que j'avois presque entamée, j'espère que
 “vous vous prêterez à des conseils sages et prudents, et que
 “vous ne perdrez pas l'occasion qui se presente d'assurer le
 “bonheur de votre pays et la tranquillité de l'Europe. N'ima-
 “ginez point que le peuple Anglais soit disposé à se revolter
 “contre le gouvernement; n' imaginez pas qu'on désire la
 “guerre ici; point du tout, nous désirons de vivre en bonne
 “intelligence avec la France., Ib. p. 77.

23. “La premiere fois que je vis M. Noel, et qu'il m'eut
 “appris l'objet de son voyage, je lui promis de lui procurer
 “le moyen d'obtenir une entrevue avec M. Pitt, dès qu'il
 “eut l'autorisation du conseil executif., Ib. p. 76.

24. His letter to Le Brun of the 19. of December begins thus. “Je vous ai déjà écrit par M. Maret, qui est parti hier
 “pour se rendre à Paris. Je vous écris encore aujourd'hui
 “confidentiellement, et c'est M. Noel qui aura la bonté de
 “faire passer ma lettre., Ib. p. 63.

Brun, "to authorise either Maret or Noel, to give satisfactory explanations upon those points, which appeared and with reason, to give uneasiness to our government ²⁵.,, But all his expostulations were fruitless: for the French executive council, departed not from the resolution, which had been once taken ²⁶.

It is here unnecessary to examine, whether the executive council acted with propriety, or not, in refusing to authorise Mr. Maret to treat with the British ministry, as it undoubtedly possessed the power of exercising its own judgement, in regard to the choice of a negotiator. But as Mr. Maret had already had a conference with Mr. Pitt, as he was highly satisfied with his reception, and in consequence of the assurances, which he received from the British minister, had sent a courier to Paris in order to obtain instructions, the refusal of the executive council, especially as Mr. Maret himself sincerely wished to prevent a rupture, by no means evinced a similar pacific disposition on

25. "Voilà l'histoire abrégée de cette ridicule aventure (Mr. Maret's Conference with Mr. Pitt) "qui m'ôtera à jamais peut-être les moyens d'entamer une négociation, si vous n'autorisez pas Maret ou Noel à donner des explications satisfaites sur les points qui semblent donner, et avec raison, de l'inquiétude à notre gouvernement.,, Ib. p. 65.

26. This resolution has been quoted at the end of the preceding paragraph.

the part of the French government. Mr. Chauvelin on the contrary was very hostilely inclined: he made no scruple to declare, "that if he was not received at "St. James's, *the height of his ambition would be to leave this country with a declaration of war* ²⁷,; and Mr. Miles, who was well acquainted with his character, has declared, that if a pretext for a quarrel between the two countries had been purposely sought, „France certainly could not have selected a better object for the purpose,, ²⁸. It is no wonder therefore that the British ministry would rather have negotiated with Mr. Maret, whose pacific sentiments coincided with their own, than with Mr. Chauvelin, who was equally desirous of war with his employers themselves. Besides, if Mr. Chauvelin alone was destined to negotiate, why did the executive council send so many other agents at this time to London ²⁹: and why did these agents demand conferences, if they had no authority to treat? We may submit it to the judgement of every impartial man to determine, whether this conduct bore not evident marks of duplicity, whether these agents

27. Authentic correspondence, p. 84.

28. *Ib.* *ib.*

29. Mr. Miles (p. 96.) says "there was a constant supply of them., But Mr. Maret, as we have seen was not of the number, as he had no mission whatsoever from the executive council.

agents belonged not to the class of emissaries, whose object was to excite an insurrection, and whether the conferences, demanded of the British ministry, were not intended merely as cloaks to cover their really hostile designs ³⁰. It may be demanded further, whether Le Brun, if he had been disposed to prevent a rupture with Great Britain would have so shamefully misinterpreted the conference which was held with Mr. Maret: or whether the executive council would have permitted it, if they had not been inclined to provoke the British government to a contest, which, it was the firm belief in Paris, would instantly occasion a revolt throughout this country ³¹. But whether these questions be answered in the affirmative, or not, thus much at least has been proved by evidence, which no one can controvert, that it was no refusal on the part of the British ministry, as opposition writers, and opposition orators have repeatedly asserted, but the obstinacy of the French executive council, which prevented Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret from producing the desired effect ³².

30. Mr. Miles (p. 94.) has promised to explain a future period the cause of the above-mentioned imposition, which was practised by the French agent both on himself and Mr. Pitt. Whether he has ever done so, I know not.

31. See the *Authentic Correspondence*, p. 96.

32. Though the calumnies, which have been propagated

As it was the will therefore of the French executive council, that Mr. Chauvelin alone should con-

against the British government both at home and abroad during the present war, are almost without number, yet nothing can well surpass the malevolence, which appears in the inventions, which certain persons have ventured to lay before the public as real history, in regard to Mr. Maret. For they have not only declared, that he was furnished with instructions from the executive council, but have even fabricated the terms of these instructions, which they have rendered very conciliatory, in order to increase the odium, which they would willingly throw on ministers, who, as they pretend, refused these advantageous offers, and consequently, as the said persons conclude, merited the execration of their country. That this representation of the conduct of certain opposition writers may not be thought exaggerated, I will quote the following passage which every one acquainted with political publications will easily know where to find. "It is confidently reported, that Mr. Maret had it
 "in his instructions, unequivocally to offer to our ministry
 "these three points: first, that the navigation of the Schelde
 "should be given up; secondly, that the French troops
 "should not approach the Dutch territories within a given
 "distance; and that the decree of the 19. of Nov. should be
 "either altered or repealed. When the ostensible reasons for
 "undertaking a war are thus previously removed by the
 "concession of the enemy, then none but the most suspicious
 "motives can induce ministers to sacrifice the peace, treasure,
 "and welfare of the country to their secret or wicked views."
 — A charge of so black a nature, as is here laid to the

duct the negotiation with the British ministry, he accordingly, on the 27. of December 1792, delivered to Lord Grenville, his majesty's principal secretary of state for the foreign department, the following note ³³.

British ministry, and laid with the consciousness, as it necessarily was, of being unable to support it by any real evidence, betrays something worse than mere levity. Nor has the charge been confined to political publications, for it has been often heard even in the British senate, till the authentic documents were published by Mr. Miles, who calls it (p. 92) "the vile expedient of a distressed and hungry faction, impatient to get into office, upon any terms, and by any means., — Similar falsehoods were propagated in regard to Mr. Maret's journey to London at the end of January 1793: but the notice of these must be deferred to the 15. chapter, where the history of Mr. Maret's second journey will be given at large.

33. The French original is printed in the *Moniteur* 3. Jan. 1793. — In order to preserve, as much as possible, diplomatic accuracy, I have in general hitherto quoted French documents in their original language, even where an English translation is given in the text. But as the Notes, which were exchanged during the present negotiation are very long, and it is necessary to lay the *whole* of their contents before the reader, in order to enable him to judge, whether the subjects in debate were fully exhausted, on which his final decision must now depend: further, as these notes in the English translation were laid before the British

"The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of
 "France has the honour to communicate to Lord Gren-
 "ville the instructions, which he has received from
 "the executive council of the French republic, with
 "orders to lay them before his Britannic majesty's se-
 "cretary of state for the department of foreign affairs,
 "in case he should think that he should not speedily
 "enough obtain an interview with the minister.

"The French government, by continuing, since
 "the recall of Lord Gower from Paris, to leave at Lon-

Parliament on the 28. of January 1793, and thus acquired the authority of the originals themselves, I hope no one will take it ill, that I here make an exception, and produce only the English translation, which I copy from the New Annual Register. However should any one doubt of its accuracy, he may easily compare it with the originals, because it will be always noted, where the originals are to be found: and in those passages, where there is room for verbal criticism, I shall not neglect to quote even here the French words themselves. At the same time I shall take the liberty of accompanying the Notes, which passed on this occasion; with a continued commentary, in which the *actions* of the French government will be compared with its *declarations*. — During this negotiation, Mr. Chauvelin wrote twice to Lord Grenville on the alien and corn bills: these two letters have no reference to our present inquiry, but belong to the eleventh chapter, where proper notice has been already taken of them.

“don a minister plenipotentiary, thought they gave to this Britannic majesty an unequivocal proof of the desire, they had to remain in good understanding with the British court ³⁴, and to see all those clouds

34. This argument has likewise been used even by British writers, to prove the pacific disposition of the French rulers. But the premises by no means warrant the inference, which is deduced from them: for one government may have resolved to engage in war with another, and yet, in order to conceal its intentions, permit its ambassador to reside with that other government, till the plan is fully ripe for execution. The mere possibility of this case destroys the whole force of the above-mentioned argument: and that in regard to France it was not only possible, but highly probable, or rather absolutely certain, is evident from the facts, which have been related in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work. Further, it is to be observed, that, immediately after the return of Lord Gower from Paris, Mr. Chauvelin was actually recalled from London, that his letters of recall were brought by Mr. Noel, that Mr. Chauvelin objected, “that though he was not well with the English minister, yet “he was perfectly so with Mr. Fox and some other members “of opposition, and that it would not be prudent in France, “to lose the fruits of his labours with these gentlemen, and “their subsequent services, for a vain form of diplomatic etiquette,, and that in consequence of this argument the executive council revoked the order, and permitted Mr. Chauvelin’s further residence in London. See the Authentic Corresp., Appendix p. 33. So far therefore was *friendship* for the British court, as was asserted in Mr. Chauvelin’s Note,

“dissipated, to which events necessary and inseparable
 “from the internal government of France ³⁵, seemed
 “then to have given birth. The intentions of the ex-
 “ecutive council of France toward England have never
 “ceased to be the same ³⁶: but they cannot see with
 “indifference the public conduct, which the British mi-
 “nistry observe at present toward France. It is much
 “to be regretted, that they have perceived in this con-
 “duct an indisposition, which they still force themsel-
 “ves not to believe ³⁷. They think it a duty howe-

the cause of his continuing to reside in London, that sheer
 enmity to the court of Great Britain was the motive of it.

35. The events, which are here officially declared to
 have been *necessary and inseparable from the internal govern-
 ment of France*, were the massacres committed on the 10. of
 Aug. 1792. From this declaration we may judge of the cha-
 racter of the men, with whom Great Britain was then doomed
 to negotiate.

36. This assertion admits of no doubt.

37. The French executive council here complains, that
 the British government was *ill* disposed toward that of France,
 as if they had a right to expect, that it should be *well* dispo-
 sed toward those, who on the 28. of Nov. and on other occa-
 sions, had avowed their intentions of overturning the British
 constitution. But it is the practise of the modern rulers of
 France to make an absolute game of common sense; and
 they shew in all their dealings, that they imagine, men are
 already prepared to receive chains, not only for their per-
 sons, but for their understandings. It must be admitted

“ver, which they owe to the French nation, not to
 “leave it much longer in a state of uncertainty, into
 “which it has been thrown by several measures lately
 “adopted by the British government, an uncertainty in
 “which the English nation must share, and which must
 “be equally unworthy of both ³⁸. The executive
 “council of the French republic has consequently au-
 “thorised the minister of France at London to demand
 “with openness of the ministers of his Britannic ma-
 “jesty, whether France ought to consider England as
 “a neutral or hostile power, and has particularly char-
 “ged him to obtain on this point a definitive answer ³⁹.

likewise, that not a few have answered these expectations:
 and hence the present Directory is encouraged to impose on
 the world fallacious arguments with as much assurance, as
 the national convention did.

38. Whatever unworthiness there may be in state of
 uncertainty, no such unworthiness fell to the share of the
 British ministers, for they were already tolerably certain in
 regard to the designs of France, and consequently in regard
 to the measures, which it was necessary to take at home.

39. The best answer to this question was contained in
 the decree of the 19. of November, in the encouragement
 given by the national convention on the 28. of the same
 month to the societies, who announced their intention of
 overturning the British constitution, in the decree of the 15.
 of December, and in the resolution of the 24. of that month,
 not to except England from the decree of the 19. of Novem-

"But in demanding from the ministers of his Britannic
 "majesty an open and candid explanation of its inten-
 "tions toward France, the executive council does not
 "wish, that the smallest doubt should exist respecting
 "the disposition of France toward England, and of its
 "desire to remain at peace with it. They even wish
 "to answer previously to all those reproaches, which
 "may be thrown out against France, in order to justify
 "England. Reflecting on the reasons, which might
 "determine his Britannic majesty to break with the
 "French republic, the executive council can see them
 "only in a false interpretation given perhaps to the
 "decree of the national convention of the 19. of No-
 "vember 40. If the British ministry are really alar-

ber: to say nothing of the circular letter of the marine mi-
 nister, and the order actually given to invade Holland, as
 they succeeded by several days Mr. Chauvelin's Note of the
 27. of December. In fact, after the French government had
 solemnly declared itself the enemy of the British government,
 it required no small share of assurance, to demand a catego-
 rical answer, whether the latter intended to become the
 enemy of the former. There was only one categorical
 answer, which could be given to such a question, namely:
 "since you are resolved to become my enemy, I *must* be-
 come your's in my own defence.,,

40. Even without so much reflexion, the executive
 council might have discovered many other reasons, which
 not only excited a suspicion, but proved to a demonstration

"med at that decree, it can only be for want of com-
 "prehending the true meaning of it. The national
 "convention never intended, that the French republic
 "should favour insurrections, and espouse the cause of
 "a few seditious persons, or, in a word, that it should
 "endeavour to excite disturbance in any neutral or
 "friendly country whatever. Such an idea would be
 "rejected by the French nation. It cannot without
 "injustice be imputed to the national convention.
 "*This decree then is applicable only to those people, who*
 "*after having conquered their liberty may request the*
 "*fraternity and assistance of the French republic by*
 "*a solemn and unequivocal expression of the gene-*
 "*ral will* 41.

that the national convention was hostilely inclined toward the British cabinet.

41. This explanation is an instance of such black hypocrisy, and such daring assurance, as is hardly to be found but within the limits of republican France: for it was given twelve days *after* the decree of the 15. of December, in which the national convention had solemnly declared, "that every nation, which would *not* rebel against its government, should be treated as an *enemy*., See Note 14. to the preceding chapter. It was given likewise three days after the resolution of the 24. of December, by which the national convention had determined, that the decree of the 19. of November should be actually applied to England. And yet Mr. Chauvelin, or rather the executive council, was not

"France not only ought and wishes to, respect
"the independence of England, but that also of its

ashamed to assert in this very note, that such an idea could not without injustice be imputed to the national convention, and that this venerable body, which had declared itself the decided enemy of all nations, which would not rebel against their governments, had no design whatsoever of exciting insurrections in neutral countries. Besides, the interpretation here given of the decree of the 19. November, is in direct contradiction to the plain terms of the decree itself, which are, "*la convention nationale accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur liberté,,*" not *qui ont recouvré* leur liberté, as the interpretation implies, which in other respects is a manifest absurdity, it being incredible, that in any country a disaffected party, which had been able without the assistance of France to accomplish its purpose and effect a revolution, should be so completely befotted, as afterwards to require the intervention of the great nation. Further, the general proclamation, annexed to the decree of the 15. of December, in which the following words, "*nous sommes venus pour chasser vos tyrans,,*" (Ch. XII. Note. 22.) was put into the mouth of the French generals, affords an additional proof, that it was not the intention of the national convention to defer the promised fraternity, till the nations, for whom this inestimable blessing was designed, had already dethroned their sovereigns. And that it was the grand *object* of the decree of the 19. of November to excite insurrections, had been admitted by the same French minister, Le Brun, from whom Chauvelin received his instructions. For on the 5. of

"allies, with whom it is not at war. The undersigned therefore has been charged to declare formally, *that*

December, three weeks therefore before Mr. Chauvelin delivered the present Note to Lord Grenville, Le Brun in a letter to the president of the national convention announced an insurrection in a bishoprick of the German empire as an *happy effect* of the said decree. "Citoyen Président, nous éprouvons de jour en jour les heureux *effets* du décret de la convention nationale, qui promet au nom de la nation Française assistance et protection aux peuples qui osent secouer le joug de la tyrannie, et qui plantent au milieu d'eux l'arbre de la liberté. Les habitans de l'évêché de Porentru etc. — *forts de la loi du 19. Novembre*, leur courage s'est ranimé etc., Moniteur 7. Dec. 1792. (The result of this happy effect was the establishment, under the auspices of the great nation, of the now forgotten Rauracian republic, which like the Cisrhenane, preserved a temporary existence, till the mother republic thought proper to take her daughter-republics into her own bosom). In like manner, the President himself on the 3. of December had quoted the decree in question, and introduced it with the following preface. "N'aurions nous réveillé les peuples souverains, détrônés par les rois, que pour les replonger par des traités dans la servitude? — Notre diplôme d'alliance et de défense reciproque est écrit de la main de la nature. Nos principes et notre haine contre les tyrans, voilà nos ministres plénipotentiaires., Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792. (It is never to be forgotten, that, in the language of the national convention, the words, *Roi* and *Tyran* are perfectly synonymous). Likewise Rémi, a celebrated orator of the convention said on

"France will not attack Holland, while that power confines itself on its part within the bounds of strict neutrality" 42.

the 2. of December: "Apprenez aux peuples à punir leurs tyrans d'une manière digne d'eux. — Si vous éleviez des doutes sur la condamnation du dernier de vos tyrans, si vous le supposiez encore au dessus des autres hommes, quel exemple donneriez vous aux peuples à qui vous portez la liberté? Ils croiraient devoir hésiter, comme vous, à punir leurs tyrans., Ib. — After the unanimous interpretations then, which had been publicly given in the convention itself at the beginning of December, one of which proceeded from the president, and another from the minister for foreign affairs, it was expected that the British ministry at the end of the same month should give credit to Mr. Chauvelin's diametrically opposite interpretation!

42. Yet only *fourteen days* after this solemn declaration, which has had such an effect on a celebrated opposition writer, that he has asserted so late as the year 1797, "the security of Holland, while she preserved her neutrality was professed and in a manner *guaranteed*.,, the executive council sent positive orders to General Miranda, to invade, within twelve days at furthest, Dutch Flanders and the province of Zealand. See Ch. XII. Notes 50 — 53. It cannot be objected that the States General had in the mean time transgressed the bounds of neutrality, for a more scrupulous observation of them was impossible. An attack on France could not even have suggested itself to the government of Holland; for the Dutch troops were withdrawn from the frontiers, to preserve tranquillity in the interior, which the French party in Hol-

"The British government being thus assured respecting the two points, no pretence for the least dis-

land threatened to disturb; and it was the defenceless state, in which the Dutch frontier towns were thus left, that tempted the executive council to give the order for invasion. But we need not wonder at the falsity displayed in Mr. Chauvelin's Note, since Brissot, who knew all the secrets of the executive council, and was their principal agent in the national convention, declared two days *after* the order for the invasion of Holland had been actually given, that the French government had no such intention. His own words were: "L'aggression du Stadthouder envers la France, ou l'insurrection contre lui de la majorité des Hollandais, voilà *les seuls cas*, où la France croirait de son devoir, et de sa justice, de porter les armes dans les Provinces-Unies: *et ces cas n'existent point, et la France, en ce, veut rester tranquille.*," *Moniteur* 15. Janv. 1793. The words, "ces cas n'existent point," contain likewise an acknowledgement, that the Stadtholder had not acted hostilely toward France. Lastly, as soon as Brissot had ended his speech, the national convention confirmed his declaration in regard to Holland by the following decree: "Que le Conseil exécutif est chargé de déclarer au gouvernement d'Angleterre, que l'intention de la république Française est d'entretenir l'harmonie et la fraternité avec la nation Anglaise, de respecter son indépendance et celle de ses alliés, tant que l'Angleterre et ses alliés ne l'attaqueront pas," *ib.* On the tenth of January therefore the French government gave the order for the invasion of Holland, and on the twelfth of the same month a *formal decree* was issued containing the most positive assurances of

“ficulty can remain, but on the question of opening
 “the Schelde, a question irrevocably decided by reason
 “and justice, of little importance in itself ⁴³, and on
 “which the opinion of England, and perhaps even of
 “Holland are too well known, to render it difficult to
 “make it seriously the sole cause of a war. Should
 “the British ministry however embrace this last motive
 “to induce them to declare war against France, would
 “it not then be probable, that their private intention
 “was to bring about a rupture at any rate, and to take
 “the advantage at present of the most futile of all
 “pretences, to colour an unjust aggression long ago
 “meditated ⁴⁴?

the contrary. So daring and so solemn a falsehood had probably never been uttered by statesmen of any country, till French philosophy and French republicanism had set religion and honour at defiance.

43. It was of no importance therefore, whether the mouth of the Schelde should be converted into a station for a French fleet! See what said on this subject in the tenth and eleventh chapters. The French government knew likewise very well how important the mouth of the Schelde was for *France*, or they would not have stipulated in the fourteenth article of the treaty, which they forced on Holland in May 1795, that the town and harbour of Flushing, the fortifications of which command the mouth of the Schelde, should be constantly garrisoned by French troops.

44. This passage is fraught with artifice and sophistry.

“On this fatal supposition, which the executive council rejects ⁴⁵, the undersigned would be authorised to support with energy the dignity of the French

In the first place it is presupposed, what is absolutely false, that the appropriation of the Schelde to France (for this was manifestly the meaning of what was called the opening of it) was a matter of total indifference both to England and to Holland: and from these premises is deduced the inference, not that the British ministry, in case they opposed the design, set too great a value on the preservation of the Schelde, which is the only inference, that the premises, even if they were true, would warrant, but that the British ministry had *long ago* meditated an attack on France. Now since the 16. of November 1792, the day on which the resolution was made for the opening of the Schelde, several other very alarming measures had been taken by the national convention, which necessarily operated as still stronger inducements with the British ministry, to oppose the ambition of France. Consequently, even if a declaration of war had proceeded from the British government, instead of proceeding, as it really did, from the French convention, and even if the opening of the Schelde had been a matter of as little consequence, as was pretended, still the natural conclusion would have been, that those more alarming measures, that those more important motives had occasioned the war, and not that long existing causes, which the executive council neither did nor could allege, had produced it.

⁴⁵. Here the fatal supposition is rejected: but with the usual consistency of the executive council it will be soon afterwards again assumed.

“people, and to declare with firmness that a free and
 “powerful nation will accept war, and repel with in-
 “dignation an aggression so manifestly unjust, and so
 “unprovoked on their part ⁴⁶. When all these ex-
 “planations necessary to demonstrate the purity of the
 “intentions of France, and when all peaceful and
 “conciliatory measures shall have been exhausted by
 “the French nation, it is evident that the whole
 “weight, and the whole responsibility of the war will
 “sooner or later fall upon those who have provoked it.
 “Such a war would really be the war of the British
 “ministry only against the French republic: and should
 “this

46. Whoever has read the facts recorded in the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work will find it difficult perhaps to repress the indignation, which he must necessarily feel at the hypocrisy and insolence of the French executive council, in daring to use such expressions, as “*unprovoked aggression*, *purity of the intentions of France*, *peaceful and conciliatory measures*, and the like. But though they well knew, that they were uttering falsehoods, they knew likewise that these falsehoods would produce effect: they knew that they were furnishing their advocates with the means of defence: and they knew by experience how many thousands were at that time ready to become the dupes of the most wretched artifice. It is likewise a matter of great importance, when a revolution of principles is to be effected, to gain the popular opinion.

"this truth appear for a moment doubtful, it would
 "not perhaps be impossible for France to render it
 "soon evident to a nation, which, in giving its confi-
 "dence never renounced the exercise of reason, and
 "its respect for justice and truth 47.

47. "Ce ne ferait réellement qu'une guerre du *seul mi-*
nistère contre la *république Française*, et si cette vérité pou-
 vait paraître un moment douteuse, il ne ferait peut-être pas
 difficile d'en convaincre bientôt une *Nation*, qui en donnant
 sa confiance, n'a jamais renoncé à l'exercice de sa raison, à
 son respect pour la vérité et la justice., This sentence rela-
 tes to the appeal to the English *nation*, which Le Brun had
 already announced to the national convention on the 19. of
 December, and which he said he had given Chauvelin ex-
 press orders to make. See Ch. XII. Note 27. It has been
 shewn in the tenth chapter, that the French government
 was at this time fully persuaded, the people of England
 were ripe for rebellion. Consequently, it was supposed that
 nothing would more contribute to set this people in commo-
 tion, than an appeal to their *reason*, and *their respect for*
justice and truth, namely, as it necessarily understood, and
 as Brissot in his interpretation of the appeal openly declared
 (Ch. XII. Note 34.) from the *unreasonableness*, the *injustice*
 and *faithlessness* of their government, from which the people
 would withdraw that confidence they had hitherto placed in
 it, and take the administration of public affairs into their
 own hands, as soon as they were convinced, (which con-
 viction the French attempted to produce by every possible
 artifice, though in vain) that the British ministry alone wished

“Such are the instructions, which the undersigned
“has received orders to communicate officially to Lord
for war, and that too merely because France was become a
republic. Such is undoubtedly the meaning, though it is
very artfully veiled, of the present passage in Mr. Chauve-
lin’s Note. Now when two governments are at variance,
and in a negotiation relative to the points in dispute, an
ambassador of the one receives orders, not only to use in-
sulting language to the ministers of the other, but to excite
an insurrection of the people, it is evident that the former
government wishes not for a continuance but for a breach
of peace with the latter, which the circular letter of the
marine minister, issued during this very negotiation, fully
confirms. If a British ambassador at Paris had ventured, in
a note to the executive council, to threaten an appeal to the
people of France, in case the national convention continued
to pursue its plans of conquest and aggrandizement, and to
intermeddle in the domestic concerns of neutral nations,
though such an appeal would have been much more justifi-
ble, than that with which the British government was threa-
tened, yet there can be no doubt, that he would either
have received for answer an order to quit the country; or
would have been committed to the Temple, as an exciter of
sedition, for under the republican government of France,
the imprisonment of foreign ministers takes place at Paris
as well as at Algiers. Lastly, it is not improbable, that the
executive council, beside the grand motive of exciting an
insurrection in England, had an additional reason for their
insolent conduct: they wished probably to irritate the British
ministry, and to provoke a declaration of war already de-

"Grenville, inviting him, as well as all the council of
 "his Britannic majesty, to weigh with the most serious
 "attention the deliberations and demands, which they
 "contain. It is evident, that the French nation de-
 "sires to preserve peace with England. It proves this
 "by endeavouring to remove every suspicion, which
 "so many passions and various prejudices are continual-
 "ly labouring to excite against it ⁴⁸. But the more
 "it shall have done to convince all Europe of the pu-
 "rity of its views, and the rectitude of its intentions ⁴⁹,
 "the greater right it will have to a claim of being no
 "longer misunderstood ⁵⁰.

terminated at Paris, in order to avoid the reproach of being
 the first aggressors. But in this they were wholly disappoint-
 ed: for Lord Grenville replied to the menace, with a tem-
 perate firmness, which the French themselves hardly expected.

48. It was not passion and prejudice, but the own acts
 and declarations of the national convention recorded in the
Moniteur itself, which excited the suspicion, and more than
 suspicion of hostile designs against Great Britain. Nor did
 the present negotiation contribute in the least to the dimi-
 nution of it.

49. *Purity* of the views, and *rectitude* of the intentions
 displayed by the national convention on the 19. and 28. of
 November, and the 15. and 24. of December!

50. It is true that their views were misunderstood, and
 very strangely misunderstood, especially by some, though
 perhaps not by all, of their friends and advocates: but they

„The undersigned has orders to demand a written
 “answer to the present note. He hopes that the mi-
 “nisters of his Britannic majesty will be induced by
 “the explanations, which it contains, to adopt ideas fa-
 “vourable to a good understanding between the two
 “nations; and will have no occasion, in order to return
 “to them, to consider the terrible responsibility of a
 “declaration of war, which would incontestably be
 “their work ⁵¹; the consequences of which must be

were not misunderstood by the British ministry, who clearly saw the point to which they were directed. Gentlemen of the opposition party likewise appear at present to have discovered the drift of French politics, as we may judge from an admirable speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 20. April 1798, on which Mr. Pitt very justly remarked, that if resistance to the ambition of republican France had been deferred till the period, when the honourable gentleman became convinced of its necessity, the House of Commons would have ceased to be the theatre of his oratorical talents.

51. If this position was so easy to be proved, why did not the executive council attempt the proof of it? And why did they not compare their own conduct, even to the nicest detail, with that of the British government, if they were convinced that the comparison would illustrate the pretended purity of their views, and the vaunted rectitude of their intentions? In fact they well knew that such a comparison would illustrate only the baseness of their designs, and therefore they very prudently avoided it. Their object was, not to investigate the truth, which would have

"fatal to both countries and to all mankind, and in
 "which a generous and free people could not long con-
 "sent to betray their own interests, by serving to assist
 "and support a tyrannical coalition,,⁵².

(Signed) Chauvelin.

been highly prejudicial to them, but to lead those into error, whom it was their interest to deceive.

52. "Dans laquelle un peuple généreux et libre ne pourrait consentir long-tems à trahir ses propres intérêts, en servant d'auxiliaire et de renfort à une coalition tyrannique., Here we have another allusion to the threatened appeal to the people of Great Britain, whose generosity is extolled, not out of any regard entertained for them by the French executive council, but in order to separate the people from the government, to gain over the former by the aid of flattery for the French cause, and by the assistance of an odious contrast to place the conduct of the latter, if possible, in a detestable light. By this artifice the rulers of France endeavoured to excite the British nation against the British government, and to work the one against the other, that both might at length fall a prey to French ambition: for they imagined that the people of Great Britain were so easy to be duped, as to be capable of being converted into instruments of French ambition, as Barbaroux said in the national convention on the 1. of February: "j'ai espérance de voir le peuple Anglais sortir enfin de la stupeur, — et nous venger lui-même d'une Cour etc., Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793. And that they expected the artifice would soon succeed, appears from the expression in Mr. Chauvelin's note: "ne pourrait consentir long-tems à trahir ses propres intérêts., Lastly

When we reflect, that the ostensible object of this note was to remove the causes of those complaints, which had been made by the British government, and to effect a reconciliation with that of France, we must acknowledge that it is a very singular phaenomenon in diplomatic history. Whenever it is the *real* intention of one cabinet to regain the lost friendship of another, it is usual to adopt polite and conciliatory language: but when one government, which has already threatened another with imminent danger, says to that other government at the very outset of a negotiation apparently designed to restore harmony between them, "if the armament which you have begun (and which in the present case, as has been clearly proved, was merely defensive) be still continued, we shall appeal to your people, which will not long consent to betray their own interests by serving to support a tyrannical coalition,, it is evident, that the real object of that government is *not* to effect a reconciliation. In fact Mr. Chauvelin's note was so far from removing the causes of those complaints, which the British government had very justly made, that it only added new injuries and insults: and if ministers had the assertion which is here manifestly implied, that the British government, in opposing the French convention, acted with treachery to the British nation was as insolent, as it was awful.

refused to return any answer, it may at least be doubted, whether they would have merited censure. Nay, if such a negotiator as Mr. Chauvelin, a man who was sowing the seeds of civil war, while he affected to be a minister of peace, had been ordered on the receipt of this note, to depart immediately from the kingdom, it would have been nothing more, than what the French executive council would have done under similar circumstances. But so desirous was the British administration of preventing, if possible, an open rupture with France, that Mr. Chauvelin was permitted to remain, till it was found that all further negotiation must be fruitless, and that the French government, instead of offering satisfaction for the past and security for the future, confirmed by the negotiation itself the suspicion of its designs, to involve Great Britain both in foreign and domestic war.

Four days therefore after the receipt of Mr. Chauvelin's note, Lord Grenville returned the following answer ⁵³.

„Whitehall, Dec. 31. 1792.

“Sir

“I have received from you a note, in which, styling yourself minister plenipotentiary of France, you communicate to me as the king's secretary of state,

⁵³. The French original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 14. Jan. 1793.

"the instructions, which you state to have yourself re-
 "ceived from the executive council of the French re-
 "public. You are not ignorant, that since the un-
 "happy events of the 10. of August the king has
 "thought proper to suspend all *official* communications,
 "with France ⁵⁴. You are yourself no otherwise ac-
 "credited to the king, than in the name of his most
 "christian majesty. The proposition of receiving a mi-
 "nister accredited by any other authority or power in
 "France, would be a new question, which, whenever it
 "should occur the king would have a right to decide
 "according to the interests of his subjects, his own digni-
 "ty, and the regard, which he owes to his allies, and to
 "the general system of Europe. I am therefore to inform
 "you, Sir, in exprefs and formal terms, that I acknowledge
 "you in no other public character, than that of mini-
 "ster from his most christian majesty, and that conse-
 "quently you cannot be admitted to treat with the
 "king's ministers *in the qualizy and under the form sta-*
 "*ted in your note* ⁵⁵.

54. See what said on this subject in the ninth chapter.

55. "Dans la qualité et sous la forme dont il est question
 dans votre note.,, That when Lord Grenville returned this
 answer, Mr. Chauvelin had received no other credentials,
 than those which had been given him by Louis XVI. appears
 from a passage in the note of the executive council of the 7.
 of January 1793, in which is said of Mr. Chauvelin "quoi-

"But observing that you have entered into explanations of some of the circumstances, which have gi-

qu'il ne soit accredité auprès de sa majesté Britannique que de la part du ci-devant roi. (Moniteur 14. Jan. 1793). Indeed it was in the note of the 7. of January, which was delivered to Lord Grenville on the 13. of that month; that the executive council first announced to the British ministry its intension of furnishing Mr. Chauvelin with new credentials. On the 31. of December 1792 therefore he had no other public character, than that, with which he had been invested by Louis XVI. and if the British cabinet has been ever so disposed to acknowledge at this early period the French republic in due form (a question, which Lord Grenville leaves here undetermined) still it was not in its power on the 31. of December to admit Mr. Chauvelin as the *accredited* minister of the French republic, because he had neither delivered, nor had even himself received, any letters of credence from the administrators of that republic. Consequently it was impossible to admit him to treat with the kings ministers "in the quality and under the form stated in his note.," But Lord Grenville had already declared to him "*that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic majesty*, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both parties. See Note 4. to this chapter. The question therefore, whether the differences subsisting between the two parties could be amicably settled or not, depended not on the form, but on the *substance* of the negotiation: it depended upon this, whether the French executive council, whatever might be the organ, through which it spake, really gave explanations, which

“ven to England such strong grounds of uneasiness
 “and jealousy ⁵⁶, and that you speak of these expla-
 “nations as being of a nature to bring our two coun-
 “tries nearer ⁵⁷, I have been unwilling to convey to
 “you the notification stated above, without at the
 “same time explaining myself clearly and distinctly
 “on the subject of what you have communicated to
 “me, though under a form, which is neither regular
 „nor official.

“Your explanations are confined to three points.
 “The first is that of the decree of the national con-
 “vention of the 19. of November, in the expressions
 were satisfactory, and assurances, on which the British go-
 vernment could rely.

56. Well might Lord Grenville say *“some of the circum-
 stances, which had given uneasiness to England: for Mr.
 Chauvelin’s Note contained no allusion whatsoever, either
 to the declaration of the national convention on the 28. of
 November, that it was ready to assist in overturning the
 British constitution, or to the decree of the 15. of December,
 which declared hostilities against every nation, which refused
 to take up arms against its government, or to the determi-
 nation of the national convention on the 24. of December,
 that the decree of the 19. of November should be actually
 applied to England.*

57. It is true, that Mr. Chauvelin *spoke* of them as such:
 but whether they really were so, the reader will easily de-
 termine from the Notes 41 and 42. to this chapter.

“of which all England saw the formal declaration of
 “a design to extend universally the new principles of
 “government adopted in France, and to encourage dis-
 “order and revolt in all countries, *even in those, which*
 “*are neutral* ⁵⁸. If this interpretation, which you
 “represent as injurious to the convention, could admit
 “of any doubt, it is but too well justified by the con-
 “duct of the convention itself: *and the application of*
 “*these principles to the king’s dominions has been shewn*
 “*unequivocally by the public reception given to the pro-*
 “*moters of sedition in this country, and by the speeches*
 “*made to them precisely at the time of this decree, and*
 “*since on several different occasions* ⁵⁹.

“Yet notwithstanding all these proofs, *supported*
 “*by other circumstances* which are too notorious ⁶⁰, it
 “would have been with pleasure that we should have
 “seen here such explanations, and such a conduct, as
 “would have satisfied the dignity and honour of Eng-
 “land, with respect to what has already passed, and
 “would have offered a sufficient security in future for
 “the maintenance of that respect toward the rights, the

58. The eleventh article of the decree of 15. December
 (Ch. XII. Note-14) is a general proof of this assertion: and
 the resolution of the 24. of December (Ib. Note 14.) is a
 particular proof of it in regard to England.

59. See Ch. X. p. 120—127.

60. Ib. p. 134—145.

"government, and the tranquillity of neutral powers, which they have on every account the right to expect.

"Neither this satisfaction, nor this security, is found in the terms of an explanation, *which still declares to the promoters of sedition in every country, what are the cases in which they may count beforehand on the support and succour of France, and which reserves to that country the right of mixing herself in our internal affairs whenever she shall judge it proper, and on principles incompatible with the political institutions of all the countries of Europe.* No one can avoid perceiving how much a declaration like this is calculated to encourage disorder and revolt in every country ⁶¹. No one can be ignorant how contrary it is to the respect, which is reciprocally due from independent nations, nor how repugnant to those principles, which the king has followed, on his part, by forbearing at all times from any interference whatever in the internal affairs of France ⁶².

61. Consequently the explanation, which the French executive council gave of the decree in question, was so far from affording satisfaction for the past, and security for the future, that it only increased the insult already offered, and magnified the danger, with which Great Britain was already threatened.

62. The acknowledgement of Le Brun, the French mi-

"And this contrast is alone sufficient to shew, not only
 "that England cannot consider such an explanation as
 "satisfactory, but that she must look upon it as *a fresh*
"avowal of those dispositions, which she sees with so
"just an uneasiness and jealousy.

"I proceed to the two other points of your expla-
 "nation, which concern the general dispositions of
 "France with regard to the allies of Great Britain, and
 "the conduct of the convention and its officers relative
 "to the Schelde. The declaration, which you there

nister for foreign affairs, on this subject, at the latter end
 of August 1792, has been already quoted at the beginning
 of the ninth chapter: and that the British cabinet had con-
 tinued to preserve the most strict neutrality toward France
 even to the period when Lord Grenville wrote the present
 note, was admitted by the national convention itself on the
 13. of January 1793. For the introduction to this decree
 runs thus. "*La convention nationale informée par le ministre*
"des affaires étrangères, des préparatifs extraordinaires de
"l'Angleterre, considérant le changement de conduite de ce
"pays relativement au caractère de neutralité qu'il avait con-
"servée jusqu'ici touchant les affaires de la France etc., Monit.
 16. Jan. 1793. With respect to the sudden change in the
 conduct of the British administration, which is here made a
 subject of complaint, it was the unavoidable consequence
 of the measures, which had been taken by the convention
 itself: for it is obvious, that, when one nation is threatened
 by another, it must put itself in a posture of defence

"make, that France will not attack Holland, so long
 "as that power shall observe an exact neutrality, is
 "conceived nearly in the same terms with that, which
 "you were charged to make in the name of his most
 "christian majesty in the month of June last ⁶³. Since
 "that first declaration was made, an officer, stating
 "himself to be employed in the service of France, has
 "openly violated both the territory and the neutrality
 "of the republic, in going up the Schelde, to attack
 "the citadel of Antwerp, *notwithstanding the determina-*
 "*tion of the government not to grant this passage, and*
 "*the formal protest by which they opposed it* ⁶⁴. Since
 "the same declaration was made, the convention has
 "thought itself authorised to annul the rights of the
 "republic exercised within the limits of its own terri-
 "tory, and enjoyed by virtue of the same treaties, by
 "which her independence is secured. And at the very
 "moment, when, under the name of an amicable ex-
 "planation, you renew to me in the same terms the

63. The following is the passage in Mr. Chauvelin's
 Note of the 18. June, to which Lord Grenville here alludes.
 "Il s'empresse en même tems de lui déclarer, conformément
 au desir énoncé dans cette réponse, que les droits de tous
 les alliés de la Grande Bretagne qui n'auront point provoqué
 la France par des démarches hostiles, seront par lui non
 moins religieusement respectés., Moniteur 20. July 1792.

64. See Ch. X. Note 10. and Ch. XI. Note 7.

“promise of respecting the independence and the
 “rights of England and her allies, you announce to
 “me, *that those, in whose name you speak, intend to*
 “*maintain these open and injurious aggressions. It is*
 “*certainly not on such a declaration as this, that any*
 “*reliance can be placed for the continuance of public*
 “*tranquillity.*

“But I am unwilling to leave without a more par-
 “ticular reply, what you say on the subject of the
 “Schelde. If it were true; that this question is in it-
 “self of little importance, this would serve only to
 “prove more clearly, that it was brought forward only
 “for the purpose of insulting the allies of England by
 “the infraction of their neutrality, and by the viola-
 “tion of their rights, which the faith of treaties obli-
 “ges us to maintain. But you cannot be ignorant that
 “here the utmost importance is attached to those prin-
 “ciples, which France wishes to establish by this pro-
 “ceeding, and to those consequences, which would
 “naturally result from them ⁶⁵: and that not only

65. The dangerous consequences both to England and to Holland, which necessarily resulted from the opening of the Schelde, when France was in possession of the Low Countries have been shewn in Ch. X. p. 115, and Ch. XI. p. 156 — 159. With respect to the principles, which the French republican government wished to establish by this proceeding, they implied nothing less, than, that the mo-

"those principles, and those consequences, will never
 "be admitted by England, but that she is and ever
 "will be, ready to oppose them with all her force.

"France can have no right to annul the stipula-
 "tions relative to the Schelde, unless she have also the
 "right to set aside equally all the other treaties be-
 "tween all the powers of Europe, and all the other
 "rights of England, or of her allies. She can have
 "even no pretence to interfere in the question of open-
 "ing the Scheldé, unless she were the sovereign of
 "the Low countries, or had the right to dictate laws
 "to all Europe.

"England will never consent that France shall ar-
 "rogate the power of annulling at her pleasure, and
 "under pretence of a pretended natural right, of
 "which she makes herself the only judge, the politi-
 "cal system of Europe, established by solemn treaties,
 "and guaranteed by the consent of all the powers.
 "This government, adhering to the maxims which it
 "has followed for more than a century, will also never
 "see with indifference that France shall make herself,
 "either

dern rulers of France possessed the right, not only to inter-
 meddle, in the internal affairs of neutral nations, but to act
 as the arbitrators of all Europe. In fact, they have both
 assumed this right, and have exercised it during seven years
 with almost unremitted success.

“either directly or indirectly sovereign of the Low
 “countries, or general arbiters of the rights and liber-
 “ties of Europe. *If France is really desirous of main-
 “taining friendship and peace with England, she must
 “shew herself disposed to renounce her views of ag-
 “gression and aggrandizement, and to confine herself with-
 “in her own territory, without insulting other govern-
 “ments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without
 “violating their rights* 66.

66. “Si la France désire réellement de conserver l'amitié
 et la paix avec l'Angleterre, il faut qu'elle se montre dispo-
 sée à renoncer à ses vues d'aggression et d'aggrandissement, et
 à se tenir à son propre territoire, sans outrager les autres gou-
 vernemens, sans troubler leur repos, sans violer leurs droits.,,
 By this clear and precise declaration of the conditions, under
 which the British cabinet was willing to continue at peace
 with France, and without which peace could not possibly be
 maintained, the negotiation was brought to a crisis: and the
 issue of it now depended entirely on the question, whether
 the national convention would renounce its views of con-
 quest and aggrandizement, and cease to interfere in the in-
 ternal concerns of neutral nations, to infringe on their pri-
 vileges, and disturb their tranquillity. If the national con-
 vention thought proper to submit to these conditions, which,
 on the one hand were absolutely necessary for the preserva-
 tion of Great Britain, and, on the other hand could not be
 considered as injurious to France, because they were nothing
 more than what the French government itself had repeatedly

“With respect to that character of ill-will, which
 “is endeavoured to be found in the conduct of Eng-
 “land toward France, I cannot discuss it, because you
 “speak of it in general terms only, without alleging
 “a single fact. All Europe has seen the justice and
 “the generosity, which have characterised the conduct
 “of the king. *His majesty has always been desirous of*
“peace: he desires it still, but such as may be real and
“solid, and consistent with the interests and dignity of
“his own dominions, and with the general security of
“Europe” 67.

“On the rest of your paper I say nothing. As
 “to what relates to me and to my colleagues, the
 “king’s ministers owe to his majesty the account of

declared to be the basis of their new system of politics, peace was preserved, whether France were a monarchy or a republic, for no allusion whatsoever was made in these conditions to any particular form of government. But if the national convention rejected the conditions, they confirmed the suspicions already entertained: and left the British ministers no other choice, than either to prepare for a serious combat, or to sacrifice their country to the ambition of France.

67. “*Sa majesté a toujours désiré la paix. Elle la désire encore, mais réelle et solide, et telle qu’elle soit compatible avec les intérêts et la dignité de ses états, et avec la sûreté générale de l’Europe.*” Here reference is again made to the conditions, which had been already precisely determined.

“their conduct: and I have no answer to give to you
 “on this subject, any more than on that of *the appeal*
“which you propose to make to the English nation ⁶⁸.
 “This nation according to that constitution, by which
 “its liberty and its prosperity are secured, and which
 “it will always be able to defend against every attack,
 “direct or indirect, will never have with foreign pow-
 “ers connection for correspondence, except through
 “the organ of its king: of a king, whom it loves and
 “reveres, and who has never for an instant separated
 “his rights, and his happiness, from the rights, the in-
 “terests and the happiness of his people ⁶⁹.

“(Signed) Grenville.,,

68. Beside the insinuation in Mr. Chauvelin's Note, see the declarations made on this subject in the national convention by Le Brun and Brissot, Ch. XII. Notes 29. 30. 32. where Lord Grenville's observations on it are quoted likewise in the French original.

69. This note is written with the coolness and dignity of a statesman, who is conscious of having justice on his side, and forms a striking contrast with the menacing language adopted in Mr. Chauvelin's Note: and this contrast is the more remarkable, when we consider that the British secretary of state was doomed to notice not only unprovoked aggressions, but explanations still more disgusting and insolent, than the aggressions themselves. Yet there are writers even of our own country, who have ventured to declare that no one can compare the *temperate* language of the memorials

Two days after Lord Grenville had communicated this answer to Mr. Chauvelin, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, on the subject of the pending negotiation: and as this Letter is a document of some importance, and throws considerable light on the history of French politics, it will be necessary to make from it a few extracts ⁷⁰. It is dated Cleveland-row, 2. Jan. 1793,

from the executive council of France with the *insufferable arrogance* visible in the Notes of Lord Grenville, without drawing a conclusion greatly to the disadvantage of the latter. Such an assertion is quite in character, and corresponds exactly with the tone adopted by the French themselves, who during the late negotiation at Rastadt, after all that part of Germany, which lies to the West of the Rhine, together with the Austrian Netherlands had been formally ceded to them, after they had made themselves masters of Holland and Italy, and after they had conquered Switzerland in the midst of the negotiation, continually talked of the *great sacrifices* which *France* had made, in order to obtain peace. One should really suppose that French republicans possessed the privilege of setting common sense at defiance.

70. The French original is printed in the Authentic Correspondence of Mr. Miles with Le Brun, Appendix p. 92 — 98. I do not quote the whole of this letter here, because several parts of it relate to other things, and have been already introduced in various places, as the subjects required.

and begins thus. „You always express, Sir, in your
 “different reports to the convention, and in the des-
 “patches, which I have seen, the desire of preserving
 “peace between England and France: but what re-
 “liance can be had on *protestations, which are contra-*
 “*dicted by facts?* How is it possible to believe your *in-*
 “*tentions* pacific, while your *conduct* is hostile? Do we
 “live in an age when enigmas are in vogue, or is it
 “necessary in order to comprehend your meaning, to
 “read, what you write, backward ⁷¹. — It is a me-
 “lancholy truth, Sir, that prosperity dazzles nations,
 “as well as individuals, and that great calamities are
 “sometimes necessary, to teach them justice and mode-
 “ration. The rapidity of your conquests in the Au-
 “strian Netherlands, in Germany, and in Savoy, made
 “you lose sight of what you owe to yourselves and
 “others: and because you succeeded by the intrepidity
 “of your arms against some governments, naturally
 “weak, and already infected with the contagion of the
 “times, you thought you could dictate laws to all Eu-
 “rope, and force it to adopt the same principles of
 “anarchy, of which you have been the victims since
 “the 14. of July 1789.” — Mr. Miles, after a long
 passage, in which he endeavours to prove the pacific

⁷¹. The passage, which immediately follows relates to
 Mr. Maret and has been quoted in this chapter, Note 18.

disposition of the British cabinet ⁷², then proceeds, as follows. "Recall all your emissaries, put an end to your propaganda, and no longer strive to disturb the public tranquillity in this country Your decrees of the 19. of November and 15. of December *) are menaces, which no government can hear, without taking measures of precaution immediately for its own safety: and while such decrees exist, we cannot rely on your *pacific assurances*. Besides, when you express your sentiments directly contrary to the explicit declarations of the *Convention*, you can only be considered as a private individual. In the name of God, if you wish to avoid an universal conflagration, do not meddle with our government. If we are less free than you, if we were even in the most abject state of slavery, let us and our chains alone: and as you do not feel them, why trouble yourselves about them? I dwell the more willingly on this article, as I am no stranger to the groundless hopes you have conceived of a general revolt: and while you encourage such schemes, it will be impossible for me to as-

⁷². See Ch. XI. Note 51.

* "I had reason to believe that these decrees were levelled at this country, in consequence of the delusion, which prevailed in France, that we were on the eve of an insurrection in England, and that the promise of support would instantly produce an explosion. *Note of Mr. Miles.*

"list you, or even to hold any correspondence with you, or the executive council." — Lastly, after having once more assured Le Brun, that the British cabinet was sincerely disposed to preserve peace, and that it would not enter into a war, unless forced to it, either as a measure of precaution, or as a measure of necessity to repel an aggression on the part of France ⁷³, he made to the French minister the following declaration. "This country would not be averse to an arrangement dictated more by imperious circumstances, than by justice. I have proposed this arrangement as the only condition, on which you would agree to give up the Schelde, renounce your conquests, and grant peace to Prussia and Austria ⁷⁴. *"It is for the executive power (council) to decide."*

⁷³. Mr. Miles's own words in the French original were: "*ne rendez pas la guerre nécessaire, ni comme mesure de précaution, ni par nécessité pour repousser une agression de votre part, et vous ne l'aurez pas: comptez là-dessus, et je répondrai du reste.*"

⁷⁴. Mr. Miles has not explained in what the proposed arrangement consisted: nor is it easy to discover it from the contents of this letter alone. In the sentence immediately preceding, where it is natural to look for an explanation, he had said: "Be wise, and you will restore liberty to Liege and Brabant: the empire and the emperor will have nothing to say, and a brave and loyal people will be freed from a

On the 7. of January 1793, after the French executive council had received Lord Grenville's Note

"yoke, which has long oppressed them., — But, as Mr. Miles himself says, that the arrangement, which he had proposed, was dictated more by imperious circumstances, than by justice, he could not allude to the just-mentioned settlement in regard to Liege and Brabant, because he represents *that* arrangement as perfectly consistent with justice. Besides, he says to Le Brun, that he had proposed the arrangement in question, as the only condition, on which the executive council would consent to renounce its conquests: but it is a certain fact, as will presently appear, that the erecting of Brabant and Liege into an independent republic was a condition, to which the executive council was resolved not to submit. The arrangement in question therefore must mean something else: and as Mr. Miles had been already informed in a letter dated Paris 17. December 1792, that the executive council would insist on the formal acknowledgement of the French republic as a *sine quâ non* (Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 83), we may conclude that the arrangement, which Mr. Miles proposed to the British ministry as an indispensable condition of peace, was no other than the required acknowledgement of the French republic, especially as he says it was dictated rather by imperious circumstances, than by justice. If this conclusion be just, the British ministry, according to Mr. Miles's own account would have consented at the close of the year 1792 to have acknowledged the French republic, had this republic consented to renounce all views of conquest and aggrandizement. The words of the

of the 31. of December, and Le Brun, who in all matters relative to foreign affairs was the principal person in it, had likewise received Mr. Miles's Letter of the 2. of January, the following Note which, as will appear from the close of it, was the *Ultimatum* of the French government, was signed by Le Brun in the name of the executive council, and sent to Mr Chau-

original are: On n'est pas du tout éloigné d'un arrangement, que les circonstances imperieuses ont peut-etre dicté beaucoup plus que la justice. But whether this or any other arrangement was meant, Mr. Miles represented the acceptance of it by the British ministry as a mark of great moderation: and in the sentence immediately following that, which was last quoted, he said to Le Brun "if you decline an arrangement *so reasonable* (un arrangement si raisonnable) a calamitous war will be the consequence. The refusal therefore or acceptance of it on the part of the executive council decided the issue of the negotiation. But we shall see from their Note, which was dated the 7. of January, and consequently after Le Brun had received the present letter from Mr. Miles, for it was immediately sent to Paris in a despatch from Noel (Auth. Corresp. 'Append. p. 105.) that they still persisted in the opening of the Schelde, in the occupation of the Netherlands as long as they thought proper, and in the right to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations, in cases which they reserved to themselves to determine. Their object therefore was not merely to found a republic in France, but to acquire unlimited dominion over *other* nations.

velin, who on the 13. of January communicated it to Lord Grenville ⁷⁵.

“The provisional executive council of the French
 “republic, before they reply more particularly to
 “each of the points comprehended in the Note
 “remitted to them on the part of the minister of his
 “Britannic majesty, will begin by repeating to that
 “minister the most express assurances of their sincere
 “desire to maintain peace and harmony between
 “France and England. The sentiments of the French
 “nation toward the English have been manifested, du-
 “ring the whole course of the revolution, in so con-
 “stant, so unanimous a manner, that there cannot re-
 “main the smallest doubt of the esteem, which it
 “vows to them, and of its desire to have them for
 “friends ⁷⁶.

75. The French original is printed in the *Moniteur* 14. Jan. 1793, and is superscribed: *Note officielle du pouvoir exécutif de France, en réponse à celle du ministère Britannique.* — Paris le 7. Janvier 1793, l’an deuxième de la république. — In the *New Annual Register* for 1793, where the English translation of this Note is printed, an error of the press has taken place in regard to the date, namely 4 instead of 7.

76. It cannot be denied that the national convention had manifested its sentiments to many Englishmen, (especially to those, who on November 28. signified their intention of overturning the British constitution) in so constant,

"It is then with great reluctance, that the re-
 "public would see itself forced to a rupture much
 "more contrary to its inclination, than to its *interest* 77."

so unanimous a manner, that there could not remain the smallest doubt of the esteem, which it vowed to *them*, and of its desire to have *them* for friends, or, more properly speaking, for dupes. In addition to the documents quoted in the tenth chapter from the *Moniteur*, as proofs of *this* kind of friendship, may be alleged the Fête civique, celebrated at White's Hotel in Paris on November 18, the day before the celebrated decree in favour of universal insurrection was voted. This festival is described at length in Rivington's Annual Register for 1792, P. II. p. 153 — 155. The company was composed of British, French, and some few persons from other nations: several members of the national convention were present, likewise Generals Dillon, Santerre, and Bruyere, with Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Thomas Payne, and other well known characters. After dinner the following, among many other, toasts were drunk. "The national convention of France., — The patriotic societies of Great Britain and Ireland, with those who have contributed to inform and enlighten the people, Priestley, Fox, Sheridan, Barlow, etc. — *"The approaching national convention of Great Britain and Ireland.* — "May revolutions never be made by halves.

77. From this declaration the British government could draw no other conclusion, than that an open attack on the part of France was not far distant: for, as the French rulers themselves declared, that a rupture with England would

“Before it proceeds to such a disagreeable extremity
 “explanations are necessary; and the object of them
 “is so highly important that the executive council
 “have not thought, that they could intrust them to a
 “secret agent always to be disavowed ⁷⁸. For this

not be contrary to their *interest*, one might be certain, that their thirst after conquest and dominion, on which no man, who has read the tenth and twelfth chapters of this work, can entertain a doubt, would shortly derive new gratification in a war with England. The reason why they supposed, that a war with England would be so advantageous to them, has been already assigned in the tenth chapter. They imagined, namely, that the disaffected party in England (as was afterwards the case in Ireland) would immediately join them, that a civil war would be the consequence, and that both parties (for they considered the disaffected merely as instruments in their own hands) would at length fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Their pretended friendship therefore for the English democrats (for they certainly had none for the nation at large) was nothing more than a snare: and without doubt they have often laughed in their hearts, that so many thousands have been dupes enough, to fall into it. And with regard to those advocates of the French, who have described the British ministers as the authors of the war, they could have no right to lay this accusation, even were it founded on truth: for no advocate can consistently censure a step, which his client himself declares to be agreeable to his own interest.

⁷⁸. This observation was intended as an excuse for

“reason they have thought proper under every point
 “of view, to intrust them to citizen Chauvelin, *though*
“be is not accredited to his Britannic majesty but from
“the late king.

“The opinion of the executive council on this
 “occasion is justified by the manner, in which our ne-
 “gotiations are at the same time carried on in Spain,
 “where citizen Bourgoign was exactly in the same si-
 “uation, as citizen Chauvelin at London, which how-
 “ever has not prevented the minister of the Catholic
 “king from treating with him ⁷⁹ on a convention of
 “neutrality, the ratification of which is to be exchan-
 “ged at Paris between the minister for foreign affairs
 “and the chargé des affaires of Spain. We will even
 “add, that the principal minister of his Catholic ma-
 “jesty, when writing officially on this subject to citizen
 “Bourgoign, did not forget to give him his title of mi-
 “nister plenipotentiary of France ⁸⁰. The example

their refusal to send instructions to Mr. Maret, with whom
 Mr. Pitt had expressed a desire to negotiate, and who was
 undoubtedly much better qualified, to have prevented a
 rupture, than Mr. Chauvelin. But for this very reason he
 did not suit the purpose of the executive council.

79. We have seen likewise that nothing prevented the
 ministers of his Britannic majesty from treating with citizen
 Chauvelin.

80. “Ministre plenipotentiaire de France., — Now as

"of a power of the first rank, such as Spain, might
 "have induced the executive council to hope, that we
 "should have found the same facility at London. The
 "executive council readily acknowledges, that this ne-
 "gotiation has not been demanded according to diplo-
 "matic strictness, and that citizen Chauvelin is *not for-*

Mr. Chauvelin, when he delivered his Note of December 27, had, by the acknowledgement of the executive council, no other credentials, than those which he had received from the king of France, and Mr. Bourgoign, by the acknowledgement of the same council, was in the same situation at Madrid, as Mr. Chauvelin was at London, the circumstance, that the minister of the king of Spain still continued to give him the title of *ministre plenipotentiaire de France*, by no means proves what the executive council intended to prove by it. For since Mr. Bourgoign had received no letters of credence from the executive council, the title, which the Spanish ministry still gave him, was necessarily founded on the letters of credence, which he had brought from Louis XVI. The British ministry likewise refused not to grant Mr. Chauvelin a title derived from *this* source, as appears from the first paragraph in Lord Grenville's Note of the 31. of December. They declared only, what was perfectly true, that, when he came forward as an agent of the French executive council, he could not act under a title, and under an authority, which he had not derived from that council. This declaration was surely very different from a refusal to treat with him at all, a refusal which was never made, for as Brissot himself said, "the British ministry

"mally enough authorized" ⁸¹. To remove entirely this "obstacle, and that they may not have to reproach themselves with having stopt, by a single defect in form, a negotiation, on the success of which depends the tranquillity of two great nations, they have sent to citizen Chauvelin credential letters, which will give him the means of treating according to all the severity of diplomatic forms.

"To proceed now to the three points, which can alone form an object of difficulty with the court of London, the executive council observes on the first, that is to say, the decree of November 19., that we have been misunderstood by the ministers of his Britannic majesty, when they accuse us of having given an explanation, which announces to the seditious of all nations, what are the cases, in which they may depend before-hand on the succour and support of France. Nothing can be more foreign to the sentiments of the national convention, and to the explanation which we have given, than this reproach: and we did not think it was possible, that the open de-

both gave and courted explanations. See Note 5. to this chapter.

81.. Hitherto therefore the executive council had no reason to complain, that the British ministry did not treat with him by the title of minister plenipotentiary of France.

“sign of favouring seditious persons could be imputed
 “to us, at a moment even when we declared, *that it*
“would be doing an injury to the national convention, to
“ascribe to them the plan of protecting insurrections and
“seditious commotions, which might arise in any corner
“of a state, of associating with the authors of them, and
“thus of making the cause of a few individuals that of
“the French nation ⁸².

“We have said, and we choose to repeat it, that
 “the decree of November 19. could not be applicable,
 “but to the single case, where the *general* will of a
 “nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, should
 “call for the assistance and fraternity of the French
 “nation

82. On this explanation see Note 41 to the present chapter. — The words here inserted by the executive council “*in any corner of a state* (*dans quelque coin d'un état*) and the words, “*cause of a few individuals* (*la cause de quelques particuliers*) are very artfully introduced: for thus they reserved to themselves the right of assisting the seditious in all countries, as soon as their number was at all considerable. At the very time therefore that they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree, they maintained their resolution of applying it: for they had nothing more to do, than to declare, that the number of the seditious in any country was considerable, and, by their own avowal, they were authorized to put it in practice.

"nation ⁸³. Sedition can certainly never exist, where
 "there is an expression of the general will. These

83. "Nous vous avons dit, et nous aimons à vous le re-
 "peter que le décret du 19. Novembre ne pouvait avoir son
 "application que dans le *seul* cas, où la volonté générale
 "d'une nation, *exprimée clairement et sans équivoque*, appel-
 "lerait l'assistance et la fraternité de la nation française. Cer-
 "tes, la *sedition* ne peut jamais être là où se trouve l'ex-
 "pression de la *volonté générale*., It deserves particularly to
 be noticed, that this solemn declaration, not to interfere in
 the internal concerns of any nation, with a view of over-
 turning its government, till the *general* will of that nation,
 clearly and unequivocally expressed, should call for the
 assistance of France, was given by the executive council on
 the 7. of January, and that on the *day following*, namely
 on the 8. of January, the instructions for the commissaries in
 Belgia (that is, the commentary on the decree of December
 15. quoted in the preceding chapter) were signed by the
 same executive council, in which they declared that they
 regarded *whole* nations as enemies, which *resolved* to retain
 their sovereigns. The executive council's own words were:
 La nation Française regarde comme ennemi, même un
 peuple *entier*, si refusant la liberté et l'égalité il *voulait* trai-
 ter avec un prince et avec des castes privilégiées. Chauffard
 p. 198. This, said the executive council, was the spirit of
 the eleventh article (l'esprit de l'article XI.) of the decree
 of December 15. Likewise the *words* of that article are in
 direct contradiction to the explanation given in the Note to
 the British government of 7. January. See the preceding

"two ideas mutually exclude each other: for sedition
 "is, and can only be a commotion of a small number

Chapter. Further the executive council, in its commentary on the eleventh article of the decree of December 15, said: "Les deux dispositions, qui renferment cet article ne sont *ni* "une vaine menace, *ni* une promesse illusoire; elles sont au "contraire des conséquences directes de tous les principes, des- "quels dérive la loi juste et salutaire décrétée par la conven- "tion nationale.,, Chaussard, p. 225. Now there can be no doubt that the instructions given to the commissaries on Jan. 8. conveyed the *true* meaning of the executive council, and consequently that the explanation given to the British government on Jan. 7, was given *with the consciousness of its falshood*: for it could have answered no purpose, to have deceived their own commissaries, whereas the keeping the British cabinet in the dark in regard to their real designs afforded the most effectual means of putting them in execution. Besides, the instructions given to the commissaries corresponded not only to the words of the decrees of Nov. 19. and Dec. 15, but likewise to all the interpretations, which had been given in the national convention itself. See Note 41. Lastly, the declaration made to the commissaries, that even a *whole* nation would be treated as an enemy, if it refused to rebel against its sovereign, and consequently that France would intermeddle in the internal concerns of neutral nations, even where *not one* seditious person was to be found in the whole country, forms also a strange contrast with the declaration made at the same time to the British government, that their number must be very *considerable*,

“against the majority of a nation; and this commo-
 “tion would cease to be seditious, if all the members
 “of a society should arise at once, either to correct
 “their government, to change its form entirely, or to
 “accomplish any other object ⁸⁴.

before the national convention would think itself justified in interfering.

84. Brissot likewise, in his report of the 12. of January 1793 said: “Un peuple libre fait distinguer *l'insurrection* de “la *révolte*, la volonté bien prononcée d’une *grande majorité*, “du voeu partiel de quelques individus. Protéger ces der- “niers contre la *majorité*, c’est protéger la *révolte*; c’est être “injuste, et un peuple libre ne veut point l’injustice; les “moyens ténébreux sont indignes de lui., *Moniteur* 15. Jan. 1793. Yet in Brissot’s work, *A ses commettans*, p. 87. we find the following passage: “Les *révolutions*, répondait-on, ne se font qu’avec les *minorités*: C’est la *minorité* qui a fait la révolution Française., But even if the revolutionary principles of the French rulers had involved no contradiction, and even if their theory had been in itself perfectly pure and just, still the *application* of their theory to particular cases was subject to various doubts, the determination of which they reserved to themselves: for instance, the decision of the two previous questions, first, whether the disaffected party in any country, to which they had directed their attention, really constituted a majority of that country, and secondly, whether the majority at the same time wished for the intervention of French fraternity. Consequently the executive council, in order to acquire the right of applying the decree

"The Dutch were certainly not seditious, when
 "they formed the generous resolution of throwing off
 "the Spanish yoke: and, when the general will of
 "that nation called on the assistance of France, it was
 "not accounted a crime to Henry IV., nor to queen
 "Elizabeth, that they listened to them ⁸⁵. A know-

of November 19. to England, and of interfering in the internal concerns of this kingdom, wanted, according to its own explanation, nothing more than the simple declaration, which it was at all times in its power to make, that the English societies, which had sent addresses to France in November 1792, and at other times, constituted the majority of the English nation. It is obvious therefore, that, when they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree of November 19, they sought evasions for the application of it, and endeavoured to obtain their object by deceiving the English government. After all, it was ridiculous to enter into theoretical distinctions relative to what should, or should not be made, when the application of the decree to England actually *was* made. But this is a *fact*, which the conduct of the national convention on November 28 and December 24 had proved beyond a doubt. They ought to have instantly repealed the offensive decree, and to have acted up to that repeal: but we see from this very Note of the executive council that they insisted on retaining it, and it has been shewn in the twelfth chapter of this work, that they continued to regulate all their actions by it.

85. But neither Henry IV., nor queen Elizabeth made a public declaration that they were ready to assist *all* nations,

"ledge of the general will is the only basis of transactions between nations: and we cannot treat with

which thought proper to take up arms against their governments: and there is surely a wide difference between the lending of assistance to a *particular* people, *after* it is really oppressed, and the making a *general prospective* declaration like that contained in the decree of November 19. Besides, at the time, when this decree was voted, France not only was itself in a state of revolution, but had already infused similar principles into the neighbouring nations; and, therefore such a decree necessarily disturbed the general repose by setting men's passions every where in commotion. Nor will any man venture to compare the state of the disaffected party in England, when this decree was issued, with the state of the Dutch, when they were assisted by queen Elizabeth. For the latter were persecuted in the most cruel manner by the Spanish governor, the Duke of Alva, who, in order to force them to popery, introduced a Robespierrian system of terrorism, who instituted domiciliary visits, in order to discover *religious* heretics, as the French Directory did in 1793, in order to discover *political* heretics, and daily brought offerings to the sword or the fagot, as the modern rulers of France have done to the guillotine. The support of a nation thus cruelly oppressed, when that nation demanded assistance, was very different from the encouragement of insurrection in a country, where the inhabitants, upon the whole, have great reason to be satisfied with their condition. A great deal likewise depends on the *object* of the support, which one nation gives to another. Queen Elizabeth, after she had assisted the Dutch in shaking off the

"any government, but because that government is sup-
 "posed to be the organ of the general will of the na-
 "tion, to which it belongs. When by this natural in-
 "terpretation therefore the decree of November 19. is
 "reduced to its real signification, it will be found, that
 "it announces nothing more, than an act of the general
 "will above all contest, and so founded in right, that
 "it was not worth while to express it. For this reason
 "the executive council thinks, that the evidence of
 "this right might have perhaps rendered it unnecessary
 "for the national convention to make it the object of
 "a particular decree: but with the preceding interpre-
 "tation it cannot give offence to any nation ⁸⁶.

Spanish yoke, left them in quiet possession of their liberty,
 and even secured it by all possible means: whereas the
 French rulers have removed from the Dutch, as they have
 done from the Swiss, a merely imaginary yoke, in order to
 impose on them a real and insupportable one.

86. We have seen that the preceding interpretation con-
 tained the grossest falsehoods: consequently it could not be
 satisfactory. Even Brissot, though in his report to the na-
 tional convention of the 12. of January (Moniteur 15. Jan.
 1793) he supported the executive council, and endeavoured
 to justify the decree by similar sophistry, called it a few
 months afterwards, on more mature deliberation, "*l'absurde*
et impolitique decret du 19. Novembre, qui a *justement* excité
 les inquietudes des cabinets étrangers. — A ses Commet-
 tans, p. 68.

"It appears that the ministers of his Britannic majesty have made no objections under the declaration respecting Holland, since their only observation on this subject relates to the discussion concerning the Schelde ⁸⁷. It is on this last point therefore, that we have to make ourselves understood.

87. It is not true, that the ministers of his Britannic majesty made no objections under the declaration respecting Holland: for Lord Grenville, in his Note of December 31, had combated that declaration with the following solid and unanswerable argument. In the month of June 1792 the French government had already engaged to respect the rights of the allies of England, as long as those allies continued neutral: but it had since acted contrary to that engagement; French ships of war having forced their way up the Schelde; in opposition to the formal protest of the States General; and thus violated the rights of the Dutch, the allies of England. And not only was this violation founded on a resolution of the French executive council, but the said council announced its determination to support that resolution. Since therefore the French government broke its word in regard to *one* important point, what security had Great Britain that it would not break its word in *another*, and still further violate the rights of the Dutch by an open invasion of their country? — This was the clear meaning of Lord Grenville's argument; and experience soon proved that it was just, for it was only ten days after the date of his Note, and only three days after the date of the present note of the executive council, that the order for the immediate invasion of Holland

"We here repeat that this question itself is of little importance: The British ministers thence conclude, that it is therefore more evident, that it has been brought forward only for the purpose of insulting the allies of England. We reply with much less warmth and prejudice ⁸⁸, that this question is

was actually given. See Ch. XII. Notes 50 — 52. It is no wonder therefore, that on the 7. of January the executive council wished to evade the question of the danger, which threatened Holland. The manner, in which they evaded it, was likewise extremely artful, indeed much more so, than any one, on a superficial reading of their Note, would imagine. They exchanged, namely, the inference for the premises, wholly set aside the *analogical* part of Lord Grenville's argument, confined themselves to the opening of the Schelde, without taking the least notice of the conclusion, which had been drawn from it, and argued, as if the British cabinet could have no reason to suspect an invasion of Holland, provided it heard something consolatory about the Schelde.

88. So far was any warmth from being visible in Lord Grenville's Note, that it was written with all possible coolness and deliberation, though the insolence of Mr. Chauvelin's Note, to which he replied, was sufficient to have irritated any statesman, who had less command of his passions. With respect to prejudice, I leave every impartial reader to determine, whether the Notes of the British or the Notes of the French government, are more consistent with truth, with justice, and with reason. And even if the French Notes had

“absolutely indifferent to England ⁸⁹, that it is little
 “interesting to Holland ⁹⁰, but that it is of the utmost
 “importance to the Belgians ⁹¹. That it is indifferent
 “to England does not even require to be proved.
 “It is little interesting to Holland, since the productions
 “of the Belgic Netherlands can be conveyed through

been able to lay the most solid claim to one or all of these qualities, it was not well calculated to produce a reconciliation with the British government, to say to its face, that it wrote with warmth and prejudice. But reconciliation was not the object of the executive council.

89. The contrary of this assertion, and the dangerous consequences resulting to England from the opening of the Schelde, when the French are masters of the Netherlands, have been so clearly shewn in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that it would be a waste of time to add any thing more on the subject.

90. This position is so manifestly false, that a confutation is unnecessary. The Dutch themselves best knew, whether the opening of the Schelde would be injurious to them, or not: and if they had not been fully convinced, that it would, they would have hardly been so anxious to secure the close of it by so many different treaties, from that of Westphalia in 1648 down to the treaty with France in 1785.

91. They ought rather to have said “of the utmost importance to *France*: for the union of the Austrian Netherlands with France was already determined, when the French executive council drew up this Note, as will presently be proved by authentic documents.

"the canals, which end at Ostend ⁹²: but it is of
 "great importance to the Belgians, on account of the
 "numerous advantages, which they may derive from
 "the port of Antwerp. It is therefore on account of
 "this importance, to restore to the Belgians the enjoy-
 "ment of a valuable right, and not to offend any one,
 "that France has declared, that it is ready to support
 "them in the exercise of so legal right ⁹³.

"But is France authorized to break stipulations,
 "which oppose the opening of the Schelde? If we
 "consult the right of nature, and of nations, not only
 "France, but all the nations of Europe are authorized
 "to break them. No doubt can remain on this
 "point ⁹⁴.

92. But this is not the ground, on which the importance of the close of the Schelde for Holland rested. Nor is the position itself true: for the produce of Brussels, and all other parts of the Low Countries, which lie to the East of the Schelde, can be much more conveniently shipped at Antwerp than at Ostend.

93. It is evident from this declaration, that the French executive council was determined not to abandon the design of opening the Schelde. Likewise in the instructions sent to Mr. Chauvelin, it was expressly said, "*that the Schelde would not be given up.*," See the Authentic Corresp. p. 84.

94. When individuals in civil society enter into a contract, each party circumscribes his right of nature, in order to obtain civil privileges, to which the right of nature alone

"If public right is consulted, we say that it ought never to be but the application of the principles of

would not entitle him. In like manner, when two nations enter into a treaty, they submit themselves to limitations, to which the right of nature would not oblige them, in order to obtain political advantages, which without such limitations would be unattainable. Neither a contract therefore between individuals, nor a treaty between nations can exist, without a restriction of the exercise of natural right. Consequently, if we adopted the maxim, that every treaty, which was inconsistent with the free exercise of the right of nature, was in itself void, no treaty whatsoever could subsist. The whole depends on this single question: Is he, who enters into a contract with another, entitled to submit himself to the limitations, which arise from that contract? If he is *entitled* to submit himself to these limitations, he is undoubtedly *bound* to fulfil the conditions of the contract, and no third person has a right to dispense with the obligation. The case is exactly the same in regard to whole nations. But the government of the Austrian Netherlands, like every other independent government, was certainly entitled to submit itself to a limitation in the navigation of the Schelde, especially since, as far as this limitation operated, both sides of the Schelde were Dutch territory, a circumstance, which in itself gave the Dutch a claim to the sovereignty over that part of the river. And the continuation of this long enjoyed sovereignty had been further granted to them by the Emperor Joseph, only seven years before the period in question, for the sum of ten millions of florins: France itself had been

"the general right of nations to the particular circumstances, in which nations may be in respect to each other; so that every private treaty, which might violate these principles, could never be considered, but "as the work of violence"²⁵. We will next add, that

a party to the engagement, and by a particular treaty with Holland in the year 1785 had guaranteed to them that very sovereignty, of which it now attempted to deprive them. See Martens *Recueil des principaux traités*, Tom. II. p. 612. Consequently, it was neither the right of nature, nor the right of nations, but wholly and solely the right of the stronger, on which the opening of the Schelde in the year 1792 was grounded. Even, if the Austrian Netherlands had been at that time already formally ceded to France, still the French government would have had no right to have taken such a step: for, if an estate is mortgaged, or is otherwise subject to any kind of limitation, that estate does not change its quality by a change of its master. The new proprietor, if he chooses to free himself from the limitation, must, provided he act according to justice, make a compromise, and give an equivalent to the person or persons, in whose favour the limitation had been made. But this mode of proceeding does not accord with the system adopted by the rulers of France, who expect, as we have lately seen in the negotiations at Rastadt, that, when they take possession of an estate, which is encumbered with debts, those debts should be transferred to the estates of their neighbours.

25. But is such a treaty therefore not binding? It was the work of violence, that in the negotiation at Rastadt the

"in regard to the Schelde, the treaty was concluded
"without the participation of the Belgians"⁹⁶. The

left bank of the Rhine was ceded to France, for the German empire, unless it had been forced to the concession, would not have yielded to its enemy so many beautiful and important provinces. Yet the French directory certainly did not consider the articles of cession as therefore null and void. Public right is founded on existing treaties, whatever were the circumstances, which gave birth to those treaties: and all that the executive council said on this subject, is mere sophistry and confusion. In fact, it was not their intention to convince by clear argumentation, but to perplex their opponents with finely-sounding words: and the French rulers in general have so completely laid aside the works of Puffendorf, Grotius, and Vattel, that Mr. Genet, in a Note to the American secretary of state, said: "I thank God, I have forgotten what these hired jurisprudents have written upon the rights of nations. See the New Annual Register 1793, Public papers p. 111.

96. If no treaty, made by any two governments, were valid, till it had been ratified by the general voice of the subjects of those two governments, it would be difficult to find a valid one in any part of Europe. It is in fact absurd to talk about consulting the great mass of the people, in regard to the connexions between its government and that of other nations. For how is it possible, that they, who are seldom rightly informed in regard even to political facts, who are wholly unable to penetrate into the secrets of foreign cabinets, and to discover the springs of action, should be able to form a proper estimate of the relative situation of their own

"Emperor, to secure the possession of the Netherlands, "sacrificed without scruple the most inviolable of "rights. Being master of these beautiful provinces he "governed them, as Europe has seen, with a rod of "absolute despotism, respected none of their privileges, "but those which were of importance for him to pre- "serve, and continually attacked or destroyed the "rest ⁹⁷. France entering into a war with the house "of Austria ⁹⁸, expels it from the Low Countries, and "restores liberty ⁹⁹ to those people, whom the court "of Vienna had devoted to slavery. Their chains are "broken ¹⁰⁰: they are restored to all those rights,

country to that of foreign ones? Least of all have the present lords of France a right to appeal to a want of expression of the general will: for they set at defiance not only the people, but even their representatives, who are both qualified and bound to discuss political subjects.

97. Do the new masters of the Netherlands act otherwise? or rather do they not act infinitely worse?

98. Namely by a declaration of hostilities on the part of France at a time, when the Austrian cabinet was neither prepared for war, nor, in all probability, had any intention of acting offensively. See Ch. VII. p. 69—77.

99. In like manner the Romans, after they had reduced Greece to a Roman province said, *Libertas* Graeciae data. Livii Hist. Lib. XXXIII.

100. And other chains, ten times as heavy imposed on them.

“which the house of Austria had taken from them ¹⁰¹.
 “How can that right, which they had over the Schelde,
 “be excepted, especially when it is of real importance
 “only to those, who were deprived of it ¹⁰²? In
 “short, France has too good a profession of political
 “faith ¹⁰³ to make, to be afraid of avowing its prin-
 “ciples. The executive council declares then, not that
 “it may appear to yield to some expressions of threat-
 “ening language, but only to render homage to
 “truth ¹⁰⁴, that the French republic does not mean

101. In order that those rights, together with whatever privileges the Emperor Joseph had left unimpaired, might be surrendered to the new house of France.

102. That is, in plain English, “as this right was of real importance to France. And hence arose the determination of the executive council, not to abandon its design.

103. Their *profession* of political faith was certainly very captivating, and has produced wonderful effects, especially in a popular pamphlet which appeared in the year 1797, where many examples of their fair *professions* are quoted at length. But a comparison of their *professions* with their *actions*, which latter are left wholly unnoticed in the said pamphlet, will probably induce the reader of the present work to draw a conclusion diametrically opposite to that, which results from a contemplation of their professions alone.

104. We have already seen in *what manner* the French rulers rendered homage to truth. As to threatening language, no instance is to be found of it in Lord Grenville’s Note,

“to establish itself an universal arbiter of the treaties,
 “which bind nations together. It equally knows to
 “respect other governments, and to take care that it
 “may make its own respected. It does not wish to give
 “law to any one ¹⁰⁵: and it will never suffer any one
 “to give laws to it. *It has renounced, and still renounces*
“all conquest ¹⁰⁶: and its occupying the Netherlands
 “will

though many in that of Mr. Chauvelin. At the same time must be admitted the truth of their assertion, that they were not influenced in any of their actions by a fear of the British government: for a French agent said to Mr. Miles on November 13. 1792, *that France as little dreaded England, as she did the republic of Ragusa.* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 58. And this contempt of the power of England, which arose from the expectation of a civil war, necessarily increased their inclination to hostilities. They little thought at that time, that the ruin of their then considerable navy would be the consequence: on the contrary, they expected, that the navy, and the commerce of England would be transported to France.

105. The decree then of December 15, and the commentary on it by the executive council, which commanded whole nations, whether they wished it or not, to overturn their existing governments, under pain of being treated as enemies by the French convention, *prescribed laws to no one!*

106. If we had not been already too much accustomed to hear glaring falsehoods from the executive council, to expect an adherence to the truth, our indignation would

“will continue no longer than the war, and during
 “that time which may be necessary for the Belgians
 “to secure and consolidate their liberty ¹⁰⁷: after
 perhaps be roused at the daring assertion *that they still re-
 nounced all conquest*, when the Dutchy of Savoy had only a
 few weeks before been incorporated into France by a solemn
 and unanimous decree of the national convention. See Ch.
 X. Note 3. (Yet a celebrated opposition writer has ventured
 to declare, “*that the ancient limits of France were proposed
 as her dominion.*,”) The incorporation of Nice and its terri-
 tory was likewise unanimously voted within three weeks
 after this pretended renunciation of aggrandizement. See
 the Moniteur 1. Feb. 1793. And on the very same day, that
 the incorporation of Nice was voted, the incorporation of
 the Austrian Netherlands, and the bishopric of Liege, was
 proposed by Danton, who said to the national Convention:
 “Je ne demande rien à votre enthousiasme, mais tout à votre
 raison, mais tout aux *intérêts* de la république Française.
 N’avez vous pas *préjugé cette réunion*, quand vous avez dé-
 crété une organisation provisoire pour la Belgique? Vous
 avez tout consommé par cela seul, que vous avez dit aux
 amis de la liberté: organisez-vous comme nous., Ib. Nor
 was Danton’s proposal rejected, but only *deferred*, till the
 Proces-verbal of the people of Liege, for which they waited,
 should arrive in Paris. *Ib.* In this manner did the rulers of
 France *render homage to truth*: in this manner did their
 actions correspond to their promises, to renounce conquest
 and aggrandizement.

107. By this clause the executive council reserved to it-
 self the right of occupying the Austrian Netherlands with a

"which, provided they be independent or happy,
 "France will be sufficiently rewarded ¹⁰⁸.

French army, as long as it thought proper: for it is to be understood, that the French alone would determine the question, *when* the liberty of the Belgians could be considered as sufficiently consolidated. Besides, it was easy to foresee, that if a French army remained there, till the Belgians became a free people, it would remain there, till it was expelled by force.

108. Here we have a specimen of the sentimental, which has not failed of its effect: for a celebrated opposition writer, though he has quoted not a syllable either from Mr. Chauvelin's Note of Dec. 27, or from Lord Grenville's answer to it, or from his reply to the present Note, has quoted this sentimental passage not less than twice in the compass of one page. But if, instead of suffering ourselves to be influenced by passion, we attend to the dictates of cool reason, we shall discover, that *at the very time* that the executive council wrote thus sentimentally on the pretended independence of the Belgians, it was fully determined *to incorporate Belgium into France*. For in the first place, within four and twenty hours after this Note was signed, the executive council signed the instructions for the commissaries in Belgium: and the whole drift of these instructions, which are printed in *Chaussard Memoires historiques et politiques*, p. 180 — 228. was manifestly to reduce the Belgians to a state of absolute dependance on France, as every one must perceive even on a superficial reading. Secondly, on Dec. 31. 1792, a whole week therefore, before the Note of the executive council to

"When that nation shall find itself in the full possession of its liberty, and when its general will

the British government was signed, one of the commissaries, Publicola Chauffard, received his private instructions, in which was said: "Prions et requérons tous ceux à qui le dit commissaire s'adressera, ou pourra s'adresser, de lui donner toute assistance et toutes les facilités qu'il jugera convenables et nécessaires pour remplir, conformément au vœu de la république, l'objet de sa mission., Chauffard, p. 157. Thirdly, when the commissaries, who were nine in number, met at Brussels on the 3. of February 1793, to determine the important question: "La Belgique doit-elle être réunie à la France?, agreeably to their instructions, or, as was said, agreeably to the will of the republic, the question was determined in the affirmative. See the documents on this subject in Chauffard Memoires, p. 80—85. See likewise p. 11—21, where the reasons are assigned for the necessity of incorporating Belgia into France. Three days after the decision, Chauffard wrote to Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, and said: "La minorité favorable aux principes révolutionnaires se divise elle-même: nous tâchons de la rallier autour du système de la réunion; mais une partie se flatte de l'espoir d'une convention nationale., Ib. p. 86. But the national convention confirmed the decision of the commissaries, as Chauffard himself says p. 425, Note 15. "La convention par un decret a approuvé les arrêtés de ses commissaires dans la Belgique., Likewise in Brissot's work, A ses commettans, p. 87. we find the following passage. "Cambon disoit hautement devant les Belges mêmes: la guerre de la

"may be declared legally and unfettered, then if England and Holland still affix any importance to the

Belgique nous coute des centaines de millions ; leurs revenus ordinaires , et même des impôts extraordinaires ne les mettront jamais à même de nous rembourser, et cependant nous avons besoin. L'hypothèque de nos assignats touche à la fin. Que faut-il faire ? Vendre les biens ecclésiastiques du Brabant ; voilà une hypothèque de deux milliards. Mais comment nous en emparer ? En nous réunissant à la Belgique. *Et aussitôt on ordonne cette réunion.*, Lastly, General Dumouriez, who was well acquainted with the secrets of the French government has publicly made the following confession. "L'intention *secrète* à Paris n'était point que le peuple Liegeois, et encore moins celui de la Belgique, se réunît en corps de nation, pour se donner une constitution et des loix ; *on craignoit* qu'une fois assemblés ces deux peuples ne connusent leurs forces, et ne fondassent une république indépendante., Vie de Dumouriez, T. III. p. 348. There remains therefore not the shadow of a doubt, that it was the intention of the French government *from the very beginning* to incorporate Belgia into France, and consequently it is certain that the assurances of the contrary, which were given to the British government on the 7. of January, were given *with the consciousness of their falshood.*

With respect to the pretended love for the Belgians, which according to the executive council was so great, that their independence and happiness was the whole reward which was sought by France for its kind exertions, the above-quoted passage in Chauffard's Letter to the French

"opening of the Schelde, the executive council will
 "leave that affair to a direct negotiation with the Bel-

minister for foreign affairs affords an admirable proof of it. For it appears from that passage, that the majority of the Belgians wished for no revolution whatsoever, and that even a part of the minority wished, not for an union with France, but for a national convention of their own. Chauffard himself therefore admitted that the incorporation of Belgia into France was a measure, which was disapproved by far the greatest part of the inhabitants. And this representation was in fact much too feeble: for so early as the 29. of Dec. 1792, at a meeting of the Belgians at Brussels, the proposal, that they should renounce their old constitution, and take the new oath, produced the following effect. *Le serment fut hautement refusé dans le plus grand nombre des sections. "Point d'égalité, point de nouvelles loix; nos Etats, notre ancienne Constitution, et point d'autre chose,, s'écriait de toutes parts.* Moniteur 6. Jan. 1793. The French executive council therefore were well acquainted with the sentiments of the Belgians, even before they signed the instructions for the commissaries. But Chauffard, faithful to his trust, easily discovered the means of removing all objections, and said in his vote for the incorporation: "On m'oppose le voeu du "peuple: le voeu d'un peuple enfant où imbécile serait nul, "parcequ'il stipulerait contre lui-même., Such is the French method of promoting the high-prized happiness and sovereignty of the *people*. Well therefore did Dumouriez say: "On disait aux Belges dans le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres; on les traitait en esclaves., Vie de Dumouriez, T. III.

"gians. If the Belgians, through any motive whatever, shall consent to deprive themselves of the navigation of the Schelde, France will not oppose it. It will respect their independence even in their errors 109.

p. 374. — That the French rulers have spoken so speciously, and have acted so infamously, is no wonder, because systematic deception is a constituent part of their general plan: but that so many men of talents and penetration could suffer themselves to be duped by their artifices, is really a wonder. Fortunately however for Great Britain, our *ministers* saw more clearly: or we should ere now have shared the wretched fate, which has befallen the Dutch and the Swifs.

109. It was to be expected that so captivating and sentimental a passage, as this, would not escape the notice of a celebrated writer, who has made a copious collection of the fair *professions* of the French rulers. Indeed he has not only quoted it, but has ventured to declare, that "implicit respect was manifested to the *independence* and *constitutions* of other nations., — But in *what* manner the independence of Belgia was respected, in *what* manner its constitution, which the majority of the inhabitants wished to preserve, was held in honour, and in *what* manner the French executive council regulated its conduct by the will of the sovereign people, has been shewn in the preceding note. Further, says Dumouriez, immediately after the words last quoted: "On ne leur laissait aucune administration; on les mettait en tutelle. On se chargeait du séquestre de tous les biens ecclésiastiques, qu'on nommait biens nationaux, sans s'embarrasser,

"After so free a declaration, which manifests the
 "present designs of peace, the ministers of his Britan-
 "nic majesty ought to entertain no doubt respecting
 "the intentions of France ¹¹⁰. *But if these explana-*
"tions appear to them insufficient, and if we are still
"obliged to bear the language of haughtiness, and if hostile
"preparations are continued in the ports of England, after
"having done every thing in our power to maintain peace,
"we will prepare for war ¹¹¹, conscious at least of the

s'il conviendrait aux Belges de dépouiller son clergé, et de déclarer ses biens nationaux. Tout cela se faisait, *pour les forcer à se donner à la France*; et bientôt on employa la violence et les moyens les plus criminels, pour arracher l'émision de ce voeu.,, Whoever wishes to read a circumstantial account of these violent and infamous measures, of which not only Dumouriez, but even Brissot (A ses commettans p. 82—87.) loudly complains, may consult the second volume of Desodoards Histoire philosophique de la revolution de France. The description given by Desodoards, which no one will call in question, as the author is himself a staunch republican, and a decided enemy of Great Britain, should be further compared with the all-promising manifesto, with which the entry of the French army into the Netherlands was accompanied, and it will then be confessed, that a more abominable plan of systematic deception was at that time introduced, than had ever disgraced the annals of mankind.

110. Nor did they entertain any doubt.

111. Hence it is evident that this Note of the executive council contained their *Ultimatum*: for they expressly say

"justice of our cause, and of the efforts we have made
 "to avoid that extremity ¹¹². We shall combat with
 "regret the English, whom we esteem ¹¹³: but we
 "shall combat them without fear.

(Signed) _ Le Brun.

To this final Note of the French executive council Lord Grenville returned, within five days after the receipt of it the following answer ¹¹⁴.

"we will prepare for war (nous nous disposerons à la guerre) if the explanations appear insufficient, and the preparations in the ports of England be still continued. — The British government therefore was reduced to this dilemma: either to admit, that the explanations given by the executive council were satisfactory, and to put a stop to the preparations making in the sea-ports: or to reject the explanations as unsatisfactory, and to continue the preparations in the sea-ports. But it has been fully proved, that the former was *impossible*: consequently, the latter was *unavoidable*.

112. One becomes gradually so accustomed to the hypocrisy of the French rulers, that indignation at length gives way to contempt.

113. With great artifice was this clause inserted. It was designed to separate the people from the government, and to promote the expected insurrection. They never lose sight of their favourite maxim: *Il faut soulever les administrés contre les administrans*.

114. The French original of Lord Grenville's answer to the Note of the executive council was not printed in the *Moniteur*, as the preceding Notes were: but as the English

“Whitehall Jan. 18. 1793.

“I have examined, Sir, with the utmost attention
 “the paper you remitted me on the 13. of this month.
 “I cannot help remarking, *that I have found nothing*
 “*satisfactory in the result of it.* The explanations
 “which it contains, are nearly reduced to the same
 “points, which I have already replied to at length.
 “The declaration of wishing *to intermeddle with the af-*
 “*fairs of other countries* is there renewed. No denial is
 “made, nor reparation offered for the outrageous pro-
 “ceeding I stated to you in my letter of December 31:
 “and the right *of infringing treaties and violating the*
 “*rights of our allies* is still maintained by solely offer-
 “ing an illusory negotiation upon this subject, which
 “is put off, as well as the evacuation of the Low
 “Countries by the French armies, to the *indefinite*
 “*term*, not only of the conclusion of the war, but like-
 “wise of the consolidation of what is called the li-
 “berty of the Belgians.

“It is added, that, if these explanations appear
 “insufficient to us, if you should be again obliged to
 “hear a haughty tone of language, if hostile prepara-
 “tions should continue in the ports of England, after
 “having made every effort to preserve peace, *you will*
 “*then make dispositions for war.*

translation was officially laid before Parliament, it supplies the place of the original.

"If this notification, or that relative to the treaty
 "of commerce, had been made to me under a regular
 "and official form ¹¹⁵, I should have found myself
 "under the necessity of replying to it, that to threaten
 "Great Britain with a declaration of war, because she
 "judged it expedient to augment her forces, and also
 "to declare that a solemn treaty should be broken, be-
 "cause England *adopted for her own safety such pre-*
"cautions as already exist in France ¹¹⁶, would only be

115. It was admitted by the French executive council, in the very Note to which Lord Grenville here replied, that Mr. Chauvelin was no otherwise accredited to his Britannic majesty than from the late king of France, and that he was not formally enough authorized to treat as an agent of the new government of France. Consequently Mr. Chauvelin's communication of the Note, to which Lord Grenville here replied, was in diplomatic strictness no *official* communication: and as this was avowed by the executive council itself, no one could censure a British minister for using the same language. Indeed it is obvious, that, if the British government had been ever so inclined to acknowledge at that early period the French republic, it could not consider any individual as the accredited ambassador of that republic, till credentials from the part of those, who had the administration of it, had been both delivered and received. But (as Lord Grenville had already explained to Mr. Chauvelin) the issue of the negotiation depended, not on the *form*, but on the *substance* of it. See Note 4 to the present chapter.

116. It has been proved that the French naval prepara-

"considered, both the one and the other, as new
 "grounds of offence ¹¹⁷, which, as long as they
 "should subsist, would prove a bar to every kind of
 "negotiation.

"Under this form of extra-official communica-
 "tion, I think I may yet be permitted to tell you, not
 "in a tone of haughtiness but of firmness, *that these*
"explanations are not considered as sufficient, and that

tions preceded those, which were made in Great Britain, by
 three whole months, and that the number of ships of war,
 which were ordered by the British government to be put in
 commission in the latter half of December and the former
 part of January, was inferior to the number of those, which
 France had already in commission, to which was now to be
 added the considerable reinforcement of ships of the line and
 frigates ordered by the national convention on the 13. of
 January. See Ch. X. Note 5. Ch. XI. Note 44. and Ch. XII.
 Notes 59. 61.

117. To complain about preparations, which were not
 only mere measures of defence, but were still less extensive
 than those already adopted by the menacing power, and,
 while the motives, which had given rise to the preparations
 of the menaced nation, still continued, to insist on the cessa-
 tion of those preparations, and lastly, when the causes of
 alarm were openly avowed, to accompany the demand with
 a new menace, that, unless it were instantly complied with,
 a declaration of hostilities would be the consequence, was
 in fact to treat the menaced nation with the utmost insolence
 and contempt.

"all the motives, which gave rise to the preparations, still
"continue. These motives are already known to you
"by my letter of December 31, in which I marked in
"precise terms what those dispositions were, which could
"alone maintain peace and a good understanding" 118.
"I do not see that it can be useful to the object of
"conciliation, to enter into a discussion with you on
"separate points under the present circumstances, as I
"have already acquainted you with my opinion con-
"cerning them. If you have any explanation to give
"me under the same extra-official form, which will
"embrace all the objects contained in my letter of the
"31. of December, as well as all the points, which
"relate to the present crisis with England, her allies,
"and the general system of Europe, I shall willingly
"attend to them.

"I think it however my duty to inform you in
"the most positive terms, in answer to what you tell
"me on the subject of our preparations, that under the
"present circumstances all those measures will be conti-
"nued, which may be judged necessary to place us in a
"state of protecting the safety, tranquillity, and the
"rights of this country, as well as to guarantee those of

118. On the precise terms, in which Lord Grenville had marked to Mr. Chauvelin the dispositions, which alone could maintain peace and harmony between the two nations see Note 66 to this chapter.

"our allies, and to set up a barrier to those views of ambition and aggrandizement, dangerous at all times to the rest of Europe, but which become still more so, being supported by the propagation of principles destructive of all social order.

(Signed) Grenville.

When we examine the several parts of the preceding negotiation, we must confess, that the motives, which had induced the British government to have recourse to a naval armament, were far from being removed by it, and that those causes of alarm, which have been described at large in the tenth chapter, continued to operate in full force. And in the middle of January 1793 were now to be added those additional causes, which have been related in the twelfth chapter, causes which necessarily produced so much the more striking effects, as they arose at the very time, that the French executive council was pretending to remove the former causes of complaint, and during negotiations, of which the apparent object was the preservation of peace. For the decree of December 15. the new address to all nations in favour of insurrection, the menace in the national convention of an appeal to the British people, and the decisive refusal on December 24. to except Great Britain from the decree of November 19, succeeded Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret, and took place about the period, when

the French executive council must have been engaged in preparing instructions for Mr. Chauvelin. It was only four days after Mr. Chauvelin had delivered his Note of December 31, and on the very day, on which Lord Grenville replied to it, that the marine minister, Monge, wrote the circular letter to the French sea-ports, threatening England with an invasion and fifty thousand caps of liberty. It was only one day after the executive council had in the Note of January 7. solemnly pledged its word to respect the independence both of England and its allies, that this same council instructed its commissaries, that the French republic considered every nation as an enemy, which, however unanimous in the resolution, was determined to preserve its ancient form of government. Lastly, it was only three days after the solemn pledge to respect the allies of England had been given, and even before any reply either was or could be made by the British government, that positive orders were sent to General Miranda for an immediate invasion of Holland. It lies not therefore within the power of sophistry itself to deny, that the French executive council entered into the negotiation with the sole view of amusing the British government, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was fully ripe for execution. But the British government had more penetration, than the French

government imagined, and was too wise to be decoyed into a snare, which within the compass of a few years has proved the ruin of millions ¹¹⁹.

Besides, the negotiation itself, even without any reference to those facts, which place the systematic

119. The readiness to give credit to the protestations of the French rulers, till the iniquitous invasion of Switzerland at last opened the eyes of all, who chose to see, and rendered the truth, that the actions of these pretended benefactors of mankind were uniformly at variance with their specious professions, as palpable even to the illiterate in politics, as it had been from the very beginning to the intelligent, appears from the following passage of a letter written from Paris in the autumn of 1798 and published in the *Annals of the Prussian monarchy* (*Annalen der preussischen Monarchie*) November 1798, p. 272—276. “The (French) government sent to Germany, some time ago, a man of great talents and information, who expresses himself with spirit and fluency, in order to probe the public opinion, and if possible to work upon it. He is lately returned, and has informed me that he has made the following report to the government: *that before the events in Switzerland foreigners were still inclined to suffer themselves to be deceived in regard to the real views of the French government, but that after those extortions and excesses all attempts to justify its conduct were without effect.*” — This passage proves likewise, what indeed wants at present no proof in England, that the French government still sends revolution-professors abroad, to work on the public opinion.

deception of the French rulers in the clearest point of view, proved beyond a doubt, that they preferred the gratification of their ambition, and a war with England, to moderation and a continuance of peace. For, if they had preferred the latter, they would have readily accepted the conditions, which were offered by the British government, since these conditions were nothing more, than, first, that France should renounce its views of aggression and aggrandizement, and secondly, that it should cease to interfere in the internal concerns of neutral nations ¹²⁰.

Without

120. Not only were these conditions distinctly specified in Lord Grenville's Note of December 31, but the conduct of the national convention, as being contrary to what was required in those conditions, had on the 13. of December been alleged in his Majesty's speech as the cause of the British armament. "I have carefully observed, (said his Majesty) a strict neutrality in the present war on the continent, "and have uniformly abstained from any interference, with "respect to the internal affairs of France: *but it is impossible "for me to see, without the most serious uneasiness, the strong "and increasing indications, which have appeared there of an "intention to excite disturbances in other countries, to disregard "the rights of neutral nations, and to pursue views of conquest "and aggrandizement etc.,* — Great Britain therefore had recourse to an armament, as to a measure of defence, because France had displayed views of conquest and aggrandizement,

Without a compliance with these conditions on the part of France, it would have been madness to have

and had interfered in the internal concerns of neutral nations, particularly of Great Britain itself. And, when that armament became a subject of negotiation, the question, whether it should cease or be continued, depended entirely on the question, whether the French rulers would abandon or retain their plan of interference and aggrandizement, whether they would accept or reject the proposed conditions. The whole negotiation turned on this single point, and therefore it is sheer sophistry, when the adversaries of the British ministry, intermix other questions, such as the new form of government in France, to which the negotiation had not the most distant reference. The French rulers themselves were conscious, that it was their views of conquest and aggrandizement, which occasioned the British armament, and that they were determined under no conditions to abandon those views: for on the day, which preceded the declaration of war, Danton said in the national convention: "*Les limites de la France sont marquées par la nature: nous les atteindrons dans leurs quatre points, à l'Océan, au Rhin, aux Alpes, aux Pyrénées. — On vous menace de l'Angleterre! Les tyrans de l'Angleterre sont morts: vous avez la plénitude de la puissance nationale.*" *Moniteur* 1. Feb. 1793. From this passage we see likewise the reason, why the conditions, proposed by the British government were rejected by the rulers of France. They supposed namely, in consequence of the expected rebellion, that the British constitution was at its last gasp: in the heat of their imagination they repre-

desisted from the preparations, which were making in the ports of Britain. For, in regard to the former, it was certainly not to be expected, that, after the conquest of Holland, and the great accession of sea-coast and naval power, which would accrue from it to France, the government of that country would not take the earliest opportunity of attacking Great Britain with double force. It was surely not to be expected, that a nation, which has ever been the great rival of France, a nation which on account of its power and wealth is envied by all Europe, would alone remain unmolested. Nor could it be supposed, that the desire of humbling Britain, which is necessarily inherent in the French, would diminish with the increase of their power, and that this desire would at length vanish, when they had acquired the means of controlling us according to their pleasure. The renunciation therefore of conquest and aggrandizement on the part of France was a condition essential to the salvation of Britain. Equally necessary was the acceptance, and even the most punctual fulfilment of the other condition: for it was wholly impossible that Great Britain should preserve its internal tranquillity,

sented royalty in Britain as even expired: and disdained therefore to be re-conducted within the limits of moderation by a government, which on account of its imagined debility they despised.

while the decrees of November 19. and December 15 continued in force, while the French government continued to encourage those societies, who by their own avowal on the 28. of November had formed the resolution of overturning the British constitution, and while it still persevered in infesting our country with its apostles of rebellion ¹²¹. It is clear therefore that France had no right to expect a cessation of the war-like preparations on the part of Britain, unless the former would condescend to accept of conditions, which were indispensably necessary for the preservation of the latter. This matter was represented very perspicuously by Mr. Miles on the 11. of January 1793, in a letter addressed to his friend Mr. Maret, who was then become *Chef du département pour les affaires étrangères*, and consequently the principal person in that department, after the minister himself. Mr. Miles pointed out the impossibility, that the British government should remain tranquil, unless the executive council would consent to fulfil what was required in the proposed conditions: and at the same time he positively assured Mr. Maret, *that if the executive council would comply with them, a war would not take place* ¹²².

121. See Ch. X. p. 120—140.

122. As this letter was written to a man in an official capacity, and is a document of some importance, it is necessary to quote the following extract from the original.

To the French minister for foreign affairs himself Mr. Miles had already written on the 2. of January on

A Londres le 11. Janvier 1793.

La dépêche envoyée par Monsieur Chauvelin Lundi 31. Decembre vous est certainement parvenue, cependant vous ne m'en accusez pas la reception. Vous me parlez de l'ardeur du peuple Français et de ses ressources immenses; hélas! mon cher Maret, il n'est question ni de l'une ni de l'autre. Après les griefs détaillés dans la réponse de Milord Grenville à la note de Monsieur Chauvelin, quel autre parti y a-t-il à prendre pour la France, que *de reculer ou se battre*. Je n'en connois aucun. Vous me direz, peut-être, que ce qu'on a exigé est trop humiliant; mais mon cher ami, *il n'est pas question d'orgueil, mais de justice*. — Si l'Assemblée nationale dans un moment d'ivresse fait des bévues ou des injustices, il convient qu'elle corrige les uns et répare les autres. Permettez que je vous repete ce que vous avez déjà lu dans la réponse de Milord Grenville, que les ordres donnés à vos officiers généraux de poursuivre l'ennemi sur les terres neutres est une atteinte contre l'indépendance des puissances qui ne sont point en guerre avec vous. L'arrêté du Conseil sur l'ouverture de l'Escaut est une infraction des traités. L'appropriation de la Savoie est contre vos propres principes; vous avez renoncé à toutes conquêtes, et vous en faites! Comment se fier à une nation qui ne respecte ni ses traités ni ses sermens? Le décret du 19. Novembre ainsi que celui du 15. Decembre étant conçus en termes généraux, et invitant, pour ainsi dire, les peuples de tous les pays à se revolter contre leurs gouvernemens respectifs, en leur pro-

the same subject, and had assured him, *that the fate of Britain and France depended on the decision of the executive council* ¹²³. If this council then had been really desirous of peace, it would have decided in favour of the acceptance of the proposed conditions, especially as they contained nothing more, than the proposal, that France should remain true to the prin-

mettant du secours, sont des griefs trop evidens et trop serieux pour ne pas indigner le gouvernement Britannique, et justifier ses craintes, sur tout après que l'Assemblée nationale a accueilli, avec un empressement aussi peu décent que peu politique, les adresses de quelques clubs factieux en Angleterre, qui ne dissimulaient pas leurs intentions de tout bouleverser. Voilà donc, mon cher Maret, où nous sommes; si vous pouvez engager le conseil exécutif à revenir sur ses pas relativement aux articles ci-dessus, la guerre n'aura point lieu. Il faut convenir que l'Angleterre ne peut que se sentir comprise dans les décrets qui offrent ce que vous appelez fraternité à tous les peuples du monde. Il est évident aussi que notre existence politique ne permettra nullement que la France s'agrandisse: et vous ne pouvez nier que le traité de 1788 nous oblige à garantir la fermeture de l'Escaut, et que vous y êtes tenu par le traité de 1786. Il est aussi vrai, que pendant qu'un traité existe on doit le respecter. Répondez le plutôt possible à ma lettre etc. Authentic Correspondence etc. Appendix p. 106 — 108.

123. The words of the original are: "*C'est au pouvoir exécutif à décider*:" and a few lines after, "*Vous êtes maître de leur destin*." Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 97. 98.

ciples, which from the commencement of the revolution it has uniformly professed. No alteration was required in the new form of government: the subjects of negotiation related solely to the *external* power of France: and if this power had continued in the hands even of Louis XVI., and he had acted toward Great Britain in the same manner as the national convention did, the British government would have been equally obliged to insist on the same conditions, and, in case of their rejection, to persevere in the preparations for war. But we have seen that the executive council, instead of accepting these conditions, which his Majesty had mentioned in his speech to the British Parliament on the 13. of December, and which Lord Grenville in his first Note to Mr. Chauvelin had very distinctly proposed as the only possible basis of peace ¹²⁴, still insisted on the right of applying the

124. The proposition was in fact so clear (see the Notes 66. and 120. to this chapter) that it creates just matter of surprise, that an eminent leader of opposition could venture, on the 18. of February 1793, in the House of Commons to lay the following charge to ministry: "that in the late negotiation — they never stated distinctly to the French government any terms and conditions, the accession to which, on the part of France, would induce his Majesty to persevere in a system of neutrality." See New Annual Register 1793, British and foreign history, p. 57. But another leader

decree of November 19. in certain cases, that is in fact, of interfering at its own pleasure in the internal concerns of Great Britain ¹²⁵. On the right of violating existing treaties, of depriving the allies of Eng-

of opposition does not rest satisfied with this charge: for he seems at least to deny the existence of the negotiation itself, saying in his late popular pamphlet, "we neither made war upon these aggressions, which might have led to a termination of it upon their removal, nor would we consent to put their removal into a train of amicable negotiation., — It is true, that whoever derives his knowledge of British and French politics from this eminently superficial, though highly eloquent, pamphlet, might be induced to suppose, it were true, that no negotiation was conducted between the two governments, since the author has thought proper, if we except a few specious promises in the Note of the executive council, which he calls *conciliatory declarations*, to pass over the negotiation in total silence. On the other hand, as he acknowledges that a *correspondence* was carried on between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, he appears in reality to object only to the *term* negotiation. But as this very term was used not only by Mr. Fox in the above-mentioned charge, but likewise by the French themselves, who spoke of "negotiations avec l'Angleterre,, (Ch. X. Note 49.) and as it is not the name, but the thing, which demands our attention, I leave it to the reader to give whatever appellation he thinks proper to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France. In *verbis* simus faciles.

125. See Notes 82—84. to this chapter.

land of privileges garanteed to them by almost all the powers of Europe, and of occupying the Netherlands with a French army till the liberty, as it was called, of the Belgians was consolidated, that is for ever ¹²⁶, was likewise formally insisted. Consequently the two conditions of peace, proposed by the British government, were unequivocally rejected. Thus was the negotiation brought to a crisis: for without the acceptance of these conditions Great Britain *could not* desist from the preparations then making in the ports, and these conditions France *would not* accept. The former therefore *was obliged* to continue its preparations, as Lord Grenville explained to Mr. Chauvelin, in his Note of January 18., on this very ground. And as the French executive council formally and positively declared, that they would commence hostilities, if the explanations given in the Note of January 7. were not deemed satisfactory, and the preparations in the British ports were not consequently discontinued, we have an irrefragable proof, *that it was not in the power of the British cabinet to prevent a rupture with France* ¹²⁷.

126. See the Notes 106—109. to this chapter.

127. On the 18. of January therefore Mr. Miles closed his correspondence with the French minister, Le Brun, with the following Letter: "Un événement m'est arrivé qui m'ôte à jamais la douce espérance d'être utile à la chose publique.

CHAPTER - XIV.

Proof, that the French rulers had fully resolved on a war with Great Britain some time before the middle of January 1793. Investigation of the motives which induced them to undertake it.

WE have seen in the preceding chapter that the question, whether a rupture should take place be-

J'aurais voulu écarter la guerre, ce terrible fléau du genre humain : mais enflé d'un orgueil très déplacé vous n'écoutez ni la prudence ni la justice. Je me trouve tracassé et estropié de tout côté et de toute maniere. Je n'en puis plus. Il y a bien des années que vous connoissez mes principes : mes démarches ont été dictées jusqu'à présent par l'amour de la verité et de la liberté, non pas d'une liberté effrénée et sans bornes comme la vôtre, mais d'une liberté bien entendue, bien raisonnée, et qui rend le monde un paradis terrestre. Mais que faire ? L'enthousiasme vous aveugle et vous ne voyez plus ni la justice ni la prudence. Quant il était question du traité de commerce, j'exprimai mes vœux dans une lettre adressée à Mr. Pitt que ce traité pût devenir la base d'une alliance entre les deux nations, qui assurerait à l'Europe et au monde entier la douce jouissance d'une paix éternelle. Mais au lieu de la paix, c'est la guerre que je vois prêt à s'éclater et engloutir les deux nations. Le Brun ! vous allez vous charger d'une terrible responsabilité. Songez y bien ; il est encore tems ; vous pouvez tout reparer : j'ai le coeur gros

tween Great Britain and France, was fully decided before the middle of January ¹ 1793, and that this decision was founded on the refusal of the French executive council, to accept the conditions of peace, which had been proposed by the British government. Now as the Note, in which the refusal was signified, was signed by Le Brun on the 7. of January, the executive council must at least on that day, if not sooner, have come to a resolution of engaging in a war with England, because they knew from Lord Grenville's express declaration, in his Note of the 31. of December, that without the acceptance of the proposed conditions, a rupture would be unavoidable. But they had undoubt-

et obsédé par des idées tristes et lugubres; la vie commence à me peser furieusement., *Authentic Correspondence*, Appendix p. 113. But this last warning was of no more avail, than the preceding: the resolution, once formed, was not altered: and Le Brun's obstinacy, of which Mr. Miles had already complained in a letter to Mr. Maret of the 4. of January *, rendered him insensible to the calamities, in which and he and his colleagues were wantonly involving Great Britain and France.

* "J'ai le coeur navré de voir que tous mes efforts pour écarter la guerre n'aboutissent à rien *et ça à cause de l'opiniâtreté de Le Brun*, qui est assurément très mal instruit de la situation intérieure de ce pays., *Ib.* p. 89.

1. It was on the 13. of January, that the Ultimatum of the French executive council was delivered to Lord Grenville.

edly formed this resolution at a still earlier period, and even before the answer of the British court to Mr. Chauvelin's Note of December 27. was known to them: for it was on the very day, on which Lord Grenville replied to it, namely December 31., that the marine minister, Monge, sent his celebrated circular letter to the sea-port towns of France, and it is evident that no minister would take so open and decisive a step, before war had been resolved on in the cabinet ². The date of the circular letter deserves

2. This is so obvious that the circular letter of the marine minister was considered by the inhabitants of the sea-ports as the signal of an immediate attack on England. The following answer returned by the municipality of St. Malo, dated 17. January, and printed in the Journal de Paris 28. January 1793 may serve as an example.

Lettre du Conseil-général de la Commune de St. Malo, au Ministre de la Marine, le 17. Janvier.

A l'instant où nous avons reçu votre lettre, avec la deliberation du Conseil exécutif en date du 7. Janv. nous nous sommes empressés, de concert avec l'Ordonnateur civil, de lui donner la plus grande publicité par la voie de l'impression, bien certain que nos concitoyens seraient jaloux de prouver leur patriotisme, *en entrant dans les vues du Pouvoir exécutif*, et faisant leurs efforts pour coopérer de tous leurs moyens, à anéantir les tyrans, et les hordes d'esclaves ligués contre notre liberté. Nous n'avons point été trompés dans notre attente, Citoyen Ministre, et déjà nous vous an-

likewise in another respect to be particularly noted, because it shews, that the resolution of engaging in a war with England was formed by the executive council, even before they knew the conditions, under which the British government was willing to preserve peace with France, and consequently that they were determined on a rupture, at all events, whatever might be the terms required, as the price of peace. Though the question therefore, whether a rupture must take place between Great Britain and France could not be

nonçons que nos armateurs travaillent avec grande activité, à disposer les objets nécessaires à l'armement de six corsaires, dont trois montent 28 canons en batteries et trois autres plus petits. Vous pouvez compter qu'ils seront prêts à l'instant où la Convention nationale ouvrira sur les mers un nouveau champ d'honneur aux Français régénérés., — The contents of the *Deliberation of the executive council bearing date 7. of January*, which is mentioned in this letter, have, I believe, never been made known to the public: but it is evident from the manner, in which the municipality of St. Malo spake of it, that its tendency was the same, as that of the letter written by the marine minister, namely, to rouse the people to a war with England. The circumstance therefore that it was signed by the executive council on the *very same day*, on which the Note of the executive council to the British government was signed, affords a new and very striking proof of that glaring duplicity, which characterizes the rulers of modern France.

brought to its final issue before the tribunal of the public, till the Ultimatum of the executive council had been delivered on the 13. of January, yet their private determination had been irrevocably made, without the least regard to the result of a negotiation. Indeed the whole conduct of the French rulers from the middle of November to the middle of January afforded one continued proof of this assertion: and Mr. Miles, who in consequence of his connexions with Le Brun and other leading men in France, was intimately acquainted with their secret views, has testified, that the executive council had formed a decided resolution on the part to be taken in regard to England, not four weeks only, when the circular letter of the marine minister was issued, but even *ten* weeks, before the open declaration of hostilities ³.

That the resolution, to engage in a war with England, was taken by the executive council, at least before the negotiation was finished, if not before it commenced, appears likewise from the confessions of General Dumouriez. In the first volume of his *Memoirs*, where he speaks of his own residence in Paris during the former part of January, and the measures which were then concerting for the next campaign, he

3. Compare p. 87. with p. 88. of the *Authentic Correspondence* with Le Brun and others.

says in positive and unequivocal terms, that Le Brun, the French minister for foreign affairs, desired him to pay no regard to the negotiation with Great Britain, and *that this negotiation was not made even a subject of the least inquiry* ⁴. We have here also an additional proof, that the executive council, of which Le Brun, in all matters relative to foreign countries was the chief, was resolved *at all events* on a war with England, and that the negotiation, which was then carrying on, had no other object, than to amuse its government, till the plan of attack was ripe for execution. Further, General Dumouriez informed General Miranda in a letter dated Paris 10. January, that the war between England and France appeared to be decided. He said indeed to Miranda, "decided on the part of England," ⁵, being too prudent to betray the secrets of the executive council: but that he himself was convinced, the British government had at that time *not* determined on a war with France, is manifest from the circumstance, that in a passage of his Memoirs, where he had just before expressly spoken

4. "Le Brun pria même le général d'écarter tout ce qui concernait les negociations avec l'Angleterre, et la Hollande: il n'en fut pas du tout question. Memoires de Dumouriez Tom. I. p. 108.

5. La guerre de la part d'Angleterre paroît à-peu-près décidée. Correspondance du General Miranda etc. p. 3.

of the *fifteenth* of January ⁶, he says *it would have been extremely easy for France, to have avoided a war with England* ⁷. Dumouriez therefore certainly did not believe on the *tenth* of January, that the English cabinet had determined on a war with France: for in that case he could not have supposed, that the French government, on the *fifteenth* of that month, might so easily have avoided a rupture: nor could he have at all imagined, that the decision of war and peace depended on the will of the executive council, unless he had been thoroughly persuaded, that the designs of the British government were pacific. The expression therefore *guerre de la part d'Angleterre* must be considered as synonymous to *guerre avec l'Angleterre*: the use of it must be ascribed to the caution, which he thought was necessary in writing to Miranda, but

6. Tom. I. p. 103. "Nous étions déjà au 15 du mois de Janvier.

7. "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde proposait, qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaisseaux de guerre, ce qui supposait nécessairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, et qu'il eût été *très facile*. et très-nécessaire d'éviter. Ib. p. 105. He says also p. 128. "De Maulde en arrivant à Paris pour se justifier vint trouver le général, et lui dit, que si on voulait garder la neutralité avec la Hollande et l'Angleterre, *rien n'était plus facile.*,"

which no longer operated, when he published his memoirs: and the decision in favour of war must be understood of the French government, a construction, of which the justness is demonstrated, not only by Le Brun's acknowledged resolution, to pay no regard to the negotiation with England, but likewise by the order sent to General Miranda on the same tenth of January, to make an immediate attack on the United Provinces. And it receives still further confirmation from the declaration made by Lord Auckland in the House of Lords on the 9. of January 1798, whence it appears, that at the time when preparations were making ⁸ to open a negotiation between Lord Auckland, then ambassador at the Hague, and General Dumouriez, the General himself acknowledged, that the French executive council had determined on a war with England. His Lordship further added, that he had not mentioned the matter before, but that he then felt himself at liberty to state it ⁹.

But

8. Of these preparations, which commenced only a few days before the declaration of war, more will be said in the following chapter.

9. See the parliamentary debates on Jan. 9. 1798. — As no personal interview, if I mistake not, took place between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, the negotiation having been stopped at the very outset by the declara-

But whatever may be the period, at which the French cabinet came to a settled resolution in regard to the war with England and Holland, the *fact* that it did come to this resolution, and that too before the middle of January 1793. has been so fully demonstrated in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the present work, that it would be a waste of time to say any thing further on the subject. Indeed the positive order sent to General Miranda on the 10. of January, for an immediate invasion of Holland, and the considerable augmentation of the French marine, which was ordered only three days afterwards, expressly to act against England, though the French had a greater number of ships already in commission, than were at that time sitting in the English ports ¹⁰, would alone

tion of war on the part of the national convention, the secret, which his Lordship has revealed, must have been contained in some written or verbal message, either to himself or to some other person. Now Dumouriez relates in his *Memoires*, Tom. I. p. 142. that he sent a confidential letter to his friend De Maulde, who was then at the Hague, and that De Maulde shewed this letter to Lord Auckland. But whether the acknowledgement of General Dumouriez was contained in this confidential letter, or in some other despatch, his Lordship can best determine. As the information however was really communicated, the vehicle is of no great consequence.

10. See Ch. XII. Note 61.

demonstrate the truth of the assertion. Lastly, Mr. Miles says in the work ¹¹, which has been frequently quoted, "I have other documents in my possession, "which all tend to prove, that France was too much "intoxicated with her success, and too confident that "She was invincible, to keep any measures with a na- "tion, whom it was her misfortune to behold in no "other light, than as a very powerful neighbour and ri- "val, and whom she thought it was necessary to humble "if not to crush.," — Perhaps the documents, of which Mr. Miles here speaks, will hereafter be laid before the public: however they are unnecessary for our present purpose, as we have already evidence enough.

To this war with Great Britain the republican rulers of France were induced by various motives, which, unfortunately for humankind, derived their origin from the French révolution.

The completion of it, as it was called, had already induced the national assembly in April 1792. to declare war against Austria ¹²: they had deemed it expedient to employ their forces abroad, that they might be more at liberty to execute their projects at home, and to divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations

11. Pag. 98.

12. See Ch. VII. Note 2.

on the borders, that their own secret machinations might less attract the notice of the public. When hostilities were once commenced, the same motives urged both the continuance and extension of them: for the minister of the interior declared in the summer of 1792, that, as there were three hundred thousand men in arms, it was necessary to make them march as far as their legs would carry them, or they would return, and cut the throats of their employers ¹³. War therefore was considered as a national benefit, and peace, as Brissot himself acknowledged ¹⁴, was regarded as the only evil, which the republican rulers of France had to dread, because, as Louvet observed, it was destructive to the republic ¹⁵. The successful campaign of 1792, and the advantages, which had been obtained over Austria and Prussia, opened new fields of action to the French armies, which were daily increasing both in numbers, and in military prowess: and to men accustomed to subsist by rapine, nothing more inviting could be offered, than the plunder of a commercial country, whose wealth is proverbial. And, as it was deemed expedient, to find employment for the French sailors, as well as for the soldiers, a war with

13. Ch. VII. Note 36.

14. *Ib.* Note 7.

15. *Ib.* Note 12.

Great Britain was not only an alluring object, but appeared to the national convention to afford the means of securing its authority at home.

As the war however with Austria and Prussia already answered the ends of the French rulers to a certain degree, it is probable that the declaration of hostilities against Great Britain would have been deferred to a somewhat later period, unless other causes, of which the effects were more rapid, had operated at the same time. These causes were partly general, or such as applied to other countries beside Great Britain, and partly especial, or such as applied to Great Britain alone. To the former class is to be referred the resolution of the French republicans to extirpate monarchy not only in France, but throughout all Europe, a resolution, which was formed by degrees, and which may be traced in the several stages of the French revolution.

The rational sense of liberty, which had long prevailed in Britain, was scarcely awakened in France, when, in consequence of the impetuosity of the French character, it began to degenerate into wild enthusiasm. From the original design of establishing a monarchy, limited by a proper intermixture of democracy and aristocracy ¹⁶, which is the happiest confi-

16. I purposely say the *design* of establishing such a monarchy, for the framers of the constitution of 1789, or

tion for a great empire, a sudden transition was made to all the horrors of anarchy: and the consti-

as it is more usually called of 1791, because it was then formally accepted, entirely failed in the execution; they by no means introduced a just mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and on that very account it was impossible, that the constitution should be of long duration. The grand fault consisted in this, that the states of France, which had been formerly divided into three houses, or chambers, were melted into *one*. Thus the equilibrium of the state-machine, which it is the first object of a good legislator to preserve, was totally destroyed: and it was easy to foresee, that with such an institution, aided by the spirit of the times, the king would be degraded to a mere commissary of the national assembly, and that for want of a separate aristocratic power, to form a counterpoise, the monarchical part of the constitution would soon be annihilated by the daily increasing power of the democratic part. The states should have been divided into *two* houses: the heads of the principal noble families, with the higher orders of the clergy, should have been placed in the one, and the representatives of the people in the other. The reciprocal action of aristocracy and democracy would then have preserved an equilibrium: the prerogatives of the king, and the liberties of the people, would have been guaranteed at the same time: tranquillity would have been secured to France, and the miseries, which have been inflicted on the neighbouring countries, would have been avoided. The faultiness of a *single* legislative body has been since discovered by the French themselves, and there-

tuent assembly, in which were many very respectable members, was scarcely dissolved, when the legislative

fore in the latest of their constitutions they have introduced *two* councils, in imitation of the two houses of the British Parliament. But the imitation falls greatly short of the original: for the council of elders, and the council of five hundred, can never answer the purpose, which is attained by the house of lords, and the house of commons. The house of lords, which forms the aristocratical part of our constitution is admirably devised, to keep the monarchical and democratical parts within their due limits. It has an equal interest with the commons in preventing a too great increase in the power of the one, and an equal interest with the king in preventing a too great increase in the power of the other. And as it is placed immediately between both, it can keep the constitution in a proper poise, by siding with the one, if incroachments are made by the other, and by supporting both, when they preserve the limits marked out by the constitution. But no such advantage attends the French council of elders. They are representatives of the people, and consequently belong to the democratical part of the French constitution, as well as the council of five hundred: the two councils are in fact nothing more than parts of the *same* house, and whether seven hundred and fifty representatives assemble in *one* hall, as they did before, or whether one room be allotted to five hundred of them, and another to the remaining two hundred and fifty, as at present, the difference in the result is not so great, as the authors of the last French constitution imagined. Both councils

assembly, which met in the autumn of 1797. and consisted chiefly of violent democrats, formed the secret

consist of men of the very same description; the members of each have an equal interest in all cases, whether they be inclined to oppose or to support the directory, to which the executive power is entrusted: and their ability or inability must be likewise in all cases the same. The present French constitution therefore has established oligarchy (the directory) on the one hand, and democracy (the two councils) on the other, without any intermediate power, to prevent mutual incroachments. Consequently, as from the natural desire, which all men have to increase their authority, the one part of the constitution must have always a tendency to oppress the other, the whole can never be kept in equilibrium. Either the directory will render the two councils, and with them the whole nation, subservient to its absolute will: or the two councils will infringe on the executive power, and impede the necessary operations of government. The former case has already taken place: for even since the 4. of September (18. of Fructidor, as they call it) 1797 the directory has governed France with a rod of iron, and their unhappy slaves might say with Tacitus, *memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissimus, si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci, quam tacere.* But if a change of circumstances from without should occasion discontents in the interior, and the two councils be enabled to resume the power, which is allotted them by the constitution, they will probably go as much beyond the constitutional exercise of it, for want of an intermediate check, as the directory has hitherto done, and thus

resolution of dethroning the king of France, and of raising *themselves*, under the specious and alluring title of friends of the people, to the dignity of all-potent sovereigns. In the jacobin club especially, where all subjects of importance were discussed and arranged, before they were introduced into the national assembly, the plan was already settled at the beginning of the year 1792, not only for the establishment of a republic in France, but for the introduction of the same form of government in every quarter of Europe. The spirit, which animated the club of the jacobins, operated on almost every member of the national assembly: and to the national convention, which met in

reduce the executive power to a state of debility, unless, in imitation of the national convention, they take the whole into their own hands, and destroy the constitution at one stroke. Though the British constitution therefore is adapted to all cases, the present constitution of France is adapted to none: under the latter there is always danger either of despotism or anarchy, under the former there is danger, neither of the one, nor of the other: the former has stood the test of a whole century, the latter was shaken to its foundation before it had existed even two years. A comparison then, which so illustrates the excellencies of the British original and the defects of the French imitation, must excite in Britons of every description the sincere desire of transmitting unaltered to posterity the constitution, which they have inherited from their ancestors.

September 1792, it was transmitted in all its vigour. A hatred of kings, which, without distinction either of their political power, or of their private character, were denominated tyrants, betrayed itself in every harangue: and sovereigns of all descriptions were openly branded, in what was called the senate of a great nation, with the opprobrious appellation of public robbers ¹⁷. And this hatred displayed itself not mere-

17. *Les rois ne savent combattre les peuples qu'en brigands*, said Barbaroux in the national convention, on the 8. of December 1792. See the *Moniteur* 10. December 1792. And whoever consults the *Moniteur*, not to mention the *Journal des Jacobins*, with the view of discovering other expressions of the same kind, will find them in abundance. I will not trouble the reader therefore with many extracts: but I cannot avoid quoting a passage from a letter written by a very celebrated member of the convention, Thomas Paine, whose principles, as is well known (for he was afterwards imprisoned) were deemed by the jacobins *too moderate*. This letter, which was read in the national convention on the 14. of January 1793, begins thus. "*Citoyen Président, mon mépris et ma haine pour le gouvernement monarchique sont assez connus; ma compassion pour les infortunés, amis ou ennemis, est également profonde. J'ai voté pour mettre Louis Capet en jugement, parcequ'il était nécessaire de proposer à l'univers la perfidie, la corruption, et l'horreur du système monarchique. La masse des preuves, que vous avez sous les yeux, le constate suffisamment. Il en résulte que la monarchie, quelque forme qu'on lui donne, despotique ou limitée,*

ly in detached speeches, or in the opinions of only a few orators, but was so generally adopted, that it

devient nécessairement le centre autour duquel se forment et se rassemblent tous les genres de corruption, et que le métier de roi détruit aussi certainement toute moralité dans un homme, que le métier de *bourreau* toute sensibilité. Je me rappelle que pendant mon séjour en Angleterre je fus extrêmement frappé d'un mot de M. Anthoine aux Jacobins, lequel est parfaitement conforme à l'idée que j'énonce: *Faites moi roi aujourd'hui*, disait-il, *et je serai demain un brigand.*, Moniteur 18. Jan. 1793. — Of expressions, abusive of the English government in particular, the following may serve as specimens. "Voyez par quels moyens *perfides* le gouvernement Anglais a tout-à-coup aliéné la Nation Anglaise. — Faire ici le tableau de la comédie jouée par les *machiavelistes* qui dirigent l'Angleterre, c'est peindre les *forfaits* de presque toutes les puissances de l'Europe.", These words were uttered in the national convention on the 1. of January 1793, by Brissot, who was afterwards called Allié de Pitt. See the Moniteur 3. Jan. 1793. A similar expression, "un acte de *perfidie*," was used likewise in a letter to Lord Grenville by the *temperate* Mr. Chauvelin, as he has been termed. See Note 38. to Ch. XI. On the 31. of January 1793 Danton represented royalty as already extinguished in England, saying: les *tyrans* de l'Angleterre sont morts; vous avez la plénitude de la puissance *nationale*. Moniteur 1. Feb. 1793. On the day, on which the national convention declared war, Ducos said, "le peuple Anglais trompé par les proclamations *mensongères* et les terreurs *hypocrites* de son gouvernement etc.: and in the public manifesto, with which the entry of

became an essential ingredient in French politicks. *Principles* (said the President of the national convention, Gregoire, on the 28. of November 1792.) are waging war against royalty, which will fall under the blows of philosophy ¹⁸: and five days afterwards, another President, Barrere, with his gorgeous eloquence, declared, that *their principles and their hatred of kings* were their ministers plenipotentiary ¹⁹. But should any one still entertain a doubt, whether this hatred extended itself to the French rulers in general, it will certainly be removed by the following exclamation of the *whole* national assembly on the 4. of September 1792; *We all swear hatred to kings and to royalty* ²⁰.

the French army into Holland was accompanied about ten days afterwards, was said "le peuple Anglais se laisse égarer — par les mensonges de son roi. See the Moniteur 3. and 20. of February 1793. These, with numberless other passages of the same import, merit the particular attention of those gentlemen, who have taken so much offence at the warmth, with which Mr. Burke censured the conduct of the French rulers.

18. See Ch. X. Note 19.

19. *Nos principes et notre haine contre les tyrans, voilà nos ministres plénipotentiaires.* Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792. It is never to be forgotten, that in the language of the French convention the words *roi* and *tyrant* are always synonymous.

20. *Dites au peuple Français (said Chabot) que vous avez trop appris à connaître les vices des rois, et de la ro-*

This hatred however, which had never been accompanied with fear, was gradually converted, before the declaration of war against England, into profound contempt; and the name of king was become, in the national convention, a subject of jest and ridicule. "Another Bourbon (exclaimed Treilhard, then President of the convention, on Jan. 8. 1793, when the king of the two Sicilies had been forced by the French fleet in the Mediterranean to submit to an indignity) another Bourbon in the number of the vanquished: *kings are here the order of the day* ²¹. And the contempt of the French rulers for the kingdom of Great Britain in particular was so great, that, according to their own declarations, they cared for it as little, as for the republic of Ragusa ²². This contempt arose in some measure from the pride, with which the successful

yauté, et que vous les détestez. Oui, oui, s'écrient tous ensemble les Députés: Nous le jurons. Journal de Paris 1792, p. 941. And this hatred was carried to such a length, that Jean de Brie, who was afterwards appointed by the Directory to negotiate with kings and princes, proposed to the national convention to establish, for the more easy propagation of French principles, a corps of twelve hundred knights regicide.

21. Encore un Bourbon au nombre des vaincus: *les rois sont ici à l'ordre du jour.* Moniteur 9. Jan. 1793.

22. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 58.

campaign of 1792 necessarily inspired them, but more particularly from their conviction, that French principles had every where taken such deep root, that the neighbouring nations were become ripe for rebellion, were prepared to depose their sovereigns, and to open their gates to the pretended deliverers of humankind. Of the English nation in particular they entertained these sentiments ²³: whence they supposed, that the English government was not only in a state of debility, but approaching to its final dissolution. And so confident were they in their expectations of universal insurrection, that the impending execution of Louis XVI. was openly represented in the national convention as a prelude to similar executions in the other kingdoms of Europe. "Teach the nations, (said Remi on the 2. of December 1792) to punish their tyrants in the manner, which becomes them," ²⁴: and two days afterwards, the celebrated orator Carra said likewise to the national convention, "ye know, that the stroke, by which the head of Louis is about to fall, *will make the heads of the other despots totter*," ²⁵. And af-

23. See the latter part of Ch. X.

24. Apprenez aux peuples à punir leurs tyrans d'une manière digne d'eux. Moniteur 6. Dec. 1792.

25. Vous sentez que le coup, qui va faire tomber la tête de Louis XVI, va faire chanceler celles des autres despotes. Moniteur 8. Dec. 1792.

ter the fatal catastrophe had taken place in France, Danton, speaking of kings in general, said only two days before the declaration of war against Great Britain: "You have thrown them the gauntlet; this gauntlet is the head of a king: *it is the signal of their approaching death* ²⁶. Even so early as the 21. of November, the President of the national convention, Gregoire, in a speech, which was translated into all languages ²⁷, and was published, two days after the celebrated decree, as a manifesto of all nations against their sovereigns, had declared, "It was a glorious day *for the universe*, when the national convention of France pronounced these words, "*royalty is abolished*."

That in making these, and numerous other declarations of the same kind, the rulers of France had their eyes directed particularly to Great Britain, is too apparent to stand in need of additional proof, since the whole of the preceding history contains one continued demonstration of it. All doubts however on this subject, should any really remain, will be removed by the speech, which was uttered by Carra in the national convention on the 2. of January: a speech,

26. Vous leur avez jetté le gant: ce gant est la tête d'un roi: *c'est le signal de leur mort prochaine*. Moniteur 1. Feb. 1792.

27. An English translation of it is printed in Rivington's Annual Register 1792. P. II. p. 356.

which is so much the more remarkable, as it was not only insolent in the extreme toward the British government, but was delivered at the opening of the negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, and proved therefore, or at least might have proved, at that very time, to the world at large, that it was not the object of the national convention, to produce a reconciliation with the British cabinet ²⁸. "Your courage (said Carra) will rouse all nations, and they will soon wish to have their tenth of August, their convention, and their republic. Already has George III. commanded the Tower of London to be fortified. Need we more, to enable us to predict the destruction of this new Bastile? Need we more, to enable us to foresee the overthrow of royal and noble tyranny in England. The human species commenced with infancy: it now approaches toward manhood. Form not then your judgement of what you have to fear by the preparations in England, and by the comedy now played by the parliament in concert with the court: and be assured, that it is not the real intention

28. Brissot's insolent speeches of the 1 and 12 of January, which were likewise delivered during the negotiation, afford an additional proof of this assertion. See the *Moniteur* 3 and 15. Jan. 1793. Specimens of these speeches have been already given in Ch. XII. Note 34. and in Note 17. to the present chapter.

"of the court to make war on us, but merely to intimidate the national convention ²⁹. Let therefore the head of Louis fall; and George III, with his minister Pitt, will feel if their heads rest firm on their shoulders ³⁰. Then will the parliament of England ³¹ no longer hesitate to demand an alliance with the French republic. *The same fate will attend the other despots*: and shortly will every nation say; the head of our tyrant is not more divine, than that of Louis; let us strike it off therefore; let us abolish royalty; let us imitate the French in every thing; and cries of *vive la liberté! vive l'égalité! vive la république!* shall resound in every quarter of Europe

29. This acknowledgement, that it was not the intention of the British cabinet to make war on France, from one of its most violent enemies deserves particular attention, and above all the attention of those, who have represented ministers as taking every opportunity, before the war broke out, of repelling peace. With regard to their alleged endeavours to intimidate the national convention; every Briton, who loves his country, must thank them for attempting to prevent the execution of its avowed projects.

30. Fortunately for Great Britain, their heads have rested firm on their shoulders, long since the heads of Carra and his associates have fallen to the dust.

31. Namely when metamorphosed into the national convention announced on the 28. of November.

"rope," ³². — By speeches like these, and still more by actions, which corresponded to them, the republicans of France, republicans who, as Louvet said, were worthy of the name, "aspired at the lasting renown, at the immortal honour of abolishing royalty itself, of

32. "Votre courage donnera l'éveil à toutes les nations, et toutes voudront avoir bientôt leur 10. Août; leur convention et leur république. Déjà George III. a fait fortifier la Tour de Londres. En faut-il davantage, pour prédire la destruction de cette nouvelle Bastille? en faut-il davantage, pour prévoir le renversement de la tyrannie royale et nobiliaire en Angleterre? Le genre humain a commencé par être enfant; il commence aujourd'hui à devenir un homme. Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'est jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour: et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'est réellement pas de nous faire la guerre, mais seulement d'intimider la convention nationale. Que la tête de Louis tombe; et George III. et le ministre Pitt tâteront si la leur est encore sur leurs épaules; alors seulement il n'y aura plus de difficulté dans le parlement d'Angleterre pour demander l'alliance de la république Française. Il en sera de même des autres despotes: bientôt chaque peuple se dira, mais la tête de notre tyran n'est pas d'une nature plus divine que celle de Louis; abbattons-la donc; abolissons la royauté; imitons en tout les Français: et vive la liberté! vive l'égalité! vive la république dans toute l'Europe! Moniteur 4. Janv. 1793.

abolishing it for ever, at first in France, and then throughout the world,,³³

The confident expectation of the French rulers, that the neighbouring nations were prepared to rebel against their sovereigns, and to make a common cause with those, who under specious and alluring protestations endeavoured to conceal the infamy and destructiveness of their designs, brought at last the torch of their ambition into open flame. To whatever quarter they directed their attention, they foresaw in imagination the struggles of a civil war: they rejoiced at the combat of parties, which, by weakening or destroying the power of both, prepared the way for Gallic despotism: and regarding with a smile of malevolence the folly of devoted victims, who, seduced by all the arts of systematic deception, were operating their own destruction, anticipated the triumph over the expected prey. When ambitious monarchs attempt to gratify their thirst of conquest, they seldom think of subduing more than one country at a time: but such narrow projects of aggrandizement afforded much too little nourishment for the mighty minds of these republican rulers, and before *they* could be gratified, it was necessary, that all Europe should lie prostrate at their feet. Already was Savoy both conquered, and incorporated into France: already had they made themself-

33. Words of Louvet. See Ch. VII. Note 13.

ves masters, and even determined on the incorporation, of the Austrian Netherlands: already had they vanquished a considerable part of Germany, had commenced hostilities, as well against the republic of Geneva, as against several states of Italy; and preparations were already made for the conquest of the Swiss cantons ³⁴. Already had they treated the British government as an open enemy ³⁵: and, while they endeavoured to excite insurrection within, had destined a formidable fleet and army, to support their projects from without ³⁶.

34. This last fact, though not generally known, admits of no doubt; for General Dumouriez (Memoires, Tom. I. p. 110.) speaking of Colonel Weiss, and of the events of January 1793, says: "Son coup d'oeil sur les relations politiques de la République Française et du Corps Helvétique, lancé à propos au moment de l'éruption, acheva de déjouer les projets hostiles; et il est très probable, que sans lui la guerre eût été déclaré avant la fin de Février; *divers préparatifs secrets étant déjà en activité.* Ils se dirigeaient d'après le plan assez mal combiné par Robert, Claviere, et quelques émigrés Suisses, qui déterminaient l'attaque sur trois points à la fois.

35. The conduct of the French convention on the 28. of November was equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British government: and to their conduct on that day every measure, which was afterwards taken, perfectly corresponded.

36. That thirty ships of the line were ordered on the

And the allies of England, the States General, were not merely threatened, but the order for actual invasion had been already given. Nor was all this sufficient, to satisfy the ambitious projects of the French rulers: for Brissot, who considered France in January 1793 as more powerful than all Europe³⁷, and not

13. of January to be put in commission, in addition to the twenty two already commissioned, has been related in the twelfth chapter. And that the menace of a landing in England, made by the marine minister on the 31. of December, was not a mere gasconade, but the result of a serious and deliberate plan, appears from the *Rapport sur l'organisation générale des armées* delivered in the national convention on the 25. of January, in which, where the subject relates to England, there occurs the following passage. "Toujours cette puissance a craint une descente; jamais le projet ne s'en est effectué, et il n'a jamais été sérieusement préparé. Mais il sera sans doute suivi avec plus de force et d'énergie sous le régime de la liberté: vous y destinerez 40,000 hommes d'embarquement.,, Moniteur 27. Janv. 1793.

37. In his address A ses Commettans p. 75. speaking of the inhabitants of France he says: "Ces vingt-cinq millions se trouvaient, même au mois de Janvier dernier, avec des moyens matériels et pecuniaires bien superieurs à tous ceux des puissances étrangères, même à ceux de cette Angleterre si fière de ses richesses. Ils avaient une masse de ressources, telle que jamais aucune nation n'en a possédée, masse qui se doublait encore, si l'on avait pu faire regner l'ordre; car tout se tenait dans notre plan.,,

wholly without reason, on account, as well of the general fermentation, which then prevailed, as of the want of confidence and union among the cabinets themselves, had formed the plan of conquering likewise, at the same time, Italy and Spain ³⁸. And, as if Europe were too small a theatre for the exercise of the French arms, expeditions were in agitation to the distant regions of Asia and Africa ³⁹. Even at that time therefore the French rulers claimed for France the title, which has been since assumed, the title of the *great nation*, for which purpose, as Brissot observed, "it was necessary to have vast ideas, grand designs, and an object sublime and difficult ⁴⁰.

38. "Brissot y étala ses projets de conquérir l'Espagne et l'Italie.,, *Memoires de Dumouriez*, Tom. I. p. 108. Further says Dumouriez p. 105. Kellermann, en prenant congé de la Convention, pour aller commander l'armée du Dauphiné, forte d'à-peu près vingt-mille hommes, indépendamment de celle du comté de Nice aux ordres du général Biron, qui était à-peu-près dix à douze mille, *avait reçu l'ordre d'aller conquérir Rome*, et avait répondu gravement qu'il allait à Rome.

39. "Il s'agissait dans cette expédition de la Clos, (qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde) de s'emparer du Cap de Bonne-Espérance et de Ceylan, pour ensuite se joindre à Tippoo Saib, et tomber sur le Bengale.,, *Memoires de Dumouriez*, Tom. I. p. 105.

40. "Pour former des hommes, *une grande Nation*, il

The rage of conquest, which animated the republican rulers of regenerated France, was distinguished likewise as much by its *kind*, as by its *magnitude*. The zeal of converting all mankind to their political and supposed philosophic creed, which in minds destitute of religion can operate as fervently, as religious zeal in the most determined bigot, excited an enthusiasm, of which modern ages furnish no example, and which can only be compared with that of the followers of Mohammed in the seventh century. Conscious too, like these, of their military prowess, and of their ability to propagate their doctrines by the sword, they had recourse to the measures, which had been applied by the Saracens, and determined to impose the system, adopted by themselves, on a conquered world. They formed accordingly the resolution, "of breaking with *all* the cabinets, of setting all Europe at defiance, of setting the four corners of Europe on fire ⁴¹. And in the heat of their enthusiasm they

faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un but sublime et difficile., A ses Commettans p. 76.

41. These expressions, which were vauntingly used by the French rulers themselves have been quoted in the original, Ch. VII. Notes 14. 15. 16. The well-known Camille Jourdan likewise, in his address A ses Commettans, which was written in October 1797, has made p. 88. the following remarkable confession. "Quel fut le grand principe de la

were so confident of success, that in the decree of the 15. of December they proclaimed to the whole world their system of universal revolution.

guerre, le grand obstacle à la paix? Ne fut-il pas, dans nos doctrines révolutionnaires, dans cet insensé projet de renverser tous les trônes, de bouleverser tous les empires?., Yet a celebrated opposition writer, speaking of the 24. of January 1793, says: "*Before this time*, France was undoubtedly solicitous for peace. — The arguments, by which he endeavours, in defiance of the French rulers themselves, to support this notion, are founded, partly on the fine and pathetic expressions, which were used in the Note of the French executive council of the 7. of January 1793, and partly on the proposal, which had been made by Mr. Chauvelin to the British cabinet as long ago as June 1792, to act as mediator between France and Austria. Now of those *fine and pathetic expressions* enough has been already said in the preceding chapter, to place their falsity in the clearest point of view. And of the mediation, which was proposed before the deposition of Louis XVI. and in *his* name, it has been shewn in the seventh chapter, that if it be regarded as a request of the national assembly, it affords a proof of the blackest hypocrisy. But even had it been true, that the republican rulers of France wished for peace in June 1792, it would surely be very absurd, to conclude therefore, that they entertained the same sentiments six months afterwards, when they were become all-potent conquerors. To corroborate his opinion, the same writer says further, that the national convention, at least before the meeting of Parliament on the 13. of December,

The motives, which induced the rulers of republican France, to attempt the destruction of all kingly governments, affected the kingdom of Great Britain in an equal degree with any other kingdom in Europe: for kings of every description, whether absolute or limited ⁴², were considered by those political zealots as monsters, which it was necessary to extirpate. And nothing was at that time more common in the national convention, than to declaim on the slavery of Britons, and the benefits to be conferred on them by the communication of French freedom. But be-

could have done nothing, which even the British cabinet considered as a ground of war, because war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech. Now from the circumstance, that war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech, we may conclude that it was the intention of the cabinet, to act only on the defensive: but to infer, that, because it did not instantly commence hostilities, there was no reason to suspect an aggression on the part of France, is the very summit of sophistry. We may justly wonder therefore that a pamphlet, containing *such* arguments, could meet in Great Britain with so rapid a sale, and make such an impression on a nation, which reasons in general on political subjects more justly, than any nation in Europe. In fact, it affords a confirmation of that melancholy truth, that even men of sense may be deceived by the most futile reasoning, when that futile reasoning is veiled in eloquent and spirited language.

42. See Note 17 to this chapter.

side the *general* motives, in which Great Britain was included, *particular* reasons induced the French rulers, at the close of the year 1792, to a war with their ancient rival. In the first place, the internal fermentation at that time, which they themselves assisted to the utmost of their power, the numerous addresses from seditious societies, and the civic feasts which were held before their own eyes in Paris ⁴³, led them to believe, that the insurrection, which they expected in all countries, would first break out in Britain. Secondly, the number of ships of war, which France had actually in commission, was superior to the number of those, which were ordered to be commissioned in the British ports: and it was imagined, that republican enthusiasm would so animate the French sailors on the one hand, and that disaffection would so prevail among the British sailors on the other, that the former would gain an easy victory. Thirdly the land forces in England, if we except the militia, for which it was supposed the expected insurrection would furnish sufficient employment, did not amount at that time to twenty thousand men: and from the immense army then in the pay of France, twice or thrice that number could be spared, which, if once conducted

43. An example of this kind has been quoted in the preceding chapter, Note 76.

across the channel, a matter supposed in France to be very feasible ⁴⁴, might perhaps, under the peculiar circumstances of the time, have succeeded in the attempt, to overturn the government, the constitution, and the power of Great Britain. Lastly, till the empire of the sea was wrested from Britain, it was impossible that the ambition of the French rulers should ever be gratified: and, on the other hand, it was obvious, that as soon as the British naval and commercial power was transferred to France, the conquest of the continent would be rendered easy, and that all Europe would soon lie prostrate at her feet.

44. See Note 32 to this chapter, and Note 39 to Chapter XII.

CHAPTER XV.

Events of the last fourteen days before the declaration of war. Mr. Chauvelin's demand on the 17. of January to be acknowledged as ambassador of the French republic. Answer of the British government, that under the existing circumstances it thought proper not to comply with the demand. Order sent to Mr. Chauvelin by the French executive council, to return to France. Similar, but later, order on the part of the British government: with the motives thereto. Copies of the papers relative to the late negotiation laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British Ambassador at the Hague, who accompanied them with a memorial on the conduct of the French rulers. Message from his Majesty to the two houses of Parliament. Apparent preparations for a new negotiation made by General Dumouriez. De Maulde's journey to the Hague, to propose a conference between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, on the frontiers of Holland. Mr. Maret's departure from Paris on the twenty sixth of January for London; where he remained eight days, but for want of instructions from the

French executive council again produced no effect. Departure of Dumouriez from Paris on the same day, to hold the proposed conference with Lord Auckland, to which the British government had consented, but which did not take place, because the national convention refused to await the issue of it, and declared war against Great Britain and Holland on the first of February.

The history of the politicks of Great Britain and France has been already brought down to the middle of January 1793, and the relative conduct of the two powers, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz, has not only been clearly represented, but the representation has been every where supported by unanswerable documents. It has been proved on the one hand, that the British cabinet was so far from acceding to a coalition against France, that it had acted toward that country according to the rules of the most strict neutrality, and even with the utmost friendship^x. On

x. It was impossible for one government to shew a stronger proof of friendship for another, than the firm refusal of the British cabinet, till war had been declared, to accept the offers made by the French planters in St. Domingo to surrender that valuable colony to Great Britain. See the latter part of Chap. II.

the other hand it has been shewn, that the French government repaid this friendship with the blackest ingratitude, that it endeavoured to excite an insurrection in Great Britain, with a view of destroying, not only our constitution, but our existence as an independent nation, and that, while the secret machinations were conducted with all the arts of systematic deception, a formidable armament was prepared in France itself. It has been further shewn, that the measures adopted by the British government were merely measures of self-defence, that they were not taken till after the French convention had *openly* avowed its design of overturning the British constitution ², and that the naval preparations in the ports of Britain were not less than three months posterior to the naval preparations in the ports of France ³. We have seen likewise, that, when the relative conduct of the two countries became a subject of negotiation, and the British cabinet insisted on conditions, which alone could insure the safety of Britain, the French government not only refused to comply with those conditions, but declared at the same time in the most positive manner, that if, notwithstanding this refusal, the preparations in the British ports were continued, it

2. See Ch. X. Note 24.

3. See Ch. X. Note 5. and Ch. XI. Note 44.

was determined to commence hostilities. Lastly, it has been proved in the preceding chapter, that the French rulers, whose measures during more than two months had uniformly tended to a war with England, came to a final resolution on the subject, at least before the middle of January 1793: and the various motives, which induced them to it, motives which operated before the period in question, have been fully assigned. As the fate of the two countries therefore was now determined, the events of the last fourteen days, before the public declaration of hostilities, which took place on the 1. of February, cannot possibly be reckoned among the *causes* of the war. The real causes had already produced their full effect; and the events, which followed, could serve only as *pretexts*, or as sophistical arguments to palliate an act of injustice, to which they gave not birth. In a review then of the *causes* of the war they might be safely passed over in silence: but, since whatever concerns the relative conduct of Great Britain and France till the public declaration of war against the former, belongs to the present history, it will be necessary to relate the events of the last fourteen days with the same exactness, as the preceding.

On the 17. of January 1793, though the question of war or peace was fully determined, and the residence therefore of a French minister in London was

become wholly useless, Mr. Chauvelin, by order of the executive council, demanded, that the court of Great Britain should formally receive him as the accredited ambassador of the French republic ⁴. Never perhaps was a favour demanded by one government of another, at a more unseasonable period, than this: for a favour undoubtedly it would have been, if Great Britain, which no power could have forced to a compliance, had given so early an example of a formal acknowledgement of the new republic. To have acquired a claim to such an expression of friendship, this republic should have itself acted with friendship toward Great Britain, should have rested satisfied with the revolution, which had been effected at home, and should not have attempted to disturb the tranquillity of its neighbours. If the French republic had really acted in this manner, and, instead of endeavouring to overturn all the kingdoms of Europe, had behaved with becoming moderation, it is not improbable, that the British government would have acknowledged the French republic, if not in January 1793, at least as soon as it

4. That Mr. Chauvelin's Letter to Lord Grenville, in which this demand was made, was dated the 17. of January, appears from Lord Grenville's answer, which begins thus, "I have received your letter of the 17. instant." But I have not been able to find it in the *Moniteur*, nor in the *New Annual Register*.

was settled on so firm a basis, as to promise durability to any engagement with it^s. It is true, that in a political light the British ministers, if they had had the choice, must necessarily have preferred the continuance of a monarchical government in France to the establishment of a republic, not only because great republics, like

5. As the republic of France acted with avowed hostility toward the kingdom of Great Britain, and thus forfeited all pretensions to a formal recognition on the part of the British government, it is in fact unnecessary to inquire, whether the latter would have acknowledged the French republic in the year 1793, provided this republic had acted with friendship toward Great Britain and its allies, and had renounced all views of conquest and aggrandizement. No one however can assert, that the British government, in that case, would have refused: and the expression used by Mr. Pitt to Mr. Maret, "that it would give him great pleasure to treat with him, as a confidential person of the French executive council," (Ch. XIII. p. 10.) and the assurance given by Lord Grenville to Mr. Chauvelin, "that outward forms would be no hindrance to his Britannic majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both parties," (lb. p. 4.) lead rather to the conclusion, that if satisfactory explanations had been really given by the rulers of the French republic, the British government would not have refused to acknowledge it. But without such satisfactory explanations, no acknowledgement of this kind could at that time be expected.

like that of France, are naturally inclined to be both restless in themselves, and to disturb the peace of their neighbours ⁶, but because the ambition of the new rulers of that country, aided by the energy, with which the revolution inspired the French in general, who fondly imagined they were fighting for the establishment of their political liberty ⁷, unavoidably ren-

6. It was a strange notion entertained by many in the year 1792, that the conversion of France into a republic would secure the tranquillity of Europe, though the notion is contradicted by the experience of all ages. We need only appeal to the Roman and Carthaginian republics, which displayed a greater thirst of conquest and aggrandizement, than perhaps any monarchy ever did. The instances, which have been alleged of the republics of Holland and Switzerland, are foreign to the purpose. For, in the first place they were merely federate republics, formed therefore only for self-defence, whereas the republic established in France was one and indivisible, formed therefore for aggression: and, in the next place, they were surrounded with neighbours more powerful than themselves, whereas the very reverse took place in regard to France.

7. The inhabitants of France however have since discovered, that they have been fighting for no other purpose, than to establish the power of a new set of governors, whose tyranny is insupportable: and that their efforts have produced no other effect, than the exchange of a virtuous sovereign, who loved his subjects, for despots, who treat them as slaves. The enthusiasm therefore of the French armies, unless the

dered France a much more dangerous neighbour to England, than it had ever been under its ancient government. And his majesty in particular, as every man in his situation would have done, necessarily felt a certain degree of indignation at the deposition and condemnation of an innocent sovereign. But neither those political reasons, nor this personal indignation, would have occasioned a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain; of war, which arose from totally different causes, as has been fully proved in the preceding chapter, and was not only declared, but *provoked*, by the rulers of France. Besides, had the British ministry, as their adversaries contend, resolved on a war with France, merely because France was become a republic⁸, they would not have entered into a nego-

fertility of invention, which is characteristic of the French rulers, furnishes new means of inflaming it, will hardly be equal in future to that, which was displayed at the commencement of the war.

8. When a certain opposition writer, in order to extort a confession from government itself, that the war was its own work, and that too because France was become a republic, quotes a passage from his Majesty's speech of the 21. of January 1794, and not only suppresses the words "*an attack was made on us and our allies*," but even interpolates the verb "*to oppose*," so as to give the whole passage a difference sense, we can hardly ascribe his conduct to mere ignorance. But as it has been already very justly exposed

tiation with the agents of that republic, and still less would they have proposed conditions, under which they were ready to remain in peace with it. They demanded not, that the republic should cease, but merely that it should conduct itself with moderation and friendship: and from the very first establishment of it had armed neither by land nor by sea, till Great Britain itself was threatened with destruction. When the British ambassador departed from Paris after the deposition of the king of France in August 1792, he was particularly charged to declare, that his Britannic majesty meant to observe the principles of neutrality in every thing, which regarded the arrangement of the *internal government of France*: and Le Brun was so satisfied with the declaration, that he said a few days afterwards, in his report to the national assembly, the British ambassador had left *a satisfactory testimony of the sentiments of his court* ⁹. On the 18. of December Mr. Miles in a letter to Le Brun again reminded the French minister, that the British cabinet was determined not to interfere in the internal affairs of France, and speaking of Mr. Pitt in particular he said, "I dare refer you to all the public and avowed decla-

by a sensible and well informed opponent, it is unnecessary to take further notice of it.

9. See Ch. IX. Notes 1. 12.

"rations of the English minister, to convince you, that
 "from the beginning of the revolution he has made it
 "a point not to meddle with the internal affairs of your
 "government; *that he has always rejected with firmness*
"every proposal made to him for attacking the French ¹⁰,
"and always refused to be concerned in any project for
"a counter-revolution. As he has made it his duty not
"to meddle with your affairs, so he has made it his
"glory to remain attached to his own wise and equi-
"table principles," ¹¹. — The same system of neutra-
 lity, and the determination, not to interfere in the in-
 ternal affairs of France prevented likewise the English
 ministry from interceding in behalf of Louis XVI.
 though the fate, which awaited him, could not possibly
 be a matter of indifference to them, either in a mo-
 ral or in a political view ¹². Lord Grenville likewise,

10. That the British cabinet positively refused to join a coalition against France in 1791 appears from Ch. I. Note 2: and that the same proposal was renewed by various courts of Europe during the summer of 1792, but that the British cabinet uniformly answered in the negative, was asserted by Mr. Dundas, in his speech in the house of commons on the 14. of December 1792.

11. Authentic correspondence, Appendix, p. 80.

12. Even if the British government had interceded in behalf of Louis XVI. it is certain, that the intercession would not have produced the desired effect: it would only have

in his Note to Mr. Chauvelin of the 31. of December, left the question, whether the British cabinet would

given rise to complaints of an officious and unwarranted interference, and thus have furnished the national convention with an additional pretext, for colouring the aggression, on which it had already resolved. For Danton said in the convention, on the 16. of January 1793, of the intercession attempted by the king of Spain, and which ended, as every man acquainted with the declarations of the French rulers (see Ch. VII. XIV.) expected, "*Quant à l'Espagne, je l'avouerai je suis étonné de l'audace d'une puissance, qui ne craint pas de prétendre à exercer son influence sur votre deliberation. Si tout le monde était de mon avis, on voterait à l'instant, pour cela seul, la guerre à l'Espagne.*" *Moniteur* 21. Jan. 1793. Even the more moderate Vergniaud said on the 31. of December, "*J'aime trop la gloire de mon pays, pour proposer à la convention, de se laisser influencer dans une occasion aussi solennelle par la considération de ce que feront ou ne feront pas les puissances étrangères.*" *Moniteur* 2. Jan. 1793. And Brissot on the 19. of January said of England in particular, "*Je m'indignerais sans doute, de voir qu'on épargnât le roi, pour arrêter la flotte Anglaise.*" *Moniteur* 24. Jan. 1793. This note may serve therefore to justify the conduct of the British government, not only with the friends of Louis XVI, who might otherwise imagine, that its intercession might have been of service, but likewise with the friends of the opposite party, some of whom, with a strange inconsistency, have likewise censured the neglect of intercession. Perhaps however no argument will satisfy the

acknowledge the French republic, 'wholly undetermined, and said, that, when it came to a decision, "the king would have the right to decide according to the interests of his subjects, his own dignity, and the regard which he owed to his allies, and to the general system of Europe,"¹³. That his Britannic majesty possessed this right, there can be no doubt: and it is equally clear, that a republic, which threatened destruction to Europe in general, and to Great Britain in particular, had no right to expect to be formally acknowledged. For it would be the height of folly to contribute voluntarily to the energy of a power, which had already declared itself hostile; it would be madness, for a man strengthen wantonly the arm, which was raised, to destroy him. But it has been proved, that the republic of France had determined to annihilate the kingdom of Britain, and that the question of

latter, since their passion for finding fault with the British ministry carries them so far, as to condemn a conduct, which on *their* part at least deserves commendation.

13. The words of the original are, "La proposition de recevoir un ministre accrédité de la part de quelque autre autorité ou pouvoir en France ferait une question nouvelle, laquelle, au moment où elle se présenterait, sa Majesté aurait le droit de décider d'après les intérêts de ses sujets, sa propre dignité, et les égards qu'elle doit à ses alliés, ainsi qu'au système général de l'Europe.,, *Moniteur* 14. Janv. 1793.

war or peace was fully determined before the middle of January. The other question therefore, whether the French republic should be acknowledged by Great Britain, or not, which on the 31. of December had been left undetermined, and subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, was on the 20. of January, after the negotiation was ended, and the designs of the French government had been fully confirmed, necessarily answered in the negative. Indeed *under the existing circumstances* an affirmative answer would have been absurd: and therefore Lord Grenville in his Note to Mr. Chauvelin of the 20. of January, said ¹⁴, "I have already apprised you ¹⁵, that his Majesty has reserved to himself the right of deciding according to his judgement upon the two questions of acknowledging a new form of government in France, and of receiving a minister accredited on the part of some other authority in France, than that of his most christian majesty. In answer to the demand you now make, whether his majesty will receive your

14. The original French note is not printed in the *Moniteur*: but the English translation, which was laid before the two houses of Parliament on the 28. of January 1793, and is therefore as good authority as the original itself, is printed in the *New Annual Register* for 1793, Public papers p. 75.

15. Namely in the Note of December 31.

"new letters of credence, I have to inform you, that, "*under the present circumstances*, his majesty does not "think proper to receive them.,,

On this refusal the republican rulers of France had no right to complain; for not only were they conscious, that their plan of revolutionizing all Europe was known to the British ministry ¹⁶, but they had declared, on their parts, five weeks before the period in question, *that they acknowledged no kingly government* ¹⁷, and at the same had issued a proclamation, in which they asserted in unequivocal terms, that it was their design *to expel all kings* ¹⁸. If under these

16. Brissot, in his report to the convention on the 12. of January, speaking of the British ministers, said, " *Ils pré- voyaient que cette république pouvait se consolider, et porter le flambeau des révolutions en toute l'Europe.* Moniteur 15. Jan. 1793. As it was avowed then, that the British ministers foresaw this, (and their foresight, at a time when so many thousands were struck with blindness, does them great honour) it was undoubtedly their duty to avoid a step, which would have given additional force to the engine of destruction.

17. See the introduction to the decree of December 15, quoted in Ch. XII. Note 2.

18. *Ib.* Note 22. — From what has been already said in the present and two last chapters, the reader will easily determine, whether the assertion be true, that the British government refused to receive Mr. Chauvelin's new credentials

circumstances, if after the design of overturning the British constitution had been formally announced in the national convention ¹⁹, if after the king of Great Britain had been publicly threatened in the same assembly with the fate, which was then impending over the king of France ²⁰, and after the late negotiation had ratified both these and numerous other injuries and insults, if under *such* circumstances, the British government had acknowledged the republic of France, its rulers would have ascribed the acknowledgement, not to a desire of preserving peace but to the dictates of fear ²¹; and Treilhard would have again exclaimed, *Another king in the number of the vanquished! Kings are here the order of the day* ²²! In fact the French rulers themselves could not seriously expect, that the republic, which was no more dreaded by Great Britain at that time, than it is at present, would be acknowledged under such circumstances by the British cabinet.

merely because France was become a republic. It was not the bare existence of that republic, but its *destructive character*, which determined the conduct of administration.

19. Ch. X. Note 24.

20. Ch. XIV. Note 28.

21. We have already seen (Ch. XIII. p. 11.) in what manner Le Brun interpreted Mr. Pitt's willingness to confer with Mr. Maret.

22. See Ch. XIV. Note 17.

Unless therefore they had been desirous of seeking pretexts for a quarrel, they would not have then proposed the question, but would have left the decision to the effects of time: and hence we may safely infer that the demand was made with no other view, than, on the presumption that it would be answered in the negative, to furnish themselves with at least one plausible argument, and thus colour an aggression, on which they had long resolved ²³.

The refusal, given by the British cabinet on the 20. of January, to acknowledge the French republic in the person of Mr. Chauvelin, could hardly have been known many hours to the executive council, before they sent him an order to return to France: for Dumouriez, in a letter to Miranda dated Paris 23 January, speaks of the order for Chauvelin's recall, as already given ²⁴. Dumouriez indeed says nothing in this letter of the above-mentioned refusal of the British government, and assigns another motive for the recall of Chauvelin, namely, that Dumouriez himself

23. Mr. Chauvelin made no secret of declaring, that if he was not received at St. James's, *it would be the height of his ambition to leave this country with a declaration of war.* See the Authentic Correspondence, p. 84.

24. His own words are "*On a donné ordre à notre ambassadeur Chauvelin de revenir.*," Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 15.

intended to go England, in order to open a new negotiation ²⁵. But, whatever was the motive, which induced the executive council to recall Mr. Chauvelin, the *fact*, that they did recall him, though it is not generally known, and moreover that they signed the order, at the latest, on the *twenty third* of January, is proved beyond contradiction by Dumouriez's letter of that day to Miranda.

On the *twenty fourth* of January, though the order, which had been given by the executive council could not have been known in London, a similar order was sent to Mr. Chauvelin by the British government. To this measure the British government was induced by various and weighty motives. In the first place, after the negotiation was at end, and the question of war or peace was finally decided, Mr. Chauvelin's residence in London could be of no further use. This was virtually admitted by the French government itself, in having *already* ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return ²⁶. It is likewise the usual practice with all go-

25. Of this design, which was not put in execution, more will be said in the latter part of this chapter.

26. If it be objected, that according to Dumouriez's letter to Miranda, though Chauvelin was recalled, a new negotiation was intended to be conducted by Dumouriez, it may be replied, that the French executive council was so far from taking any part in the new negotiation, that they

vernments, when a negotiation is ended, and either a rupture, or the continuance of hostilities is already settled, to order the minister of the hostile power to depart from its territories, because his further residence would enable him to furnish his own court with information, which must be detrimental to the other power. But beside this general motive, there existed a very particular reason for dismissing Mr. Chauvelin, as soon as all hopes of a reconciliation were at an end: for his *personal* conduct was of such a kind, that no government under any circumstances, and much less in such a general ferment, as then prevailed in England, could have suffered his residence, without exposing itself to imminent danger. Every one must admit, that it is the duty of a foreign ambassador to confine his political communications to the court, to which he is accredited, and that it is an insult as well as an injury to that court, if he forms *political* connexions with persons, who act in opposition to it. It is true that an opposition party in England, if it conducts itself with moderation and dignity, and, setting aside all chicane and sophistry, examines with candour the measures of ministers, is not only entitled to respect, but is a real benefit to the nation. Yet even to *such* an opposition

took every possible measure to counteract it, in which they fully succeeded, as will appear in the sequel.

party no foreign minister has a right to attach himself, and to make the members of it his confidential friends on *political* subjects, since by virtue of his office he must confer on matters of state with ministers, and ministers alone. But Mr. Chauvelin, soon after his arrival in the spring of the year 1792, formed a close alliance with the members of opposition, and the longer he staid, the more close was the connexion. His intimacy with the opposition party appears from his own letter of the 17. of July ²⁷: and when he was recalled by the executive council at the end of August, he obtained a revocation of the order by using the following argument, "*that though he was not well with the English minister, yet he was perfectly so with Mr. Fox and some other members of opposition, and that it would not be prudent in France to lose the fruit of his labours with these gentlemen, and their subsequent services, for a vain form of diplomatic etiquette*" ²⁸. — And before the negotiation commenced, which has been described in the thirteenth chapter, he went so far as to communicate his *secrét* instruc-

27. In this letter he said: "D'après tous les renseignements que je me suis empressé de prendre dès le premier moment que j'en ai eu connaissance, j'ai partagé à ce sujet, et partage encore, la securité de tous les Anglais, même les plus jaloux du gouvernement. See Ch. VIII. Note 3.

28. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix p. 83.

tions, (in which was positively stated, that the Schelde would *not* be given up, and yet that an acknowledgement of the French republic should be demanded) to an intimate friend of Mr. Fox ²⁹.

A conduct like this, even in times of perfect tranquillity, would have excited the suspicion, that it was Mr. Chauvelin's intention, not to preserve peace, but by secret cabals to do injury to government. At a period then, when London was overrun with French apostles of rebellion, when the disaffected party in England spake loudly and vehemently against the government, when seditious societies publicly proclaimed their design of establishing a British national convention, and this design was as publicly encouraged by the convention of France, Mr. Chauvelin's union with men; who acted in opposition to government, whether the object of those gentlemen, considered by itself, were reprehensible or not, afforded an unequivocal proof, that Mr. *Chauvelin's* object, was to encourage the insurrection, which was confidently expected by his employers. Nor did his employers make it a secret, that they regarded him as an instrument of sedition: for they commissioned him, first, "to embrace every opportunity of assuring the English *nation*, that notwithstanding the ill humour of its *government*, the

French desired nothing more ardently, than to merit *its* (the English nation's) esteem ³⁰; and secondly, to threaten the British government with *an appeal to the people* ³¹.

Now when ministers have condescended to negotiate with a man of this description ³², and have patiently borne with his insulting language, till the negotiation was brought to a crisis, and till it had ceased to be in their power to prevent a rupture, they are so

30. See Ch. XII. Note 27.

31. *Ib.* Notes 29. 32. See also Ch. XIII. Notes 47. 52.

32. Even without any regard to the personal character of Mr. Chauvelin, it was only the desire of leaving nothing untried, which might prevent a rupture, that could have induced ministers to commence a negotiation at all with the French rulers, as it was not to be expected, that any convention made with so fluctuating an administration would produce a lasting effect. Besides, as there was not only a continual struggle between the ruling-parties, but each party, when fallen, was branded with the appellation of a faction, the British government by negotiating with the rulers of the day, exposed itself to the danger of being accused by the next ruling party of having treated with factionists. To all these inconveniencies the British government submitted at the end of the year 1792, when Great Britain was threatened with an attack, in order, if possible, to prevent it. But on the 20. of January 1793 it was clear, that its efforts were, and must be, fruitless.

far from deserving censure for *then* dismissing the negotiator, that we should rather commend their moderation, in having suffered him to stay so long ³³. If a British ambassador had conducted himself in Paris, as Mr. Chauvelin conducted himself in London, the French government would certainly not have awaited the issue of the negotiation, but would either have answered his very first note with an order to quit the territories of the republic, or, since the persons of foreign ambassadors are no more respected by the modern rulers of France, than by the Dey of Algiers ³⁴,
they

33. Yet it has been said: that the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin shut the door to all negotiation. Now when a negotiation has been kept open, till the questions in dispute have been brought to a decision, as has been fully proved in the thirteenth chapter, *that* party alone can be justly said to have shut the door to the negotiation, which rendered the issue of it fruitless. But we have already seen, that it was the French executive council, which rendered the negotiation fruitless by refusing to accept the conditions proposed by the British government. Besides, if an order sent to Mr. Chauvelin to return to France be called shutting the door to the negotiation, the charge will again fall on the executive council, because they ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return, even *before* the British government did.

34. Witness the imprisonment of the Portuguese ambassador in Paris.

they would have arrested him, as an exciter of sedition, and have searched his papers. In fact any government whatsoever, which was not anxious to leave nothing unattempted, that might avert hostilities, would have refused Mr. Chauvelin, who was much more an apostle of rebellion, than a minister of peace, to remain after he had threatened an appeal to the people in his Note of the 27. of December. How much more then was it allowable, to dismiss him on the 24. of January, when all means of reconciliation had been exhausted, and the fixed determination of his employers, to attack Great Britain at all events, had been fully proved? Nor could it be said, that the British government dismissed a French *ambassador*: for Mr. Chauvelin *at that time* had no claim whatsoever to the title. He had been accredited by Louis XVI, and as long as the king of France was still alive, Mr. Chauvelin by virtue of the credentials, which the British government had received, might at least pretend, that he was the accredited minister of France. But after the death of the king of France, who was executed on the 21. of January, those credentials had ceased to be valid, and Mr. Chauvelin therefore could be considered only as a part of the general mass of foreigners resident in England. The new letters of credence from the executive council, which he had offered on the 17. of January, had been refused for the reasons

already assigned. His forfeited diplomatic character therefore was not restored: for before any individual acquires the privilege of an ambassador, his letters of credence must be first accepted by the government, to which he is designed to be accredited ³⁵. Consequently, by the death of Louis XVI. the sole hindrance to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, after the negotiation had been ended, was removed: and the cogent motives, which induced the British government at that time to send away every stranger, which endeavoured to excite insurrection, operated unrestrained.

Lastly, *under the existing circumstances*, after it was certain that Great Britain would be attacked at all events, the British government might surely be permitted to express its indignation at a cruel and wanton execution, which filled all Europe with horror. It was surely allowable to remove, even with tokens of displeasure, the agent of those, who had not only brought their own sovereign to the block, but openly threatened his Britannic majesty with a similar fate ³⁶, and Great Britain itself with destruction. It was allowable, not indeed to engage in a war with France,

35. The modern rulers of France have, of all men, the least right to call this position in question.

36. Ch. XIV. Note 28.

merely because the French had executed their king ³⁷, but certainly to censure the cruelty of his judges, when those very judges were determined, to engage in a war with Britain. And it was not only allowable, but even necessary, to render popular a war, which could no longer be avoided, to place the actions of the French rulers in the light, which they deserved, to contribute to the indignation, which was generally excited by their cruel conduct, and, by directing the sentiments of Britons to their proper channel, rouse them to a vigorous resistance against an implacable enemy, which had resolved "to set fire to the four corners of Europe." — When to these reasons we add the urgent motives, which at that time induced the British government to remove every foreigner, who acted like Mr. Chauvelin, we shall no longer be surpris'd at the following Note, which was sent to him by Lord Grenville on the 24. of January. "I am charged to notify "to you, Sir, that the character, with which you had "been invested at this court, and the functions of "which have been so long suspended, being now entire- "ly terminated by the fatal death of his most Chris-

37. Of this charge, which has been very falsely laid to the British ministry, the present work contains a complete confutation by proving, that the French rulers not only declared war, but provoked it.

"tian majesty, you have no longer any public character
 "here. The king can no longer, after such an event,
 "permit your residence here ³⁸. His majesty has

38. It is remarkable, that this passage was omitted in that copy of the French original, which appeared in the *Moniteur* 31. Jan. 1793, and runs thus. "Je suis chargé de vous notifier que le caractere dont vous avez été chargé auprès du Roi vient d'être terminé par la mort funeste de S. M. T. C. Sa majesté juge à propos que vous sortiez du royaume dans l'espace de huit jours. Je vous envoie un passeport pour vous et votre suite. Je prendrai toutes les précautions pour que vous entriez en France avec les égards dus à un ministre qui avait été accredité auprès du roi par sa majesté très-chrétienne., The passage however, which the French rulers thought proper to omit, has, together with a similar one in his Majesty's message to the two houses of parliament, been used in Great Britain as an argument, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed merely in consequence of the execution of Louis XVI. That he was dismissed in consequence of that event is certain: but we must not therefore conclude, that he was dismissed *merely* in consequence of that event, since it has been shewn that independently of that event there existed very urgent motives for his dismissal, and that it was the death of the king of France which removed the only obstacle to their operation. The execution of the king of France therefore may in *this* sense be said to have occasioned the removal of Mr. Chauvelin. But even if this argument be deemed inconclusive, and it be still asserted, that Mr. Chauvelin was ordered to leave England for no

"thought fit to order, that you should retire from this
 "kingdom within the term of eight days; and I here-
 "with transmit to you a copy of the order, which his
 "majesty in his privy council has given to this effect.
 "I send you a passport for yourself, and your suite:
 "and I shall not fail to take all the other necessary
 "steps in order, that you may return to France with
 "all the attentions, which are due to the character of
 "minister plenipotentiary from his most Christian ma-
 "jesty, which you have exercised at this court., —
 After all, should the arguments alleged in justification
 of the order, communicated to Mr. Chauvelin on the
 24. of January, be thought unsatisfactory, and should
 any one be still of opinion, that the British ministry

other reason, than because the king of France had been put
 to death, we can deduce no other inference, than that the
 British government *unnecessarily* furnished its enemy with a
 pretext for declaring war, as on the other hand, if the vali-
 dity of the above-assigned reasons for his dismissal be ad-
 mitted, the pretext was not unnecessarily afforded, to which
 the British government in other respects had no great neces-
 sity for attending, since they who are resolved on war, as it
 has been proved that the French rulers were long before the
 24. of January, are seldom at a loss for pretences, and in
 the list of grievances, with which the declaration of war was
 accompanied, the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin really made
 only one among eighteen.

would have acted more prudently, if they had waited till hostilities had been formally declared, which from the reasons assigned in the fourteenth chapter it was easy to foresee would soon take place, yet the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin can in no case be numbered among the *causes* of the war, because it has been unanswerably proved, that the French rulers had determined on a war with England and Holland, *before* that event ³⁹.

39. Yet a certain opposition writer, in defiance of all documents, has ventured to assert that, before the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, "France was undoubtedly solicitous for peace,,," whence, in order to throw the whole blame of the war on the British ministry, he would have his readers conclude, that it was that event, which *first* excited the idea of a war with England in the minds of those *pacific* rulers of republican France. On this subject however I beg leave to refer his readers to the seventh, tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth chapters of the present work, which relate to a period *prior* to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin. When the same writer says in another place, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed, because ministers were resolved to accept of no conditions of peace from France, he must have forgotten that it was the British government which *offered* conditions of peace, and that it was the *French* government, which *rejected* them. See the latter part of Ch. XIII. — It must be granted however, that the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin has found a very proper place in the pamphlet in question, because it is so far from

On the 25. of January, copies of all the Notes, which had been exchanged during the late negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, were laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British ambassador at the Hague, as the issue of it affected Holland in an equal degree with Great Britain. It was necessary to inform the government of that country, which was the most exposed to an attack, that the French executive council had rejected the conditions of peace, which had been offered by the British government, that it still insisted as well on the opening of the Schelde, as on the occupying the Austrian Netherlands with a French army during its own pleasure, and that it had given, as its Ultimatum, the assurance that, if the naval preparations in the British ports were continued, which Great Britain had commenced in self-defence, and which, as the proposed conditions were rejected, could not possibly be stopped, *it would prepare for war* ⁴⁰. The copies of the papers relative to the negotiation were accompanied likewise with a Note, in which Lord Auckland arraigned the conduct of the French rulers. He complained, that,

being a view of the *causes* of the war, that it is literally a view of the *pretexts* for it.

40. See the latter part of the Note of the executive council of Jan. 7.

though they assumed the title of philosophers, they endeavoured to destroy the received notions of subordination, manners, and religion, which had hitherto founded the security, the happiness, and the consolation of the human race. He complained, that, though the British government as well as the States General, had observed the most strict neutrality, and had carefully avoided all interference in the internal affairs of France, the rulers of that country endeavoured to excite an insurrection both in England and in Holland, while they were taking every measure for an invasion with a French army. But he assured the States General that the British government was determined to support its allies, to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of 1788, and to protect, to the utmost of its power, the United Provinces from the depredations of France. He reminded them of a small squadron, which had lately sailed from the Downs to protect the coast of Zealand ⁴¹, and then, declaring the readiness of

41. This small squadron consisted of a ship of 50 guns, two frigates of 36 guns, and four vessels of inferior force, and left the Downs at the beginning of January, under the orders of Commodore Murray. That it was designed merely to act on the defensive, was admitted in the *Journal de Paris* 12. Jan. 1793. where, after mention had been made of some Dutch ships, which had been ordered to join it, was added, "*Cette petite armée navale combinée a le double*

the British cabinet to co-operate with the States General in the defence of the United Provinces, he concluded in the following words. "Your high mightiness

but, de garder la Zélande, et de défendre l'ouverture de l'Escaut. That this small combined squadron was not designed to act on the offensive, appears further from the order sent by the States General to the Dutch Commodore, which in the words of the *Moniteur* 30. Jan. 1793 run thus. "Que dans le cas où des navires français armés se présenteront pour descendre la rivière il les laisse passer; mais en protestant, que si quelque navire prétend la monter, il tâche d'abord de l'en dissuader avec douceur, que cette voie se trouvant infructueuse, il montre de la fermeté; qu'enfin, au besoin, il repousse la force par la force., It was this small squadron, to which Dumouriez alluded in his letter to Miranda of the 10. of January, in which, speaking of the French gun vessels; which had already sailed up the Scheldé, and then lay before Antwerp, he gave Miranda the following information. "Le ministre de la marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonnières, pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges. Ces trois batimens tirent peu d'eau, et chasseront facilement les frégates, par la supériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges., Correspondence du Général Miranda p. 5. Miranda however replied on the 15. of January; (*ib.* p. 8.) that the French gun vessels would not be able to beat off the combined squadron; and the intended attack on Zealand was deferred. The assistance therefore sent to the Dutch arrived at a very seasonable juncture.

"ses have acknowledged these dispositions of his ma-
 "jesty in what he has done already. You will not
 "find them abated in the preparations, that are now
 "making. In consequence of which his majesty is
 "persuaded that he will continue to experience on the
 "part of your high mightinesses a perfect conformity
 "of principles and conduct. That conformity can
 "alone give to the united efforts of the two countries
 "the necessary energy for their common defence,
 "which will also oppose a barrier to the evils, with
 "which Europe is threatened, and secure from every
 "attempt the safety, tranquillity, and independence of
 "a state, the happiness of which is insured by your
 "high mightinesses, through the wisdom, and energy
 "of its government ⁴².

42. Certain opposition writers, who have extolled the
temperateness of the language used by the French rulers
 toward the British government, have not only severely cen-
 sured some expressions in this Note of Lord Auckland, but
 have applied them to palliate at least, if not to justify, the
 declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. More wretch-
 ed sophistry however cannot well be devised: for when the
 national convention declared war on the 1. of February, it
 had no knowledge of this Note. Consequently, it cannot
 be reckoned even among the *prettexts* for war, much less
 among the causes of it. That the Note was unknown to
 the national convention, when war was declared on the 1. of
 February is evident from the circumstance, that no mention

Three days, after the British ambassador at the Hague had delivered to the States General the papers

whatsoever was made of it, either in the debates, or in the list of grievances. See the *Moniteur* 2. and 3. Febr. 1793. Nor did it appear in the *Moniteur*, at that time the official paper of the French government, before the *sixth* of February. On the other hand if a copy of it had really reached Paris before the 1. of February, the omission of it in the list of grievances will prove that the French rulers themselves had no objections to make it. In either case therefore it cannot be numbered among the pretexts for war. — That it contains some warm expressions, which it is prudent to avoid in all diplomatic communications, cannot be denied: but then it must not be forgotten, that it was delivered to the States General after the negotiation with France was at an end, after war was fully decided, though not openly declared, after the British government had been loaded with a series of injuries and insults, after the most opprobrious language had been used by the French rulers even while the negotiation was pending, and lastly, that it was drawn up under the impression of the intelligence just arrived at the Hague of the condemnation of Louis XVI. To enable the reader however to judge, whether it contains any thing, which bears the most distant resemblance to the menacing language, which had been already repeatedly used by the French rulers, I will subjoin the *whole* Note in the French original, as printed in the *Moniteur* 6. Feb. 1793.

Hauts et puissans Seigneurs.

Le soussigné ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de S. M. Britannique, s'empresse en conséquence des

relative to the late negotiation, the following message was sent from his Majesty to the House of Commons.

ordres exprès du roi, de mettre sous les yeux de vos hautes puissances des copies de toutes les pieces qui ont été échangées depuis le 27. décembre dernier jusqu'au 20. de ce mois, entre Lord Grenville, secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. et M. Chauvelin. Le roi, hauts et puissans seigneurs, est dans la ferme persuasion que les sentimens et les principes, exprimés au nom de la Grande-Bretagne, sont parfaitement conformes à ceux qui animent votre Republique, et que vos hautes puissances sont disposées à concourir pleinement aux mesures que la crise actuelle exige, et qui sont une suite nécessaire de ces sentimens et de ces principes. Les circonstances qui nous ont menés à cette crise, sont trop récentes, et la conduite du roi est trop connue, pour que le soussigné soit dans le cas d'entrer dans de longs détails. Il n'y a pas encore quatre ans, que quelques malheureux, se qualifiant du nom de philosophes, ont eu la présomption de se croire capables d'établir un nouveau système de société civile. Afin de réaliser ce rêve de la vanité, il leur a fallu bouleverser et détruire toutes notions reçues de subordination, des moeurs, et de religion, qui ont fait jusqu'ici la sûreté, le bonheur et la consolation du genre humain. Leurs projets de destruction n'ont que trop réussi; mais les effets du nouveau système qu'ils ont voulu introduire, n'ont servi qu'à démontrer l'ineptie et la scélératesse de ses auteurs. Les événemens qui se sont si rapidement succédés depuis lors, surpassent en atrocité tout ce qui a jamais souillé la page de l'histoire. Les propriétés,

"His majesty has given directions for laying before the house of commons, copies of several papers

la liberté, la vie même, ont été les jouets de la rage effrénée des passions de l'esprit de rapine, de la haine, de l'ambition la plus cruelle et la plus dénaturée. Les annales du genre humain ne présentent pas d'époque, où dans un aussi court espace de tems on ait commis tant de crimes, causé tant de malheurs, fait verser tant de larmes : enfin, dans ce moment même, ces horreurs paraissent être parvenues à leur comble. Pendant tout ce tems, le roi environné de son peuple, qui jouissait par la protection divine d'une prospérité sans exemple, n'a pu voir les malheurs d'autrui qu'avec un pressentiment profond de pitié, et d'indignation ; mais, fidelle à ses principes, S. M. ne s'est jamais permis de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures d'une nation étrangère. Elle ne s'est jamais écartée du système de neutralité qu'elle avait adopté. Cette conduite que le roi a vu avec plaisir observée également par vos hautes puissances, dont toute l'Europe a reconnu la bonne foi, et qui aurait dû être respectée à tant d'autres titres, n'a pas réussi à mettre sa majesté, ses peuples et cette République, à l'abri des trames les plus dangereuses et les plus criminelles. Depuis quelques mois, des projets d'ambition et d'agrandissement, alarmans pour la tranquillité et la sureté de l'Europe entière, ont été publiquement avoués. On s'est efforcé de répandre dans l'intérieur de l'Angleterre, et de ce pays, des maximes subversives de tout ordre social, et l'on n'a pas même eu honte de donner à ces détestables tentatives le nom de pouvoir révolutionnaire. Des traités anciens et solennels, garantis par le roi, ont été enfreints ; et les droits et les territoires de la République ont été violés.

"which have been received from Mr. Chauvelin, late
"minister plenipotentiary from the most Christian king,

Sa majesté a donc cru dans sa sagesse devoir faire des préparatifs proportionnés à la nature des circonstances. Le roi a consulté son parlement, et les mesures que sa majesté avait trouvé bon de prendre, ont été accueillies par l'assentiment vif et unanime d'un peuple qui abhorre l'anarchie et l'irréligion, qui aime son roi et qui veut sa constitution. Tels sont, hauts et puissans seigneurs, les motifs d'une conduite, dont la sagesse et l'équité ont assez prouvé jusqu'ici au roi votre concert et votre coopération. Sa majesté, dans tout ce qu'elle a fait a constamment veillé au maintien des droits et de la sûreté des Provinces Unies. La déclaration que le soussigné a eu l'honneur de remettre à vos hautes puissances, le 13. novembre dernier, et l'arrivée d'une petite escadre destinée à protéger les parages de la République, pendant que ses propres forces se rassemblaient, en fournissent la preuve. Vos hautes puissances ont reconnu ces dispositions du roi dans tout ce que sa majesté a déjà fait. Elles ne les retrouveront pas moins dans les mesures qui se préparent. -En conséquence, sa majesté se persuade qu'elle continuera à éprouver de la part de vos hautes puissances une parfaite conformité de principes et de conduite. Cette conformité peut seule donner aux efforts réunis des deux pays, l'énergie nécessaire pour leur commune défense, opposer une barrière aux maux dont l'Europe est menacée, et mettre à l'abri de toute atteinte, la sûreté, la tranquillité et l'indépendance d'un Etat dont vos hautes puissances assurent le bonheur par la sagesse et la fermeté de leur gouvernement.

Fait à La Haye, le 25. janvier 1793. Auckland.

"by his majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs,
 "and of the answers returned thereto; and likewise
 "the copy of an order made by his majesty in council,
 "and transmitted by his majesty's commands to the
 "said Mr. Chauvelin, in consequence of the accounts
 "of the atrocious act recently perpetrated in Paris.
 "In the present situation of affairs, his majesty thinks
 "it indispensably necessary to make a further augmen-
 "tation of his forces by sea and land; and relies on
 "the known affection and zeal of the house of com-
 "mons to enable his majesty to take the most effectual
 "measures, in the present important conjuncture, for
 "maintaining the security and rights of his own domi-
 "nions; for supporting his allies; and for opposing
 "views of aggrandizement and ambition on the part
 "of France, which would be at all times dangerous to
 "the general interests of Europe, but are peculiarly
 "so, when connected with the propagation of prin-
 "ciples, which lead to the violation of the most sacred
 "duties, and are utterly subversive of the peace and
 "order of all civil society,, 43.

While the British government was thus engaged
 in preparing new measures of defence, and daily ex-
 pected to hear of a declaration of war against Great

43. A similar message was sent at the same time to the
 house of Lords.

Britain and Holland, General Dumouriez formed, or appeared to form, the resolution of attempting a new negotiation. It has been already related in the twelfth chapter, that the order of the executive council for the immediate invasion of the United Provinces was communicated by General Dumouriez on the 10. of January to General Miranda: and it is evident from his whole letter, that the project of invasion, if not proposed by him, had at least his complete approbation ⁴⁴. We have seen likewise, that the only reason, why

44. See Ch. XII. Notes 51. 52. where two long extracts are quoted from his letter, which clearly prove his approbation of the intended attack on the United Provinces, though every one who reads the first chapter of his *Memoirs*, without being acquainted with his private correspondence, would suppose the contrary. In his letter to Miranda he even called the plan *his own*, and said immediately after the passage quoted in Ch. XII. Note 52: “Je vous développerai *mon plan* de jour en jour. In the same letter he gave likewise to Miranda the following advice, in order to defray the expences of the expedition. “Faites vous donner une liste des capitalistes d’Anvers; appelez-les nominativement à l’hôtel de ville, faites-les y garder, et ne les relâchez pas, qu’ils n’aient pris une résolution et rempli l’emprunt, ou de bon gré ou forcément. Si c’est de bon gré, *touchez tout de suite deux millions de florins, pour les frais de l’expédition. Si c’est forcément, imposez-les; l’un à cinquante mille florins,*

why the project was not executed in the middle of January, was the want of magazines, which prevented Miranda from putting his troops in motion at the instant; and that the executive council, on Miranda's representations entered into a resolution on the 18. of January, by which it was not abandoned, but only deferred ⁴⁵. That *part* of it indeed, which related to Zealand, a province consisting entirely of islands, had in consequence of the seasonable arrival of a fleet of English and Dutch frigates, from which Miranda apprehended effectual resistance ⁴⁶, been so far altered, that it had been determined, either to make a false attack only on that quarter, or to leave the inva-

l'autre plus, l'autre moins, selon leurs facultés; et faites-les payer sous huitaine, en les faisant garder à vue chez eux."

An additional proof, that Dumouriez wholly approved of the invasion of Holland, is contained in his letter to Miranda of the 19. of January, which will be quoted presently.

45. See Ch. XII. Note 53.

46. In his letter to Dumouriez of the 15. of January, he said: "*Si vous laissez dehors de votre plan l'entreprise de la Zélande, il serait beaucoup plus praticable, à ce qu'il me paraît, et nous n'aurions pas à nous compromettre avec les forces maritimes de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande, qui ne laisseraient pas de nous arrêter au commencement même de notre entreprise, n'ayant pas de notre part des forces maritimes à leur opposer.*" *Correspondence du Général Miranda*, p. 8.

sion of Zealand to the persons, who called themselves Dutch patriots. But this partial arrangement had not affected the general plan: for the resolution to invade the United Provinces remained unaltered. On the 19. of January Dumouriez, who was then in Paris, had written to Miranda, "I am of opinion that, if the war with England and Holland is determined ⁴⁷, "only a false attack must be made on Zealand, that "we must make ourselves masters of Maestricht, Venlo, "Geldres, and Emmerick, take the route of Nimeguen "and the heights of Amersfort, turn Utrecht, gain "the sluice of Muyden, in which Marshal Luxembourg "failed in 1672, and thus we shall arrive without difficulty at Amsterdam. In this campaign, which ought "to be very rapid, *and on which I have long meditated* ⁴⁸, we must consider the patriots only as a trifling "accession, and we must trust to our own forces alone, "and to the means of conquest ⁴⁹. Zealand then falling of itself, with the isle of Walcheren, however strongly it may be fortified, becomes a poor retreat

47. Dumouriez well knew at that time, that it *was* determined, though he did not *say* so to Miranda. See the former part of Ch. XIV.

48. This passage deserves particular notice.

49. Yet in the manifesto, with which the invasion of Holland was soon afterwards accompanied, it was asserted that the French came merely as *friends and deliverers*.

"for the house of Orange and the administration of the country, because we shall join the Dutch marine to our own artillery, to penetrate thither, when nothing more remains," 50. — On the 23. of January Dumouriez again wrote to Miranda, and likewise from Paris, "I have informed you, my dear Miranda, that I have abandoned, as well as yourself, the project of Zealand: but this is an additional reason for pushing with the utmost vigour that of the attack on Maestricht, Venlo, and Nimeguen. I shall give howe-

50. "Je crois que si la guerre est décidée entre nous et la Hollande et l'Angleterre, il ne faut faire qu'une fausse attaque sur la Zélande, que nous devons occuper Maestricht, Venlo, Gueldres, Emmerick, nous rabattre sur Nimègue et par les hauteurs d'Amersfort, tourner Utrecht, gagner l'écuse de Muyden que le maréchal Luxembourg a manqué en 1672, alors nous arrivons sans difficulté à Amsterdam. Dans cette campagne, qui doit être très prompte, et que j'ai long-tems méditée, il ne faut compter les patriotes que comme un léger accessoire, et ne se fier qu'à ses propres forces et aux moyens de conquêtes. La Zélande alors tombée d'elle même et l'île Walcheren, fût-elle rendue inexpugnable, devient une pauvre retraite pour la maison d'Orange et pour les administrations du pays, parceque nous joindrons tous les moyens de la marine Hollandaise à tous nos moyens d'artillerie, pour y pénétrer, lorsque nous n'aurons plus que cela à faire." Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 11.

“ver to Caock and Bendels ⁵¹ the small succour which they require, in the opinion they entertain of succeeding with three or four thousand men, which is all that they have demanded of the executive council. In a few days I myself shall examine the whole matter on the spot ⁵².

Such were the circumstances, under which the resolution, in other respects apparently meritorious, of commencing a new negotiation with Great Britain and Holland, was formed by General Dumouriez ⁵³; in

51. Is not this an erratum for Daendels?

52. “Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j’abandonnais, comme vous, le projet de la Zélande; mais c’est une raison de plus pour pousser très-vigoureusement celui de l’attaque de Maestricht, Venlo et Nimègue. Je donnerai cependant peut-être à Caock et Bendels le petit secours qu’ils réclament, dans l’opinion où ils sont de réussir avec trois ou quatre mille hommes, qui est tout ce qu’ils ont demandé au conseil exécutif. J’examinerai cela moi-même sur les lieux sous peu de jours.” Ib. p. 14.

53. It was in his letter of the 23. of January, in which he so strongly recommended to Miranda, vigourously to push the sieges of the Dutch fortified towns, Maestricht, Venlo, and Nimeguen, that he gave Miranda the first intelligence of the intended negotiation, and at the same time mentioned, that he himself was the person, who was to conduct it. The circumstance, that in the same letter (Ib. p. 16.) he desired Miranda to keep the matter a profound secret, looked likewise mysterious.

which, if the national convention had permitted the execution of it, we should undoubtedly have heard as many galconades about *pacific dispositions and purity of intentions*, as in the late negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin. The whole project was evidently the work of Dumouriez alone: for the executive council took so little part in it, that of the five ministers, Le Brun, Garat, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, of which it was then composed ⁵⁴, the three last opposed it with all their force ⁵⁵; and Le Brun, though he was too fine a politician to *declare* himself against it, in which case, as he was minister for foreign affairs, it could not have been set on foot, took care however, as we shall presently see, that it should produce no effect. And as to Garat, who was the man that read the sentence of death to Louis XVI, and has since behaved with uncommon insolence to the sister of the late queen of France, a *sincere* desire, to promote a work of moderation

54. Roland, the minister of the interior, was at that time on the point of retiring, and no longer took part in public affairs, at least not in what related to foreign countries. See that chapter of the Memoires of Dumouriez, which is entitled *Retraite de Roland*.

55. Dumouriez speaking of the proposal of it, which he made to the executive council (Memoires, Tom. I. p. 130) says: "Claviere, Pache, et Monge s'opposerent de toute leur force à cette proposition."

and peace, would have been wholly inconsistent with his character. Nor does Dumouriez himself appear to have had any other object in view, than to amuse a little longer the English and Dutch governments ⁵⁶, as toward the end of January some obstacles presented themselves to the intended invasion of Holland ⁵⁷.

To set however the negotiation, or rather pretended negotiation, on foot, two persons, De Maulde and Maret ⁵⁸, were despatched from Paris, the one to the Hague, the other to London. "It was determined "(says Dumouriez ⁵⁹) that De Maulde, under the pretence of settling his personal affairs should repair to "the Hague, that Noel should be recalled and placed "elsewhere, and that the General (Dumouriez) should "furnish De Maulde with a letter to Lord Auckland, "signifying, that he should arrive at Antwerp on the "1. of February to inspect the winter quarters of his "army, and that, as he had learnt from his friend De "Maulde, that his Lordship had spoken of him with

56. This will be rendered at least highly probable in a following note.

57. This will presently appear from his own description.

58. De Maulde had been French ambassador at the Hague, whence, he was lately returned. With Mr. Maret the reader is already acquainted.

59. *Memoires*, Tom. I. p. 130.

"respect and confidence, it would be very agreeable to
 "him, if an opportunity presented itself of conferring
 "with Lord Auckland on the frontiers, because the
 "conference might be beneficial to humankind in ge-
 "neral, and to the two nations in particular. It was
 "determined likewise that, if Lord Auckland, as was
 "expected, gave his consent, the General should hold
 "a conference, and that he might thence, in case it
 "were necessary, even go over to England. — "As
 "soon as De Maulde (says Dumouriez further ⁶⁰) ar-
 "rived at the Hague at the latter end of January, he
 "immediately waited on Lord Auckland, and delivered
 "to him the letter of General Dumouriez. *This minister*
 "*expressed great pleasure at the proposal*, and said to
 "De Maulde that, as the interests of England and Hol-
 "land were inseparable, he would communicate the
 "proposal to the grand pensionary, van Spiegel, and
 "deliberate with him on the subject. The latter like-
 "wise consented to take part in the conference with
 "Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez. His Lordship
 "sent three successive packet boats to England: and
 "De Maulde sent his secretary to Antwerp, where the
 "General, after having visited the coast, from Dunkirk to
 "that place, arrived on the 2. of February. — Having
 "every where found the greatest disorder on his whole

"journey from Paris (as Dumouriez further relatés ⁶¹)
 "and perceiving that his embarrassments were daily in-
 "creasing, the General greatly rejoiced at the progress,
 "which De Maulde had made in the negotiation. He
 "sent immediately a courier to Le Brun with the origi-
 "nal answer of Lord Auckland, who had informed
 "him, that the grand pensionary of Holland and him-
 "self were agreed to come to the borders, in order to
 "hold the conference with the general; that he had
 "despatched several packet boats to England, *to obtain*
"the consent of his court, and instructions relative the
"conference ⁶²; that the answer would soon arrive,

61. Ib. 140.

62. Pour en obtenir la permission et des instructions relatives à cette conference. — The circumstance that Lord Auckland, before he could hold the conference, was obliged to send to England, not only for instructions, but even for *permission* to hold it, sufficiently proves, that the British ministers were not the movers of the new negotiation. It is true that, according to the account of Dumouriez (*Memoires* T. I. p. 128.), before De Maulde had given up his former embassy at the Hague, he had been assured by Lord Auckland, that the British cabinet would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez; and it appears likewise (Ib. p. 128.) that Mr. Pitt himself had expressed himself to the same purpose. On what particular occasions these declarations were made, or what was the conversation which gave rise to them, Dumouriez has not related: but in regard

“and that it was by no means his design to amuse the general, or to delay his plans and preparations for the next campaign.

to the time, they cannot have been made later than the end of December. For De Maulde, on his return from his former embassy at the Hague arrived at Paris within a few days after Dumouriez, who arrived there on the 1. of January (Ib. p. 39. 128): and the French agent, Benoit, who had brought the account, that Mr. Pitt would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez, arrived there at the same time (Ib. p. 128). This precise determination is not superfluous, because after the 13. of January, the day on which the Ultimatum of the executive council was delivered, all hopes of preserving peace had vanished. *After that time* therefore it could not occur to the British ministry to *propose* another negotiation, though at the end of the month, when De Maulde himself proposed it, they very prudently consented, not only because a refusal would have exposed them to the reproach of having neglected an opportunity to prevent a rupture, but because, however well founded the expectations of a war may be, yet, till it has been actually declared, there always remains at least a *possibility* of the contrary. Mr. Pitt however declared in the house of commons on the 1. of February (see the debates of that day) that he considered it as in the highest degree improbable, that a new negotiation would produce any effect: and experience proved how rightly he judged, for it was on that very day, that the national convention, refusing to await the issue of the negotiation, declared war on Great Britain and Holland..

"The despatch of De Maulde, with which that
 "of Lord Auckland was accompanied, explained every

Since then the British government acted a mere *passive* part in this business, all suspicion of a design to amuse the French government by the negotiation, must fall of itself to the ground; and it is obvious that, when preparations are made for a negotiation, it is the party only, which makes those preparations, and not the party, which simply gives its assent, that can be exposed to such a suspicion. It is very extraordinary therefore that Dumouriez could venture to write (Memoires T. I. p. 137.) "*on pourrait croire que le ministre Pitt n'aurait voulu qu'amuser le général Dumouriez* : and his pretended proof is still more extraordinary, namely "*le traité de la cour de St. James avec celle de Turin, qui est de la même époque, confirme cette opinion*. This assertion, which other writers, British as well as French, have faithfully copied without inquiring into its truth, contains so gross an error, as is hardly to be expected from any man, who lays claim to the character of an historian. For so far was the treaty with the court of Turin from being *of the same epoch*, that not even the *preliminaries* were signed till *twelve weeks afterward*. They are dated 25. April 1793, and, as appears from Art. 5., the ratification was to take place within two months after *that* time. Further the preliminaries were signed, not at Turin, but in London, which obviates the objection, which might otherwise be made, that the order given by the British cabinet for signing them preceded, by some time, the signature itself. Lastly that hostilities had been declared against Great Britain, before the preliminary articles were even drawn up, appears from

"thing, which had passed between them. Great indignation had been expressed at the atrocious act late

the first article, which begins thus. "Leurs Majestés le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et le Roi de Sardaigne, *se trouvant engagés dans une guerre contre la France* en conséquence des actes les plus injurieux de violence et d'aggression. See Martens Recueil des principaux traités. T. V. p. 144—149.

Having shewn that the charge of duplicity, which Dumouriez has very artfully laid to the British ministers, is wholly unfounded, we will next examine, whether he himself was not guilty of that very fault, which he has unjustly laid to his opponents. His letter to Miranda of the 23. of January, in which he recommended to him, vigourously to push the sieges of several *Dutch* fortified towns, is certainly not to be reconciled with the supposition, that the negotiation, which he was planning *at that very time* (see above Note 53), was seriously intended by him, as the means of *preventing* a war with England and Holland. What other object then could he have had in view but to amuse a little longer the English and Dutch governments, that they might be the less prepared for the intended attack? And this is further confirmed by the letter, which he wrote to Miranda from Antwerp on the fifth of February. On this day, strange as it may appear, Dumouriez had no knowledge of the declaration of war: for he himself relates (*Memoires* Tom. I. p. 142. 143) that Le Brun sent him no information of it, that he first learnt it from the public newspapers, and that not before the *seventh* of February. On the seventh, Miranda likewise had received no official intelligence of it, as appears

ly perpetrated in Paris: but as De Maulde assured
 “both ministers (the English and the Dutch) that Ge-

from his letter of that day to the war minister, Pache. See
 Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 20. Consequently,
 as Dumouriez, on the second of February had received intel-
 ligence from Lord Auckland, that he had sent to London
 for instructions, the interval between the *second* and the
seventh of February was to Dumouriez a state of uncertainty,
 in which the dictates of strict integrity certainly enjoined
 him, to abstain from every at least unconditional order for
 the invasion of Holland. Yet on the *fifth* of February he
 wrote from Antwerp to Miranda, and gave him the most
 positive and unconditional order to take Venlo immediately
 by surprise, and added, “je ferai l’investissement de Maestricht
 avec le reste de la grosse artillerie, pour brusquer cette place,
 comme vous brusquerez Venlo, où vous ne devez pas trou-
 ver de résistance, n’y ayant point de garnison.” Correspond-
 dence du Général Miranda, p. 17. 18. — These circumstances
 I mention not so much with the view of accusing General
 Dumouriez, who well knew the resolution of his government,
 to attack England and Holland at all events, and therefore
 thought it necessary to act accordingly, as of shewing how
 very ill it becomes him, to transfer the charge of duplicity
 to those who acted with the utmost integrity. With equal
 injustice has he accused likewise the British government of
 irritating that of France by dismissing Mr. Chauvelin even
 after the new negotiation was begun: for the very first pro-
 posal of it was made by De Maulde at the Hague, *after* the
 order had been sent to Mr. Chauvelin in London. Conse-

“neral Dumouriez himself was penetrated with the
 “same sentiments, and felt equal indignation, that
 “dreadful catastrophe presented no obstacles to the ne-
 “gotiation. It was decided therefore without diffi-
 “culty that, as soon as Lord Auckland received the
 “answer from his court, the conference should be hol-
 “den at Moerdyk on board a yacht of the Prince of
 “Orange, which was ordered to be fitted up for the
 “reception of the general.

During the time that De Maulde was on his jour-
 ney to the Hague, Mr. Maret was despatched to Lon-
 don, to propose the intended negotiation to the Bri-
 tish ministry. The object of Mr. Maret’s mission, as
 Dumouriez himself, who was the mover of the whole
 business, relates, was merely to inquire, whether Mr.
 Pitt was really desirous of treating with General Du-
 mouriez ⁶³, and, in case he were, to procure for Du-
 mouriez a passport, to come over to England ⁶⁴. The

quently the inference, which Dumouriez thence deduces,
 “on peut donc leur reprocher autant qu’aux Français,” falls
 of itself to the ground.

63. “Il fut décidé que Maret, qui avait déjà fait plusieurs
 voyages en Angleterre, y serait renvoyé pour savoir de Mr.
 Pitt, si réellement il souhaitait traiter personnellement avec le
 général Dumouriez.” *Memoires de Dumouriez*, T. I. p. 131.

64. In his letter to Miranda of the 23. of January he
 said: “On envoie demain un agent secret fort connu de

twenty fourth of January was the day, which had been appointed for Mr. Marer's departure from Paris⁶⁵: but Le Brun, under the pretence of giving previous information to Mr. Pitt by means of a person, who had already acted as mediator between him and Mr.

M. Pitt et de M. Fox, pour demander aux deux partis, c'est à dire à la nation toute entiere, un sauf-conduit pour moi, et l'assurance d'être bien venu, quelque succès qu'ait la mission." Correspondance de Miranda, p. 15. — Of what use a *sauf-conduit* from the opposition party could be to a French ambassador, it is not easy to determine: but thus much is clear from the passage, that the French rulers never lose sight of their favourite maxim, and that they must always have *something* to do with those, who act in opposition to government. In fact, the whole conduct of the negotiation is involved in mystery. If Dumouriez really intended to go over to England, and to negotiate with the cabinet ministers in person, what necessity was there for a conference with the British ambassador at the Hague? And on the other hand, if he intended to negotiate on the frontiers of Holland with the British ambassador at the Hague, what necessity was there for sending a person to pave the way for his reception in London? To negotiate in both places was useless. How then is the enigma, that a person was sent to London, as well as to the Hague, to be solved? Perhaps by the supposition, that it was deemed expedient to amuse *both* governments at the *same* time.

65. This appears from the passage quoted in the preceding note.

Maret ⁶⁶, but in reality, as Dumouriez himself believes, with the view of counteracting the negotiation ⁶⁷, protracted Mr. Maret's departure, and, in con-

66. *Memoires de Dumouriez. T. I. p. 133.* The person here meant is probably Mr. Miles.

67. *Ib.* But the *motive* which Dumouriez assigns for Le Brun's conduct is certainly false: for he says, "Dans le fait, le général a eu lieu de presumer, que Le Brun, piqué de ce que la cour de St. James ne voulait pas traiter avec lui comme ministre des affaires étrangères de la république, ni avec la convention, n'était pas fâché de faire manquer cette négociation sans y paraître." That Le Brun was resolved to counteract the negotiation, may be readily admitted; but this resolution must be ascribed to the motives alleged in the fourteenth chapter of the present work, and certainly not to any supposed refusal on the part of the British government to treat with Le Brun. On the contrary, it was Le Brun, from whom Mr. Maret, at Mr. Pitt's own request, had desired instructions to negotiate, and which Le Brun had refused: it was Le Brun, who communicated the instructions to Mr. Chauvelin: it was Le Brun, who had signed with his own hand the note of the executive council on the 7. of January. Besides, Dumouriez himself, had the proposed negotiation been carried into effect, must likewise have been first empowered by Le Brun, as the minister for foreign affairs: for, though the character of General might enable him to enter into a *military* convention with another general, yet he could not conclude a *political* treaty with an ambassador, till he had received full powers from his own government.

sequence, Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the *twenty sixth* of January ⁶⁸. As soon as he had landed at Dover ⁶⁹, he formed the resolution of writing to Le Brun,

The consent of the British cabinet therefore, to negotiate with Dumouriez, was again a consent to negotiate with those, in whose name, and in whose name alone, he did or could act. — Hence also another objection is removed, which, as well as the former, has been made to the British cabinet by a writer of our own country, namely, that it was absurd to think of treating with a general: as if a treaty with a general, when he assumes the character of *ambassador*, were not as much a treaty with his government, as when that character is assumed by a person in the civil line.

68. That Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the *twenty sixth* of January appears from a comparison of the following passages in the Memoirs of Dumouriez. “Le depart de Maret fut retardé assez mal-a-propos, et n'eut lieu que *le jour même du départ du général*. — *Le général Dumouriez partit le 26. Janvier*. Tom. I. p. 133. 134. He says the same also, p. 142. Again he says of himself p. 39. *arrivé dans la capitale le premier Janvier*: and p. 94. *le général Dumouriez traita les affaires pendant les vingt-six jours qu'il a passés à Paris*. This precise determination of the day, when Mr. Maret left Paris, is of great importance, as will appear in the sequel.

69. All that is here said of Mr. Maret, after his arrival in England, is grounded on the authentic relation of Mr. Miles, who was an intimate friend of Mr. Maret, who saw him every day during his stay in London; and at whose

Brun, to demand fresh instructions, probably (as he was now in England, and recollected his former favourable reception with Mr. Pitt) with the view of acting for himself: for we have seen that, when he left Paris, he had no other commission, than to pave the way for Dumouriez ⁷⁰. But whatever was his motive, whether he really intended to act for himself, or whether the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, whom he met on the road, suggested to him the necessity of an alteration in his instructions relative to Dumouriez, it is certain that he *did* write, and in very pressing terms, for fresh instructions, and moreover that he declared in his letter to Le Brun, "*that he should not desire an interview with the English minister, until fresh in-*

house Mr. Maret appears to have lodged, as Mr. Miles in a letter, which he had lately written to him, had said, *venez donc sans crainte, descendez chez moi, et considérez ma maison comme la vôtre*. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 109. Mr. Miles's relation is given in the just-mentioned work p. 101 — 104. and contains partly facts, to which he himself was eye-witness, and partly facts, for which, as he expressly attests, he had Mr. Maret's own authority. Consequently all random reports, which agree not with Mr. Miles's relation, must be declared fabulous.

⁷⁰. See Notes 62. 63. Mr. Miles likewise represents Mr. Maret's mission as only "*preparatory to the projected embassy of Dumouriez*." Authentic Correspondence p. 102.

structions arrived" ⁷¹. As soon as he had written to Le Brun, he went immediately from Dover to London: but having determined to demand no interview, or to discuss any matters of state, till his fresh instructions should arrive, he did not make any overture to the British ministry, even in regard to the embassy of Dumouriez. It is true, that he sent a short note to Lord Grenville: but this note contained nothing more than the notification, "*that he had come over to take charge of the diplomatic papers in the house of the French envoy*" ⁷². In the mean time he waited for his fresh instructions from Le Brun, which he had so pressinglly solicited: yet, though he staid in London *eight days* ⁷³, and therefore at least till the *fourth* of February ⁷⁴, he not only received not the expected

⁷¹. *Ib.*

⁷². *Ib.*

⁷³. Mr. Miles expressly says, p. 102. "His stay in London was *eight days*."

⁷⁴. It has been already shewn that Mr. Maret left Paris on the twenty sixth of January. He could not possibly therefore have reached London before the twenty eighth. Consequently, as he staid *eight days* there, we cannot fix his departure at an earlier day than the *fourth* of February, even if we include likewise the day of his arrival. But as Mr. Miles says p. 103. that they took leave of each other at midnight, he departed, at the *soonest*, in the night between the fourth and the fifth of February.

instructions, but not even a *single line or direction* ⁷⁵. But on the fourth of February the declaration of war, which had taken place on the first, was known in London: and after that time it was useless to think of negotiations. Mr. Maret therefore sent a letter to Lord Grenville, to take leave, and returned to Paris ⁷⁶. — Thus ended the celebrated mission of Mr. Maret, which would afford an additional proof, if additional proof were necessary, that the French government was determined at all events, to avoid a reconciliation with Great Britain: for otherwise it would not have refused to grant to an agent, who was already on the spot, to an agent, with whom Mr. Pitt had already expressed a readiness to negotiate, the in-

⁷⁵. This, says Mr. Miles p. 103, Mr. Maret expressly declared at the time of their taking leave.

⁷⁶. This letter, and the above-mentioned note, constituted the whole of Mr. Maret's negotiation, if it can be so called. Mr. Miles's own words, p. 103. where he speaks of the above-mentioned note, are: "This was all the intercourse that passed, and all the communication, that was made to any of his Majesty's ministers, except a letter, which was sent by Mr. Maret at the instant of his final departure from London." — Mr. Pitt likewise on the 12. of February 1793 (see the parliamentary debates) declared in the house of commons, *that Mr. Maret during his whole stay in London had proposed to his majesty's ministers no questions of state whatsoever.*

Instructions which that agent required. A compliance however with Mr. Maret's request was not to be expected, since among the members of the executive council, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, were from the very beginning inimical to the whole negotiation, and Le Brun, though he did not declare himself against it, secretly counteracted its operation ⁷⁷.

77. On Mr. Maret's mission to England at the end of January 1793 were propagated as many false reports, as on the conference which he had holden with Mr. Pitt in December: and these false reports, in defiance of Mr. Pitt's declaration in the House of Commons on the 12. of February 1793, have been adopted and repeated by his adversaries, both writers and orators, as unquestionably true. Immediately after the passage, which has been quoted in Ch. XIII. Note 32. relative to the pretended instructions of Mr. Maret on the former occasion, is added. "As the first mission of Mr. Maret was however not attended with any effect, he "was sent again from the executive council with enlarged "powers. It was asserted at that time, that his object was "to propose to the British ministry *the cession of some of the* "most valuable West India islands, and the annexing of the "Netherlands to the Dutch republic, provided this arrangement should mutually prove agreeable to the States General and the Belgic congress. Mr. Maret was however, we believe, never permitted to produce his credentials." — Now the notion, that the French government was ready to give up the Netherlands, and still more so, that it was ready to abandon some of the most valuable of the West India islands,

While Mr. Maret was in London, in vain expecting instructions from the executive council, the Bri-

is in itself so absurd, and is so completely contradicted by the avowed principles of the French rulers, and by the Notes, which had been already delivered to Lord Grenville, that nothing but the height of party prejudice could have induced any man, who was the least acquainted with the history of the times, to believe in it. And that Mr. Maret really had no such instructions, is evident not only from the relation of Mr. Miles, but from the account given by Dumouriez himself, who represents Mr. Maret as a person sent merely to pave the way for *his* reception. To the passages already quoted may be added Mr. Miles's declaration p. 103 that *Mr. Maret had very little to say*: and what *that little* was has been shewn in the Notes 63. 64. As to the assertion, that he never was permitted to produce his credentials, we have already seen, that even if he had any, he never once *offered* to produce them. To the passages above-quoted may be added the following declaration of Mr. Miles, p. 101. "That all intercourse with him was refused by the king's servants, I positively deny, and for the best of all possible reasons, because *it had never been solicited*. On the same authority that I contradicted the former assertion, I deny this; *the authority of Mr. Maret*, who may certainly be allowed to know as much of the matter, as those, who on such little foundation have repeatedly urged it in parliament etc." Even therefore if the report had been true, that Mr. Maret was authorized to make advantageous proposals, yet, as none were made, nor even *offered* to be made,

tish government received the intelligence from Lord Auckland, that De Maulde was arrived at the Hague, and had proposed a negotiation between his Lordship and General Dumouriez. Now though the conduct both of the national convention and of its executive

no blame could have attached to the British ministry. Lastly, as to the notion, which was likewise propagated with great assiduity, that Mr. Maret, as soon as he landed in England, received an order from government to quit the country, a notion, which even Dumouriez, (who after the 26. of January 1793 never returned to Paris, never again saw Mr. Maret, and therefore had no certain intelligence of what happened to him in England) has credulously adopted from the rumours of the day, it is confuted at once by the indisputable fact, that Mr. Maret remained eight days in London, and till after the intelligence arrived of the declaration of war. — It is true, that since the publication of the *Authentic Correspondence* by Mr. Miles in the year 1796, no one has ventured to say any thing more about Mr. Maret and his pretended instructions: but as, on the other hand, I know of no one, who, having related those idle reports as indisputable facts, has afterwards had the generosity to inform his readers or hearers, that those reports are the mere inventions of party malevolence, and as the *Authentic Correspondence* does not appear to be so generally known, as a work of such high importance deserves, the above-quoted extracts from it are not superfluous, because not every one, who had heard of those reports, has likewise heard of their confutation.

council had been uniformly such, as demonstrated the firm resolution of the French rulers to engage in a war with Great Britain, and consequently the improbability, if not impossibility, that they seriously intended to effect a reconciliation, yet the British government, to avoid the reproach, which would have resulted from a refusal, immediately consented to the negotiation, and authorized Lord Auckland to treat with General Dumouriez ⁷⁸. On the receipt of his instructions, Lord Auckland despatched a courier to the general, who was then at Antwerp, and proposed the tenth of February for the day of holding the first conference ⁷⁹. But no conference whatsoever took place: for the national convention, which, instead of awaiting the issue of the negotiation, resolved from the very beginning to pay not the least attention to it ⁸⁰, had already on the first of February un-

78. See the *Memoires de Dumouriez*, Tom. I. p. 143.

79. *Ib.*

80. What little attention the French government paid to the negotiation even from the beginning of it, may be collected from the circumstance, *that it was on the very day, on which the proposal was made to the British minister at the Hague, that the order was issued to lay an embargo on all British vessels in the French ports.* See Lord Grenville's speech in the House of Lords on the 12. of February 1793. What a contrast does this conduct form with the behaviour of the

animously decreed war against Great Britain and Holland.

British government, which consented to the proposal of Dumouriez, though the intelligence of the embargo arrived in London on the very same day with the first courier from Lord Auckland! See Mr. Pitt's speech in the House of Commons on the 12. of February. — It requires therefore a more than usual want either of knowledge or of integrity, to represent, on the one hand, the French government as candid and solicitous for peace, and to accuse the British government, on the other hand, of duplicity and a desire for war. The authentic documents, which have been produced in the present work, sufficiently demonstrate that the charge must be inverted. Indeed the question may be fairly asked: Is it possible, that men of talents and reading, professed speakers or writers on political subjects, should have remained wholly ignorant of all these documents? But if they were not, how could they venture to set them at open defiance, to substitute romance for history, and calumny for justice?

CHAPTER XVI.

State of parties in France at the beginning of the year 1793. Junction of Robespierre's party with that of Brissot, on the subject of the war with Great Britain. The decree for war voted without one dissenting voice. Eighteen pretexts alleged in justification of it. Confutation of those pretexts. General recapitulation, and conclusion.

THE two great parties, into which the national convention was divided at the beginning of the year 1793, were headed, the one by Robespierre, the other by Brissot. The former were denominated, sometimes by the name of Jacobins, at other times by the appellation of anarchists¹: the latter, though originally only a younger branch of the Jacobin family, had assumed the title of Girondists, because many of the members of it were from the department of the Gironde, and they were distinguished likewise by the title of Brissotines, from the name of their leader². The prin-

1. This last title was usually given them by their opponents.

2. Beside these two great parties, there were indeed some inferior factions, and subdivisions: but they were either of no importance, or they arranged themselves under the standards of the two principal parties.

cial members of the Girondist party were men of talents and education, whereas the Jacobins, though many of them were not devoid of natural abilities, were for the most part unlettered enthusiasts. The one had been educated in the school of French philosophy, and in the tenets of the encyclopedists: the other had learnt no other maxims, than those which were suggested by anarchy and brutal violence. In regard to morality there was this only difference between them, that the Jacobins set all honour and religion at *open* defiance, while the Girondists, who in their hearts possessed as little of either, had acquired from their education the habit of concealing their sentiments, and of veiling their iniquity under the mask of probity. The former were the iconoclasts, the latter the jesuits of the revolution.

These two parties had divided the power of France since the deposition of the king, and had been engaged in one continual struggle for the supreme ascendancy. But on the subject of the war with Great Britain and Holland they formed a perfect junction³, and were animated with similar principles and similar

3. "Les deux factions se reunirent, pour prendre sans reflexion, sans deliberation, sans discussion, le parti le plus violent et le plus temeraire." *Memoires de Dumouriez*, Tom. I. p. 143.

desires. The motives to this war, which have been assigned in the fourteenth chapter, operated equally on every member of the convention, and the hope of ruining the ancient rival of France smothered for a while their habitual animosity. Nay, so completely unanimous were the members of the convention on this occasion, that though seven members, out of the seven hundred and fifty, had voted against the war with Austria, yet the war with Great Britain and Holland was decreed *without one dissenting voice* ⁴. Equally remarkable is it, that this union of the two parties was soon converted into the most violent enmity: for no sooner did they find themselves disappointed in their expectations of the conquest of Holland as a preparatory step to the conquest of England, no sooner had Dumouriez, instead of carrying all before him, as in the preceding campaign, been obliged by the defeat at Neerwinden, to abandon the Austrian Netherlands, than they began to make each other the most bitter reproaches. "Who was it that provoked the war? The *Anarchists alone*: yet *they* lay the charge to *our* door," said Brissot in his address to his constituents ⁵. And not only was

4. On demande de toutes parts à aller aux voix. Le décret est porté à l'unanimité. Moniteur 3. Feb. 1793.

5. "Qui donc a provoqué cette guerre? Les anarchistes seuls! Et cependant ils nous en font un crime." Brissot à

the accusation reciprocal, but the means, which each party adopted to render the other odious to the nation, in consequence of the declaration of war, were equal. For Brissot asserted that the Anarchists or Jacobins were instruments in the hands of foreign powers ⁶, while the same ridiculous charge was laid by the Anarchists to Brissot ⁷. But as the Girondists, through causes, which it would be foreign to the present history

ses Commettans p. 71. — Dumouriez likewise, though he had left the party of the Jacobins, says of Brissot and Le Brun, "Ils ont, l'un et l'autre, *provoqué la déclaration de guerre contre l'Angleterre et la Hollande.*" Vie de Dumouriez, Tom. III. p. 385. He does not however confine the blame to the Girondists alone, for he ascribes an equal share of it to the Jacobins. "Quant à Brissot, il profitait de l'occasion, pour insulter, comme à son ordinaire, les rois et les peuples; *en, quoi il était bien secondé par Barrere, et par le parti des Jacobins.*" Memoires de Dumouriez, T. I. p. 143.

6. He calls them (A ses Commettans, p. 58.) ces meneurs, qui sciemment ou insciemment étaient *les instrumens des puissances étrangères.*

7. They gave him the title of Allié de Pitt. See what was said on this subject, in Ch. I. Note 6. — In fact the two parties were so liberal in the application of these titles, that even the monster Robespierre was called a *Royalist*: for a philippic published by Louvet, who was of the Gironde party, was entitled, A Maximilien Robespierre et à ses *Royalistes.*

to investigate ⁸, were soon overpowered by the oppo-

8. The author of a popular pamphlet, published in the year 1797, ascribes, with his usual accuracy, the fall of Brissot, and the ascendancy of Robespierre, to the part which Brissot took in the declaration of hostilities, a part, which this author himself cannot deny, though he endeavours to palliate it by saying, "the part that *even* Brissot etc." He had probably never heard, that Robespierre voted for the war with England, as well as Brissot, that in this respect therefore they were *perfectly equal*, and consequently that the fall of the one and the ascendancy of the other must be owing to some other cause. He had heard probably the exclamations of the victorious party alone, which overwhelmed the exclamations of the conquered party, not because they had a greater share of justice on their side, but merely because they were victorious. A minute investigation of the causes, which gave the Jacobins the advantage over the Girondists, lies, as already observed, without the limits of the present history: but perhaps it will not be superfluous, cursorily to remark, that the two following were the principal. First the wavering and inconsistent conduct of the Girondists on the trial of the king: for, though the principal members of this party voted, with only one or two exceptions, for his death, they insisted that, before he was executed, the sentence should be confirmed by the primary assemblies. But in this attempt they failed, and thus they gave the advantage out of their own hands, of which the Jacobins, who were *consistent* in their infamy, and exposed therefore no weak side to their adversaries, knew how to make a proper use: for in a struggle between two unprincipled parties, that

site party, it was the natural consequence, that they alone suffered for the common crime⁹; and Brissot, party, which goes the greatest length, will generally succeed. The other grand cause of the ascendancy of the Jacobins was their almost unlimited influence at the beginning of the year 1793 over the sections of the city of Paris, which at that time were vested with so much power, that the party supported by them was certain of governing the whole nation. This influence the jacobins acquired, partly by their intrigues, which enabled them to fill the principal offices in the sections with their own creatures, and partly by the system of terrorism, in which the Federates, as they were called, rendered them essential service. Prepared in this manner, the Jacobins found no difficulty, in the spring of the year 1793, of overthrowing their adversaries, even on the most futile pretext. But cause and pretext are very frequently confounded by superficial observers, especially, if he, who uses the pretext, is successful. It is not extraordinary therefore that during the long reign of Robespierre and his associates, the notion, that they were innocent in regard to the war with England, was gradually propagated, and adopted by superficial writers, who knew not that the war was *unanimously* decreed. On the other hand it must be admitted, that opposition writers act with perfect consistency, in endeavouring to remove the blame of the war from any party in France, because, if they could succeed in the attempt, they would find it so much the more easy to transfer the blame to the British government.

9. When the Jacobins brought Brissot with his associates to the bar, one of the principal charges laid to him was,

with his associates, ended his life on the scaffold, while Robespierre and his accomplices ascended the throne ¹⁰. Which of the two parties was most deserving of the guillotine it is unnecessary at present to examine: but thus much as least is obvious, that the reciprocal accusation of having involved France in a war with Britain, is a tacit acknowledgement from *both* parties, that not to the British, but to the French government alone its origin must be assigned.

The proposal of it in the convention fell to the lot of Brissot; not because Brissot was more inclined to a war with England, than Robespierre, but solely because Brissot happened to be at that time the orator of the diplomatic committee, and of the committee of general defence, which two united committees the national convention on the 30. of January had ordered to present within two days a report relative to Great Britain ¹¹, or, as the committees well understood, to propose a declaration of war. And it cannot be de-

that he had involved France in a war with England: to which Brissot very properly replied, it was the assembly of the nation, not I, who decreed the war. See the *Moniteur* Oct. 27. 1793. Supplement, 2. feuille. But this argument could not prevail against the *jus fortioris*.

10. *Committunt eadem diverso crimina fato;*

Ille crucem sceleris pretium tulit, hic diadema.

11. *Moniteur* 31. Jan. 1793.

nied, that the orator of the committees executed his commission with fidelity: for his whole speech contained one continued invective against the British government, which undoubtedly gratified the ears of the whole assembly ¹². As soon as he had ended his speech, he completed the execution of his trust by proposing, in the name of the committees, a declaration of war against Great Britain and Holland. Ducos seconded the motion ¹³: and, as no one in the whole assembly spoke against it, the cry of *vote, vote*, resounded from every quarter, and the war was immediately decreed without one dissenting voice ¹⁴. Further,

12. His speech is printed at full length in the *Moniteur* 2. Febr. 1793. The following passage may serve as a specimen. "La nation Anglaise une fois éclairée par notre exemple, fera justice aussi de ses *conspirateurs en place*. La comédie de Péternel procès de Hastings ne se renouvellera plus, et les échaffauds serviront encore une fois aux *Straffords* et aux *Lauds* du régime actuel, comme aux *simples brigands*." But unfortunately for this Allié de Pieu, who spoke so respectfully of his friends, the prophecy, like most other prophecies of the French rulers, was fulfilled only in the prophet himself.

13. The speech of Ducos, which was delivered in the same strain with that of Brissot, is printed in the *Moniteur* of the 3. of February.

14. See Note 4.

ther, as the favourite maxim of the French rulers, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," never forsakes them, was voted, on the proposal of Fabre d'Eglantine, and on the recommendation of Barrere, an address to the English nation, which was ordered to be drawn up by Barrere, Fabre d'Eglantine, Condorcet, and Thomas Paine ¹⁵.

But as the real causes of the war, which have been assigned in the fourteenth chapter, were not such as had justice on their side, it was deemed expedient to seek a number of pretexts, which might palliate the aggression with the unthinking populace, and furnish their advocates with sophistical arguments in their defence. Nor were their endeavours in this respect unsuccessful: for they were so fortunate as to discover not less than *eighteen* pretexts ¹⁶, all of which however were of such a nature, that no rational council of state, unless other motives had operated, would have been induced by them to a declaration of war. The first article is of general import, and contains the charge, that the British government after the 10. August 1792, had given many indications of being ill-affected toward France: and in the seventeen following articles the particular actions are specified, chiefly in

15. *Moniteur* 3. Feb. 1793.

16. *Ib.*

chronological order, in which this evil disposition was supposed to have displayed itself ¹⁷. These seventeen articles therefore must be particularly examined.

The first of them relates to the recall of the British ambassador from Paris on the 17. of August: but this charge has been already repelled in the ninth chapter. — In the second article is asserted, that the British government had ever since the 10. of August suspended all communication with Mr. Chauvelin. Now this charge is absolutely false, as is evinced by the negotiation described in the thirteenth chapter. It was only *official* communication with Mr. Chauvelin which had been suspended, of which the fault had not lain with the British government: for it was the deposition of the king of France, which rendered Mr. Chauvelin's former credentials of no value, and it was not before the 17. of January, when the question of war or peace was already decided, that he had even offered to produce new credentials. — The third and fourth articles relate to the refusal of the British government, to acknowledge the French republic in the person of Mr. Chauvelin, a refusal, which has been

17. It is to be observed, that even the sophistry of the national convention was unable to discover any pretext for accusing the British government, before the 10. of August 1792, whence it appears that the advocates of the French have gone still greater lengths than their clients themselves.

already justified in the preceding chapter. — In the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles, complaints are made about the acts of parliament, mentioned at the end of the eleventh chapter, where it has likewise been shewn that those complaints are ungrounded. — In the ninth article the British government is accused of having given a reception to French emigrants, as if hospitality to persons in distress were a crime. And this charge, in another respect, ill became those, who had not only from the very commencement of the French revolution, uniformly encouraged, and corresponded with the disaffected party in England ¹⁸, but on the 28. of November had received, with every mark of friendship and every token of applause, the addresses of those societies, who on that day signified their intention of overturning the British constitution. Besides, whatever might be the private views of the French emigrants, who were permitted to reside in England, it is a known fact that they were not permitted to act an open part, or to assemble in a military corps, till after the declaration of war: whereas the French executive council had not only already formed the Dutch patriots, to the amount of ten thou-

18. See the documents on this subject in Rivington's Annual Register for 1793, Part. II. p. 128 — 155. The first has so early a date as Nov. 4. 1789.

land, into a separate legion, but had placed them on the frontiers of Holland, as a preparatory step to its invasion. It required therefore more than usual audacity, to accuse the British government of having granted an asylum to the French emigrants. Another charge in the ninth article relates to the emigrants from the island of St. Domingo. Now it is undoubtedly true, that even before the close of 1791, a great part of the French colonists in the island of St. Domingo, highly dissatisfied with the conduct of the national assembly, to which they justly ascribed the insurrection of the negroes, sincerely wished to submit the colony to the crown of Britain, and that several of the colonists came to London, with the view of inducing ministers to send out an armament and take possession of the country. But equally certain is it, that the British government, true to the principles of neutrality, which it had determined to maintain, rejected the offer, and that no attention was paid to the colonists, till after war had been declared ¹⁹. Its upright

19. The words of Mr. Bryan Edwards, whose authority on this subject is not to be questioned, and who certainly cannot be accused of an unjust partiality in favour of administration, are as follows. "To these representations *no attention at that time was given*: but at length, after the national assembly had thought proper to declare war against Great Britain, the English ministry began to listen with

conduct therefore deserved, not the censure, but the thanks of the national convention ²⁰. — The three following articles relate to the naval preparations in England, the necessity of which has been so fully demonstrated in the eleventh chapter, that it would be a waste of time to say any thing further on the subject. They contain also a complaint, that certain friends in England were ill treated by the government. Now though it cannot be denied, that the measures taken by the British government, to counteract the machinations of those, who acted in concert with the national convention, necessarily gave offence to that venerable body, yet in converting those measures into a subject of complaint, it really outdid its *usual* outdoings. — In the thirteenth article a complaint was made about the English ships which had been sent to Flushing at the beginning of January: and it was made under the pretence, that those ships had been sent “to disturb the operations of France in Belgia ²¹.” But it has been shewn in the preceding chap-

“some degree of complacency to the overtures, which were *again* made.” Historical Survey of St. Domingo, p. 140.

20. This is not the only instance, in which the integrity of the British cabinet has been strangely abused, and that not by the French alone.

21. Pour troubler les operations de la France dans la Belgique.

ter ²², that the object of the squadron was merely to act on the defensive, and, in case of an attack on the part of France, to protect the coast of Zealand. The presence of this squadron was likewise absolutely necessary: for on the 10. of January the attack on Zealand had been already ordered by the executive council, but was abandoned in consequence of the obstacles, which this very squadron presented to the undertaking ²³. The charge therefore brought in the thirteenth article is totally without foundation ²⁴. — The

22. Note 41.

23. See Miranda's letter on this subject quoted in Ch. XV. Note 46.

24. A celebrated opposition writer has objected to the assistance sent to the Dutch, on *another* ground, namely that it was sent without being previously requested by the Dutch government. Now whether Baron Nagel, the Dutch ambassador in London formally demanded of Lord Grenville the succour stipulated by the treaty of 1788, is a question which I cannot determine by official documents, as the communications, which passed between Lord Grenville and Baron Nagel, have never been laid before the public: though I have been informed from very good authority, that the Dutch ambassador really did make the demand, but requested that it might be kept a secret, lest the bare act of concerting measures of defence should be distorted by the national convention into a combination *against* France, and thus expose the Dutch to a still greater danger, than that which

fourteenth article relates to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, a subject which has been fully discussed in the

they were already threatened, when the demand was made. And that the Dutch government, whose preservation depended on the co-operation of England really did make the demand is so highly probable in-itself, that it seems to be unnecessary to attempt a proof of it. Be this however as it may, it is certain that the States General had formally declared to the British ambassador at the Hague on the 16. of November 1792, *that nothing could more effectually conduce to the happiness and mutual interests of the two nations, than the continuance of that intimate union which had been established between them*: and equally certain is it, that fourteen days afterward they formally protested against the opening of the Schelde. See Ch. XI. After these declarations the States General might certainly expect, that, as soon as the United Provinces were in real danger of an invasion, the British government would fulfil its duty to its ally, without it being further reminded of it: and no one can deny, that when the Squadron in question, which was the first succour sent to the Dutch, arrived off the coast of Zealand, that province was threatened with very imminent danger. Further that the arrival of the British ships was agreeable to the desire (whether formally expressed or not) of the States General, is evident from the circumstance, that Dutch ships of war were ordered to join them. See Ch. XV. Note. 41. And this very junction was made a subject of complaint against the Stadtholder in the national convention, when war was declared against Great Britain and Holland. See the *Moniteur* 3. Feb. 1793. Lastly, after the war was openly declared, and the

preceding chapter, where it has been proved, that though it may find a place in a view of the *pretexts*

States General had ceased to be under the influence of the motive alleged above, they declared to the whole world, in an official note presented to Lord Auckland on the 20. of March, their sincere desire, that the British government would make *their* cause its own. The notion therefore, that we assisted the Dutch, without being desired to do so, is ungrounded.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, it were true, that the States General had neither directly nor indirectly, neither on the 16. of November nor at any other time, signified a desire of assistance, yet the protection of Holland was a duty, which Great Britain owed to itself, if not to its ally. When two houses are so connected, that the one cannot be destroyed without endangering the fall of the other, and the master of the latter, while his neighbour is asleep, sees an enemy approaching to destroy the house of the former, he would certainly be considered as a downright idiot, if he determined to wait till his neighbour awaked and demanded assistance. Nothing therefore could be more absurd, than the reproach made to the British government of having sent succour to the Dutch, even if the premises, on which the reproach is founded, were true. Besides, what shews the inconsistency of the opposition party, on the 15. of March 1793, in a debate relative to the succour by land, which was not sent till *after* the declaration of war, it was objected to ministers, that the measures for the defence of Holland were not taken *sooner*. See the New Annual Register for 1793, British and foreign history, p. 75.

for the war, it can have no place in a View of the *causes* of it. — In the fifteenth article the British government is accused of an attachment to the traitor, as he is there called, Louis XVI, and of having given orders, immediately after his execution, to augment the preparations both by sea and by land. Now of the attachment to Louis XVI, it has been shewn in the preceding chapter that the British government remained perfectly neutral, that it did not even intercede for him, and that it took no other part, than that, which every honest man must take in the cause of an innocent sufferer. And in regard to the augmentation of the military preparations, which was ordered in the latter part of January, it was the necessary result of the refusal, which had been made by the executive council, to accept the conditions of peace proposed by the British government. — In the sixteenth article the British government is accused of having entered into a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, during the month of January which was just elapsed. But this charge is absolutely false: for since the 10. of August 1790, two years and an half therefore before the declaration of war, Great Britain had made no treaty whatsoever with Austria: and even that treaty was nothing more than a convention, relative, not to France, but to the Austrian Netherlands.²⁵ In the

25. Martens Recueil des principaux traités, T. III. p. 342.

interval, which elapsed between the 10. of August 1790 and the 1. of February 1793, not even a forged treaty between England and Austria has ever been produced, though the history of the last ten years furnishes many examples of the kind: nor is it possible, that the genuine treaty, had any such existed, should have remained to this very hour a profound secret. But what puts the matter out of all doubt, is the positive declaration of Lord Grenville in the house of Lords, and of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas in the house of Commons, on the 12. of February 1793, who in consequence of the charge brought by the national convention were called upon to explain themselves, and all three solemnly declared that no such treaty existed ²⁶. — The seventeenth and last article contains a falsehood, which is equally gross with the preceding: for it is there said that the British government had drawn the Stadtholder into a coalition against France ²⁷. Now it is true that the British government acted in concert with the government of Holland: but it has been so fully demonstrated, that all its measures were

26. See the parliamentary debates of that day.

27. This charge has been echoed even in England by a well-known opposition writer, who has ventured to assert, that "*We* involved Holland in all the horrors of war." — If by *We* he means the British government, the assertion is confuted by every page of the present history.

purely defensive, that it would be an affront to the reader to add another syllable on the subject.

The history of the politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz to the declaration of war against Great Britain, is now brought to a conclusion. The principles and the conduct of the two governments, during this important and decisive period, have been delineated with historical accuracy, the representation has been every where founded on authentic documents, and every assertion has been supported by unquestionable testimony. In the narration of the manifold events, strict attention has been paid to the order of time, the relation between cause and effect has been thus uniformly preserved, and hence every action has been traced up to its real source. Nothing of the least importance, whether favourable or unfavourable to either party, has been omitted: no fact, however disadvantageous to the British cabinet it might appear, when considered by itself, has been suppressed, and on the other hand, every thing, which, under the same circumstances, appears advantageous to the French rulers, has been scrupulously observed. Consequently, the measures adopted by the two parties being completely represented, and placed at it were in parallel, they appear in their true light. Lastly, the account which have been given both of the actions and the declarations of the French rulers, has not

been derived from a second-hand source, but has been *immediately* taken from their own writings, and their own official journals, from which there lies no appeal. Nothing therefore now remains, than to bring the heads of the preceding history, of which the vouchers have been already given, into one view, in order to enable the public to decide with greater facility on the grand question: Who were the aggressors?

1. In the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in August 1791, the British government took not the most distant part: and, if any treaty was concluded there, which is itself a matter of great doubt, the British government not only never acceded to it, but was never apprised even of its contents. Further, when the British government was requested in 1791 to join a coalition against France, it gave a positive and unequivocal refusal ²⁸.

2. Toward the close of the same year the valuable colony of St. Domingo was preserved to France by the timely assistance sent by Lord Effingham, then governor of Jamaica: and the British cabinet signified through its ambassador at Paris to the French government, that it fully approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. At the same time, true to the strictest principles of honour and neutrality, it refused the advantageous offer made

by the French colonists¹, who were highly dissatisfied with the national assembly, to surrender the French part of St. Domingo to the crown of Britain. And these acts of generosity were repaid by France with the utmost ingratitude ²⁹.

3. When Louis XVI. formally accepted the new constitution in September 1791, and sent circular letters to the different courts of Europe signifying his assent, the court of Great Britain, was one of the first which returned an answer; and the answer was couched in very respectful terms, whereas some other courts either did not answer at all, or in a manner displeasing to the national assembly. Yet on the other hand an event took place about this very time, which shewed how very little the national assembly cared about the neutrality of Great Britain ³⁰.

4. When parliament assembled in January 1792, the British cabinet was so far from displaying any hostile views, that it was proposed in his Majesty's speech to make an immediate reduction of the forces both by sea and by land. The number of seamen and marines, to be employed that year, was accordingly diminished to sixteen thousand: it was determined that the Hessian subsidy, which then expired, should not

²⁹. Ch. II.

³⁰. Ch. III.

be renewed: the British land forces were likewise reduced: and taxes to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds were abolished. Yet at this very time the national assembly took measures for a very considerable augmentation of the French marine; measures, which had they been taken in England, would have been represented in France, as acts of hostility. But our ministers did not suffer themselves to be disturbed in their system of neutrality ³¹.

5. After France had declared war against Austria on the 20. of April 1792, the British government proved both by its actions and declarations, that it was determined to remain neutral in the contest between the two powers. The French minister in London, Chauvelin, sent official information on the 28. of April to his court, that the British cabinet was resolved to preserve neutrality: and on the 1. of May the king of France wrote a letter of thanks to his Britannic Majesty, and acknowledged his obligations for the refusal to join the coalition. On the 15. of May, Mr. Chauvelin delivered a Note, in which, after an attempt at a justification of the national assembly in declaring war against Austria, the British government was requested to forbid all British subjects to accept of commissions from any power, which was hostile to

France. This request was punctually complied with, and a royal proclamation to that purpose was issued on the 25 of May. At this friendly conduct the French government again expressed its satisfaction ³².

6. The proclamation of the 21. of May was a mere matter of national police, which the machinations then at work to overturn the British constitution rendered absolutely necessary: it contained nothing which could give the least offence to the French government, which was not even named in it: it contained no indications whatsoever of a hostile disposition to that country: nor did any such thought occur to the French government, but on the contrary, not only Mr. Chauvelin, in a Note which he delivered three weeks afterward, but Le Brun himself, in the name even of the *new* government, in the month of August, testified his conviction of the friendly disposition and conduct of the British cabinet toward France ³³.

7. When the British cabinet on July 8. in answer to the proposal to act as mediator between France and the other belligerent powers, replied, that it could not do so, unless the mediation were requested by *all* the parties concerned, the refusal was so far from indicating a disposition to hostilities, that it proved the

32. Ch. V.

33. Ch. VI.

very reverse: and this is confirmed by Mr. Chauvelin's acknowledgement in his letter of July 17, and by the acknowledgement of Le Brun, in his Note to Lord Gower. Besides, the mediation was requested in the name of the king of France, at a time when his authority was expiring: and though he was not *formally* deposed before the 10. of August, yet the events of the 20. of June had transferred the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, to the national assembly: and this assembly was so far from being solicitous for peace, as certain persons have very falsely and very artfully asserted, in order to throw the blame of the war on the British government, that it was determined at all events to prosecute the war ³⁴.

8. When an alarm was spread in France in July 1792, in consequence of the sailing of five ships of the line and a few frigates from Portsmouth, merely to perform naval evolutions in the channel, Mr. Chauvelin sent a Note to his own government, in which he testified the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet, and even complained of the false notions, which were entertained on this subject. On the 4. of August, Mr. Chauvelin's Note was read in the national assembly: and it was declared that Mr. Chauvelin's testimony to
the

the pacific dispositions of the British cabinet was satisfactory ³⁵.

9. The recall of the British ambassador from Paris after the king had been dethroned, was no breach of neutrality toward France, either in itself, or in the manner, in which it was conducted. As he had been accredited to the king, his letters of credence were become useless: and before a new diplomatic connexion could be formed, it was necessary first to know, who was to govern France in future. But at that time all authorities were organised only provisionally: and, during the struggle of contending parties, it was most consistent with the principles of neutrality, to await the issue of it. Besides, the letter of recall was couched in such pacific and friendly terms, that Le Brun openly testified his approbation of it, and declared in the national assembly, that the British ambassador had left a satisfactory testimony of the dispositions of his court. The pacific disposition of the British court was further evinced by the decisive rejection of the invitation, which was made at that very time, as it had been already in the preceding year, to join the coalition ³⁶. — But that the provisional executive council might not be wanting in etiquette; it immediately

35. Ch. VIII.

36. Ch. IX.

despatched Mr. Noel with an order to Mr. Chauvelin to return to Paris. Mr. Chauvelin however obtained a revocation of the order, in consequence of his making the following remonstrance; "that he was perfectly well with Mr. Fox and some other members of opposition, and that it would not be prudent in France, to lose the fruits of his labours with these gentlemen, and their subsequent services, for a vain form of diplomatic etiquette ³⁷."

10. In the month of November 1792, after the Dutchy of Savoy, the Austrian Netherlands and a part of Germany had been conquered, the French rulers threw off the mask, and declared to the whole world the revolutionizing system, which they had hitherto only followed in the dark. Not only was it decreed on the 19. of November, that all nations, which chose to rebel against their governments should receive assistance from France, but on the 28. of November, when deputies from certain British societies appeared at the bar of the national convention, and signified their intention of overturning the British constitution, they were received with applause from the whole assembly, and were assured by the President himself, that the period was not far distant, when Frenchmen would come to congratulate the national convention of Great

Britain. After this declaration it ought no longer to be a question: Who were the aggressors? — Further toward the close of the year 1792 England was overrun with French emissaries, who were engaged in the plot for the overthrow of the British constitution, and were supplied for that purpose with immense sums from the French government. A considerable fleet also was fitted out in France three months before Great Britain even began to arm ³⁸.

II. When the British Parliament assembled in the month of December in consequence of the danger, with which the country was threatened from France, all the measures, which were taken, were purely defensive: and a war might have easily been avoided, had it been the will of the national convention and of the executive council ³⁹.

12. While measures were taking in Great Britain, in order to ward off the danger, with which it was already threatened, the rulers of France continued to augment that danger: and by a new series of injuries and insults proved their determination to engage in a war with Great Britain and Holland. By the decree of December 15 war was declared, not only on all kings, but on all nations, which refused to take up arms

38. Ch. X.

39. Ch. XI.

against them: and this decree, with that of November 19, was in various ways applied to Great Britain in particular. The minister for foreign affairs threatened in the national convention an appeal to the British nation, and the marine minister publicly proclaimed the design of a landing in Britain with fifty thousand caps of liberty. A new and very considerable addition was ordered to be made to the French ships already in commission, with the avowed view of acting against Great Britain: and before the middle of January the order was signed for the actual invasion of Holland 40.

13. In the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France the British ministers displayed no unwillingness to negotiate: and, though no negotiation could be considered at that time as strictly official, Mr. Chauvelin's credentials having been received from the deposed king of France, yet he was assured by Lord Grenville, that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and beneficial to both parties. Mr. Pitt likewise, in a conference which he had with Mr. Maret expressed his readiness to negotiate with Mr. Maret as a confidential person of the French executive council; but

this council not only refused to grant instructions to Mr. Maret, but forbade him even to converse with Mr. Pitt on political subjects. When the negotiation was conducted between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, the Notes which were delivered on the part of the French government were so far from containing satisfactory explanations, that a firm resolution was avowed in them, of continuing those very aggressions, of which the British government complained. And when, notwithstanding this avowal, the executive council endeavoured by all the arts of sophistry, to impose a belief of its pacific intentions, its actions uniformly contradicted its assertions. Nor was it ashamed to utter the most solemn declarations even with the consciousness of their falshood. Its whole mode of conducting the negotiation betrayed as much insolence as hypocrisy: and an appeal to the people of Great Britain was threatened in the very first note. On the other hand the conditions of peace, proposed by the British government, had no reference whatsoever to any particular form of government in France; they related only to the external power of that country; they were absolutely necessary for the salvation of Britain, and were so far from being degrading to France, that they required only an adherence to that principle, which the republican rulers had repeatedly declared to be the basis of their system of politicks. These conditions were

rejected: and at the same time it was announced, that, if the preparations then making in the British ports (which had been ordered merely in self defence, and which could not be possibly be stopt, after the executive council had rejected the conditions, which alone could insure safety to Great Britain) were still continued, a declaration of war would be the consequence. It was no longer in the power therefore of the British government to avoid a rupture with France ⁴¹.

14. A war with Great Britain had been resolved on in the French cabinet, not only before the negotiation was ended, but even before it commenced: and the object of the executive council was not to produce a reconciliation, but to amuse the British government, and to deceive the nation, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was fully ripe for execution. The mad ambition of the French rulers, their determination to extirpate all kingly governments and the confident expectation of insurrections in every part of Europe, aided by the necessity of finding employment for their turbulent armies, were their motives to war in general: and their firm belief, that the inhabitants of Great Britain were so disaffected to their government, that French assistance would induce them to an immediate revolt,

the inconsiderable number of troops at that time in Great Britain in comparison with those which could easily be spared from France, the forward state of the French navy, the persuasion that a landing on the British coast would be attended with no difficulty, and the immense advantages expected from the acquisition of the British wealth, commerce and marine, in the prosecution of their conquests on the continent, all these motives added to the innate desire of crushing an ancient and formidable, but at that time despised, rival, induced them to a war with Great Britain in particular ⁴².

15. The events of the last fourteen days before the declaration of war cannot possibly be numbered among the causes of it, because the war was already determined. As to the negotiation attempted by General Dumouriez, it had no other object than to amuse the British and Dutch governments a little longer: and though both governments gave their consent to it, the national convention, refused to await the issue of it, and declared war unanimously on Great Britain and Holland ⁴³.

16. The prettexts alleged by the national convention to justify the declaration of hostilities, were either

42. Ch. XIV.

43. Ch. XV.

futile, or false, or were events, which had not taken place, till after a war with Great Britain and Holland had been resolved on. Lastly, though the two great parties in France, the Girondists and the Jacobins, formed a junction on the question of a war with Great Britain: yet as soon as they found, that it did not answer their expectations, they accused each other of having been the authors of it. And this mutual accusation is a tacit acknowledgement from both parties, that the blame did not attach to the British government ⁴⁴.

After a statement of these premises, all of which have been proved in the preceding history by unanswerable documents, every shadow of doubt must be removed in regard to the origin of that war, which was declared by the national convention on the 1. of February 1793. It was a war of aggression, of injury and of insult, on the part of France, as well in the motives, which gave it birth, as in the open declaration of it: and on the part of Britain it was just and necessary, as being strictly a war of self defence.

44. Ch. XVI.

F I N I S.

APPENDIX.

THE
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A P P E N D I X

CONTAINING

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS

MADE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

TO RESTORE PEACE.

As the preceding history contains a full and unanswerable proof that the war, which was declared against Great Britain in February 1793 derived its origin from the French government alone, a plain and impartial statement of the attempts, which have been made to restore peace, will equally prove, that the continuance of the war can no more be ascribed to the British government, than the commencement of it.

After hostilities had continued three years, and the arms of Britain had been crowned by sea with as much success, as the arms of France had been by land, the British government formed the resolution in February 1796 of making at least an attempt to restore that

peace, which the mad ambition of the French convention had wantonly broken ¹. The period in question

1. It cannot be said, that the French, on their part, had made any attempt to restore peace: for the Note signed by Le Brun on April 2. 1793, and delivered by a notary public to Lord Grenville (New Annual Register 1793, British and foreign history p. 98), was nothing more, than a new attempt to amuse and to deceive the British government. In this note Le Brun, who in the negotiation conducted by Mr. Chauvelin had displayed the most shameful duplicity, who had acknowledged to Dumouriez his resolution to pay not the least regard to that negotiation, who had refused to await the issue of the conference with Lord Auckland, and had moreover twice refused to furnish Mr. Maret with instructions, presumed to notify to Lord Grenville an intention of sending the same Mr. Maret to London as a negotiator. Now after the British ministers had been so frequently and so shamefully deceived by Le Brun, they really must have been deficient in common sense, had they listened to his proposal of the 2. of April: and after the irrefragable proofs of the hostile disposition of the national convention toward Great Britain, they must have been struck with blindness, had they supposed, that the convention sincerely wished to live in peace and amity with Great Britain. But they clearly saw, that the only object of Le Brun's Note was to gain time, as the invasion of Holland had already met with a considerable check, and to suspend the operations of Great Britain, in order that its intended destruction might be completed at a more convenient opportunity.

was well adapted to the purpose, if any thing short of irresistible force can induce the Directory of the *Great Nation* to make a general peace: for the armies both of General Pichegru and of General Jourdan had been lately obliged to yield to the imperial troops, at that time victorious; Manheim had been retaken, the supposed impregnable lines before Mayntz had been forced, the right bank of the Rhine was again free, and Marshal Clairfayt had advanced a considerable distance on the other side. The intelligence, that the Cape of Good Hope has surrendered to the British arms was already known in Europe; Corsica was still in our possession; a British fleet commanded the Mediterranean; and Buonaparte did not yet stand at the head of a victorious army in Italy. An armistice of two months had been concluded between Austria and France, and thus a road had been opened, which, if the French government had thought proper, might have led to a general peace.

Of these apparently favourable circumstances the British government resolved to avail itself: but as it was first necessary to know, whether France, on her part, was equally disposed to peace, and as no direct communication subsisted between London and Paris, Mr. Wickham, minister plenipotentiary to the Swiss cantons, was previously commissioned to demand of Mr. Barthelemi, the French minister in Switzerland,

an answer to the following questions, which he did in a Note dated the 8. of March ².

1. "Is there the disposition in France to open a
"negotiation with his majesty and his allies, for the
"re-establishment of a general peace upon just and suit-
"able terms, by sending, for that purpose, ministers
"to a congress, at such place as may hereafter be
"agreed upon?

2. "Would there be the disposition to communi-
"cate to the undersigned the general grounds of a pacifi-
"cation, such as France would be willing to propose; in
"order that his majesty and his allies might thereupon
"examine in concert, whether they are such as might
"serve as the foundation of a negotiation for peace?

3. "Or would there be a desire to propose any
"other way whatever, for arriving at the same end,
"that of a general pacification ³?

2. Mr. Wickham's Note to Mr. Barthelemi is printed, in the French original, in the *Moniteur* 21. April 1796, where Mr. Barthelemi's answer is likewise printed. The English translation, of which a copy is here given, is that which was published by authority together with the declaration of the British court on April 10. 1796.

3. It has been objected to this note, that the word *France* was used instead of *French government*, and that this language was adopted in order to avoid a formal acknowledgement of the French republic. Now as the republican

At the same time Mr. Wickham informed Mr. Barthelemi, that he was hitherto commissioned only to propose these previous questions, and that he was not authorized to discuss the subjects of negotiation, which indeed he could not be, till it was known whether France would condescend to enter into a negotiation at all.

After having waited *eighteen days* Mr. Wickham at length received an answer to the questions in a note from Mr. Barthelemi, dated Basel 26. March.

rulers of France had not only been the aggressors, but had uniformly acted with the utmost insolence toward the British government, we were certainly not in so distressed a situation at the beginning of the year 1796, as to render it necessary to acknowledge formally that hostile republic, even before we knew whether its rulers would condescend to make peace with us. When it is further said, that the use of the word *France* was an insult, we may observe that nothing is more common, than to use the name of a country, where in strictness the government alone can be understood. Mr. Chauvelin himself, whose authority will not be rejected by those, who object to the Note of Mr. Wickham, used the word *France* in the very same sense, in which it is here used. The following passages, taken from the French original of his Note to Lord Grenville of Dec. 27. 1792 may serve as examples. *Si la France doit regarder l'Angleterre etc. — Le moindre doute sur les dispositions de la France à l'égard de l'Angleterre etc. — Non seulement la France doit et veut respecter l'indépendance de l'Angleterre etc. — La pureté des intentions de la France etc.*

“The Directory ardently wishes to procure for the French republic a just, honourable and solid peace. The step taken by Mr. Wickham would have afforded to the Directory a real satisfaction, if the declaration itself, which that minister makes, of his not having any order, any power to negotiate, did not give room to doubt of the sincerity of the pacific intentions of his court ⁴. In fact if it was true, that England began to know her real interests, that she wished to open again for herself the sources of abundance and prosperity; if she sought for peace with good faith ⁵;

“would

4. This passage very clearly proves, that the Directory was resolved to evade a negotiation: for had they been desirous of promoting it, they would not have used so wretched a pretext for throwing obstacles in the way at the very outset. That the pretext was a most wretched one is obvious. For how was it possible that the British government, which had proposed not merely to negotiate for itself, but to include its allies, should draw up instructions for its ambassador, which required a previous communication with those allies, when the place of congress had not been determined, and when it was neither known in what manner the Directory thought proper to negotiate, nor whether it chose to negotiate at all?

5. This insulting language again proved that the Directory was firmly resolved to admit no reconciliation with the British government. For when two parties are at vari-

"would she propose a congress of which the necessary result must be to render all negotiation endless?" "Or would she confine herself to the asking in a vague manner, that the French government should point

ance, and that party which had been first attacked, comes to the other and says, "let us in future be good friends," the other party certainly would not answer, "Sir you are a hypocrite," unless he were still animated with the same hostile sentiments, which he had displayed from the beginning. There was likewise great artifice in the mode of reply: it was calculated to excite discontents in England, by suggesting the notion, that the interests of the country had been wantonly sacrificed by its ministers. Nor was the artifice, when aided by the co-operation of certain persons at home, wholly destitute of success.

6. A congress will never render a negotiation endless, when *all* parties are sincerely desirous of peace: and where this is not the case, a negotiation even between two *single* powers will not advance very rapidly toward a happy conclusion. Besides, when *several* powers are engaged in war, and it is proposed to make a *general* peace, a congress, that is, a meeting of ambassadors from *all* the powers engaged, is the usual, if not the only means of effecting the purpose. But it was not the policy of the French Directory to make peace with all the allied powers at the same time: and on the other hand, it was not consistent with the integrity of the present ministers of Great Britain, to make a separate peace, and thus expose their allies to the mercy of the French.

“out “any other way whatever, for attaining the same
“object 7.

“Is it that this step has had no other object, than
“to obtain for the British government the favourable
“impression, which always accompanies the first over-
“tures for peace? May it not have been accompanied
“with the hope, that they would produce no effect 8?

“However that may be, the executive directory,
“whose policy has no other guides than openness and
“good faith 9, will follow in its explanations a conduct,

7. Here the Directory felt itself reduced to the necessity of taking refuge in nonsense. The questions, which had been proposed were simple, clear, and determinate, as it is possible for questions to be. But how could the British government determine the answers, which it left to the decision of the Directory?

8. These highly insulting questions were very artfully introduced by the French Directors, in order to transfer all blame from themselves to the British government. They were conscious of their own hypocrisy, and therefore endeavoured to obviate the charge, which might be made to them, by previously laying it at the door of their opponents. This is the usual finesse of the French rulers: and it has been hitherto attended with great success.

9. The openness and good faith of the present directory are perfectly on a parallel with the openness and good faith, which had been displayed by the executive council, the nature of which has been fully represented in the thirteenth chapter of the preceding history.

"which shall be wholly conformable to them. Yielding
 "to the ardent desire, by which it is animated to pro-
 "cure peace for the French republic and for all nations,
 "it will not fear to declare itself openly. *Charged by*
 "*the constitution with the execution of the laws, it cannot*
 "*make or listen to any proposal, that would be contrary*
 "*to them: the constitutional act does not permit it to con-*
 "*sent to any alienation of that which, according to the*
 "*existing laws, constitutes the territory of the republic.*
 "With respect to the countries occupied by the French
 "armies, and which have not been united to France,
 "they, as well as other interests, political and commer-
 "cial, may become the subject of a negotiation etc.

By this declaration all negotiation was at once
 precluded: for it was demanded, as a preliminary ar-
 ticle, from which it was resolved in no case to deviate,
 that the French should retain almost all their conquests,
 and that the English should retain *none*¹⁰. The ex-
 pression, "that which according to the existing laws
 constitutes the territory of the republic," comprehen-
 ded: 1. France, according to its ancient limits. 2. The
 countries, which had been incorporated into France,
 namely: a) Avignon and the country of Venaissin;

10. Yet it has been said that the Note of the French
 directory contained nothing, which could prevent a conti-
 nuance of the negotiation!

b) Mombeliard' and Porentru; c) The whole Dutchy of Savoy; d) Nice and Monaco; e) All the Austrian Netherlands; f) The principality of Liege; g) Dutch Flanders, Mastricht, Venlo, in short all that the Dutch had been obliged to cede to France. 3 The Spanish, as well as French part, of St. Domingo. 4. Guadeloupe. 5. The islands of Bourbon and Mauritius. 6. All the conquests which had been made by Great Britain, and were then in our possession, namely; a) Corsica; b) Martinico, Tabago, with other islands in the West-Indies; c) Pondicherry and Chandernagore in the East-Indies; d) St. Pierre and Miquelon, at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence; e) The islands of St. Marcou on the coast of France. — All this was to be granted to France, before the Directory would condescend even to enter upon the negotiation. But at the beginning of the year 1796, France was not in a situation, which warranted so enormous a demand: nor was Great Britain in so distressed a situation, as to render the acceptance of it necessary. The British government therefore very properly rejected it, and of course the attempt, which it had made to restore peace, failed of success ¹¹.

11. It is a very false conclusion, which has been drawn, that the British ministers did not wish for peace. It follows only, that they did not wish for peace *on such terms*: and in that wish, surely the hearts of all true Britons must join them.

But within six months after the first attempt had failed, the British government determined to make a second, to which it was induced by the decisive victory of the Austrians at Amberg in the Upper Palatinate, on the 24. of August 1796. This grand victory, which obliged the whole army of General Jourdan to retreat to the Rhine with great precipitation and disorder was announced in the London Gazette of the sixth of September ¹²; and *on this very day* Lord Grenville took the first step toward a new negotiation, in the hope that, as the Directory saw its project of subjugating the Emperor unsuccessful, it would at last consent to grant the blessings of peace to a suffering world. On the 6. of September, namely, Lord Grenville sent a Note to Count Jarlsberg, the Danish ambassador in London ¹³, in which, as there was no direct commu-

12. They who have not access to the London Gazette itself, need only consult any other paper of the following day. That which I have now before me is the Sun of Sept. 7. 1796, where a copy is given of the Gazette of Sept. 6.

13. Lord Grenville's Note to Count Jarlsberg, with all the other Notes belonging to the negotiation were printed under the following title: "A correct copy of the papers relating to the negotiation between Great Britain and France. London Dec. 29. 1796. As the Notes are all numbered, I shall quote each by the number prefixed to it. Lord Grenville's Note to Count Jarlsberg is No. 1.

nication between the British and French governments, his Lordship requested him, to forward an inclosed Note, addressed to the French government, dated likewise Sept. 6, and signed by Lord Grenville himself ¹⁴,

14 It is printed No. 2. and is as follows. "His Britannic Majesty, animated with the same desire, which he has already manifested, to terminate by just, honourable, and permanent conditions of peace, a war which has extended itself throughout all parts of the world, is willing to omit nothing on his part, which may contribute to this object. It is with this view that he has thought it proper to avail himself of the confidential intervention of the ministers of a neutral power, to demand of the Executive Directory passports for a person of confidence, whom his Majesty would send to Paris with a commission to discuss with the government there all the means the most proper to produce so desirable an end. And his majesty is persuaded, that he shall receive without delay, through the same channel, a satisfactory answer to this demand, which cannot fail to place in a still clearer light the just and pacific dispositions, which he entertains in common with his allies.

Westminster Sept. 6. 1796.

Grenville.

In the edition, which I have now before me, this Note is without any address: but that Lord Grenville's original was addressed to the French Directory is evident from the answer returned by the Danish ambassador (No. 3.), which begins thus. "I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that the Note addressed to the Executive Directory, in date of the 6. of the present month, was transmitted by Mr. Koe-

to the Danish minister in Paris, to be by him communicated to the French minister for foreign affairs. This inclosed Note, in which the Directory was requested by the British government to grant a passport for an ambassador, who should come to Paris to negotiate a peace, was delivered by Mr. Koenemann, the Danish Chargé d'affaires in that city, into the hands of Mr. Delacroix, the French minister for foreign affairs, who promised to lay it before the Directory and to return an immediate answer. But, as three days elapsed without any notice being taken of it, Mr. Koenemann again waited on the French minister: when, instead of receiving the requested passport, or any kind of written answer to Lord Grenville's Note, he was informed by the French minister in a very dry tone ¹⁵, that the executive directory had not permitted him to return an answer in writing, but that he was directed to express himself verbally to this effect. "That the executive directory of the French republic would not for the future receive or answer any confidential overtures transmitted through any intermediate channel from the enemies of the republic; but that, if they

Koenemann, Chargé d'affaires of his Danish Majesty, to Mr. Delacroix, minister for foreign affairs at Paris.

15. See Mr. Koenemann's Letter to Count Jarlsberg; No. 4. It is dated Paris, Sept. 19. 1796.

"would send persons furnished with full powers and official papers, these might upon the frontiers demand the passports necessary for proceeding to Paris."

From this answer, to say nothing of its affronting tone, which it is usual to avoid when a reconciliation is really desired, it was obvious that the French directory endeavoured to evade the proposed negotiation. The refusal of a passport, under the pretence that the request had been made through an intermediate channel, was mere chicane, since the Note, which contained that request, was signed, not by the Danish ambassador, but by the British secretary of state himself. The British government therefore applied *immediately* to the Directory: and it was surely a matter of perfect indifference to them, whether Lord Grenville's Note was delivered to the French minister for foreign affairs by a king's messenger, or by the Danish minister in Paris; or, if there was a difference, the latter mode appeared the most respectful. Besides, the reason, why Lord Grenville's Note to the French directory was transmitted, not by an English messenger, who, there was reason to apprehend, might be stopped at Calais, but by the means of a neutral ambassador, was so apparent, that nothing but the vilest sophistry could find any objection to the mode adopted by the British government. Mr. Koenemann himself likewise was so sensible of the unfriendly conduct of the Directory, and so

convinced, that they wished to evade a negotiation, that he closed his letter to Count Jarlsberg with the following words. "Such, Sir, is the result of a measure, which I have taken at your request. I wish for the sake of humanity, that we may meet with better success at some future period: *but I fear, that this period is still at a great distance.*"

In the mean time, the intelligence arrived in England, that the Archduke Charles had gained a new victory over the army of General Jourdan in the neighbourhood of Wurzburg, that the French had evacuated Francfort and Königstein, and that the Austrians were already advanced to Friedberg: and this intelligence was printed in the London Gazette of the 23. of September. On the day following therefore, the British government made another attempt at a negotiation, in the hope that the repeated ill-success of the French arms might at length induce the Directory to listen at least to an accommodation. To avoid however, on the one hand, the inconvenience and humiliation, to which a British ambassador, waiting on the borders of France till the Directory should think fit to furnish him with a passport, would have been necessarily exposed, and yet to cut off, on the other hand, every pretext for chicane on the ground of an intermediate channel, it was determined, that the Note which Lord Grenville now addressed to the French minister for

foreign affairs, again containing a request for a passport ¹⁶, should be sent with a flag of truce to Calais, to be forwarded thence by the municipality of that place to Paris ¹⁷. Now whether the total retreat of Jourdan's army across the Rhine, which had taken place before the middle of September, rendered the Directory at this time more flexible, or whether they were apprehensive of producing discontents, if they repeatedly refused even to hear the propositions of the British government, they gave an order on the 30. of September to the minister for foreign affairs, to send the required passport, which he did within two days ¹⁸.

Lord Malmesbury was accordingly appointed by the British government to go Paris, and conduct the negotiation, where he arrived on the 22. of October ¹⁹. On the 24. of that month Lord Malmesbury delivered to Mr. Delacroix, the French minister for foreign affairs, a Memorial ²⁰, which was intended to serve

16. See No. 5. In the edition, which I possess, Lord Grenville's Note is dated September 27, but in the answer of the Directory (No. 7.) it is quoted with the date Sept. 24: and from various circumstances this appears to be the true date.

17. See the Sun 26 and 27. September 1796.

18. No. 6 and 7.

19. See No. 8.

20. No. 14. The intermediate numbers contain either

as the general basis of negotiation. In this Memorial the principle of compensation, or mutual restitution, was proposed: that is, it was proposed, that Great Britain should restore to France certain conquests, which were afterwards to be determined, and that France, in return, should make to the allies of Great Britain certain restitutions, which were likewise to be determined in the progress of the negotiation. In this principle there was certainly nothing unreasonable, especially since Great Britain, as was expressly said in the Memorial, had no restitution to demand *for herself*, being then in possession of all her own colonies, as well as of most of the colonies of France. But the Directory, without admitting the principle, and at the same time without directly rejecting it, returned an answer ²¹, which contained the grossest affronts: for it was there suggested, that the real object of the British government was *not* to conclude a peace, that Lord Malmesbury had *secret* instructions, which were designed to counteract his ostensible instructions, that the proposal to include the allies of Great Britain had been made, in order to protract and render fruitless the whole nego-

copies of the powers, with which the negotiators were respectively invested, or notes of mere ceremony.

21. This answer (No. 15.) was signed by Reveillere Lépaux, at that time President, and was dated 5. Brumaire, that is, 26. October.

tiation, that the British government had commenced it with no other view, than to throw the blame of hostilities on the French government, and thus induce the people of Great Britain more readily to furnish supplies for the continuance of the war. To which Lord Malmesbury replied ²²: "With regard to the
"offensive and injurious insinuations, which are contained in that paper, and which are only calculated to
"throw new obstacles in the way of the accommodation, which the French government professes to desire, the King has deemed it far beneath his dignity
"to permit an answer to be made to them, on his part, in any manner whatsoever. The progress and the
"result of the negotiation will sufficiently prove the principles, by which it will have been directed on
"each side: and it is neither by revolting reproaches
"destitute of foundation, nor by reciprocal invective,
"that a sincere wish to accomplish the great work of
"pacification can be evinced." — At the same time Lord Malmesbury declared that his Britannic Majesty would not recede from the resolution of including his allies in the negotiation, and concluded with a pressing solicitation, that the Directory would give a determinate answer, whether it would accept, or not, the proposed principle of compensation.

After many attempts to evade a determinate answer, the Directory at length on the 27. of November informed Lord Malmesbury, that they had resolved to admit the principle; and desired him to specify the particular *objects* of reciprocal compensation ²³. In consequence of this information, the British ambassador sent on the very day, on which he received it, the secretary of legation to London ²⁴, who returned to Paris on the 15. of December with the final instructions of the British cabinet ²⁵. These instructions were to the following purport ²⁶. *Great Britain will restore all the conquests which it has made from France*, under the three following conditions: 1. That France restore to the Emperor the Austrian Netherlands: 2. That France conclude a peace with the Germanic empire:

23. No. 25.

24. Compare No. 26. with the beginning of No. 23.

25. It must not be thought extraordinary, that eighteen days elapsed between the departure of the British secretary of legation from Paris and his return, and that he probably waited therefore ten or eleven days in London: for as the British government negotiated not merely for itself, but for its allies, it was necessary to await the consent of those allies to the propositions, which it intended to make. Between Mr. Wickham's Note of March 8, and the answer which was given to it, an equal number of days elapsed, though the Directory had to wait for no one.

26. No. 28.

3. That Italy be evacuated by the French troops. Such were the grand out-lines of the proposals made by the British government: but Lord Malmesbury accompanied them with a Note dated the 17. of December ²⁷, in which he declared his readiness, in case objections should be made to them, "*to enter into the discussion of any counter-project, which might be transmitted to him on the part of the Executive Directory.*" The same declaration he repeated ²⁸ on December 19: but the Executive Directory, not only rejected the conditions proposed by the British government, but refused likewise to communicate any proposals whatsoever on *their* part: and on the very day, on which Lord Malmesbury had a second time requested a counter-project, sent him an order to depart from Paris within eight and forty hours ²⁹.

It is evident therefore that the French Directory broke off the negotiation, not because it disapproved the terms of peace, which were offered by the British cabinet, but because it was resolved to make peace with Great Britain *under no conditions whatsoever*: for otherwise it would certainly not have refused, at the repeated request of the British ambassador, to deliver a coun-

27. No. 27.

28. No. 32.

29. No. 33.

ter-project. He who is disposed to peace, will undoubtedly, in case he thinks the terms proposed by his adversary unacceptable, reply, when requested to propose *his own* terms, "though not on *those* conditions, I will make peace with you on *these*." He would meet at least with civility an opponent, who though injured and attacked, was the first to offer a reconciliation; and would surely not repay the pacific conduct of the latter with insults and ungrounded accusations ³⁰. But

30. Beside the very gross affront, which was offered to the British government in the Note of the Directory of October 26, and which was the more remarkable, as being offered at the very commencement of the negotiation, very scandalous aspersions, during Lord's Malmesbury's stay in Paris, were cast in various numbers of the *Redacteur*, the official paper of the Directory, as well on the person of the British ambassador as on the embassy itself. The Directory thought indeed to evade all reproach, as in each number of the *Redacteur* the following notice was given: "*les articles officiels de ce journal sont les seuls qui passent sous les yeux du Directoire exécutif ou des autorités constituées.* But if the abusive remarks were not inserted immediately under the head of *Articles officiels*, if they were not inserted by the express order of the Directory, they were inserted at least with its consent, which in the present case is precisely the same thing. And even if we suppose that the *first* of those insolent remarks, which appeared in the *Redacteur*, was printed without the previous knowledge of any one of the Directors,

for the very reason, that the French government was conscious of a determination to make peace with Great Britain on no conditions whatsoever, it endeavoured, at the very opening of the negotiation, by previously exciting the false suspicion, that the British government was insincere ³¹, to obviate the well-grounded suspicion which, it justly apprehended, would result from its *own* conduct: and as an open refusal, to negotiate

yet it could not have remained unknown to them. Consequently, had they been desirous of a reconciliation with the British government, they would without all doubt, as soon as they had read the first of the injurious articles, have forbidden the continuation of them.

31. To this calumny, because it was vented by the Directory, they, who were attached to the French cause, gave at that time implicit credit. Mais qui ne connoit d'ailleurs la honteuse faiblesse de l'esprit humain? Qui ne sait, qu'il n'est point de mensonge si grossier, qui affirmé avec audace, répété avec obstination, ne trouve à la fin quelque créance? Les imaginations débiles ne résistent point à cette impression redoublée; les imaginations ardentes la saisissent d'autant plus fortement, qu'elles en sont plus vivement émues; leur surprise même devient le principe de leur illusion. *Si l'imposteur a vaincu surtout, quel argument!* Le sort des combats n'est-il pas encore, pour la multitude ignorante, ce qui fut aux siècles de la barbarie l'épreuve décisive de la justice des causes, et la voix de Dieu même?" Camille Jourdan à ses Concitoyens sur la révolution du 18. Fructidor, p. 4

goriate at all, had been deemed imprudent, lest the people, who were desirous of peace, should be irritated by the too glaring conduct of their governors, they thought it expedient to take such measures, as should not only render the whole negotiation fruitless, but at the same time remove from themselves, in the opinion of the illiterate multitude, the blame of that ill-success, on which they had resolved even before the negotiation began.

If further proof of the position, that the Directory was determined under no condition to make peace with Great Britain, were necessary, we might appeal to the well known expedition to Ireland under General Hoche. The preparations for this expedition, which Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor had already settled with General Hoche, and of which the plan had been finally arranged with Mac Nevin, who came over to Paris, as deputy of the Irish Union, for that very purpose³², were carried on with the utmost activity during the whole time of Lord Malmesbury's embassy in Paris. Nor was any doubt entertained by the Directory, that the expedition would be attended with success³³:

32. See the Report of the secret committee of the Irish House of Commons, on August 20, 1798.

33. In the *Redacteur* Dec. 22. 1796, where the sailing of the fleet from Brest is announced, is given the following account. "La totalité de l'escadre est composée de 21 vais-

And, as after the conquest of Ireland the further preservation of England appeared highly improbable, it was thought inconsistent, as well with the interest of France, as with the ambition of its governors to grant peace and independence to a country, which, it was fondly expected, would be reduced in a short time to the degraded situation of a French dependency. If it be objected that, though the *preparations* for the Irish expedition were made during Lord Malmesbury's residence in Paris, the *execution* of it was left subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, such an objection will be at once removed by the time when the execution of it took place: for it was on the *seventeenth* of December that Lord Malmesbury first delivered to the French minister the particular conditions of peace, which were offered by his court: and it was on the *fifteenth* of December, that the fleet sailed from Brest ³⁴.

seaux de ligne, outre les frégates, corvettes et transports. Elle porte à bord des troupes de débarquement, et est abondamment pourvue en munitions et instrumens de guerre. Le succès qu'a eu l'expédition précédente du citoyen Richery, sur la destination de laquelle un inviolable secret avait trompé toutes les conjectures des Anglais, peut faire augurer, que celle-ci obtiendra, sur les mêmes auspices, les mêmes résultats."

34. This circumstance, though it does not appear to have attracted the notice, which it deserved, is proved by

So far therefore were the French Directors from making the Irish expedition subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, that the final order for the execution of it was given several days, before they even knew the terms, which the British government would give as the price of peace ³⁵.

In the sanguine expectation however, that Ireland would fall a prey to France, which had been the grand inducement to the breaking off of the negotiation, the Directory was disappointed: General Hoche was obliged to return, without having effected a landing, two ships of the line ³⁶ with seven frigates were lost or sunk, two other frigates, which had brought over twelve hundred convicts to the coast of Wales, were taken, and the Spanish fleet, destined to cooperate with that of France, was defeated at Cape St.

the following passage in the *Redacteur* 22. Dec. 1796. "*L'escadre armée à Brest a mis à la voile le 25. Frimaire.*" That Frimaire 25 corresponds to December 15 is known to every one acquainted with the new French calendar.

35. In defiance of the plain and undeniable facts, which have been here recorded, Lord Malmesbury's embassy to Paris has been as shamefully perverted, as the negotiations before the declaration of war. But as the preceding narrative is sufficient to confute the various misrepresentations on this subject, it is unnecessary to examine them in detail,

36. The *Seduisant*, and the *Droits de l'homme*.

Vincent. On the other hand the French arms made a rapid progress at this very time on the continent: and at the end of April 1797, the Emperor was obliged by the preliminaries signed at Leoben to renounce his possessions in Lombardy and in the Low Countries.

As in consequence of this formal cession, the Austrian Netherlands, which the British cabinet for obvious reasons had been desirous of preserving for the Emperor, ceased to be a subject of contention, it was hoped that a new negotiation might be opened with better success, especially since the expedition to Ireland, which had so much influence on the former negotiation, had totally failed. Accordingly on June 1. 1797. Lord Grenville sent a Note to the French minister for foreign affairs in Paris, with the proposal of a new negotiation ³⁷. The proposal was likewise accepted ³⁸: and after an exchange of several notes, relative to passports, to the place of negotiation, and other preparatory steps ³⁹, the ambassadors of the respective powers met at Lisle in the beginning of July. On the 8. of this month the British ambassador, Lord

37. As the papers relative to this negotiation, which were published as soon as it was ended, are all numbered, I shall quote each note, as before, by the number prefixed to it. Lord Grenville's note of the 1. of June is No. 1.

38. No. 2.

39. No. 3 — II.

Malmesbury, presented a Note, in which the conditions of peace, proposed by the British cabinet, were delivered in the most precise and unequivocal terms. These conditions were nothing less than the following. *Great Britain will restore all the conquests, without exception, which have been made from France: and of the conquests, which France has made, Great Britain requires a restitution of none* ⁴⁰. Further, with the allies of France, (Spain and Holland), the British cabinet offered to make peace at the same time on the condition of retaining the island of Trinidad, the Cape of Good Hope, Trincomale in the isle of Ceylon, and of exchanging Negapatnam for the town and fort of Cochin ⁴¹. To these proposals it was answered the 15. of July, that the Directory required, as an *indispensable preliminary*, the consent of his Britannic majesty to cede *all* the conquests which Great Britain had made, as well from Spain and Holland, as from France itself ⁴². To this demand, which was proposed, not as the price of peace, but as a mere preliminary article of negotiation, the British government, as might naturally be expected made various objections ⁴³: and the Directory itself *appeared* at least to admit the exor-

40. No. 13. 14.

41. Ib.

42. No. 20.

43. No. 21. 23.

bitance of the demand, as it remained for some time unresolvéd, and pretended to consult with the Spanish and Dutch governments, whether some part of it could not be remitted. In the mean time several weeks elapsed, during which the ambassadors had several conferences, and exchanged several notes ⁴⁴, though without being able to effect any thing decisive, till at last on the 28. of August Lord Malmesbury was informed, that the answer, which had been received from Holland, was *unsatisfactory*, but that a second message had been sent to the Hague, and that the reply of the Batavian directory might be expected to arrive in the course of eight or ten days ⁴⁵. This ridiculous farce, for a ridiculous farce it certainly was, when the French directory pretended to be under the necessity of previously obtaining the consent of a government, which was absolutely at its disposal, is to be ascribed to the circumstance, that the Directory itself, as well as the two councils of France, was divided into two parties, one of which was desirous of a peace with England, while the other persisted in the maxim, that *modern Carthage must be destroyed* ⁴⁶. Hence arose the irreso-

44. No. 26—33.

45. No. 34.

46. On this subject see the interesting work of Camille Jourdan, entitled: *A ses Commettans sur la révolution du 18. Fructidor*, especially p. 87—90.

lution of the French government, and the delay, with which the negotiation had been hitherto conducted. But as soon as the struggle between the two parties was ended, and the pacific Barthelemi with his associates had fallen a sacrifice to the fury of Barras and his hostile accomplices, all irresolution ceased: and the eighteenth of Fructidor, or the fourth of September, decided the fate of the negotiation with England. The French ambassadors, Le Tourneur and the well-known Maret, who had hitherto negotiated with Lord Malmesbury, were instantly recalled ⁴⁷, and two other negotiators, Treilhard and Bonnier, whose principles were more in unison with those of the victorious party, were appointed in their stead. It was now formally insisted on, that the British cabinet should consent to cede *all* its conquests, as a preliminary step to any negotiation whatsoever ⁴⁸: and when Lord Malmesbury replied, that nothing would then be left for subject of negotiation, he received for answer, *“that this would not be the case, that many articles would still remain to be proposed, and many points for important*

⁴⁷. Three persons had been appointed to negotiate on the part of France: but the third, Pleville le Pelley, had already left Lisle. Indeed we find his name affixed to none of the French notes, which bear a later date than July 15.

⁴⁸. No. 42. 43.

"*discussion* 49." A compliance therefore with the demand of the Directory would have laid Great Britain at the mercy of an unrelenting foe: it was answered, as it merited, with a formal refusal⁵⁰: and on the very day, on which the answer was returned, the British ambassador received from the French plenipotentiaries, agreeably, as they expressly declared, to their instructions, an order to depart from Lisle within four and twenty hours⁵¹.

49. No. 42. So early as the 10. of July the former French ambassadors had demanded the restitution of as many ships of war, as had been taken or destroyed at Toulon (see No. 16.) that is fourteen ships of the line, and twenty four frigates. But among *the points for important discussion* this was undoubtedly one of the least consequence: for as the French government stood in very close connexion with the heads of the Irish Union, who had at that time in Paris a regularly accredited ambassador, and as during the course of the negotiation it had been positively and repeatedly declared, that the French Directory could in no case detach itself from the engagements made with its allies, we may be assured that one of the points for important discussion was the separation of Ireland from Great Britain, and the establishment of a republic there, under the auspices of the Great Nation.

50. No. 41.

51. No. 45. It is impossible to imagine any thing more absurd, than the conduct of the French plenipotentiaries on

Thus ended the last negotiation between Great Britain and France, which, if any doubt had remained, that nothing but the total overthrow of the British empire could satisfy the ambition of the French rulers, must entirely remove it. But the confident expectations of these political enthusiasts have been disappointed in a manner, which they little imagined⁵²: for from the rupture of the negotiation at Lisle to the close of the year 1798, a period during which the single island of Britain, deserted by its former friends, had not only to combat alone with the enormous power of France and its allies, but to struggle with a most formidable insurrection in Ireland, the page of history presents

this occasion. They accompanied the order for Lord Malmesbury's departure, which completely put an end to the negotiation, with the assurance that it was the desire of the French government to restore peace: they pretended that the order was given with no other view, than that the British ambassador should go and persuade his court to comply with the demand of the Directory: and, as if they seriously expected that he would return, they remained for some time in Lisle, that they might be able to pretend, the negotiation had not failed through *their* fault. If the ministers of any other nation, than France, had acted in this manner, they would have become objects of ridicule and detestation.

52. It is well known, that they presumed to mortgage Great Britain, as a security for the loan, which was raised to defray the expences of the intended conquest of it.

one continued series of French disasters and of British triumphs. The indignation of Britons has been roused: and under the guidance of a ministry, whose talents and whose efforts are proportioned to the great emergency, they have shewn themselves equal to the conflict, to which they have been driven, and have displayed an energy, which shall make the haughty rulers of republican France repent of their insolence and their presumption.

T H E E N D.







